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ABSTRACT  
This thesis attempts to evaluate the processes through which 
members of the Group of Seventy-Seven manage to maintain the 
coalition. The analysis is concerned with the management of 
conflict within the Group and the development of cooperative 
strategies. The analysis focuses on the operation of the 
Group of Seventy-Seven in the institutional context of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Part One of the study consists of a detailed account of the 
origins of the Group of Seventy-Seven. The concrete historical 
circumstances which gave rise to the formation of the coalition 
are assessed. Part Two attempts to evaluate the importance of 
organisational characteristics for the development and maintenance 
of unity in the Group of Seventy-Seven. We investigate the 
salience of the UNCTAD framework for the development of persistent 
patterns of group behaviour. We then examine the creation and 
development of organisational structures and processes specific to 
the Group of Seventy-Seven. The transformation of the Group from 
a highly informal coalition to one with highly developed institut- 
ional procedures and the influence of these organisational features 
on coalition behaviour is analysed. Part Three of the study asses-
ses the extent to which the negotiating positions of the Group of 
Seventy-Seven are affected by the existence of various cleavages 
within the coalition. Two detailed case-studies provide the data 
for an analysis of patterns of conflict and conflict management. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
The wide ranging diversity of its membership and the absence of a 
permanent institutional framework pose interesting questions concern-
ing the degree of unity attained by the Group of 77(G77). This 
thesis examines the G77 within the context of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. The G77 functions within a 
number of international organisations and a history of the G77 would 
have to examine the activities of the group in all these organisations. 
This thesis is not a history of the G77 and does not seek to document 
the entire activities of the group. The central questions posed for 
the analysis are - Why did the developing countries form a coalition 
in the United Nations on economic issues? What is the nature of this 
coalition? Why does it continue to persist? These central questions 
suggest a number of subsidiary ones. How did the coalition develop 
over time? What are the stresses and strains within the coalition? 
How do members mediate their differences? In what ways have changes 
in the international environment and the relative economic strengths 
of coalition partners affected the functioning and cohesion of the 
coalition? What are the limits to cooperation? What importance do 
members attach to the coalition? How successful has been the G77 
in attaining its objectives. 
Initial interest in this subject was sparked by a curiosi-
ty about the relationship among the developing countries in the 
international economy and their quest for justice and equity in the 
global system. The importance of UNCTAD in this quest for change 
led to a consideration of the activities of the developing countries 
within this forum. It was never intended to complete an analysis 
16. 
of UNCTAD or of the confrontation between the developed and develop-
ing countries within the organisation but to investigate the conflict 
and cooperation among the developing countries. A central assumption 
is that an investigation confined to the G77 in UNCTAD will provide 
an adequate explanation of the nature and behaviour of the wider 
coalition. 
A variety of sources were used in this study. Official docu-
ments, issued by UNCTAD and the G77 provide the bulk of the primary 
research material. This documentary evidence was supplemented with 
a series of interviews conducted in Geneva over three different per-
iods - March-April 1976, August 1978 and October-November 1979. 
In addition a wide range of secondary sources were also consulted. 
Any analysis of the G77 which seeks to understand the way it 
functions and to provide a compelling explanation must have three 
characteristics. The first is an historical perspective. (1) It 
must take account of the fact that the pattern of interactions in 
the past and the particular processes of transformation experienced 
serve to structure the existing set of relations in the present. To 
understand and to explain the current role of the coalition it is 
necessary to know the origins of the coalition and the history of its 
organisational framework. (2) Second, explanation must come to terms 
with the reciprocal interactions between Organisational (3) identity 
and the roles played by organisational members. The G77 is not 
independent of nor autonomous from an organisational basis; and the 
modalities of organisational behaviour are affected by the demands, 
needs and interventions of the member states. Third, recognition 
must be given to the fact that bargaining over the most important 
issue-areas among the G77's concerns will highlight and reveal more 
about the parameters to conflict and cooperation within the group 
than investigation of issue-areas of secondary importance. 
These characteristics have been used to create a framework within 
which the material has been collected and organised into a coherent 
whole. Accordingly the thesis is divided into three sections. Part 
One provides a detailed historical analysis of the origins of Third 
World cooperation on economic issues at the global level. The mass 
aggregation of Third World demands could only have taken place within 
the framework of international organisation. The weak bargaining 
position of the developing countries in international trade and 
finance and the lacunae in international institutions dealing with 
trade and development issues led these countries to increase their 
demands on the U.N. system. Therefore we investigate the growth of 
Third World solidarity within the context of the U.N. and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the major postwar organisation respon-
sible for trading issues. It was at UNCTAD I that the G77 first 
emerged as a significant force in world politics and therefore the 
immediate origins of the group are to be found in a consideration of 
events at this conference. Chapter 2 traces the development of coop-
eration within the U.N. system and chapter 3 analyses the relation-
ships within the G77 at UNCTAD I. 
Part Two investigates the organisational framework and the 
(4) importance of structural and process variables. Realist, 	state- 
centric analyses of international organisation tend to reduce the 
activities of the organisation to the characteristics of its members. 
The approach adopted here explicitly rejects this form of reductionism 
and posits the existence of a subtle and continuous interactive 
17. 
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process of influence between states and international organisations. 
Therefore, the behaviour of the G77 cannot be reduced to the attribut-
es of its member states. (5) Stable, regularised patterns of activity 
as Sewell (6) noted have significant effects on outcomes. Chapter 4 
explores the wider organisational framework within which the G77 is 
embedded and considers UNCTAD as an environmental framework. The ana-
lysis eschews mechanical, structural-functional notions and explores 
in an historical manner the development of the institution. Attention 
is paid to organisational dynamics, to UNCTAD's internal working and 
to the relationship between UNCTAD and the wider international environ-
ment. Chapter 5 discusses, first, the organisational structure of 
the G77. As an informal coalition with no written constitution the 
development of standard operating procedures are crucial to the 
maintenance of orderly relations among the member states. The rules 
and modalities of group interaction are explored with a view to assess-
ing the effect of the institutionalisation of group procedure on 
group cohesion. Chapter 5 continues with an analysis of the politi-
cal process of the G77. Organisational structure and process cannot 
reveal the totality of group dynamics. Only a form of reductionism 
could infer behaviour solely from institutional features. We there-
fore investigate the structure of influence, decision-making and the 
nature and source of conflict within the group. 
Part Three consists of two detailed case-studies and provides 
evidence relating to conflict and conflict-management within the G77. 
The case studies selected - the Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) and the Integrated Programme of Commodities (IPC) - represent 
the two most salient issues for North/South relations within the 
UNCTAD forum during the time period covered by this study. The focus 
is not on the G77's bargaining strategy but rather on intra-77 
relations. The influence of ascriptive, attitudinal and behavioural 
cleavages on the unity of the G77 and the effect of these cleavages 
on the final outcomes are assessed. 
The concerns of the thesis and the approach described above 
sets this work sharply at odds with the existing literature on the 
Third World coalition. Much current writing on the G77 adopts a 
rational actor model and can be divided into two opposing schools 
of thought. The first which we term the irrational actors approach (7) 
concludes that the G77 is an irrational coalition of states which 
defies logic by staying together. The second school we term the 
nationalist actors approach (8) and analysts of this persuasion 
conclude that the G77 is a coalition which accurately reflects one 
strand of Third World nationalism. The irrational actors approach 
stresses the heterogeneity of group membership, the diversity of 
interests and the differential impact on member states of the various 
demands made by the G77. These analysts claim to show that if these 
demands were implemented some states would benefit but others would 
lose out and that among the beneficiaries gains would not be evenly 
distributed. They therefore conclude that for some states the 
costs of membership must outweigh the benefits. These analysts 
remain perplexed about the continued existence of the fragile coali-
tion. The nationalist actors perspective does not reject this 
description of the internal structure of the G77 or the likely 
differential impact of New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
proposals. Nevertheless, its adherents posit an explanation for 
the continued existence of the group and modify the claimed diver-
gencies within the G77. These scholars insist first, that the 
differences are not as large as those claimed by the 'Irrational ' 
1 9. 
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approach, and secondly that the most important cleavage in the 
global political economy is that between rich and poor nations. In 
other words cleavages exist in the G77 but these are minor compared 
to the massive fracture between the North and South. The analysis 
of a dual international economy reflecting wealth and power reinforces 
a political response of solidarity among the poorer nations. The G77 
becomes a rational response of poor, weak, vulnerable states to 
global stratification. The size of the coalition means that if it 
is to accommodate the interests of all its members policies cannot 
by definition benefit them all equally. 
The perspective offered in this thesis can best be termed an 
organisational politics approach and differs from the two contending 
schools in a number of important respects. First, it does not 
(unlike the nationalist actors approach) accept the unity of the G77 
as organic. Rather it seeks to locate this solidarity within an 
historical process and to account for its growth and development. 
Thus in distinction to the irrational actors approach it can show 
concretely how a 'unity of opposites' was forged, the reasoning 
of the participants and the exact nature and meaning of this unity. 
Secondly, a longer historical perspective on the activities of the 
coalition is taken here and this contrasts with the post 1973 oil 
crisis perspective of almost all currently available analysis on the 
G77. Thirdly, existing analysis is largely reductionist at the 
level of state actors. In probing the interaction between state 
actors, international organisations and the structure and processes 
of the global environment the thesis provides a more satisfactory 
level of explanation. Fourthly, the existence of cleavages are not 
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merely assumed and behaviour inferred from their existence. We 
use cleavage analysis to explore the patterns of conflict and conflict 
resolution, documenting the influence of a variety of variables on 
final outcomes. Fifthly, studies to date have concentrated on 
North/South relations, analysing intra-77 relations only as a subset 
of a wider concern. In other words they tend to begin with the already 
formulated G77 demand and then attempt to explain why this result was 
reached. On the other hand, this work starts from the opposite 
perspective and focuses on the G77; and bargaining within the group. 
A reversion of the order of existing analyses this thesis attempts 
to show the process through which G77 positions are arrived. Sixthly, 
the economic arguments are not taken as a given in this study, on the 
contrary conflict over the economic rationale of various proposals 
is shown to be a key explanatory variable. The simplistic notion 
that either the G77's analyses are economically unsound or that Group 
B refuses to heed sound economic logic is rejected and we show that 
the debates over the substantive content of the negotiations is of 
crucial importance in explaining the G77's strategy. 
To summarise, this analysis of the G77 is different from already 
published work in three important respects. First, it takes a deeper 
historical perspective whereas current analyses only look in any 
detail at events after 1973. Secondly, the coalition is not reduced 
to the characteristics of its member states; state interaction is 
firmly situated within a changing organisational context. Thirdly, 
the main focus is on intra-77 relations and not on North/South rela-
tions. Apart from these specific differences the present work is 
also the first major study of the G77 in UNCTAD. Although it covers 
areas previously touched on by others (e.g. UNCTAD, the GSP negotia- 
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tions and the IPC and Common Fund negotiations), other studies have 
not approached these topics from the perspective of the dynamics of 
the G77. The GSP and IPC have been approached as exercises in 
North/South bargaining and the nature of the Third World coalition 
has either been taken as a given or if treated as problematic not 
probed in any detail. Work on UNCTAD has been concerned with the 
organisation either as a forum for the developing countriel 9Or as a 
principal instrument in the North/South encounter. (10) These two 
perspectives are here combined with an added stress on UNCTAD as an 
environment for the shaping and maintenance of the coalition. When 
this study was first conceived no published sources existed on the 
organisational structure of the G77. This defect has been remedied 
by Karl Sauvant - The Group of 4 11) but this work in a wide ranging 
if rather short treatment of the G77 only devotes twenty-five pages 
to Group activities in UNCTAD. This thesis, then seeks to advance 
understanding of the cohesion and functioning of the G77 through the 
use of historical, organisational and conflict analytical techniques. 
Theoretical Considerations  
A variety of methodologies are employed in the analysis of the 
empirical material. Three general theoretical areas provide relevant 
guidelines for the analysis of data. No general, over-arching theory 
is developed to explain the behaviour of the G77. Theoretical concep-
ts pertaining to conference diplomacy and international negotiations; 
selected concepts from the theory of conflict; and insights from the 
study of political cleavages provide us with the theoretical frame 
of reference for our study. 
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Conflict and cooperation can be conceived as being the two 
separate ends of a continuum spanning inter-governmental relations. 
Pure conflict and pure cooperation are ideal states within any model 
of international relations but in reality international behaviour 
reflects some aspect of each ideal type. Inter-state relations in 
other words exhibit characteristics of both conflict and cooperation. 
In pursuance of their various aims and objectives states may either 
find themselves in conflict with other states or they discover that 
they share similar or compatible goals and decide to cooperate in 
order to maximise individual gains. Within international organisatio-
ns this paradigmatic state of international relations is conditioned 
by the prevailing institutional rules and norms. UNCTAD's internal 
structure consists of a principal organ, the Conference, various comm-
ittees and a permanent secretariat. State behaviour within an inter-
national organisation is constrained by the agenda, rules of proce-
dure, various elements of the decisional process(e.g. voting provi-
sions, time available to arrive at decisions, type of decision 
permitted) and the size of the organisation (e.g. number of members, 
budgetary provisions). The size and importance of the plenary and 
the structure of decision-making influences the political process 
within the organisation. The larger the assembly, the more likely it 
is that states will form caucusing groups or blocs. Within the United 
Nations system the phenomenon of bloc politics developed early in 
its history.(12)  UNCTAD developed from and is a part of the UN 
system and therefore politics within UNCTAD reflects to a signifi-
cant extent politics within the UN system as a whole. 
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The development diplomacy practised at UNCTAD conferences is 
similar to parliamentary diplomacy in that it involves public debates 
followed by votes on resolutions.(13)  These public debates are a 
visible aspect of an extremely complex negotiating process. A large 
part of the the negotiations takes place outside the formal frame-
work in contact groups and bilateral discussions. This private face 
of conference diplomacy, "the fine art of corridor sitting", in Marya 
Mannes' striking phrase is not subject to scrutiny by the researcher. 
The researcher must be aware of and show sensitivity to this process 
in the evaluation of public documents but cannot have access to this 
aspect of the decision-making process.(14)  The close face-to-face 
contact characteristic of conference diplomacy not only increases 
the ability and range of inter-governmental communication but changes 
the quantity and mode of interstate contact.(15)  Moreover, this type 
of diplomatic exchange increases the amount and type of pressure that 
can be brought to bear on individual governments e.g. given the social 
importance of groups (16) strong pressure can be used in order to 
ensure group cohesion. Of particular importance as a determinant of 
state behaviour is the overall decisional framework of the interna-
tional organisation. UNCTAD's decision-making competence, i.e. 
whether the organisation is primarily deliberative or legislative (17) 
is a contested issue. The developing countries have argued from the 
outset that UNCTAD is a negotiating forum but the developed nations 
have insisted that it is merely a deliberative body. The political 
dispute concerning the nature and consequence of Conference resolu-
tions was evident from the Geneva Conference and the failure to 
negotiate any specific agreements concerning international trade was 
a significant factor in persuading the developing countries of the 
need for increased unity. The unwieldy nature of the Conference 
agenda, the large number of countries involved and the 3-4 weeks 
time span of the proceedings provide definite parameters within 
which intra-group relations must be understood. 
The type of negotiations which take place within this general 
framework provide important clues to understanding the nature of 
intra-group relations. In so far as the G77 acts as a pressure 
group there are two sets of negotiations which occur in the organi-
sational framework. First, negotiations within the group to arrive 
at a common negotiating position and strategy and, secondly, negotia-
tions between the G77 and Groups B and D. Three distinct analytical 
( modes of bargaining can be identified: 18)  
i) Distributive bargaining - the process in which the parties attempt 
to maximise their share of a fixed 'cake'; 
ii) Integrative bargaining - the process in which the parties attempt 
to increase the share of the joint gain; 
iii) Mixed bargaining - the process in which the parties attempt to 
increase joint gain and decide how to allocate the shares of 
the 'cake'. 
Most bargaining situations are mixed and intra-77 bargaining 
corresponds to the mixed bargaining mode. Negotiations between the 
G77 and Groups B and D, however, most closely correspond to the 
distributive bargaining mode. In this respect moving along 
Midgaard's continuum from strictly cooperative negotiation to pure 
bargaining,(19)  relations within the G77 is closer to the strictly 
cooperative negotiating end and G77 relations with other groups 
closer to the other end of the continuum, pure bargaining. Outcomes 
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are conditioned by the relevant bargaining mode and the method for 
arriving at collective decisions. Five ways of arriving at collective 
(20) decisions, 	four of which are pertinent to intra-G77 relations can 
be identified. These are: 
i) Coercion - the attempt at injuring or threatening to injure the 
other party; 
ii) Persuasion - the attempt to persuade the other party by appeals 
to shared values or showing them where their real advantage lies; 
iii) Adjudication - the use of third parties to make an award; 
iv) Bargaining - the trading off of different goals; 
v) Institutionalisation - the influence of persisting, stable patt- 
erns of conduct sustained by norms and sanctions e.g. use of 
selected offices. 
The first method is irrelevant to G77 politics but as the study will 
show elements of the remaining four methods are continually used with- 
in the political process of the group.(21)  The bargaining situation 
which can be defined as the interrelationship between the bargaining 
mode and bargaining method is dependent on the specific conflict 
strategy. March and Simon distinguish two types of conflict strate-
gies - bargaining and analytical processes. They argue that 
bargaining approaches are appropriate when disagreement over goals 
is taken as fixed whereas analytical processes require an assumption 
that objectives are shared or "....that disagreement over sub-goals 
can be mediated by reference to common goals 422)  Within the context 
of UNCTAD's organisational framework both types of conflict strateg-
ies have been evident. Intra-G77 relations have more closely corres-
ponded to the latter strategy whilst relations between the developed 
and developing countries vary depending upon the issue-area an 
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time-frame. In the early years of the organisation when North/ 
South relations were distinctly confrontational a bargaining 
process obtained across the spectrum but as the organisation 
matured the conflict strategy varied with the particular issue. 
Haas's typology of decision-making (23) - minimum common denomina-
tor, splitting the difference and upgrading the common interest 
will be employed where relevant. 
Central to this study is the concept of conflict and therefore 
a definition of this term at the outset is necessary. A conflict 
is defined as the existence of an incompatibility of interests 
between two or more parties. We distinguish between two types of 
conflicts - latent and real. A latent conflict exists when the 
incompatibility of interest may be perceived by an observer but is 
not seen as such by the participants. Real or actual conflicts 
exist when the participants perceive the existence of differences 
in their goal seeking behaviour. Behavioural scientists enmeshed 
in a positivist methodology usually study actual conflict situations(24)
Although this study concentrates on real conflict situations the 
analysis of ascriptive cleavages reveals the existence, in certain 
cases, of latent conflict. Further, it should be stressed that a 
conflict situation may arise from a similarity or from a diss-
imilarity of objectives. This is important because we must examine 
both those situations when we can observe governments pursuing 
different interests and those when the pursuit of a common goal 
can lead to conflict. 
In order to analyse the conflictual process within the G77 
( 25) the concept of cleavage will be employed. 	The G77 is a hetero- 
geneous grouping and the political analysis of cleavages which 
examines the effect of attribute and behavioural differences on 
outcomes is a relevant analytical tool. There are three types of 
cleavage - i). ascriptive (trait); ii). attitudinal; and iii). be-
havioural. With regard to the G77 ascriptive cleavages would in-
clude levels of development, patterns of alignment and the structure 
of domestic economies. Attitudinal cleavages refer for example to 
a government's analysis of the political economy of trade and develop-
ment, ideological orientations and perceptions of the benefits to be 
gained from the proposed measures. Behavioural cleavages result from 
trait and attitudinal cleavages and refer for example to organisation-
al membership and voting behaviour. The existence of cleavages does 
not determine the political dynamics of group behaviour. It is the 
intensity of the relevant cleavage i.e. the strength of the actor's 
beliefs which determine the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the 
group (ascriptive cleavage), the existence of consensus or dissensus 
(attitudinal cleavage) and cohesion or fractionalisation (behavioural 
cleavage). The intensity of a cleavage is dependent for ascriptive 
cleavages on the political importance attached to a trait; for 
attitudinal cleavages on the strength with which a particular convict-
ion is held; and for behavioural cleavages on the significance attach-
ed to relevant actors' actions. The use of cleavages is particularly 
helpful when attempting to assess the extent of division (fragmenta-
tion); the similarity (commonality) of interests; the existence of 
cross-cutting conflicts and the existence of overlapping interests 
within the G77. 
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These theoretical approaches are used in this study to better 
understand and aid in providing a key to answer some of the salient 
questions addressed. Specifically this thesis investigates the 
nature and source of conflict within the G77 and the techniques of 
conflict management; the areas of common agreement and the develop-
ment of cooperative strategies; the influence of the organisational 
environment on the presentation of demands and the outcome of 
negotiations. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE ORIGINS OP COOPERATION : Political  
and Institutional Issues Prior to 1964  
The diplomatic solidarity of the developing countries highlighted 
at many multilateral conferences over the last two decades and now a 
major feature of world politics is the outgrowth of a series of 
developments beginning in the immediate postwar period. This solid-
arity is not organic and neither was its growth inevitable; it was 
the result of political processes within the United Nations and else-
where. Indeed, an astute political commentator as late as 1964 would 
have been showing an unerring degree of prophecy were she to have 
predicted the extent of Southern diplomatic cooperation which has 
since taken place. (1) The aim of this chapter is to discuss and 
explain the origins of this cooperation in the period prior to the 
establishment of the G77. The third world coalition is the result of 
an historical process an examination of which will show not only how 
and why it came into existence but enable us to understand its longevity. 
As will be seen, this was not a straightforward logical process but the 
,result of the coincidence of a number of disparate events which, never-
theless, was the response to specific underlying global and domestic 
political and economic forces. The most significant factors in this 
period are the developing countries' disillusionment with their economic 
position in the postwar period, their frustration with the efforts of 
existing international economic institutions to remedy their perceived 
problems and the way in which international organisational processes 
structured ldcs and dcs into distinct groupings and helped ldcs ag-
gregate their interests. In other words distinctions were made 
between developed and underdeveloped countries thus helping to identify 
interest groups. This, coupled with the emergence of the Afro-Asian 
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and non-aligned movements within the context of global cold war, 
accentuated the self-identification of the Third World. Two important 
consequences for action developed as a result of these political per-
ceptions. First, the realisation of a certainccmnonality of interests; 
in other words a feeling of shared problems arising from the generally 
underdeveloped nature of their economies and their peripheral location 
within the world productive system. (2) Secondly, the awareness that 
the necessary institutional changes could only be brought about by the 
use of concerted pressure (3) which entailed the papering over of dif-
ferences, the presentation of a common front to the developed countries 
and the reliance on superior numbers in the voting context (4) . These 
integrative tendencies were balanced by disintegrative ones from the 
outset. A variety of political loyalties cross-cut this block interest 
and ascriptive and attitudinal cleavages exist within the Group. More-
over the responses of the West and the communist states and the climate 
of international political relations are also salient factors affecting 
the process of coalition formation. 
This chapter therefore traces the origins of developing countries' 
cooperation on economic issues within the U.N. system through (i) an 
investigation of their diplomatic activity within that environment; 
(ii) an examination of the institutional structure of world trade 1945-
1964; (iii) an analysis of the major changes in international economic 
relations with specific emphasis being placed on the problems of the 
developing countries; and (iv), a discussion of the changirg international 
political environment. In our examination of each of these issue- 
areas close attention will be given to the development of the coalition. 
In other words, the solidarity was the result of an historical process 
and not an already existent reality in 1945 as most writers seem to 
maintain.(5) 
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2.1 The Restructuring of the International Economic System  
During the second world war American and British negotiators began 
making plans for the restructuring of international economic relations 
at the end of the war. (6) These discussion were initiated by the 
United States and progressed from the Atlantic Charter (1941) through 
the Mutual Aid Agreement (1942) to the discussions based around the 
plans of John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White (1943) culminating 
in the meeting at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944, which 
agreed the creation of the International Monetary FUnd (IMF) and Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This latter 
conference, although a multilateral affair, was dominated by the United 
States and the United Kingdom(7) and must be seen in the context of 
Anglo-American financial collaboration rather than as an ad hoc inter-
national conference. The plans which delegates agreed to had largely 
been decided upon in advance by the U.S. and to a minor extent the 
United Kingdom. 
Given this background to the Conference it obviously reflected the 
interests and concerns of the United States the hegemonic power in postwar 
international relations and not those of the under-developed countries. 
It is therefore a reflection of power and not of representation which 
is the important factor in understanding why the Bretton Woods frame-
work failed to satisfy the requirements of the Mos. This is a vital 
point because it has become almost a commonplace to argue that when the 
immediate postwar economic organisations were created and the rules 
framed to institutionalise international trade and payments, the majority 
of countries which currently constitute the developing world were not 
independent and hence not represented at these talks. It is further 
argued that not only were their interests overlooked but also that the 
very system negotiated was constructed to work against their interests 
and keep them in economic subservience. (8) The lack of representation 
35. 
argument cannot be sustained in the face of the evidence that the ides 
had a numerical majority at Bretton Woods. Of the forty-four allied 
and associated nations which took part in the conferences leading to 
the establishment of the IMF and IBRD, twenty-eight can firmly by 
classified as being underdeveloped. These countries failed to achieve 
any significant 'gains' at this conference for a variety of reasons. 
First, the United States was the most powerful country economically 
and politically(9) and it almost singlehandedly dictated the shape of 
the postwar institutions. Secondly, the problems of economic growth 
and development as they subsequently unfolded, did not exercise the 
consciousness of either the politicians or general public in the 
developed countries. (10) Thirdly, the intellectual leap necessary to 
recognise the special economic problems facing underdeveloped countries 
had not been taken. 01) Finally, the planners of the post-war economic 
and political order did not envisage the dramatic increase in the number 
of sovereign states which subsequently occurred thus providing both the 
necessity and the means by which the problem of world poverty was placed 
on the international agenda. The developing countries at that time 
were still mainly colonies and hence the concern for their development 
rested with the metropolitan countries who saw colonial development as 
being dependent on the health of the metropolee own economiesc l2)  The 
predominance in emphasis on the problem of the developed market 
economies was not one based on numerical superiority but on the pre- 
vailing distribution of political and economic power and on the prevalence 
of a liberal philosophy of international economic relations. 
The necessity to create an institutional structure for world trade 
arose mainly because with the development of a truly international 
economy national economic policies to be effective had to take cognisance 
of the international dimension. (13) An international economy had begun 
to emerge during the nineteenth century, the result of the spread of 
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industrialisation, changes in the technological base of societies, the 
development of communication networks, the massive export of lone-term 
capital and the high levels of European migration. (14) By the turn 
of the century there was a difference in both the scope and structure 
of world trade and payments such as to make the internationalisation 
of the world economy a reality. Specialised productive power grew 
with a consequent increase in the volume of international trade and 
this was matched by a diversification in both output and demand. The 
extension of international credit became wider and the factors of prod-
uction, both labour and capital, moved in greater volume and along new 
channels. With the second wave of industrialisation, after 1870, due 
primarily to technological advances industrial, financial and commercial 
capital became more interdependent. The second wave of colonisation 
led to the development of infrastructural facilities in African economies 
which increased further the links between Africa, previously the most 
backward region, and &rope. (15) This expansion of international exchange 
necessitated consultation at both bilateral and multilateral levels to 
regulate these flows, resulting in the creation of various functional 
agencies and the signing of trade treaties, e.g. the Cobden-Chevalier 
Treaty of 1860 which ushered in reduced tariffs throughout Enrope. (16) 
The high degree interdependence of the world economy was obscured and 
distorted by the First World War. Trade barriers at the end of the war 
were higher than in 1914 and the channels of trade were disrupted with 
the demise of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the creation 
of a Bolshevik State in Russia. The successor states in a drive for 
self-sufficiency attempted to turn their largely agricultural countries 
into industrial ones through the uses of tariffs and other trade bar-
riers. (17) The debt problem at the end of the war was a further 
barrier to trade. The depression of the 1930s heralded a fall in 
industrial activity and consequently in world trade. There was no 
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radical change in the international trading pattern but the aggregate 
level of activity fell. Governments reacted to the world crisis in 
narrow and parochial fashion which in its manifest failure to solve 
the problems or even to deal adequately with it served to show the 
integration of the various sectors of the world economy. The com-
petitive devaluations and beggar-my-neighbour policies contributed to 
a deepening of the crisis. (18) The economic nationalism of the 1930s 
was reflected in the protectionist policies followed by the major states 
despite the efforts of the League of Nations (19) to develop new approach-
es and principles for free trade. (20 The schemes for international 
cooperation after World War II were based on the belief that the failure 
to solve the economic problems of the 1930s had been due to a lack of 
understanding and cooperation and faith that the construction of a 
liberal framework of trade and payments would ensure both a return to 
free trade and contribute to world peace. This is not to argue that 
the League of Nations had been dormant during the period 1930-39, but 
that it had been a failure. Its failure, however, needs to be under-
stood within its historical context and it should be remembered as Koul 
points out that 
"From the standpoint of international trade and 
economic law, Lit is concludef that the League 
of Nations in the period 1930 to 1939 strived to 
achieve the formulation of the standard 'most 
favoured nation' clause. This standard clause 
has been invariably used in the subsequent bilateral 
and multilateral agreements". (21) 
It was believed by many that a link existed between economic 
instability leading to war. (22) A foremost exponent of this view was 
Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State. (23) There was 
thus on the one hand a recognition of the interdependence of national 
economies and the existence of an international economy which needed 
certain global management features if prosperity was to ensue for all, 
and on the other a clear and explicit connection between the political 
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settlement and the economic one. This appreciation of the problems 
facing the world community could have remained solely at the theoretical 
level if it had not coincided with the interests of the dominant state 
within the system. (24) A liberal international economic framework 
benefiting all countries was perceived by the decision makers in the 
United States government to be coincidental with their own interests. 
The United States stood astride the postwar world like a colossus. It 
had expanded its industrial production whilst other countries had shrunk. 
A clear priority was the necessity of finding export markets for surplus 
production estimated to be between AO bn - %14 bn. (25) Standing in 
the way of U.S. exporters were the various discriminatory and pro-
tectionist schemes being used by U.S. competitors. 
Two particular areas of concern were the British Imperial Preference 
System which governed trade between the U.K., dominions and colonies  
and the systems of protection which had arisen in many underdeveloped 
(mainly Latin American) countries during the war to boost home pro-
duction. At this time the U.S. government still felt that the British 
would pose a serious threat to U.S. interests in the postwar period. 
The full extent of Britain's physical (economic) decline was not visible 
and the U.S. administration extracted concessions of "good behaviour" 
in return for loans. The underdeveloped world represented vast untapped 
reservoirs where the U.S. could supplant the economically weak colonial 
powers but needed access to these markets to be retained through the 
prohibition of nationalist economic policies. American hegemony was 
therefore in favour of the creation of a non-discriminatory, multi-
lateral system of trade and payments. In technical terms this meant 
the institution of the most favoured national principle, international 
supervision of tariff policy and the outlawing of quantitative restrict-
ions in the trade field and fixed exchange rates and freely convertible 
currencies in the monetary field. 
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The tasks of reconstruction were conceived to be an essential pre-
requisite to the satisfactory working of such a system. Hence, attention 
was focused on those war-damaged economies which had previously enjoyed 
a high standard of living and needed outside assistance to regain a 
high level of effective demand; in other words, provide markets for 
American goods. There was also a strong political motive behind re- 
construction. Healthy European economies would provide the base against 
which the spread of communism would be halted. Further, the European 
governments themselves acquiesced in these priorities (27) since economic 
revival was important not solely for the sake of their countries but also 
for their political futures. The Cold War was an added systemic con-
sideration to those who remembered the chaos in European financial 
arrangements at the end of the First World War. All concerned were 
determined not to repeat the mistakes of the post World War I settlement. 
It is also important to remember that Europe included important members 
of the states system - Britain and France whose participation was vital 
for an orderly return to peace. In this context, there was a justified 
fear about the possibility of recession in the developed world. The 
developing countries then were hardly awarded any priority. Moreover, 
at this time primary commodities were scarce and consequently enjoyed 
high prices. Hence there was little urgency attached to finding 
solutions to ldc 'problems'. 
Although the major motivation of the postwar planners was to 
mitigate the effects of the war and not to eliminate poverty, the major 
preoccuption of the ldcs, we can still note the minor influence exerted 
by these states at Bretton Woods. Here the viewpoint of the under ,- 
developed countries was especially represented by the Latin American 
countries who were concerned about the priorities to be attached to the 
proposed World Bank. Afraid that the allocation of resources would be 
biased in favour of reconstruction leaving meagre resources for develop- 
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mental purposes, they proposed that the Bank should annually allocate 
equal amounts for reconstruction and development. Limited success 
was achieved by having the word 'development' added to the name of the 
Bank and including in its Articles provisions that equal emphasis should 
be given to reconstruction and development. (28) Article III, section 
(a) states that 
"The resources and facilities of the Bank shall 
be used exclusively for the benefit of members 
with equitable consideration for development 
and projects for reconstruction alike". 
The insistence on the inclusion of development functions of the Bank 
was a concession granted by the U.S. in order that Latin American 
countries would be willing to join the I.M.F., access to the Bank's 
lending being tied to membership of the Fund. (29) 
The developing countries played a minimal role in the institution-
alisation of economic relations at the end of the Second World War. 
The institutions and rules created reflected the interest and concerns 
of the major trading states, principally the United States of America. 
At this time, there was some common identification of an underdeveloped 
country's position but it was a hazy and unformed notion. 
2.2. 	The Institutional Structure of World Trade 1945-63  
Central to the vision of the creation of a managed system of 
international economic relations was the idea of a global trade 
organisation. Subsequent to its proposals in the monetary and finan-
cial fields, the U.S. government published proposals for the creation 
of an international trade regime on 6th December 1945. (30 These 
proposals were taken up within the U.N., and the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) in February 1946 proposed the convening of an Inter-
national Conference on Trade and Employment, "for the purpose of 
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promoting the expansion of the production, exchange and consumption of 
goods". (31) A nineteen-nation(32) preparatory committee was establish-
ed and it held two sessions - October 15-22 November 1946 in Landon 
and April 4 - 22 August 1947 in Geneva. A 53-nation conference (The 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment) was held at Havana, 
Cuba, from November 21st 1947 to March 24th 1948. The outcome of the 
preparatory committee and the conference was the Havana Charter for 
an International Trade Organisation which comprised an outline for an 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) and a Code of Conduct for ITO 
members with regard to international trade. 
It is possible to identify the developing countries (33) as a 
specific interest group during these negotiations. From the very 
first meeting of the Preparatory Committee, the ldcs espoused a dif-
ferent view from the developed countries, (34) arguing that the thrust 
of the developed countries' proposals was negative, in prohibiting 
restraints on trade rather than seeking to stimulate it. They wanted 
the developed countries to take a more positive attitude towards trade 
promotion including the exchange of technical skills, producer goods 
and credits and the provision of non-remunerative funds. (35) The ldcs 
put forward several arguments and proposals to support a claim for 
special treatment within the new institutions. First, a relaxation 
of the proposed trade rules would enable governments to promote in-
dustrialisation through the use of protectionist measures such as 
import quotas; and, secondly, the inclusion of a Charter on Economic 
Development would permit the underdeveloped countries to impose 
restrictions on trade in order to aid their new industries. Although 
defeated on most of these issues the ldcs were able to secure the 
inclusion of eight articles dealing with development issues and a 
whole chapter (chapter VI) devoted to international commodity agree-
ments in the Final Act. Despite this success the general tenor of 
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the agreement was one of free-trade; anti-preferential arrangements 
and restrictions on trade and subsidies. It was agreed that inter-
national commodity agreements (ICAs) in their efforts to help producers 
should not take any measures which were likely to worsen the equilibrium 
situation and producers and consumers should be given equal weight in 
the negotiated ICA. (36) This left the developing countries dissatis-
fied(37) , although it can be argued that their economic analysis was 
erroneous (38) and therefore the claimed benefits, from an agreement 
partial to ldc demands, largely illusory. This is a somewhat moot 
point because the Havana Chaster was never ratified and its provisions 
including the ITO died an abortive death. With the decision of 
President Truman in 1950 not to submit the Charter to Congress for 
ratification, (39) the ITO was effectively dead. Without U.S. approval 
it would have proved unworkable and no other government would bother to 
ratify. In fact, prior to the U.S. decision, only two countries - 
Australia and Liberia - had formally ratified the treaty. With the 
demise of the ITO, an institutional vacuum was created in world trade, 
the effects of which were partially responsible for the development of 
the Third World coalition. It was in the efforts to fill the gap left 
by the ITO and the dissatisfaction with the work of its erstwhile suc-
cessor the GATT which provided the underdeveloped countries with a 
focus of common interest and stimulus toward collective action. 
The organisation that was left holding the centre of the stage was 
one that in many respects was ill-equipped to deal with the spotlight. 
GATT has been termed, "a slender reed on which to base progress toward 
a multilateral regime 	(which was) permeated by an atmosphere of 
impermanence"; (40) and in the context of the ITO,Eugene Black, the 
former President of the World Bank, reflected that it was,"a sad monu-
ment to our unwillingness in the late nineteen-forties to adhere to 
the still-born International Trade Organisation". (41) The role of GATT 
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in the period under discussion is a contentious one and it should be 
made clear that our aim is not to analyse the effect of GATT on the 
developing countries trade prospects but rather to analyse the political 
process of the activities of these countries within GATT. 
GATT was a direct result of the negotiations leading to the Havana 
Charter. In March 1947, when the prospects for the successful con-
clusion of the ITO were encouraging, 23 nations met in Geneva to 
negotiate the tariff concessions envisaged in Article 17 of the Havana 
Charter. In January 1948, in the same hopeful atmosphere, these pro-
visions were put into effect. The major aspect of this trade agreement 
incorporating reciprocal tariff concessions between the contracting 
parties was the existence of the most-favoured nation clause. It was 
envisaged that with the establishment of the ITO, GATT would cease to 
exist. GATT is different from all existing international organisations 
in that it is not a standing organisation but a contractural agreement 
among its members. (42) It has never been ratified by its members and 
exists through a "protocol of provisional application". But it has 
acquired new organisational features during its existence and has an 
independent secretariat (43) and various tribunals concerned with dispute 
settlement. The main principle governing GATT's activities is the 
most-favoured nation (MFN) principle. This means that any concession 
granted to one Contracting Party must be extended to all others - hence 
the basis for a liberal, multilateral, non-discriminatory system was 
established. The GATT authorities favoured the use of tariffs as the 
only permitted protectionist device. The original General Agreement 
consisted of three parts. Part I contained the MFN clause and the 
tariff schedules of the contracting parties; Part II, the commercial 
policy regulations; and Part III, inter alia, the provisions on 
territorial applications and regional arrangements. 
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From the standpoint of the developing countries the original 
agreement was notable for its omissions, rather than its inclusions. 
It excluded the development provisions and commodity framework of the 
Havana Charter. The ldcs' dissatisfaction with the scope of the agree-
ment was reflected by the fact that the exclusion of the eight articles 
on development questions, the restrictions on the use of quantitative 
restrictions, subsidies and preferential agreements, and the omission 
of Chapter VI of the Havana Charter concerning commodity agreements, 
led only three Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile and Cuba) to 
sign the original General Agreement, whereas seventeen had signed the 
Havana Charter. ( ) The specific provision of primary interest to the 
developing countries in the original agreement was Article XVIII 
entitled, "Adjustment in Connection with Economic Development". This 
article permitted countries to apply restrictions to trade under certain 
defined conditions. Paragraph C therein sanctioned the use of quanti-
tative restrictions for the purposes of economic development. Never-
theless, this could only be done to promote an indigenous primary 
industry and not a secondary one, or one which had developed under war-
time circumstances and the consent of the Contracting Parties was needed 
before such action could be taken. In practice, this article was hardly 
ever used. Between 1948 and its revision in 1954, only four countries 
availed themselves of its use - Ceylon, Cuba, Haiti and India - getting 
the consent of the Contracting Parties to impose quantitative restrict-
ions on thirty-two commodity groups (twenty-nine of them alone for 
Ceylon). The developed Contracting Parties were thus able to frustrate 
the attempts of the developing countries to resort to Article XVIII and 
could (perhaps) argue that they were attempting to forestall a situation 
whereby, "an unwise use of such measures would impose undue burdens on 
their own economies (ldcs) and unwarranted restrictions on international 
trade". (45) The non-automaticity of Article XVIII inibited many 
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developing countries from invoking it and they turned instead to 
Article XII which permitted import restrictions for balance of payments 
reasons. The disgruntlement at the limited application of Article 
XVIII was one of the first unifying elements among the developing 
countries in GATT and led to efforts to reform the Article. The 
ineffectuality of Article XVIII was well expressed by the Ceylon 
Minister of Commerce, Trade and Fishers to the Ninth Session of the 
Contracting Parties, 
"Those of us who have had recourse to its 
provisions - and Ceylon I think has had most 
experience of its incidence - find that the 
restrictions and limitations it places practic-
ally destroy the benefits that it professes to 
'confer". (46) 
It has also been argued that the developing countries resented 
having to go 'cap in hand' to the richer Contracting Parties asking 
for permission to impose restrictions when the richer Contracting 
Parties were unilaterally imposing restrictions to protect their own 
high-cost agriculture. (47) Apart from Article XVIII the developing 
countries had other specific complaints against the operation of GATT 
in the nineteen-fifties. First, many felt that the price of entry 
was too high, because on entry a country had to make certain tariff 
concessions in equivalence for tariff reductions already made by exist-
ing members of the agreement. (48) Secondly, many found that the rates 
at which they had "bound" their tariffs on entering GATT were too low 
when their infant industries began to develop and this became a 
difficulty because of the cumbersome nature of the negotiations concerned 
with opting out of their obligations. Thirdly, the mode of negot-
iating in GATT favoured the more developed states, marginalising the 
weaker ones. The combination of the twin principles of reciprocity 
and non-discrimination meant that to be successful a country needed a 
competitive position in the world market; bargaining focused on 
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commodities of special interest to the more powerful negotiating 
countries, hence indirectly discriminating against Third parties; and 
thirdly, the spillover of the benefits of tariff concessions to third 
parites resulting from MFN treatment is limited. (49) In practice, 
this meant that ldc participation in the five completed 'rounds' of 
tariff cutting prior to UNCTADI was minimal. (50) For example, only 
Chile, Haiti, India, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan and Peru of the twenty 
ldc GATT contracting Parties participated in the Dillon Round. 	See 
Table 2:1. 
TABLE 2.1  
LDC Membership of GATT 1960-61  
1. Contracting parties to GATT 
Brazil 	Israel 
Burma Malaysia 
Ceylon Nicaragua 
Chile Nigeria 
Cuba 	Pakistan 
Dominican Republic 	Peru 
Ghana Sierra Leone 
Haiti Southern Rhodesia 
India 	Tanganyika 
Indonesia Unugua 
2. Countries which have acceded provisionally 
Tunisia 
3. Countries which participate in the work of the 
contracting parties under special arrangements 
Argentina 
Cambodia 
Yugoslavia 	Source : GATT - Trends in Inernational 
Trade 1962 
Of some 4,400 tariff concessions, only 160 bindings or reductions of 
duties were on items of interest to the ldcs. (51) The asymmetry of 
benefit in the application of the rules was succinctly expressed by an 
ldc spokesman when he said, "Equality of treatment is equitable only 
among equals". (52) 
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Fourthly, they had little influence and means of exerting pressure, 
e.g. the rich states instituted a system of agricultural protectionism 
which discriminated against ldc exports but which the ldcs could not 
change. Fifthly, although permitting the development of the European 
Community, GATT was held to be inflexible towards regional groupings 
among developing countries. (53) Finally, many ldcs felt that the 
implementation of GATT reports was unsatisfactory. (54) 
The specific interests and needs of the ldcs and their recognition 
by spokesmen of both developed and developing countries was the begin-
ning of a process that would lead third world countries to cooperate 
in seeking institutional change. The ability to exert pressure given 
their small share of world trade would be to a large extent dependent 
on their numerical strength within the organisation. 
TABLE 2.2  
Growth in ldc membership of GATT, 1952-1964 
1952 1953 1955 1957-58 1960 1961 1962 1964(Feb) 1964(Nov) 
13(33) 14(34) 14(35) 16(37) 18(39) 20(43) 35(59) 38(62) 40 ( 64) 
Figures in parentheses give the total number of GATT members 
Sources : GATT Trends in International Trade (Annual) 1952-65 
See Table 2.2 above  
The development 
of a political consciousness and solidarity of the ides can be traced 
in the efforts at reform within the GATT. Certain features within 
this process stand out: (i) the overall satisfaction of the rich 
countries with the workings of the agreement and their resistance to 
changes in the rules governing world trade; (ii) the increasing 
polarisation of opinion and the increasing stridency of the ldcs; 
(iii) the clearer definition of a developing country; (iv) the rather 
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piece-meal attempts at reform which, instead of quelling resistance, 
only served to increase demands. We thus see a heightening of 
stridency and militancy at the same time as efforts at reform are 
increased. 
There were two major reform initiatives - the 1954/55 review of 
the General Agreement and the series of events ushered in by the 
Haberler Report. The original impetus behind the 1954/5 revisions 
was not to make concessions to the ldcs but to make the GATT provisions 
even more stringent. (55) 	For the developing countries the major 
significance of the revision was the implementation of a new Article 
XVIII entitled "Governmental Assistance to Economic Development". (56) 
This new article consisted of four sections. Section A granted ldcs 
a certain latitutde in modifying or withdrawing a concession in order 
to protect specified branches of activity already established or those 
about to be. Section B allowed ldcs to apply quantitative restrict- 
ions to safeguard the external payments situation and ensure an adequate 
level of reserves for economic development programmes. Section C 
authorised the adoption of measures to stimulate specific branches of 
production. Section D, similar to Section C, governed economies more 
developed than the lowest. Measures taken under Sections A and C were 
to be notified to the Contracting Parties. Measures taken under 
Section B were subject to review every two years, unlike quantitative 
restrictions imposed by developed countries which were subject to annual 
review. Measures taken under Section D needed the prior approval of 
the Contracting Parties. The new article made it clear that its 
provisions would only apply to a country, 
"the economy of which can only support low 
standards of living and is in the early 
stages of development". (57) 
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This served to exclude certain states - South Africa, Israel, Yugoslavia, 
Australia and New Zealand - which were sometimes classified as ldcs 
from the underdeveloped category, although some of these countries 
continued to be treated as underdeveloped. A further distinction 
was made in paragraph 4 between contracting parties with the type of 
economy referred to above and those which are in the process of devel-
opment but can support higher standards of living. This was an import-
ant step in the self-identification of developing countries. 
The concern expressed by delegates to the 12th session of the 
Contracting Parites in 1957 concerning the slow growth rates experienced 
by the developing countries led to the convening of a panel of experts 
to examine trends in international trade with particular reference to 
"the failure of the trade of less developed countries to develop as 
rapidly as that of industrialised countries, excessive short-term 
fluctuations in prices of primary products and widespread resort to 
agricultural protection". (58) In 1958, the results were published 
(Trends of International Trade. Report by a Panel of Mcperts) (59) 
and this ushered in a process of consultation and discussion concerning 
ldc problems. In this context the attention of the Contracting Parties 
was turned firmly towards the obstacles to the export prospects of the 
ldcs. The report had stated unequivocally, 
the prospects for exports of non-industrial 
countries are very sensitive to internal policies 
in the industrial countries and that on balance their 
development will probably fall short of the increase 
in world trade as a whole". (60) 
As a consequence of the report, the Contracting Parties decided in 
November 1958 to formulate a Programme of Action Directed Towards an  
Expansion of International Trade. To assist in this task three com-
mittees were established: Committee I was supposed to encourage general 
tariff reductions; Committee II to examine the problems of international 
trade arising from the agricultural protectionist policies of the rich 
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countries; and Committee III to examine other restrictive practices 
impeding the flow of exports of primary processes and manufactured 
products from ldcs to the developed countries. Although Committee II's 
investigations showed that agricultural protectionism was widespread 
it was unable to record any progress on the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers. Committee III was the most important in its attempt at 
fulfilling its terms of reference. It approached its task in four 
ways. First, an identification of barriers to trade on a commodity 
by commodity basis. Secondly, through continuing efforts to achieve 
the removal of these barriers using available GATT machinerype.g. the 
Action Committee, the Special Group on Tropical Products. Thirdly, 
parallel extension of the commodity by commodity approach into a 
broader study of development plans and export potential. Finally, 
consideration of other measures to expand exports, e.g. preferences, 
trade information and trade promotion services. (61) 
Parallel to and as a consequence of these studies, the developing 
countries began to organise as a pressure group within GATT. A note 
submitted in May 1959 by Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Chile, Cuba, the 
Federation of Malaya, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Ghana, 
Greece, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru and Uruguay was the first joint 
action by these countries in GATT and the outcome of their first meet-
ings as a distinct group in this forum. (62) In this note on the 
acpansion of International Trade Programme, they pointed out that their 
capacity to participate in tariff negotiations was limited but this was 
an important part of commercial policy since they needed tariffs for 
fiscal and development purposes. They asked the industrialised 
countries to consider making unilateral concessions in this area. 
Among their demands was the granting of a facility whereby they would 
have the ability to negotiate on high internal revenue charges. Above 
all, these states stressed the urgency of finding a solution to the 
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problem of increased export earnings and the early provision of 
(63) 
tangible results. 
A special report of Committee III was presented to the Contracting 
Parties in 1961 and this said inter alia that 'insufficient progress 
had been made' and called for 'prompt and positive actions by govern-
ments'. At the 19th session of the Contracting Parties in November a 
'Declaration on Promotion of the Trade of Less-Developed Countries' was 
adopted. This placed particular emphasis on the industrialised countries 
to give greater access to the ldcs through the elimination and/or pro-
gressive removal of quantitative restrictions, tariffs, revenue duties 
and fiscal charges. This basis for the future work of the committee 
was held to be too conservative by the ldcs, nineteen of whom submitted 
a note to the Ministers calling for a programme of action to help their 
export prospects. A separate note by Nigeria called for the immediate 
elimination of tariffs on tropical products. The continuing gap between 
intention and performance continued to draw the ldcs together and in 
1962, twentyone ldcs (64) submitted a seven-point programme of action 
(later increased to eight, following a speech by an IBM representative 
to Committee III on 1 April 1963). The programme called for: 
a) a standstill on new tariffs and non-tariff barriers, 
b) the elimination of quantitative restrictions within 
a year (at the latest, by the end of 1965), 
c) duty-free entry for tropical products by 31/12/63, 
d) elimination of tariffs on primary products, 
e) reduction and elimination of tariff barriers on 
semi-processed and processed products from ldcs 
on a scheduled basis providing for a reduction 
of at least 5% of present duties over the next 
three years, 
f) reduction of internal fiscal charges and revenue 
duties on products wholly or mainly produced in 
ldcs (completely eliminated by 31/13/63), 
g) reporting procedures to help insure implementation 
of the action programme, 
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h) other measures for facilitating diversification 
and expansion of export capacity and foreign 
exchange earnings of the economies of the ldcs.(65) 
This 8-point Programme of Action was discussed at the GAIT Ministerial 
Meeting 16-21 May 1963. Many reservations were expressed (mainly by 
the EEC) as to the scope and speed of implementation. It was decided 
not to take specific action but to set up an action committee to clarify 
and elaborate the programme in more consistent and concrete terms. The 
Action Committee,which began work in September 1963, was submerged by 
other developments within the GATT. First, the guidelines for the 
Kennedy Round were agreed upon and, secondly, the Contracting Parties 
began to take measures to modify the agreement to take account of the 
special problems of the ldcs. (66) Hence, immediately prior to UNCTADI 
in Spring 1964, the Contracting Parties drafted Part IV of the General 
Agreement, a new chapter on Trade and Development which was added to 
the General Agreement in February 1965. Another new development was 
the opening of the GATT International Trade Centre in Geneva in 1964 
to provide market information for ldcs and a liaison system to facilitate 
communication among governments. 
The increased ldc membership of GATT and the recognition of their 
special problems - weak bargaining position attributable to small market 
shares and low tariff structures; desire to protect infant industries 
and accumulate capital quickly; the ability of the developed countries 
to use 'waivers' which affected ldc export prospects; and the unequal 
results of the operation of the MFN principle - led to studies of these 
problems by the Contracting Parties which stimulated the ides to press 
for greater revisions of the agreement. Concerted ldc pressure in GATT 
coupled with the challenges posed to the organisation by developments 
within the wider institutional context of world trade led to a serious 
consideration of the obstacles to ldc trade and a major revision of the 
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principles upon which the agreement had been based. A recognisable 
caucus of developing countries emerged within the organisation and was 
a forerunner of Third World solidarity. 
2.2.2. In 1963, one study(67) listed 43 international organisations  
concerned with trade and commodity problems. This was more than 
five times the number of such organisations existing in 1945. The 
mushrooming of international organisations in this field contributed 
to the growth of Third World solidarity in two distinct ways. First, 
the lack of a central organisation and the haphazard manner in which 
bodies grew up, sometimes duplicating each other's efforts but never 
seeming to fill the existing vacuum provided the basis of a common 
grievance and a rallying point for efforts to reform the system with 
the creation of a central institution. Secondly, one type of organ-
isation - the regional economic commissions - were important centres 
where ldcs could exchange information and coordinate policy. 
We are concerned not with the operation of the various commodity 
bodies, per se, but only with the way in which they affected cooperation 
among developing countries.(68)  It is principally a perceptual process 
with which the analysis is concerned, i.e. not objective reality but 
reality as perceived by the low-income countries. The central organs 
dealing with trade and related problems were the United Nations General 
Assembly, the Second Committee (Economic and Financial), the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Commission on International Commodity 
Trade (CICT), Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP), GATT, the Interim 
Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Agreements (ICCICA) 
and the three regional economic commission in the developing world - 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 
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From the perspective of the developing countries these organisations 
were deficient and incapable of filling the gap left by the demise of 
the ITO. The Second Committee of the General Assembly and ECOSOC had 
overcrowded agendas and the eighteen-nation ECOSOC was held to be un-
representative, hence the ldcs launched a campaign to increase its 
(ECOSOC) membership to twenty-four. The ICCICA, CCP and CICT were 
merely consultative organisation and hence of limited usefulness in 
attaining the goals sought by the ldcs. The twin goals of the develop-
ing countries were the stabilisation of their export earnings through 
the creation of commodity agreements ani the provision of compensatory 
financing to remedy fluctuating export receipts. In the link between 
specific trade problem pressures and the creation of institutions can 
be seen the basic human tendensy to establish institutions to solve 
problems and to provide an orderly framework for the conduct of 
activities in particular fields of interest. (69) In the analysis of 
the genesis of the coalition 1960-63, this stress on the perceived 
inadequacy of existing institutions and its use as a focal point for 
ldc agreement will be discussed. 
The regional economic commissions served as centres for ideas 
which were developed and refined to be used in the struggle against 
the developed countries. Here, detailed research was undertaken and 
statistics computed to embellish and support the Third World's claims 
for greater justice in the global economic system. The later import-
ance of the regional economic commissions in the group politics of the 
G77 and its regional organisation is a direct outgrowth of this early 
involvement in institutional politics. The supreme example of this 
interest aggregation and articulation function is provided by ECLA and 
the doctrines of Raul Ptebisch. (70) Further, the desire of the ldcs 
to play an increasingly important role in the economic activities of 
their regions led to a de facto situation where the regional economic 
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commissions were performing functions that were questionable from a 
de lure approach. This tension between competing interpretations and 
the asymmetry between intent and performance came to a conclusion at 
the end of the nineteen-fifties and the meetings of the three regional 
commissions in 1960 produced a situation where it was no longer possible 
to ignore the change in their status. At its sixteenth session held 
in 1959-60, ECAFE adopted Resolution 31(XVI) on regional economic co-
operation for the development of trade and industry recommending that 
the countries of the region develop joint projects, carry out industry 
possibility surveys, encourage domestic savings and adopt measures for 
attracting domestic and foreign investment into productive enter- 
. prises. (71)  Similar initiatives were taken by ECA and ECLA. (72) The 
attempt to remedy this discrepancy and to increase the power of the 
regional bodies was made in the General Assembly, as a result of which 
G.A. Resolution 1518(XV) entitled 'Decentralization of the United Nations 
economic and social activities and strengthening of the regional economic 
commissions', requested the Secretary-General inter alia to: 
"make every effort to strengthen the secretariats 
of the regional economic commissions" 
and 
"to consult the regional economic commissions at 
their next annual sessions and the specialised 
agencies, and to report to the Economic and Social 
Council at its thirty-second session and to the 
General Assembly at its sixteenth session on the 
steps taken in implementation of Council resolution 
793(XX) regarding the decentralization of activities 
and operations and the increased utilization of the 
services of the regional economic commissions".(73) 
The institutional deficiencies within the global economic system became 
more noticeable as the ides found themselves in a disadvantageous position 
as a result of the operation of market forces during this period. The 
institutional issue became important when individual efforts at problem- 
solving proved ineffectual. Therefore it is to an examination of the 
(common) trade problems of these countries that we turn. 
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2.3 The Developing Countries in the International Economy 1945-64 
The definition or identification of a developing country (74) is 
one that is fraught with controversy and it is not the aim of this 
study to enter into the controversy. Here a procedural definition 
will be followed, namely, a developing country is one which considers 
itself as such and is generally included in this category by inter 
natioanl trade and financial institutions; thus, there is both an 
element of self-selection and independent validation for this status. 
Further, since membership of any international caucusing group is both 
voluntary and dependent on the approval of existing members, membership 
of a developing country caucusing group will be taken to confirm this 
status. Accepting a political definiton does not imply that economic 
criteria are irrelevant, merely that they are not sufficient as a single 
factor distinguishing characteristic. It is possible to use certain 
economic indices to categorise states in the global economy. Per 
capita G.N.P., level of industrialisation, rate of infant mortality, 
percentage of doctors per 1,000 of population, ratio of manufactured 
goods to primary commodity exports, the ratio of exports to national 
income, levels of illiteracy, incidence of malnutrition and disease are 
all indices that when used together gives a picture of a stratified 
international society with poles of wealth and poverty reflecting the 
unevenness of economic development. 
The uneven development of capital does not simply create two classes 
of country. There are many disparities in income and wealth within 
the developing country category. There is a distinct absence of homo-
geneity within the group. 	Developing countries vary enormously in 
(a)size - India and Brazil compared with Grenada and the Gambia; 
(b)population and population density - in the mid-1960's, India's 
population was around 500 million and the Gambia's approximately 300,000. 
Malta's population density was over 2,600 people per square mile whilst 
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Mauretania had a population density of 3; (c) natural resource endow-
ment - from mineral rich states like Nigeria and Zaire to Chad with no 
known mineral resources; (d) industrial development - Brazil and India 
compared with Benin and the Central African Republic; (e) per capita 
GNP in 1963 from Kuwait's %3,000 to Haiti's %80j These differences 
between countries also extend to differences between regions. In 1963 
the average per capita income was for Africa A06, Asia $92, Latin 
America %333 and the Middle East P22. By African and Asian standards, 
Latin America as a region is prosperous. Given these differences, it 
is advisable not to generalise from the special case of a particular 
country to the general needs of the developing countries and vice versa. 
Cognisance of the differences among developing countries is crucial for 
the subsequent analysis. However, it is on the differences between 
developed and developing countries that we concentrate, since it was 
around this duality that the coalition was constructed. The developing 
countries as a distinct group and their peculiar trade problems are the 
concern of this section. 
The trade problems of the developing countries and their particip-
ation in the international economy forms the background to their pressure 
politics in the trade field during the 1950s. (75) Two major problems 
were foremost during this period - the remuneration given to the develop-
ing countries as exporters of raw materials and their receipts of external 
financial assistance. The ldc trading pattern can be divided into three 
areas - primary commodities, manufactures and invisibles - and trends 
in these three areas, provided the environmental context in which 
economic development policies were formulated. The subsequent slow 
rate of development, coupled with balance of payments problems, led to 
a growing dissatisfaction with the existing trading system. The trading 
environment emerges as a vital contributory factor in the growth of 
Third World cooperation. 
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The distorting effect of the Korean War boom makes the comparison 
of developing countries experience at the beginning and end of this 
period a difficult enterprise. The abnormally high prices achieved 
by primary commodity exports means that the decline will look even 
greater than it is, if the base year used falls during this period. 
Between 1945 and 1951 raw material exporters were doing so well that 
the ides' share of world trade rose from a quarter to a third. FUrther, 
in discussing aggregate figures, it is instructive to remember that these 
give an overall picture and may not correspond to the experience of many 
of the countries covered in the sample. These qualifications are 
pertinent for the examination of the empirical material presented below. 
As a group, the developing countries' share of world trade declined 
steadily during this period. Between 1953 and 1961 it fell by 22%, 
the most marked increase coming after 1955 when the inflationary aspects 
of the Korean War book had played itself out (see Table 2.3). This 
general decline is mirrored in the commodity composition of ldc exports. 
As Table 2.4 shows, of the five commodity groups examined, fuels was 
the only one to show an increase. 
TABLE 2.3  
World Trade : Percentage Shares of Exporting Country Groups in Value  
of Exports. 1953, 1955, 1960 and 1961  
Region 	 Year 
1953 1955 1960 1961 
Developed Market Economies 59 64 63 67 
Developing Market Economies 27 26 22 21 
Centrally Planned Economies 10 10 12 12 
Source : 'International Trade and its Significance for 
International Development', Proceedings (1964) 
Vol. VI. 
TABLE 2.4  
World : Percentage shares of exporting country groups in value of exports by type of export 1955 and 1961  
Agricultural 
Raw Materials 
and Ores 
Fuels Base Metals Manufacturers 
1955 1961 1955 1961 1955 1961 1955 1961 1955 1961 
Developed Market Economies 49 55 48 54 32 26 74 74 85 83 
Developing Market Economies 42 34 40 35 57 60 16 12 5 4 
Centrally Planned Economies 9 11 12 12 11 14 10 14 10 12 
Source: Proceedings,(1964) Vol. VI. p. 79 
'International Trade and its Significance 
for Economic Development' 
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Table 2.5 shows the slow growth in the developing countries' 
exports, the only significant expansion being exports to the centrally 
planned economies, but this was slower than the expansion of intra-
communist trade and of the developed countries' export to the socialist 
bloc. 
With 70%r903.6 of their export proceeds coming from primary 
commodities, the ides were naturally concerned at the trends in the 
price and volume of these products traded internationally. Price and 
demand instability and the resultant fluctuating export earnings led 
to calls for some kind of stabilisation scheme. On the import side, 
ides were heavily dependent on imported manufactures since their 
domestic industrial sectors were small or non-existent. During this 
period, manufactured exports accounted for between 510-60% of their 
import bill. The movement in the relative prices of raw materials 
and manufactures gave rise to concern about the declining terms of 
trade of the developing countries. (76) The common perception was 
that the growth of import requirements was outstripping export earnings. 
Overall, of course, the problem was economic development and these 
obstacles in the trade field were held to be primary constraints to 
economic development and causal factors in explaining the rather 
sluggish growth performance of the poor countries. 
The flow of international aid was never as great as the ides 
wanted. Their dissatisfaction with the existing efforts can be seen 
in the attempt to create SUNFED in the U.N. General Assembly. The net 
disbursements of the international aid agencies is shown in Table 2.6. 
TABLE 2.5  
World : Annual rates of growth of value of exports by origin and destination, 1950-1962 a 
Importing 	Country 
Group 
Worldb 
Developed 
Market 
Developing 
Market 
Centrally 
Planned 
Exporting Country Group Economies Economies Economies 
World 7.1 7.2 5.1 11.0 
Developed Market Economies 8.0 8.6 5.8 11.3 
Developing Market Economies 3.4 3.8 1.8 8.5 
Centrally Planned Economies 11.1 8.2 14.9 11.4 
a. 70, values "Special category" exports of U.S. are excluded components do not always add 
up to totals because of rounding. 
b. Including exports whose destination cannot be allocated. 
Source : 'International Trade and its Significance for Economic Development'; Proceedings ( 1964) Vol. VI. p. 72. 
TABLE 2.6  
Net disbursement by international financial agencies to developing 
countries 1951-1962  
(In millions of dollars) 
Cumulative 
Total 
Annual 
Average 
Organisation 1951-1962 1951-1955 1956-1959 1960-1961 1962 
IBRD 2301 124 243 220 269 
IFC 47 3 11 15 
IDA 57 57 
IDB 53 2 49 
EDF 63 lo 53 
Total: 2521 124 246 243 444 
Source : Bureau of General Economic Research and Policies of the 
U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs - Finance in 
International Trade (1964). 
This shows a steady increase in disbursements, mainly the result of 
developing country pressure, but insufficient to meet the demand for 
increased capital transfers. 
This brief profile of the developing countries in the international 
economy shows that as a group they faced severe problems during this 
period. A relatively healthy picture at the end of the war had turned 
into a depressing one by 1964. This gave rise to a sense of injustice 
concerning the workings of the international economic system. (77) 
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Three interrelated aspects to the evolving ldc position emerge from 
the analysis above. First, changes affecting the prices of their 
imports and exports. Secondly, changes in the volume of their imports 
and, thirdly, the worsening of their balance of payments positions. 
The pressures for remedial measures to be taken to cure these ills 
were mounted in the GATT and the United Nations. Having already 
discussed developments within the GATT, it is to these efforts in the 
U.N. and the forging of a united ldc front that we now turn. 
2.4 	The Developing Countries in the United Nations : Diplomatic  
Cooperation on Economic issues 1945-63  
Diplomatic cooperation among developing countries during this 
period was affected by a variety of institutional, political and 
economic factors. A combination of events internal to the U.N. and 
those arising from the wider network of international political 
relationships helped to shape a developing coalition. The grouping 
which successfully created a new international organisation at the end 
of this period was the outcome of haphazard yet definite developments. 
The changing perceptions of the developing countries was accompanied 
by changes in the fabric of world politics which affected the structure 
and functioning of the United Nations. Foremost among these were the 
effects of the process of decolonisation which increased the repre-
sentation of the Third World within the U.N.; the formation of the 
non-aligned movement; and the changes in the East-West conflict with 
the ushering in of a phase of 'competitive co-existence'. In the 
analysis which follows the material is divided into two sub-sections. 
The first will discuss events until the end of 1960 and the second will 
be concerned with the immediate events (1961-63) prior to the creation 
of the G77. 
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2.4.1 	Within the wider UN system there are numerous organisations 
concerned with trade and development issues, however, this section is 
concerned with the core organisation and not the wider system. Of 
the six principal organs, three - the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the 
Secretariat - are concerned with development diplomacy. The General 
Assembly and ECOSOC provided organisational contexts within which the 
unity was forged and the secretariat contributed towards increased 
awareness and solidarity through its investigation of development 
problems to affect the modalities through which states can bring economic 
issues to the global body. e.g. delegations can raise trade and aid 
questions at the opening sessions of the General Assembly during the 
general debate. Economic issues are then passed to the Second Commit-
tee (Economic and Financial) where detailed consideration is given to 
the issues. It is here that draft resolutions are first considered 
and, if successful, transmitted to the General Assembly for debate and 
voting. The eighteen-nation ECOSOC met twice yearly and its small size 
was conducive to more serious consideration of issues. However, during 
this period ECOSOC increasingly played a marginal role partly because 
the West failed to participate at a high level and partly because the 
developing countries felt that it was unrepresentative. (78) The sec-
retariat in a series of reports from the mid-fifties focused attention 
on ldc trade problems and showed the limitations of import-substitution 
policies. (79)  The U.N.'s interest in development policies developed 
slowly during this period. At the end of the war the focus was on 
the war-ravaged economies of Europe and it was not until the inauguration 
of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EFTA) in 1950 that 
the special problems of the ldcs became one of central concern. (80) But 
the U.N. had already made an important contribution with the establish-
ment of ECAFE in 1947 which gave the ldcs, for the first time, a U.N. 
forum of their own. 
65. 
The existence of this framework could not, by itself, provide 
the impetus towards cooperation, the necessary political accommodation 
had to be found among the ldcs. In the general attempt to translate 
political independence into economic independence, the United Nations 
emerged as a relevant forum for pressure mainly because the weak 
bargaining position of individual ldcs suggested that an aggregation 
of states was necessary to put sufficient pressure on the West for 
change. Politics within the U.N. is a reflection of politics in the 
international political system and the use of the organisation as a 
centre for foreign policy initiatives by various states. As such, 
the developing countries as a group and their demands for change were 
conditioned by the dependent nature of their economies and their general 
foreign policy orientations. For much of the 1950s any common inter-
ests they possessed on economic issues were obscured by the East-West 
conflict. In other words, cold war alignments were frequently in-
corporated into economic conflicts, so dividing the ldcs into non- 
. aligned (after 1955)c 81)  those favourable to the West and those favour-
able to the East. For example, when General Assembly Resolution 
520(VI ) (82) which requested ECOSOC to submit "... a detailed plan for 
establishing a proposed International Development Authority as soon 
as circumstances permitted" was sponsored by Argentina and passed by 
30 votes in favour (mainly ldcs), 16 against (mainly developed 
countries) and 11 abstentions (largely socialist countries), the ldcs 
which voted against or abstained - Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, Thailand and Turkey - were heavily dependent on U.S. 
military aid. Similarly, at the 11th session of the General Assembly, 
after Soviet inspired attempts to convene an international trade con-
ference had been defeated, (two) developing countries (Argentina and 
the Philippines) co-sponsored a draft resolution with Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, the United Kingdon and the United States which, 
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"recognised that existing international bodies 
and agreements concerned with international 
trade provide a framework for the effective 
consideration of trade problems, payments 
arrangements and related problems of mutual 
interest". (83) 
This was adopted by 55 votes to 7 with 4 abstentions. 
Despite the existence of these divisions there were examples of 
concerted pressure during this period. The major thrust was for the 
establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development 
(SUNFED) and the creation of the CICT in 1955 against the wishes of the 
United States and United Kingdom, was the first occasion on which the 
ides had been able to erect an institution opposed by the major trading 
states.
(84) This pressure began to be channelled more effectively 
with the increase in U.N. membership after 1955 and the emergence of 
the non-aligned movement. Between 1955-1959 twenty-three states were 
admitted to the U.N., among them twelve African and Asian ldcs and four 
communist European countries. The increase in membership sparked off 
a battle between the U.S. and Soviet Union for leadership within the 
General Assembly during the period of competitive co-existence. The 
Soviet Union attempted to seize the initiative by making various pro-
posals from 1956 onward for the convening of an international trade 
conference. (85) The developing countries, dependent on the West for 
aid and knowing that the West opposed such a move, refused to support 
the Soviet bid. The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, 
18-24 April 1955, had important repercussions for the emerging coalition. 
Apart from stressing the features of global economic inequality the 
Final Act inter alia urged its members to make greater use of inter-
national organisations and to join those to which they did not at 
present belong and to work together in international organisations to 
promote their mutual economic interests. (86) The policy of non- 
alignment gave the ldcs a common basis for political cooperation and 
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proved attractive to countries gaining independence who joined the 
group. Moreover, the image of a non-aligned Third World began to be 
accepted by the West and East as well as by the Afro-Asian countries 
themselves and although at this time it was inaccurate the image was 
applied to Latin America. In political terms, the argument for a 
separation of cold war and economic development issues proved highly 
effective. The argument that the ldcs could not joint alliances in 
order to gain development assistance began to be accepted by the West 
and thus they were therefore able to put pressure on economic develop-
ment issues without making any concessions on security matters. (87) 
 This was still in many senses a nascent development because at this 
juncture security matters still dominated the agenda of the non-aligned. 
Further changes in the political and economic, institutional and en-
vironmental frameworks were to produce both an intensification of 
pressure for negotiated change and the evolution of Third World 
cooperation into a distinct negotiating group. 
2.4.2 	Many of the features present in the earlier period were 
reinforced between 1961-63. In 1960 the entry of 17 African states 
and Cyprus swelled the ranks of the developing countries guaranteeing 
a decisive majority in the General Assembly. The new African states, 
generally at a lower level of economic development, perceived economic 
growth as one of the most important problems facing their regimes and 
at the international level infused a new intensity to the demands for 
reform of the trading system. Simultaneously with these demands, 
international organisations were taking a greater interest in trade 
and development matters. The investigations by GATT, following the 
publication of the Haberler Report, were continuing and the ensuing 
discussion led to the GATT Declaration on the Promotion of Trade of 
Less Developed Countries in November 1961. Earlier that year, the 
Group of Experts established through General Assembly Resolution 1423 
(XIV) had published their report entitled, "International Compensation 
for Fluctuations in Commodity Trade" (Posthuma Plan); which called 
for the creation of a Development Insurance Fund in order to counteract 
the 'adverse effects of instability in commodity trade, particularly 
in the less developed of the primary producing countries', and also 
urged the creation of compensatory financing schemes to protect the ldcs 
against 	'setbacks in their development caused by instability in the 
world commodity markets'. (88) Thirdly, the non-aligned countries 
made a specific contribution to this debate. At the Belgrade Conference 
of Non-Aligned Nations attended by 25 countries, 1-6 September 1961, 
some states demanded better terms of trade for the poor countries and 
called for efforts to eliminate excessive fluctuations in primary 
commodity trade as well as restrictive practices. The Final Act of 
the conference - the Belgrade Declaration - called for the convening 
of an international trade conference to discuss the trade problems of 
the developing countries. (89) 
It was with this background that the 16th Session of the General 
Assembly which centred on trade and development was convened in Septem-
ber 1961. During the debates of the Second Committee, the Posthuma 
Plan and Belgrade Declaration were constantly mentioned by spokesmen 
from the developing countries. (90) The 16th Session of the General 
Assembly marked the onset of a struggle to create a new institutional 
mechanism in the trade field and it is in an examination of this process 
that we can chart the final stages in the formation of the coalition. 
It was not a clear-cut question of the ldcs combining to use their 
numerical majority against developed country opposition to form a new 
trade organisation. Rather, it is a process in which the radical 
African and Asian states who pressed the institutional issue and the 
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more conservative Latin American states who wanted a discussion of 
development problems but no new machinery, began to find a common 
position. Once the conference was decided upon, they coalesced their 
efforts in order to get the maximum benefits from the conference. (91) 
 In this sense differences could still exist within the group but any 
gains made at the conference would be in the face of stiff Western 
opposition and the best hope of mounting effective pressure lay in 
unity which provided a numerical majority. The organisational context 
provided both the opportunity and necessity for pressure group politics. 
The decisional framework of the U.N., in particular, majoritarianism 
created conditions conducive to the formation of a Third World coalition. 
Two draft resolutions, on the subject of international trade were 
introduced in the Second Committee in 1961 by developing countries. Six 
Latin American countries submitted one entitled, "International Trade 
as a Main Instrument for Economic Development" (92)and sixteen African 
states and Indonesia one entitled "Promotion of International Trade". (93) 
 Although dealing with the same problem and similar in outlook, the 
seventeen-power draft resolution was more forceful and on the institution-
al issue called for a world trade conference. Although the latter 
resolution was withdrawn in favour of the Latin American text, because 
of a lack of support, the African states and Indonesia introduced an 
amendment reiterating their demand for an international trade confer 
ence, (94) and when this met with fierce objection they changed the 
wording so that the Secretary-General was no longer requested to prepare 
a provisional agenda but to "consult the Governments of Member States 
concerning the advisability of holding an international conference". (95) 
 But even this softening of tone proved too radical for many ldcs and 
the amendment, although adopted by 45 votes to 36 with 10 abstentions, 
highlighted the disunity of the developing countries. All the Latin 
American countries with the exception of Cuba (at best a marginal 
member of the Latin American group) voted against and Cyprus, Ethiopia, 
Iran, the Philippines and Thailand abstained gew Zealand, an original 
member of the Group of 75, voted againsg. The Latin American draft 
resolution was then adopted by 81 votes to none with 11 abstentions. (96) 
 This resolution, amended in the General Assembly(97) to placate those 
who did not want a conference, became General Assembly Resolution 1707 
(XVL) - "International Trade as the primary instrument for economic 
development". (98) The developing countries had cooperated on the 
substantive discussions of their problems but were seriously divided 
over the question of holding a conference to discuss these problems. 
The coolness of the Latin American countries towards the idea of a trade 
conference can be explained as an attempt to maintain leadership in the 
U.N., on trade and development issues by acting 'responsibly' or, as 
the result of pressure by the U.S. administration, to adopt a more 
moderate stance. (99) 
The adoption by the General Assembly of Resolution 1710(XVI) on 
19 December 1961 which inaugurated the (first) Development Decade, (-too) 
did much to bring economic development to the forefront of the U.N. 
concern and, consequently, to affect the process of diplomatic co-
operation among the ldcs. The existence of the concept of an inter-
national development decade ensured that action would be taken to 
concretize the previously abstract idea. If one is genuinely working 
toward a common goal then one must be seen to be striving to attain 
that goal. With a target minimum annual growth rate of national income 
of 5 per cent to be achieved, the onus was on the developing countries 
to be more assertive and the resolution was instrumental in removing 
one of the defences of the major trading powers in their support of the 
existing system. If achievements were being measured against the hope-
ful tenor of such a resolution, the rich countries had to justify more 
clearly their current policies and to be seen to be making positive 
efforts, if only as a public relations exercise. 
7% 
1962 was a crucial year, both for the development of solidarity 
among developing countries and in the drive towards an international 
trade conference. The Conference on the Problems of Economic Develop-
ment held in Cairo 9-18 July 1962, was an event of paramount importance 
in the shaping of Third World solidarity on economic issues. Attended 
by thirty-six countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America, it was 
significant for two reasons. It was the first time that the Latin 
American countries had attended such a conference, (101) in other words, 
the Bandung coalition was being extended from its Afro-Asian base to 
a genuinely Third World one. The conference was a first stage 
crystallisation of a belief held by many developing countries and 
succintly expressed by a Brazilian delegate at the previous session of 
the General Assembly, 
"The world is not divided merely into East and 
West. This ideological cleavage makes us 
forget the existence of yet another division, 
not ideological, but economic and social -
that between the Northern and Southern 
hemispheres". (102) 
The 'Have vs. Have-Not' psychology became important for political 
analysis when the 'Have-Nots' attempted to unite to promote their 
interests. Secondly, the Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries 
which constituted the Final Act of the conference had political import-
ance in showing that the developing countries could act jointly on 
trade and development issues. Further, in outlining a strategy to 
be adopted, the declaration had a continuing relevance for future 
action. As one authority has stated, 
"Inasmuch as the participants held in many 
respects conflicting views with regard to 
most of the questions discussed the mere 
fact that a Declaration setting out a common 
position was adopted added considerable 
significance to the Conference". (103) 
The Declaration which called for common action by developing countries 
in the U.N. and GATT declared itself, 
"resolutely in favour of the holding of an 
international economic conference within the 
framework of the United Nations" whose agenda 
shall include, "all vital questions relating 
to trade, primary commodity trade, economic 
relations between developing and developed 
countries". (104) 
Decisive as it was in the developing of the Third World coalition, it 
was not as Cordovez (105) maintains the first attempt to coordinate ldc 
policies with the aim of acting jointly in the U.N., as our discussion 
of Bandung makes clear; what it did was widen the constituency. 
Within the U.N., discussions continued on the issue of a trade 
conference. The 34th session of ECOSOC (July-August 1962) was import-
ant in this respect. The Secretary-General submitted the replies of 
Governments to his letter on the desirability of holding a world trade 
conference. (106) This showed that 45 were in favour, 18 opposed and 
3 non-committal. The only developing countries which replied negative-
ly were Colombia and Nicaragua. In the face of this evidence and the 
new-found solidarity of the developing countries after Cairo, the West 
gave up its opposition (107) and a five-nation (Brazil, Ethiopia, India, 
Senegal and Yugoslavia) draft resolutionOW , which called for the 
convening of a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the 
setting up of a preparatory committee of experts to consider the agenda 
and documentation for the conference and requested the U.N. Secretary-
General to prepare documentation for the Committee, was adopted as 
ECOSOC Resolution 917(XXXIV). (109)  A delaying resolution by the 
United States to create a Group of Experts to study trade problems co-
sponsored Uruguay, thus showing that the coalition was not fully formed, 
was adopted once the Conference had been secured. (lio) 
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Differences between the developing countries on the institutional 
question still continued in the autumn of 1962 during the meetings of 
the Second Committee. The twenty-eight nation draft resolution (111) 
 submitted by the developing countries did not call for the creation of 
a new international trade organisation; therefore Brazil, Iraq and 
Lebanon introduced an amendment (112) to this effect. Whilst the 
majority of developing countries were in favour of new institutional 
machinery, some leading members of the group, e.g. Yugoslavia, India, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Tunisia were opposed. It is therefore incorrect 
to argue that the NAM was a radical force in the creation of the coal-
ition since two of its three leading members at this time opposed the 
initiative for a new trade organisation. Another issue which caused 
division among the developing countries was over the proposed date of 
the conference. Whilst the Third World states voted as a bloc in 
favour of calling the conference in 1963, the Francophone African states 
took the Western view in favour of 1964 mainly because they felt that 
the earlier date was an implicit criticism of their association with 
the EEC, since one of the reasons for the early date was an attempt to 
end the conference before the proposed British entry into the Community.(113) 
 The Francophone African countries produced another note of dissension 
when they abstained en bloc over the inclusion of the Cairo Declaration 
on the agenda of the Committee. Apart from the Central African 
Republic's delegate who claimed he had not received instructions from 
home they all gave the same reason for abstaining. They had not been 
invited to the Cairo Conference and having not taken part in its pro-
ceedings they felt the Declaration to be unrepresentative of Third World 
views. In the view of these states, it was indefensible that many 
African countries south of the Sahara had not been invited. (114) These 
political differences evident in the immediate period before the form-
ation of the coalition were not dissolved but merely papered over when 
the G77 came into existence. 
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These divisions should not obscure, however, the continued co-
operation on other issues. The Second Committee had been faced with 
two major resolutions - one by the ldcs and the other by the Soviet 
Union. The developing countries used their numerical ascendancy to 
make their resolution the centre of the debate. Adding greater 
weight to this cooperation was the statement by the Secretary-General 
that, 
H .... the present division of the worliinto 
rich and poor countries is in my opinion much 
more real and much more serious, and ultimately 
much more explosive than the division of the 
world on ideological grounds". (115) 
The developing countries were on the whole united on trade and develop-
ment issues and showed an impressive display of unanimity in voting. 
When the resolution calling for the trade conference was finally passed 
by the General Ahsembly, (116) the Francophone states had dropped their 
opposition, mainly because the prevailing mood pointed toward ldc con-
sensus. A Canada/Peru amendment (117) ensured that effectively the 
Conference would begin in 1964, so removing the objections on timing 
of various developed and developing countries. 
The preparations were now under way for the conference and it is 
conceivable that this fragile solidarity could have evaporated; 
however, the need to ensure some results from the Conference and the 
convergence of interests by those countries participating in the Pre-
paratory Committee provided a basis for further consultation. At the 
end of the second session of the Preparatory Committee (21 May 1963 - 
29 June 1963), the 'Joint Statement by representatives of Developing 
Countries' was issued, (118)  in order to stress the importance with 
which they viewed the forthcoming conference and also as a comment on 
the clear polarisation of views which existed between developed and 
developing countries. Included in the report of the Preparatory 
Committee (E/3799), the statement stressed the importance of the 
conference for the economies of the developing countries and for the 
world economy as a whole. It urged the conference to adopt concrete 
measures to achieve inter alia the improvement of institutional 
arrangements including, if necessary, the establishment of new machin-
ery and methods of implementing the decisions of the conference. 
This joint action of the members of the Preparatory Committee was 
followed at the 18th session of the General Assembly, by a joint 
declaration of the larger body of which it had been a representative. 
Seventy-five developing countries issued a 'Joint Declaration of the 
Developing Countries' in the General Assembly. (119) This was a 
charter of the developing countries' needs and grievances, hopes and 
aspirations. The document stressed the need for concrete decisions 
to be taken at the forthcoming conference and for their effective 
implementation. The criticism of the trading structure was stated 
bluntly: 
"The existing principles and patterns of world trade 
mainly favour the advanced parts of the world. 
Instead of helping the developing countries to 
promote the development and diversification of 
their economies, the present tendencies in world 
trade frustrate their efforts to attain more rapid 
growth". (120) 
This marked the first appearance of a united group of developing 
countries. The appearance of the Group of 75 did not lead automatic-
ally to the Group of 77. There was no precedent to suggest that this 
unity to demonstrate a certain resistance to stalling tactics by the 
rich countries would re-emerge at the Geneva Conference and would also 
emerge from the Conference as a permanent force. The next chapter, 
therefore, analyses the process whereby this result was achieved. The 
present chapter has sought to discuss the main causal factors which 
accounted for the development of Third World solidarity during the 
period 1945-1963. 
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Cooperation among developing countries during this period was 
based on a perception of shared interests and needs. Throughout this 
era it has been possible to identify definite conflicts of interest 
between developed and developing countries. From the outset and the 
reconstruction of the post-war system of trade and payments, distinct 
ldc demands were formulated. Within the existing structure of inter-
national production and reproduction the developed and developing 
countries occupied different places, thus giving rise to different 
interests. (121) Developments within world capitalism in the nineteen-
fifties heightened the disparities between the two groups of countries. 
The ldcs share of world output and trade fell; their export earnings 
tended to fluctuate and international capital failed to migrate in 
sufficient amounts to their economies. In a response to these develop-
ments there were many ad hoc alliances during the nineteen-fifties in 
order to press a particular demand in an international organisation. 
The burgeoning of studies addressed to the participation of the ldcs 
in the world economy showed these countries that their problems had to 
be tackled in a systematic rather than a disjointed manner, resulting 
in an increase in pressure over a wider range of subjects. The exist-
ing international organisations provided fora within which pressure 
for change could be exerted. Here the U.N. was of paramount import-
ance (122) and the modalities of the political process within that 
organisation with its emphasis on caucuses determined the creation of 
large blocs for voting purposes. The creation of the non-aligned move-
ment gave the Third World a distinct voice in international politics and 
afforded the beginning of a separation of economic from security issues. 
The success of cooperation in one forum spilled over into others and the 
attempt to safeguard minimal gains was a spur to increased solidarity. 
Thus a systematic examination of trade problems resulted in a call for 
an international conference to discuss these issues which in turn led 
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to an attempt to achieve concrete results from such an enterprise. 
The political process dictated that only through the use of their 
numerical majority could they exert pressure on the major trading 
nations. This did not, of course, guarantee success but it was a 
widely held perception, although some diplomats evinced scepticism. (123) 
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FOOTNOTES  
(1) See, for example, the way the G77 itself has mushroomed, so 
that its activities are conducted in many fora e.g. FAO, WHO, 
ILO. 
(2) It is instructive here to note, for example, that within the U.N. 
and the Specialised Agencies they were treated as an identifiable 
category. The introduction of the Expanded Program of Techni-
cal Assistance (EPTA) in 1949 was the first recognition of the 
need for special measures for poor countries. 
(3) See Carol Jane Lancaster - The Politics of the Powerless :  
Pressures in the United States for Economic Development 1945—  
'261 (University of London Ph.D. 1972) for a political analysis 
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Compromise (Leyden : A.W. Sitjhoff 1972) ch. 1 and A.K. Koul -
The Legal Framework of UNCTAD in World Trade Law (Bombay : 
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Richard V. Gardner - Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford University 
Press 1958). 
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war, the U.S. accounted for roughly one-third of the world's 
total output and by 1948 controlled three-quarters of the world's 
monetary gold. See Lars Anell and Birgitta Nygren - The Develop-
ing Countries and the World Economic Order (London : Francis 
Pinter 1980) pp. 35-37. 
(10) A reflection of this was that even the economic functions of the 
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ern Interests' John Pincus - Trade, Aid and Development (New 
York : McGraw-Hill 1967) p. 373., in contradiction to Article 55 
of the U.N. Charter which states inter alia that, 
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stability and well-being which are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
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a. higher standards of living, full employment 
and conditions of economic and social 
pprogress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, 
health and related problems'. 
(11) This is not to say that in economic analysis no distinction 
was made between rich and poor countries. Nor does it imply 
that underdeveloped country statesmen did not argue for certain 
policies which were felt to be beneficial to them. It is also 
worth noticing, at this point, that the underdeveloped countries 
then do not correspond to those today in that Australia and New 
Zealand were vocal members of the underdeveloped group at that 
time. 
(12) Moreover, many colonies had earned considerable sums by selling 
primary commodities during the war and at its close had healthy 
balance of payments e.g. India's sterling balance amounted to 
some %5 billion. In Latin America, industrialisation was 
given a fillip since domestic producers had been shut off from 
their competitors during the war. Further, immediately after 
the war there was a heavy demand for primary commodities, thus 
improving the terms of trade of the poor countries. 
(13) In other words, growing international interdependence. 
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alia, adopted a convention on the simplification of custom 
procedures, one of the abolition of import and export re-
strictions and prohibitions and made tariff policy an inter-
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Memoirs vol. 2 p. 644 quoted in D.P. Calleo & B.M. Rowland -
America and the World Political Economy (Bloomington : Indiana 
University Press 1973). Will Clayton, Truman's State Depart-
ment Economic Advisor and a man in the forefront of postwar 
reconstruction argued that ^nations which act as enemies in 
the market place cannot long be friends at the council table", 
quoted in Lloyd Gardner, Architects of Illusion (Chicago : 
QpPilvangle Books 1970) p. 123. 
(24) "We should assume this leadership, and the responsibility 
that goes with it, primarily for reasons of pure national self-
interest" Cordell Hull quoted in G. Kolko, The Politics of War :  
The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943-45 (New York : 
Vintage Books 1970) p. 251. 
25) G. Kolko - The Politics of War : The World and United States  
Foreign Policy 1943-45, ibid., pp. 252-53. 
(26) See Gardner, op. cit., pp. 156-158 for British support for 
Imperial preference and D.P. Calleo & Rowland - America and  
the World Political Economy op. cit., p. 37. 
(27) This does not mean that there were no serious conflicts e.g. 
over the pursuit of full employment policies. 
(28) Uner Kirdar - The Structure of United Nations Economic Aid to  
Under-developed Countries (The Hague : Mertinus Nijhoff 1966) 
p. 103. 	Also R.N. Gardner, op. cit., p. 85. 
(29) It is interesting to note that Lord Keynes recognised the 
developmental purposes of the Fund. It had, he said, 
"a second primary duty laid upon it, namely to 
develop the resources and productive capacity of 
the world, with special reference to the less 
developed countries", quoted in E.S. Mason & R.E. Asher - 
The World Bank since Bretton Woods (The Brooking 
Institution 1973) p. 2. 
(30) Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on 
Trade and Employment also see Proposals for Expansion of World 
Trade and Employment, Department of State Publications 2411, 
Commercial Policy Series 79 (November 1945). 
81. 
(31) ECOSOC Resolution of 18 February 1946 quoted in full in W.A. Brown, Jnr., The United States And The Restoration of World 
Trade (Washington D.C., The Brooking Institution 1950) p. 59. 
(32) The members were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ftance, India, Lebanon Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa and the 
U.S.S.R. The USSR boycotted the meetings of the Preparatory 
Committee. 
(33) Australia, New Zealand and Canada were active in support of the 
underdeveloped countries at this time. 
(34) Soul, op. cit. p. 21. 
(35) Gosovic, op. cit. p. 10; C. Wilcox - A Charter for World Trade  
(New York : MacMillan 1949) pp. 142-143. 
(36) See Wilcox ibid; Edward Dana Wilgress - A New Attempt at  
Internationalism - The International Trade Conferences and the  
Charter. A study of ends and means. (Paris : Societe d'edition 
d'enseignement superieur 1949); and J.E.C. Fawcett -"Inter-
national Trade Organisation", British Yearbook of International  
Law, vol. XXIV (1947) pp. 376-382, for accounts of The Havana 
Conference, the Charter and the ITO. 
(37) Gosovic, op. cit. p. 10. 
(38) Curzon, op. cit. p. 211 takes this view. 
(39) See W.A. Brown, Jnr. - op. cit., for a discussion of the reasons 
behind the U.S. failure to ratify, pp. 362-375. 
(40) Gardner, op. cit. p. 349 & pp. 379-80. 
(41) Eugene Black - "Internationalism : A Way to Economic Development" p. 144 in E. Black - The Diplomacy of Economic Development. 
(42) For analyses of GATT as an organisation see Kenneth Damm, The GATT : Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press 1970), John Jackson, World Trade And  
The Law of GATT (New York : Mobb-Merrill Co Inc 1969), Karin Kock, 
International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967 (Stockholm : 
Almquist & Wiksell 1969). 
(43) In 1954 The Organisation for Trade Cooperation (OTC) was created 
to administer the GATT but the failure of the United States to 
ratify the agreement meant its early demise. To come into force 
it needed support from countries representing 85% of world trade 
and since the United States share was 20%, this constituted an 
effective veto. 
(44) "The Developing Countries in GATT", UNCTAD Secretariat (tempor-
ary), Proceedings 1964, vol V. EVCONF. 46/146, P. 444. Burma, 
Ceylon, China, India, Lebanon, Pakistan (Southern Rhodesia) and 
Syria, were other developing countries adhering to GATT at its 
inception. China, Lebanon and Syria subsequently withdrew their 
membership. 
(contd) 
82. 
(44)See also ECLA - Study of Inter-Latin American Trade (1956). 
U.N. Sales No. 1956 II.G.3, for the reasons why by 1954 seven Latin American States had acceded to GATT and the reasons why 
whose who had not refused to do so. 
(45)Article XVIII. 
(46)Hon. Shirley Corea, llth November 1954. Press Release GATT/177  9th November 1954. 
(47)Sidney Wells - "The Developing Countries, GATT and UNCTAD", International Affairs, vol. 45. No. 1 (January 1969) p. 64. 
(48)This did not apply to those ex-colonies which on becoming inde-
pendent benefited from the arrangements previously made on their 
behalf by the colonial power. 
(49)See H.G. Johnson - Economic Policies Towards Less Developed  Countries (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1967) pp. 14-15. 
K. Kock op. cit. pp. 232-233; and S.B. Linder, "The Significance 
of GATT for under-developed countries" in Proceedings (1964) 
vol V p. 526. 
(50)Geneva (1947); Annecy (1949), Torquay (1960-51), Geneva (1956), 
Geneva "Dillon Round" (1960-61). 
(51)"The Developing Countries in GOT", op. cit. p. 449. 
(52)Sir Raghvan Pillai (India) at the 9th Session of the Contracting 
Parties 1954; cited in D. Cordovez - "The Making of UNCTAD", 
Journal of World Trade Law, vol. 1, No. 3 (May/June 1967) p. 267. 
(53)Gosovic, op. cit. p. 14; Kock op. cit. p. 234. 
:54) See "The Role of GATT in Relation to Trade and Development", 
GATT Secretariat, Proceedings vol 	E/CONF. 46/141 (vol. V) and 
"The Developing Countries in GATT", op. cit. for differing accounts 
of GATT and the Developing Countries on which this is based. 
(55)Curzon, op. cit. p. 215. 
(56)Came into force in October 1957. 
(57)Article XVIII paragraph 1. 
(58) GATT Press Release November 30th 1957. 
(59)Commonly called The Haberler Report after its chairman, Gottfried 
Haberler. 
(60)Trends in International Trade. Report by a Panel of Experts  
(GATT, Geneva 1958) p. 54. 
(61)"The Role of GATT in Relation to Trade and Development", op. cit. 
P. 477 
(62)See Curzon, op. cit. p. 231 - "The effect of the collected know-ledge of these trade obstacles on the under-developed countries • 
was impressive. The studies showed them how pervasive and ubi-
quitous obstacles to trade expansion really were for them". 
83. 
(63) Curzon, op. cit. pp. 231-232. 
(64) Argentina, Burma, Brazil, Cambodia, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, 
Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the UAR, Uruguay 
and Yugoslavia. 
(65) E/CONF. 46/141. vol. 3, pp. 30-31. 
(66) At the May Ministerial Meeting, A Committee on Legal and 
Institutional Framework was established to consider the "need for 
an adequate legal and institutional framework to enable the 
Contracting Parties to discharge their responsibilities 
especially in connection with the work of expanding the trade 
of less developed countries". 
(67) "Commodity and Trade Problems of Developing Countries", Report 
of the Group of Experts Appointed Under ECOSOC Res. 9 19 (XXIV); 
Proceedings 1964, vol. V. E/CONF. 46/141. pp. 377-423. 
(68) For different and conflicting interpretations of the efficacy 
of existing commodity organisation see Commodity and Trade  
Problems of Developing Countries, ibid. 
(69) Carole Lancaster, op. cit. p. 255. 
(70) A brilliant economist, effective public speaker and skilled 
negotiator, Ptebisch was Executive Secretary of ECLA from 1949 
to 1962. His theory of the peripheralisation of the Third 
World as a result of the operation of international market forces 
is a controversial one. See A.S. Friedeberg, The United Nations  
Conference On Trade And Development of 1964 (Rotterdam : Uni-
versitaire Press Rotterdam 1968) pp. 33-67 for a critical 
discussion of the man and his ideas. 
(71) Report of the Economic and Social Council, 1 August 1959 -5 August 1960. GAOR. 15th Session Supplement No. 3 (A/4415) 
PP. 38-39, paras 353-387. Also E/3340 - part III, Resolution 31 XVI. 
(72) For ECA see Resolution II(II) 5 February 1960 on multilateral 
economic and financial assistance to Africa and Resolution 19(II) 
4 February 1960 on concerted action by the ECA. For ECLA see 
Resolutions 153 (VIII) 22 May 1959 on joint ECLA/FAO economic 
development training programme; _155 (VIII) 22 Nay 1959 on 
economic development advisory groups; 172 (AC.45) on Latin 
American Common Market 28 March 1960; and 173 (AC.45) 28 March 
1960 on Central American integration. 
(73) 15 December 1960. GAOR, 15th Session. 
(74) Variously called backward, poor, underdeveloped, less developed, 
peripheral, etc. We use these terms synonymously. The term 
underdeveloped was first coined by a report to the U.N. -
'Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped 
Countries' 3rd May 1951, g/198004/10. 
(75)Carole Lancaster op. cit. p. 153. 
84. 
(76) This is treated at greater length below. Note here however that 
immediately prior to the Geneva Conference Lori Balogh wrote 
that, "The immediate cause of organising UNCTAD was the worsen-
ing terms of trade between primary products and manufactures", 
T. Balogh - "Notes on The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development", Bulletin Oxford University Institute of  
Economics and Statistics, vol. 26, No. 1 (February 1964), p. 21. 
(77) Isaiah Frank - "Aid, Trade and Economic Development : Issues 
Before the U.N. Conference", Foreign Affairs, vol. 42, No. 2 
(January 1964) p. 212. 
(78) Efforts to increase the membership originally foundered on 
Soviet objections. They refused to contemplate any changes 
until The People's Republic of China was admitted to the U.N. 
(79) Charles L. Robertson - "The Creation of UNCTAD", in R.W. Cox (ed.) -
International Organisation : World Politics (London : Macmillan & 
Co., Ltd 1969) p. 263. 
(80) See Robert E. Asher - "Problems of the Underdeveloped Countries" 
p. 581, in R.E. Asher et al - The United Nations and Promotion  
of The General Welfare (Washington D.C. : The Brookings 
Institution 1957). 
(81) The Non-Aligned Movement was not formally constituted until 1961 
but after the Bandung Conference a loose bloc of countries 
espousing a non-alignment ideology can be discerned in inter-
national politics. 
(82) January 12, 1952. 
(83) General Assembly Resolution 1027 (XI), "Development of Inter-
national Economic Cooperation and the Expansion of International 
Trade". 
4) The initial decision to create CICT was made by ECOSOC Resolution 
512A (XVII), April 30 1954. The US and UK boycotted the CICT 
until it was reconstituted in 1958. 
(85) In 1954, the Soviet Union had called for an international trade 
conference of trade experts and in 1955 the socialist countries 
had introduced a draft resolution calling for the ratification 
of the Havana Charter. It was not solely cynical political 
manipulation behind the USSR'S moves, but also an attempt to 
ease the strategic trade restrictions imposed by the West on 
East-West trade. For Russian views on these issues, see M. 
Lavichenkov and I. Ornatsky - "Barometer of Interstate Relations" 
International Affairs (Moscow : January 1964), pp. 62-68 and 
B. Pinegin - "Unsolved Problems of World Trade", ibid., pp. 69-73. 
(86) A.S. Friedeberg - The United Nations Conference on Trade and  
and Development of 1964 (Universitaire Pers Rotterdam 1968) p.7, 
calls this the first sign of the development which would result 
in the formation of the Group of 75. 
(87)  See Carole Lancaster op. cit. pp. 44-45. She argues that, "What 
happened in effect was that the image of a Third World as a group 
on Cold War issues increasingly became a reality on issues of 
economic development; a reality nowhere more evident that in the U.N." p. 45. 
85. 
(88) See E/3447. 
(89) There is some dispute concerning the intended participants at 
such a conference. G.L. Goodwin - "The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development : Beginning of a new Era?" 
Yearbook of World Affairs 1965, p. 3 thinks that this meant a 
world conference involving developed countries whilst Friedeberg 
op. cit. p. 9, that only a gathering of developing countries 
was envisaged. 
(90) See Official Records of the General Assembly, 16th Session 
Supplement. Report of the Second Committee A/C.2/SR. pp. 
716-793. 
(91) A similar point is made by Robertston op. cit. p. 261, "The 
prospect of the conference brought the unity of the 75, and 
not vice versa". 
(92) A/C.2/L.550/Rev. 1 and Corr. 1. 
(93) A/C.2/L.556/Add. 1/Hev.l. 
(94) A/C.2/L.559 and Add.l. 
(95) A/C.2/L.559/Rev.l. 
(96) See A/5056. 
(97) A/L.379 submitted by Colombia, Liberia, Mauretania, Panama, 
Philippines and Thailand requested the Secretary-General to 
consult member states on the desirability of a conference and 
its possible agenda. 
98) 19 December 1961. 
9) See Carole Lancaster op. cit. p. 262. 
This resolution originated in an idea expressed by President 
Kennedy in his address to the UNGA, where he stated, inter 
alia that political sovereignty was a mockery without the 
means of meeting poverty and disease. He proposed that the decade 1960-1970 should be designated as the U.N. Development 
Decade. See A/PV.1013 (29 Sept. 1961). This proposal was 
originally embodied in a draft resolution (A/C.2/L.554) 
submitted by Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, 
Philippines, Senegal and the U.S.A. The Federation of Malaya 
and Madascar later joined the sponsors. 
(101)Apart from Cuba, a maverick in the Latin American system (which had attended the Cairo Conference), Bolivia and Mexico attended as full participants and Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay and 
Venezuela attended in an observer capacity. 
(102)See GAOR: 16th. Session. A/PV.1011 para 13 statement by 
lir. Franco. 
(103) Cordovez op. cit. p. 259. 
(104) A/5162. The Cairo Declaration was circulated in the U.N. with 
this document number. 
(105) Cordovez op. cit.p. 259. 
(106) See E/6331 and Add 1-4 for the replies of governments. 
(107) It has been suggested that Adlai Stevenson persuaded the 
Kennedy administration to drop its objections. See Robertson 
op. cit. p. 268. 
(108) E/L. 958/Rev.2. 
(109) 3 August, 1962. 
(110) ECOSOC Resolution 919 (XXXIV), 3August 1962. 
(111) A/C.2/L.640 and Add. 1-4. 
(112) A/C.2/L.651. 
(113) When the draft resolution was put to the vote, Rwanda voted 
against and Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar 
Niger, Upper Volta and Iran abstained. 
(114) For an explanation of voting behaviour see A/C.2/SR.832. 
(115) A/5201/Add.1 p.3 
(116)UNGA Resolution 1785 'United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development' (8 Dec. 1962). 
(117) See A/L.408. 
(118) Signed by 17 developing countries, and with the support of 
developing countries represented on the Preparatdry Committee 
- El Salvador and Uruguay who were members of the committee 
but non signatories declared at the thirty-sixth session of 
ECOSOC (see E/3817) that they too adhered to the joint 
statement and had not done so when invitations to participate 
had been made only because their representatives were not 
present at the time. 
(119)In 1963 the U.N. had 76 ldc members. Cuba and the Ivory Coast 
did not co-sponsor the Joint Declaration but New Zealand did 
since as primarily an exporter of agricultural products it 
had similarities with the African, Asian and Latin American 
states. 
(120) UNGA Resolution 1897 (XVIII). Annex 11November 1963. This 
resolution was sponsored by the Group of 75 and was their 
second collective act. 
86. 
87. 
(121)As Marx wrote, "Men are the producers of their conceptions, 
ideas, etc., - real active men as they are conditioned 
by a definitive development of their productive forces and 
of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest 
forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than con-
scious existence, and the existence of men is their actual 
life process". The German Ideology. (1846) 
(122)"Had there been no United Nations, the formation of a political 
bloc of underdeveloped countries might have been deferred." 
Robert Asher op. cit. p. 639. 
(123)Robertson op. cit. p. 270 quotes a spokesman from a leading 
Third Worla state as saying,"75 is too many. They think that 
votes equal power." 
CHAPTER 3  
The Dynamics of Conference Diplomacy  
Intra-Group Relations at UNCTAD I, Geneva 1964  
The tranisition from the diplomatic solidarity manifested in the 
"Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries" (1) issued in November 
1963 during the eighteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly to 
the permanent unity envisaged by the "Joint Declaration of the Seven-
Seven Developing Countries" 	made at the conclusion of the Geneva 
conference was neither inevitable nor unproblematic. The institutiona-
lisation of the group canvassed by the 1964 Declaration could not have 
been foreseen. It was during the course of the Conference that this 
'event of historic significance' (3) was actualised. The aim of this 
chapter, therefore, is to examine the events of the Geneva Conference 
in order to assess the pertinent organisational factors surrounding 
the creation of the Group of 77. In this sense it will be a con-
tinuation of the historical origins of third world diplomatic 
cooperation discussed in the previous chapter. We will therefore 
focus in detail on the relationship among the developing countries 
at the conference. In so doing the results of the conference will 
not be of primary concern and neither will relations between the 
developing countries and the developed countries and/or the socialist 
states. But before UNCTAD convened in March 1963 there were intense 
diplomatic negotiations in the intervening four month period which 
helped to crystallise the emerging coalition. It is to these efforts 
that we now turn. 
3.1 
Regional Meetings Prior to Geneva  
The groundwork for the solidarity shown in Geneva was to a 
large extent prepared in a series of meetings in the three regional • 
centres of the G77 prior to the Conference. The African, Asian and 
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Latin American states all met at the regional level to discuss the 
forthcoming conference and to coordinate their respective strategies. 
In this process the influence of the regional economic commissions 
was paramount. (4)  Between the end of the eighteenth General Assembly 
(and the declaration of the seventy-five developing countries) and the 
convening of UNCTAD there were definite attempts to develop this new-
found solidarity. In New York, Yugoslavia was instrumental in 
organising the Group of 75 around a ommmon programme. At these 
meetings strategy and tactics were never fully discussed lest the 
newfound unity disappeared but, nevertheless, an impressive measure 
of discipline was attained. (5) Collective discussion of the forth-
coming conference was not restricted solely to the developing countries, 
the Western States, for example, organised a Working Party within 
the Organisation 	Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 
suggest common positions on agenda matters. 
Of the three developing regions Latin America had the most highly 
developed degree of institutionalisation. Within the Latin American 
system several regional economic fora existed wherein matters per-
taining to subsystemic and global economic policy issues could be 
discussed. These included the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA), the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), the Organisation 
of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Centre for Monetary 
Studies (CEMLA), the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for 
Progress (IA - AIP), the Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
(IA - ECOSOCC) and the Committee of Experts on Latin American Trade 
(CECLA). There was thus a wide ranging and varied pattern of 
organisational development with some institutions being mainly 
deliberative and others engaged quite specifically in the integrative 
process in Latin America. It was the Economic Commission for Latin 
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America which took the lead in the planning of a coordinated Latin 
American response to the issues confronting the Conference. To some 
extent the lead taken by ECLA is not surprising when one considers 
that its former executive head, Dr Raul Prebisch, had been appointed 
the Secretary-General of the Conference and it had a well-worked out 
and systematic economic philosophy i.e. an organisational ideology 
concerning the causes of underdevelopment in Latin America and the 
relationship between the workings of the international economy and 
Latin American poverty. At its tenth session, held at Mar del Plata, 
Argentina 6th - 17th May, 1963, the delegates passed resolution 221 (X) 
which, inter alia, called on the ECLA Secretariat to give priority to 
the preparation of those studies relevant to the forthcoming con-
ference which would seek ways and means of solving Latin America's 
trade problem and its economic development. It was stipulated that 
these studies should help the Latin American countries to adopt a 
concerted position at the Geneva Conference. Further, the Secretariat 
was requested to convene a seminar on the forthcoming conference with 
the help of Latin American economic specialists appointed by their 
governments. In furtherance of these aims the ECLA secretariat in 
consultation with eight eminent Latin American economists prepared a 
lengthy report entitled Latin America and the United Nations Conference  
on Trade and Development.  (6) This report was extremely influential 
particularly in setting the framework within which regional discussions 
subsequently took place. A wide-ranging and fairly comprehensive 
document the five chapters of the report covered - 'foreign trade and 
economic development of Latin America; the main obstacles to an 
expansion of Latin America's foreign trade; future prospects and 
lines of action; principal background data on the process of establish-
ing a new world trade order; and the requisites for a new structure 
of international trade and ways of achieving such structures.' (7) 
Of particular interest was its call for the creation of a specialised 
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international organisation within the UN system to deal with all 
international programmes. Recognising the difficulty of establishing 
such an agency immediately the report suggested that in the interim 
UNCTAD could act as the focus for a new international arrangement in 
the trade field. This should be a periodic conference supported by 
a standing committee, and an independent secretariat with its own 
budget and four special committees. One committee would concentrate 
on relations between the developed and cbveloping countries; a second 
on the relations between the centrally-planned economies and the fee-
market countries; a third on relations among the developing countries; 
and the fourth would be a revamped GATT working with the UNCTAD but 
retaining its autonomy. 
Two meeting in January 1964 continued this coordination of Latin 
American countries' economic policy. The first held in Mexico City 
offices of ECLA was a sub-regional and rather limited conference but 
was nevertheless important in the evolution of a coordinated response. 
The EXtraordinary Session of the Central American Trade Sub-Committee 
(6 - 11th January) was a response to a decision by the CACM countries 
at their 8th session in 1963 to work towards the bases of a common 
negotiating policy and structure of a joint negotiating body in order 
to aid these countries in their outward looking policies. With the 
forthcoming Brasilia meeting of Latin American Government Experts, in 
mind, they met to attempt to formulate a joint CACM position for 
that conference. The five memeber states - Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were joined by Panama which had 
observer status. The ECLA report, 'Latin America and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development' formed the basis of 
their discussions. Among the major topics on which agreement was 
reached was preferences and the future institutional pattern of 
world trade. The CACM states called for the developed countries to 
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establish duty-free quotas up to an amount equivalent to 59/0 of their 
domestic consumption in favour of developing countries exports and 
for an end to discriminatory preferences. Their agreement on the 
institutional issue mirrored the conclusions of the ECU report in 
that it envisaged a periodic conference with three subcommittees con-
cerned respectively with developed countries/developing countries 
economic relations, interactions between centrally planned economies 
and free market economies and cooperation among developing countries; 
GATT was to remain an autonomous agency. The resolution adopted at the 
end of this session (8) called inter alia for the coordination of 
action by the CACM countries at both the Brasilia and Geneva meetings. 
One hundred and four experts on trade policy representing nine-
teen member governments of ECLA attended the Latin American Government 
Experts on Trade Policy conference held at Brasilia, Brazil 20 - 25th 
January 1964. The main aim of the meeting was to arrive at a con-
certed Latin American position for the Geneva Conference. This was 
the first time that an attempt had been made to define the bases of 
a common Latin American policy which would be defended at a global 
conference. Despite disagreements among the delegates (Cuba as a 
non-integrated member of the Latin American subsystem particularly 
enjoying a maverick position) the guidelines of the ECLA report 
provided a sufficiently wide framework within which the representatives 
could agree on problems common to the region. One area in which there 
was unanimity was on increased market access for the manufactured 
goods exports of the region. It was emphasised that, 
11 ... an indispensible prerequisite for the attainment 
of a system which met the needs of all developing 
countries was the complete abolition of the 
discriminatory preferences established by 
certain industrialized countries and groups of 
countries in specific geographic areas; they 
had long been hindering the expansion of Latin 
America's exports, and had decisively contributed 
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to the reduction of the Latin American 
countries' share in world trade." (9) 
This diagnosis was preliminary to their advocacy of a non-discrimi-
natory multilateral preference system. Recognising that their varied 
proposals for reform within the international economic system designed 
to inaugurate a new trade and thvelopment policy could not be implemented 
under the existing institutional framework the delegates called for a 
new technically and legally qualified universal body within the U.N. 
system. However, recognising the difficulties in the way of creating 
such an organisation they supported the ECLA plan for the insitutionam. 
lisation of DNCTAD as a periodic conference with three standing 
committees. The delegates also instructed ECLA to convene its Trade 
Committee after the Geneva Conference to evaluate the results of the 
conference and to consider the establishment of a permanent system of 
consultations on trade andcbvelopment within the region. Although 
this agreement on a common regional policy was by experts (albeit 
government appointed) and not by political office holders, neverthe-
less their recommendations to their respective governments carried 
political weight and paved the way for the political endorsement of 
joint action. This came at the meeting of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) held in Alta Gracia, Argentina, February -
March 1964. This meeting had been given a mandate by the second 
annual meeting of the IA - ECOSOC to establish the general lines of 
a uniform foreign trade policy for development. The result of their 
deliberations is contained in the Charter of Alta Gracia. 
This urged the forthcoming conference, inter alia, to establish 
a new international trade structure based on 'a generalized non-
discriminatory treatment of all developing countries', and to 
institute special measures in favour of the least developed countries. 
The most striking aspect of the Charter of Alta Gracia is the attitude 
taken towards third world solidarity. It maintains that, 
"All the decisions taken at Alta Gracia also 
apply to the developing countries in Europe, 
Africa, Asia and Oceania 	 It (Latin 
America) assumes its responsibilities as a 
whole and adds its efforts to those that the 
other developing countries are making to 
attain their common objectives." 
Further it states, 
"Latin America is convinced that an essential 
element for the success of this Conference 
lies in the common denominators that can 
sustain a concerted action with the developing 
countries in other areas of the world. 
Consistent with this objective, we have  
proposed to establish a mechanism of co-
ordination, not only to ensure a common  
Latin American front, but also to achieve  
unified action in the benefit of all the  
developing countries." (10) 
(emphasis mine) 
The meeting also agreed on a series of 'conclusions' covering six 
main areas: 
(i) basic export commodities of Latin America; 
(ii)exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures; 
(iii)trade in invisible items; 
(iv)geographic diversification of trade; 
(v) financing of trade and development; 
(vi)the institutional structure of world trade. 
On the final topic no advance was made on previous formulations: the 
draft more or less, reiterated the recommendations of previous 
regional meetings. The proposal for a periodic conference with an 
independent secretariat and a set of standing committees was 
adopted with one minor change i.e. the creation of an additional 
committee, an advisory committee on trade relations of other 
international organisations. Coordination of policy in Latin 
America with the aim of increasing Latin American solidarity and 
forging links with other Third World states was pursued vigorously 
in whims regional organisations. An outcome of this process was 
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the creation of the Special Committee on Latin American Co-ordination 
(CECLA) established by the Inter-American Economic Council an organ of 
the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1963. CECLA became a 
permanent institution in December 1964 and became the main forum for 
the coordination of Latin American positions in UNCTAD issues until 
it was superseded in 1975 by the Latin American Economic System (SELA). 
The coordination of African states' policies for the Geneva 
Conference was carried out in the Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The ECA at its 
fifth session requested its secretariat to prepare studies relating 
to African trade problems. At the second session of the ECA Standing 
Committee on Trade a discussion was held on action to be considered 
at UNCTAD. Among the participants at this meeting was Dr Prebisch who 
urged the African states to formulate a joint position before the 
Geneva conference. It was decided that the best forum within which to 
discuss a joint strategy would be the 6th session of the ECA. At 
this meeting in Addis Ababa in February 1964 debate centred around 
a discussion document (E/CN. 14/279) prepared by the ECA secretariat. 
The major areas covered by the report were 
(i) expansion of international trade and its significance for 
economic development; 
(ii)international commodity problems; 
(iii)trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures; 
(iv)problems of the invisible trade of developing countries; 
(v)financing for an expansion of international trade; 
(vi)implications of regional economic groupings; 
(40 institutional arrangements; 
The report demanded the removal of developed countries' 
protectionist measures against the commodity and manufactured 
exports of African countries and the end to reciprocity in trade 
relations. It condemned the existing selective preference system 
arguing that while some African states were currently benefitting 
from preferential schemes "it would be in the long-range interest 
of the region as a whole to see such preferences abolished." (11)  
It did, however, recognise that the countries currently enjoying 
preferential treatment in the developed countries' markets would 
need to be compensated for their losses. On the institutional 
issue the report's first choice was for the creation of an inter- 
national trade organisation but it was realised that this might prove 
impossible. The second-best solution was the institutionalisation 
of UNCTAD which would be merged with GATT and existing organisations. 
The new organisation would meet periodically at the general level 
every two or three years and its day-to-day affairs would be super-
vised by a standing committee. The meeting did not agree on a broad 
ranging common programme but did conclude with a general resolution 
which pointed the way forward for increasing cooperation. This 
resolution (12)  called inter alia on African governments to establish 
a co-ordinating committee composed of those African states members 
of the Preparatory Committee and other states subsequently to be 
identified which would, among other tasks, co-ordinate the positions 
of African countries among themselves and with other developing 
countries. 
Discussions within the more political OAU took a firmer stand 
on the question of unity. At its first session held in Niamey, 
Niger, 9 - 13th December, 1963, the Economic and Social Commission 
of the OAU passed a resolution (13) calling on member states to 
pursue jointly certain common positions concerning international 
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trade and development issues. The Niamey Resolution (as it is known) 
outlined eleven areas thought suitable for joint action. These in-
cluded appeals to the developed countries to reform their trading 
practices abolishing discrimination against developing countries 
imports; specific measures aimed at increasing economic cooperation 
among developing countries; action in the commodity field to stabilise 
the prices of primary products; and the revision of existing 
institutional mechanisms. At its tenth meeting the 00 ECOSOC in 
Resolution 2(X) reaffirmed the need to create an international trade 
organisation sympathetic to the needs of developing countries. 
The major potential source of conflict within the group was confronted 
directly and the resultant decision which upgraded the common interest 
was indicative of the future decision-making with the group and the 
G77. Conflict over vertical preferences was contained through the use 
of a formula which accepted the claims of both the opposing factions. 
At its twentieth session, Teheran, March 1964, the Economic 
Commision for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) discussed the forthcoming 
Geneva Conference. Three particular issue-areas not given considera-
tion by the Latin American or African meetings figured prominently in 
the discussions - the transit trade of land-locked countries; trade 
with centrally planned economies; and shipping and ocean freight 
rates. The diverse nature of the Asian group in contrast to the 
African and Latin American was evident from the outset. This reflected 
the particular interests of certain states: Afghanistan, Laos, 
Mongolia and Nepal on the problems of land-locked states; China, 
North Korea, Mongolia and North Vietnam were centrally planned 
economies within the region and intra-regional trade was hampered by 
restrictions placed on trade for political reasons; India was very 
concerned with international shipping problems. The meeting re- 
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salted in the Teheran Resolution (14) which called for various 
remunerative measures to be taken to help the developing countries. 
On the insitutionsl question it was much more conservative than the 
other two regions. Although the existing machinery was held to be 
inadequate the only innovation desired was the periodic convening of 
DNCTAD every two years. Further, great stress was put on the continued 
use of existing international machinery. The Asian countries also 
stressed the need for continued cooperation among developing countries. 
Operative paragraph 2 of the Teheran Resolution considered that 
" ... sympathetic understanding, mutual acammodation 
and concerted action on the part of the developing 
countries are a vital prerequisite not only for 
the immediate success of the Conference but also 
for their long-term interests," 
and operative paragraph 3 urged developing countries in the ECAFE 
region to 
"consult and co-operate among themselves and with the developing countries in other regions dbsely 
and in a spirit of mutual good will with a view 
to reaching amicable and mutually acceptable 
solutions." 
Low level institutionalisation and a very diverse membership 
contributed to a lack-lustre pre-Conference session by the Asian group. 
Meeting after both the Latin American and African groups had forged 
common regional platforms it had little choice but to respond in a 
similar fashion. The political process was developing along bloc 
lines (rather than ideological or economic) and states seeking 
influence would be hard pressed to do so outside the regional context. 
In all three regions some preliminary steps had been 
taken to promote greater unity among the member countries and to pre-
sent as far as possible a common front at the Geneva Conference. 
Further, moving upwards from the regional level the three groupings 
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had all shown a common perception that certain shared interests with 
all developing countries could and should provide the basis for joint 
action on international commercial diplomacy at the Conference and in 
the immediate future. At the conclusion of this process therefore the 
developing countries came to Geneva with the readiness to cooperate, 
initially at the regional level, but ultimately looking beyond that 
to a broader coalition of all developing countries. This new 
orientation was to prove important during the twelve week long 
conference. The political process of the conference was defined 
before it had been convened. The development of bloc politics in the 
U.N. had spilled over into the functional wencies. Before UNCTAD I, 
most states had been involved in some form of collective decision-
making with the aim of arriving at the Conference with a group 
consensus as a bargaining tactic. Before considering the deliberations 
of the conference, it is necessary to consider the general features 
of the political and economic environment within which it was convened. 
3.2 
Environmental Considerations  
Two kinds of macro-environmental considerations are pertinent. 
In so far as the environmental framework had to a large extent been 
sketched in the preceding chapter this section will therefore dis-
cuss some of the most important factors affecting the operational and 
psychological environments of policy makers. (15) 
There were two types of factors affecting the political 
environment, those emanating from world politics generally and those-
specific to the international concern with trade and development 
issues. Of the former type the most important was probably the thaw 
in the Cold War. After the Berlin Crises and Cuban Missile Crisis, 
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Fast-West relations began to approach some form of detente. The 
Partial Test Ban Treaty of August 1963 contributed to this lessening 
of East-West tensions. It was thus possible for the first time in 
the postwar period for both East and West to meet at an international 
conference to discuss the trade problems of the developing world 
without the intrusion of security issues. On the other hand, the link 
made between poverty and instability meant that Western decision-
makers were concerned lest the lack of economic growth in the Third 
World tended to lead to Communist uprisings. This fear particularly 
affected the Kennedy Administration and their regional response to the 
Cuban revolution (the Alliance for Progress) is indicative of this 
line of thinking. President Kennedy's launching of the (first) 
Development Decade in 1961 was another response to this perceived 
threat. (16)  From the perspective of the non-aligned movement the 
change in the Cold War constraint affected a fundamental assumption 
on which the movement was founded. A readjustment and re-orientation 
of priorities was necessary in order to maintain the momentum of the 
grouping. The significance of global inequality which had already 
been recognised now came to the forefront of concerns alongside 
anti-colonialism. The increase in the NAM's numbers as a consequence 
of decolonisation brought into the grouping many extremely poor 
countries, governed by elites cognisant that their internal efforts 
in would befrufficient to meet the demands for economic development 
emanating from their domestic populations. (17) 
Within international institutions there had been an increasing 
concern with the trade problems of the developing countries. Since 
the publication of the Haberler Report in 1958 GATT had been 
engaged in intensive discussions of these problems and was well- 
advanced at this time with the revision of its articles of agreement 
which culminated in the November 1964 adoption of a new chapter, Part 
Pour, to the General Agreement specifically concerned with trade and 
development. (18)  The developments within the U.N. system have been 
extensively described in the last chapter but here we should note -
the resolution convening UNCTAD, the resolution establishing the 
Development Decade and the solidarity of the developing countries 
mirrored in the Joint Declaration of Developing Countries. At a more 
detailed level the period between the decision to convene the 
Conference and its actual opening was important in polarising the 
divisions between the rich and poor. This is evident particularly in 
the debate within the Preparatory Committee (19)  and the Report of 
the Group of Experts (20)  which highlighted the different prevailing 
views of first, the work of the Conference and second, proposed 
changes to the institutional structure of world trade. There was 
among the developing countries an unbounded and indeed false optimism 
concerning what the Conference could achieve and among the developed 
countries an almost equal negativism concerning the hoped for results. 
In this respect the Conference was going to be convened in an 
atmosphere of opposed expectations which would affect both the 
deliberations and outcome. 
The long-wave of capitalist expansion experienced since the 
(21) 	conditions Second World War 	created/conducive to outward looking policies 
in the major trading nations. World production and world trade were 
expanding and the major advanced countries were all enjoying periods 
of growth and prosperity. The one serious problem concerned inter-
national monetary relations where the problem of international 
liquidity had 	 (22) already been identified. 	The U.S. Trade Expansion 
Act (1962) had laid an important foundation for the success of the 
forthcoming Kennedy Round of Tariff negotiations within GATT and 
economic and political elites in the West looked with confidence to 
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the future. For the developing countries the economic outlook was 
more gloomy. Although on average they were enjoying historically 
unprecedented high growth rates the prospects for many of them 
achieving the 596 per annum target of the Development Decade was not 
very hopeful. Rising populations, declining terms of trade, slow 
export expansion, chronic instability of primary commodity prices 
and growing debt service payments all militated against an early 
entry into the take-off to self-sustaining growth. (23) These, then, 
were the major environmental factors extant when the Conference 
began its deliberations. 
3.3 
Organizational Features of the Conference  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in 
Geneva from 23rd March to 16th June 1964, the first major conference 
on international economic relations held within the framework of the 
United Nations since the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment from 21st November 1947 to 24th March 1948, was a 
gathering of historic significance. It was attended by over 2,000 
delegates from 120 countries. (24)  
The overall mood prevailing in the conference was one of North/ 
South confrontation. As such it was the first international 
conference in which this divide appeared as a salient feature of 
world politics obscuring and relegating the EastAest conflict to 
a minor place. This striking feature was a direct result of the 
origins of the conference both in the pressure for its convening in 
the General Assembly and the deliberations of the Preparatory Committee 
at its three sessions. This did not mean that East/Vest considerations 
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were absent from the debates at the conference and this was clearly 
manifest when certain countries protested the absence of the Peoples' 
Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic, North Korea and 
North Vietnam and when some ascribed the economic difficulties of the 
developing countries to the twin evils of capitalism and colonialism. 215) 
The isolation of Cuba in the Latin American group is further evidence 
of this division. North/South confrontation was to a large extent the 
direct result of the unity achieved by developing countries prior to 
the conference and grew out of their tactics during it. This is 
clearly seen in their attempts at pressure politics most noticeably 
in the use of their voting power. (26)  The rift between North and 
South significantly affected the conduct and outcome of negotiations 
and came very close to making the occasion a sterile and unproductive 
affair. (27)  
Negotiations at the Conference was conditioned by two structural 
features. On the one hand there was the formal structure within which 
deliberations were supposed to take place and on the other the in-
formal structure which arose because of the inappropriate nature of 
the formal process. The formal structure consisted of the officers 
of the Conference and the main committees. There was a President 
(Dr Abdel Moneim Kaissouni, Vice-President of the UAR), twenty-seven 
vice-presidents and a Rapporteur (George Hakim, Lebanon). The 
committee structure consisted of first, a General Committee com-
prising the President, Vice-President, Rapporteur of the Conference 
and the Chairman of the five main committees which assisted the 
President in the general conduct of the Conference and ensured the 
co-ordination of its work. Secondly, five Committees of the Whole 
were established for detailed study of the items of the agenda. These 
were First Committee (International Commodity Problems); Second 
Committee (Trade in Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures); Third 
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Committee (Improvement of the Invisible Trade of Developing Countries 
and Financing Sir Expansion of International Trade); Fourth Committee 
(Institutional Arrangements); Fifth Committee (Expansion of Inter-
national Trade and its Significance for Economic Development and 
Implications of Regional Economic Groupings). A Drafting Committee 
was also established for the preperation of the Final Act. There 
were thirty-six plenary meetings; the First Committee held seventy 
meetings; the Second Committee sixty-two; the Third Committee sixty-
four; the Fourth Committee forty-one; and the Fifth Committee forty- 
seven. (28)  The unwieldy nature of Conference proceedings and the 
antagonisms generated by conflicting views led to the increasing 
resort to informal meetings. Informal groups became increasingly 
important as the Conference progressed and the Conciliation Group 
with five developed country and eleven developing country members 
chaired by Prebisch certainly helped in promoting understanding 
among the delegates and in reaching agreement. The use of bloc 
voting by the developing countries was a major cause of this change 
once it was realised that passing resolutions which called on re-
luctant developed countries to make concessions would result in no 
concrete action. 
3.4 
The Role of the Secretary-General of the Conference  
The role of personalities in politics is difficult to assess 
and is usually either overrrated or underrated. (29) The influence 
of the executive head of an organisation must be understood within 
its environmental context, and his/her control over resources. (30)  
Within the general perspective of this chapter, we shall in this 
section be attempting to assess the role played by Dr Prebisch in 
fostering and nurturing the Third World solidarity which concluded in 
the Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries. The 
analysis will focus on his report to the Conference and his activities 
during the ensuing deliberation. 
3.4. 1 
The Prebisch Report  
Prebisch in his capacity as the Secretary-General of the 
Conference produced a report, Towards a New Trade Policy for  
Development 31) which exercised an enormous degree of influence over 
the conference proceedings. Its influence derived from two functions 
which it fulfilled. First, the report largely determined the agenda 
of the Conference and the structure of the five main committees and, 
secondly, it became the manifesto of the developing countries. The 
report's influence in agenda-setting (32)  enabled it to affect the 
resolution of conflicting interests through compromise formulae 
contained within its pages. Ptebisch's conference report was 
elevated to the status of a manifesto for the developing countries for 
a number of reasons. In a clear and penetrating manner Prebisch 
provided a searching critique of Western trade and aid policies and 
argued, forcefully, for reforms of the international trading system 
which would benefit the developing countries. In both analysis and 
prescription, although the report showed a marked bias towards the 
interests of the more advanced among the developing countries, it did 
contain sufficient points of merit to make it acceptable to all 
members of the emerging coalition. The report provided a common 
conceptual framework through which the developing countries could 
first reach agreement among themselves and, secondly, provide the 
bases of the arguments with which the West would be presented. 
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Key concepts and phrases such as the deteriorating terms of trade 
together with the trade gap and the concentration of the external 
obstacles to development with little corresponding analysis of the 
internal obstacles increased its appeal to the developing countries. 
Another reason for the report's popularity among developing countries' 
delegations was suggested by Goodwin, 
"Lack of preperation by ldc delegations and 
general ignorance and lack of skill led to 
the influence of the Prebisch Report." (34) 
Moreover among a plethora of varied documentation the report stood 
out in brevity, clarity and forcefulness, making it the major dis-
cussion document of the Conference. 
The Prebisch Report contained four assumptions. Firs -4 he 
assumed that the countries of the world could be divided into two 
groups, namely, the centre (developed countries) and the periphery 
(developing countries) and that economic processes were different 
within each region. Related to this assumption was a denial of 
Ricardian comparative advantage and instead a belief in an integrated 
capitalist world system which tended to produce disparities between 
the centre and the periphery. Secondly, he argued given the 5% growth 
target of the Development Decade there would be a trade gap of PO 
billion by 1970, mainly because of increased import costs and de-
creased export receipts. Thirdly, Prebisch assumed that the terms 
of trade of raw material producers tended to decline relative to those 
of producers of manufactures. Deteriorating terms of trade were a 
major obstacle to Third World development and therefore the developed 
countries who were benefiting from this trend should provide some 
forms of compensation. Fourthly, he held that there was a 
"persistent tendency towards external imbalance associated with the 
development process." (35) The resulting tendency was that import 
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needs in early industrialisation were different from later stages in 
the process. These four assumptions were crucial to his analysis of 
the relationship between trade and development. The major outlines of 
Ptebisch's argument will be presented below followed by a brief 
critique. 
Prebisch argued that there were various problems inherent in 
reliance on primary commodity exports as the chief income generator. 
The prices of primary commodities were more volatile in the business 
cycle, i.e. they oscillated more in both the upswing and the downswing. 
Instability of prices (and revenue) affected planning for the 
development process. Furthermore the prospects for increased 
revenue from the export of these products were not very promising. 
Two types of obstacles were identified. First, those originating from 
technological and 'natural' market characteristics and, secondly, those 
of a political nature. Low income elasticity of demand for primary 
products in the centre (in other words, as income rose consumers de-
manded less primary products relative to manufactures) and the result 
of technological progress meant that there was a diminishing raw 
material content in manufactures and the increased substitution of 
synthetic substitutes for raw materials. The restrictive policies 
followed by developed country governments, e.g. protection of high 
cost temperate agriculture and the imposition of taxes and duties on 
tropical products, compounded these market features. Similarly, there 
were two types of obstacles (structural and political) to increased 
manufactured exports from developing countries. The structural 
obstacles arise from the deficiency of capital and industrial skill 
in developing countries and the political ones are the result of the 
barriers erected by developed countries against manufactured imports 
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from the periphery. Phrther, he argued that the different competitive 
structures in the centre and periphery militated against the develop-
ment efforts of the periphery by transferring the gains of special-
isation solelt to the centre. A major obstacle in this respect was 
the impact ofirade unions in the centre which prevented real wages 
from being lowered in times of recession compared with the un-
organised worker in the periphery who is not able to benefit from 
increased productivity. Moreover, capital flows from the centre to 
the periphery was not forthcoming in sufficient quantities. This, 
coupled with the slow growth of exports, entailed a growing 
indebtedness for the developing countries. 
Prebisch's policy recommendations for both commodities and 
manufactures "entails an inversion of the protectionist policies of 
the developed countries in favour of the less developed." (36)  
He called for the imposition of quantitative targets for the entry of 
developing countries exports in both sectors into the markets of the 
industrial countries. In the commodity field he suggested the 
extension of domestic price support schemes in developed countries 
to cover ldc imports and the conclusion of commodity agreements to 
establish minimum prices or improve the long-run price trend. Where 
commodity agreements fail or are inappropriate compensatory financing 
should be provided by developed countries, over and above regular 
aid transfers to correct losses from previous deteriorations in the 
terms of trade and future deteriorations. The rate of manufactured 
exports from developing counties was to be increased by (a) a 
universal, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal system of tariff 
preferences granted by the developed countries to the ldcs; 
(b) regional preferential arrangements among developing countries. 
On foreign aid, the report recommended a softening of terms. 
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The Report came in for harsh criticism by academic and govern-
ment circles. The main lines of the critique will be presented 
below. Research showed that the trade gap of $20 billion was not the 
only possible estimate. Bela Balassa, using more sophisticated 
techniques, reached an estimate of between $9.4 412.0 billion (37) 
which is substantially less than the U.N. estimate. Prebisch's 
argument that there is a secular tendency for the terms of trade of 
primary products to decline has come in for severe criticism, (38) 
on theoretical and empirical grounds. It is difficult to use the 
terms of trade as an analytical device when there are seven different 
indices (39) which can be calculated, all of which would give 
different results and over the long term lose their accuracy. 
Prebisch concentrates on the commodity (net barter) terms of trade 
which may result in misleading calculations. For example, if 
productivity improves in a country's export sector and export prices 
fall but less than the increase in productivity, the commodity terms 
of trade will deteriorate but the single factoral terms of trade 
will improve. Further, the base year chosen affects the calculations. 
Prebisch used 1950 (a U.N. base year) when, because of the Korean 
War boom, raw material prices were abnormally high (in fact, higher 
than at any time in the preceding century). The historical evidence 
does not show a long-run trend and is in fact inconclusive. Also, 
changes in the terms of trade do not in themselves imply adverse 
changes for development because the concept does not take into 
account qualitative changes in the products trade and nor the 
introduction of new products. EVen if all these objections were over-
looked it would still be inappropriate to use the concept as an 
index ofrelative welfare since (i) it is an index of prices and not 
incomes; (ii) it measures the relative returns to producers and not 
countries; (iii) it makes no concession to changing population and 
relative productivities. (40) When Prebisch argues that low income 
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elasticity in the developed countries inhibit developing countries 
commodity exports, he is correct but the slow growth of demand could 
be counteracted by increased imports from other ldcs or the socialist 
bloc, which he omits. His argument that aid, increased exports and 
improved terms of trade are the means to bridge the 'gap' is a 
misleading generalisation when applied to all ldcs, since any balance 
of payments' deficit is ultimately traceable to an excess of invest-
ment over saving and this can only be improved by a relative increase 
in saving if the investment rate is to be maintained. Given that 
trade and aid are not substitutable, some developing countries, 
e.g. most of those in Africa would be more reliant on increased aid. (41) 
Allied to this analysis of the international economy was an 
assessment of GATT and a proposal for institutional reform. Ptebisch 
praises GATT's main achievements - severely curtailing restrictive 
practices; providing an orderly framework for the conduct of inter-
national trade; its machinery for complaint and consultation; its 
role as a forum; and the reduction made in tariffs. But he argues 
that overall these reductions have mainly been of benefit to the 
industrial countries; the Havana Charter rules of free trade are 
inappropriate to the developing countries but even where relevant the 
rules and principles have not always been complied with by the 
developed countries. Be does not see GATT as a sufficiently dynamic 
organisation able to implement proposals beneficial to the developing 
countries. Associated with GATT's failure has been the fact that 
international trade problems are not dealt with in a coordinated 
manner. He therefore proposes a new international trade organization 
with the following features: 
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(a) a periodic conference where the problems of international 
trade would be discussed as an integral part of the general 
problem of development; 
(b) a standing committee to examine and revise the trade policy 
agreed at the conference; 
(c) an independent secretariat within the framework of the U.N. 
The critics held that a new organisation was unnecessary and would 
merely duplicate the work of existing agencies. The activities in GATT 
since 1958 and the moves toward Part IV of the Agreement were cited to 
show that GATT could respond effectively to the needs of the develop-
ing countries. 
These criticisms were generally made by the developed countries 
but positive support for Prebisch's arguments could be found among the 
developing countries since this analysis matched their mood and 
aspirations. As such the report fell on fertile ground. It was not 
as is generally maintained a new look at trade and development. The 
underlying analysis and arguments had been around for some years and 
had come to be known as the Prebisch-Singer thesis, (42) and as 
Executive-Secretary of ECLA Prebisch had been publishing similar 
arguments for some time. It is noteworthy for example that at the 
ECLA and ECA meetings prior to the conference the documentation had 
mentioned the declining terms of trade. What the report did was to 
produce the argument in an intelligent, closely argued and accessible 
manner. The neutral air surrounding the report of the Conference's 
Secretary-General added to its popularity among certain 'uncommitted' 
ldc delegations. 
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3.4. 2 
Prebisch's Influence  
"Dr Prebisch was not only the Secretary- 
General of UNCTAD, but its spiritus rector 
and, above all, its hortatory economist, a 
function quite unusual for a Secretariat 
official. It was he who conceived the 
platform of the Group of Seventy-Seven in 
Geneva." (43) 
Apart from the influence he exercised through his Report, Prebisch's 
control of the Secretariat increased his stature, his efforts at 
mediation and exhortation. At the Geneva Conference members of the 
Secretariat under the direction of Ptebisch cooperated openly with 
the G75. They helped them to draft resolutions and to present their 
arguments. In one sense this reflected Prebisch's belief in a biased 
(in the interests of justice) but objective secretariat (44) and on 
the other it mirrored the self-interest of the U.N. officials who 
stood to gain if alarm/ organisation were created. This close 
cooperation between international officials and national delegations 
whilst perhaps inappropriate in such a setting was not unknown within 
international organisations. (45) However the openly political role 
adopted did not please the Western nations; Gardner quotes a western 
offical to the effect that, "This is not a secretariat - it's a 
(46) sectariat". 	Ptebisch was in constant touch with officials of 
the G75 and he was very instrumental in mediating between conflicting 
interests within the group. The institutional issue which was the 
occasion for the most bitter wrangling of the conference and which 
also provided the spur to greater ldc unity was largely solved due to 
Prebisch's intervention. It was he who pleaded with the radicals 
among the G75 to accept the compromise with the West worked out by 
the contact group and at a private dinner attended by the leaders of 
key delegations 48 hours before the conference threatened to collapse 
in disarray, he pleaded with the assembled delegates to accept a 	• 
(47) compromise. 
Prior to the conference he had toured Africa and Asia attempting 
to get support for increased Third World solidarity. At Geneva he 
provided both intellectual and material input in attempting to con-
struct the coalition. Possibly, without him, the diverging interests 
would have been too great and the fragile unity would have collapsed. 
But together with trusted secretariat officials Prebisch tried to 
devise a common strategy for the G75 and aided their internal 
deliberations by interveing in the process whereby interest were 
reconciled. 
3.5 
The Negotiations  
The negotiations took place within formal and informal structures. 
The main conference held thirty six plenary meetings, the first 
twenty-four 23rd March - 8th April providing the occasion on which 
delegations from governments and international organizations made 
opening speeches. The importance of the occasion was shown by the 
large number of Cabinet Ministers present. Closing statements were 
made at the thirtieth to thirty-sixth plenary, inclusive, 10th -16th 
June. The main committees commenced their deliberations on the 
23rd March and ended on the 4th June with the exception of the Fourth 
Committee which ended one day later. The recommendations of the 
committees were discussed and voted upon in plenary and the conference 
resulted in fifteen general principle and thirteen special principles 
and a series of recommendations which form part of its Final Act. (48)  
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3.5.1 
Substantive Issues  
The major substantive issues facing the conference had been the 
subject of intensive discussion prior to Geneva in the Preparatory 
Committee (49) 	 (50) and by the Group of EXperts 	appointed by ECOSOC. 
Discussion centred around (i) commodities; (ii) manufactures; 
(iii) capital flows; (iv) invisibles; (v) institutional 
arrangements. 
(i) Commodities. Given the South's almost total reliance on 
commodity exports as a source of export revenue commodity 
policy was a high priority item. The twin problems of chronic 
instability in commodity markets and the deteriorating terms of 
trade and the restrictions on access to the markets of the 
developed countries provided the background to the debate. 
The relationship between instability and economic development 
is not unproblematic and the suggested solutions - some form 
of stabilization agreement and/or compensatory financing 
consequently provoke intense debate. 
(ii)Manufactures. The problem in this issue-area concerned the 
small share the developing countries had in the world market 
and the slow growth of their exports. Debate revolved around 
the protectionist policies of the industrialised countries 
which hindered ldc export prospects through the use of sliding 
scales of tariffs (51)  and quantitative restrictions. The 
major proposal for increased market access was the creation of 
a universal non-discriminatory system of preferences which 
provoked violent argument. 
(1i) Capital Flows. The flow of both private and official development 
assistance was held to be inadequate to meet the needs of the 
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developing countries. Apart from the size of the flow the 
terms and conditions were not as liberal as they could be and 
contributed to mounting foreign indebtedness. The limitations 
of capital flows led to calls for 'trade not aid' but the general 
consensus was on the need for supplementary financing and an 
improvement in the repayment periods and interest rates currently 
attached to loans. 
(iv)Invisibles. Here, interest focused on the deleterious effect 
invisibles had on ides balance of payments. The practices of 
the liner conferences came under scrutiny in the shipping field 
and discriminatory practices in insurance was also discussed. The 
possibility of ides increasing their receipts from tourism was 
also debated. 
(v) Institutional arrangements. The shortcomings of GATT and the 
lacunae in international orgartations were debated. Although it 
can be argued that following the work of the Preparatory 
Committee some new institutional structure was likely to 
emerge from the Conference it did provide the most heated 
exchanges. 
(vi)Miscellaneous. These included the transit problems of the 
land-locked countries, and economic relations between countries 
having different economic and social systems. 
Three sets of negotiations - commodity policy, preferences and the 
institutional issue will now be discussed from the perspective of 
intra-G75 relations because the politicisation of the proceedings 
are more clearly evident in these issue-areas. Mixed bargaining over 
these three aspects of conference diplomacy provided the immediate 
framework within which the coalition was consolidated. 
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This recommendation (52)  proposed the abolition of protectionist 
policies - the removal of quantitive restrictions and internal fiscal 
charges; a curtailment of non-tariff barriers or non-tariff barriers 
and a ceiling on the increase in tariff and BTB rates; and the 
elimination of preferential arrangements between the developed and 
developing countries. The ldcs, produced a united front on all three 
issues except the last, the inclusion of which produced a heated and 
bitter argument between the Francophone Africans and the other 
developing countries. This conflict arose over the existing preferences 
which the Francophone Africans states enjoyed and which would be 
eliminated by such a move. On the other hand the devekped countries 
refused to sanction any programme which implied greater commitment 
and preferred that the GATT Action Program be taken as a guideline. 
The French however were sympathetic to the management of international 
commodity markets, but hostile to any programme which implicitly 
attacked and threatened the agricultural policies of the Common 
Market. The United States, sponsors of the resolution, espoused 
liberal free trade principles and refused to consider measures which 
constituted intervention in world commodity markets. The developing 
countries sought some form of compromise which would include all 
members of the G75 and meet the objections of the Francophone Africans. 
This was found by agreeing to provide compensation for those countries 
whose preferential market access would be phased out. In other words 
a solution which in Haas' terminology split the difference between 
the two groups. The new draft resolution (53) was co-sponsored by 
sixty-one developing countries and this gave them a much firmer base 
from which to win concessions from the rich countries. This draft 
recommendation was adopted by the committee and forwarded to the 
plenary, but the widespread support was by no means unanimous among 
the ides. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, although not voting 
against the resolution, entered reservations in respect of the 
3.5.2 
Commodity Policy 
Debates on international commodity problems in the First Committee 
were structured around the five aspects featured in its agenda. 
a) Review of the long.-term trends and prospects for primary 
commodity producers (including terms of trade); 
b) Programme of measures and actions for the removal of obstacles 
(tariff, non-tariff and other) and of discriminatory practices 
together with the expansion of market opportunities for primary 
commodity exports and increases in their consumption and imports 
in developed countries; 
c) Measures and actions for the promotion of trade in primary 
commodities among developing countries; 
d) Measures for stabilization of primary commodity markets at 
equitable and remunerative prices including commodity arrangements; 
e) International compensatory financing and measures for stabiliza-
tion of primary export earnings at adequate levels. 
The major negotiations took place in respect of items (b) and 
(d) above. In general the developing countries were seeking 
measures to correct their trade problems and the developed countries 
attempted to forestall any proposal that would lead to direct action. 
The discussions highlighted the slow growth of ldcs primary commodity 
exports; their falling share of the market and problems pf declining 
prices. Action in respect of both long and short-run trends were 
required. The discussion on compensatory financing was conducted 
solely at a general level in the First Committee with no attempt to 
reconcile the conflicting interests. At the outset of the negotiations 
thirty-nine developing countries proposed a comprehensive series of 
measures aimed at correcting the imbalances in the commodity market. 
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transitional measures on preferences, arguing that preferential 
arrangements among developing countries was also harnbal and the 
failure to reflect this in the draft resolution meant that an 
important area for action was being excluded. As beneficiaries of 
Commonwealth preferences the Caribbean states wanted more stringent 
safeguards to protect their interests during the transitional period. 
Jamaica pointed out that such arrangements could only be phased out 
with the mutual consent of the contracting parties; special machinery 
needed to be established to guarantee that equivalent advantages were 
received by the preference-losing countries; and these measures ought 
to go beyond financial compensation and help to offset the social and 
economic repercussions likely to result from the loss of preferences. 
The Conference adopted nine recommendations in the commodity field, 
seven without dissent. For the G75 the preference issue presented 
an exercise in distributive bargaining but the other aspects of the 
commodity negotiations corresponded to integrative bargaining. In 
the commodity negotiations, the subject of preferential treatment 
was of minor concern and didn't threaten the solidarity on other 
issues. 
3. 5. 3 
Preferences  (54)  
The issue of preferential treatment for manufactured goods was 
one in which the developing countries were divided by an ascriptive 
trait. Some countries enjoyed preferential access to the the markets 
of the EUropean Community and others to the Commonwealth. Many 
countries not enjoying such preferences, particularly the Latin 
Americans, wanted an end to this neo-classical arrangement. In the 
argument for increased market access of ldc manufactured exports to 
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the developed countries, the existence of selective preferences 
proved to be a serious obstacle. Those developed countries, aware 
of the effects of reverse preferences on their export prospects, also 
wanted an end to this system. On this issue, therefore, the natural 
division was between preference receiving and preference giving 
countries and others. But the more developed ides receiving 
preferences were prepared to sacrifice their existing preferences in 
limited markets for access to a wider, universal, non-discrimintory 
preferential system. 
In the debate in the Second Committee the developing countries 
attempted to reconcile their conflicting interests since in the 
absence of ldc unity no conference decision would be possible. 
Agreement on the preference issue was further complicated by the 
divisions among the developed countries. The United States administra-
tion was adamantly opposed to any preferential scheme. The idea was 
against traditional U.S. support for non-discrimination and the U.S. 
delegation did not want any interference with the MFN principle. 
Fiirther, the U.S. argued that any such scheme would have an 
insignificant effect on the promotion of manufactured exports from 
the ides (the forthcoming Kennedy Round was likely to have more 
impact); it would promote inefficiency and the administrative costs 
would be too high. The other major developed countries, on the other 
hand, supported the idea in principle but differed on its application. 
The United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark argued in 
support of a single preferential scheme granted by all developed 
countries to all developing countries. Belgium and France supported 
a scheme first proposed by M.Maurice Brasseur, the Belgian Minister 
for External Trade in GATT in 1963 and revived by France at the 
Conference. (55) The "Brasseur Plan" envisaged a system of limited 
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scope and duration. Individual negotiations would take place 
between each developed country and each developing country on the 
preferential margins, duration of preference and quantity of imports 
to which the preference applied for each commodity. The developing 
countries were divided over the purpose (to increase export proceeds 
or support infant industries); duration (permanent or for a definite 
period of development); coverage (equally to all ldcs or differentiated 
according to the stage of development); existing preferences (to be 
retained or to be sacrificed in favour of general preferences). This 
division was reflected in four draft resolutions submitted to the 
Committee, (56)  and the arguments among the developing countries. The 
African states associated with the Edropean Community initially 
refused to countenance giving up their special preferences and the 
Latin American group refused to accept the continuation of 
selective preferences. The African Associates generally in favour 
of the Brasseur Plan argued that the abolition of selective preferences 
could not be contemplated until their economies were fully integrated 
into the world economy. In the compromise agreed after the African 
Associates decided to put unity first, a generalised system was 
agreed but provision was made for compensation to be given to those 
countries which would lose existing preferences. Outnumbered, even 
within their regional group the African Associates eventually opted 
for a formula similar to the one they had agreed at the regional 
level. This rather vague formula was an unsatisfactory protection for 
their industries and generally the poorer, less developed countries 
would gain hardly any benefit from such a scheme. It was a recognition 
of this fact that led Jamaica to call for preferences for infant 
economies rather than infant industries. The argument of the larger 
states was summed up by Manubhai Shah, the Indian Minister of 
Commerce and head of the Indian delegation who wrote some years 
later that, 
"While it is true that initially some developing countries would benefit little 
more than other developing countries by a 
generalised system of preferences, there 
is no doubt that in the long run, the 
universal system of preference would be 
the greater growth factor for all 
developing countries." (57) 
The agreed draft resolution (58) which was voted on was the 
result of the deliberations of a Working Group set up by the Committee. 
The developing countries were united in their support of this resolution 
which fudged all the main difficulties. The Prebisch proposals had 
formed the basis of which compromise had been reached and satisfied 
those, for example, the Latin Americans who wanted all selective 
preferences abolished and those, for example, Uganda and the African 
Associates who were hesitant to risk present advantages without 
guarantee of adequate compensation or special measures for the least 
developed. Once special treatment had been conceded for the least 
developed, agreement could be reached. The agreement reached in the 
G75 was one which essentially papered over the cracks and represented 
a temporary tactical retreat by the Francophone preference re-
ceiving states. The eventual G75 position emerged and unity was 
attained because of the operation of a number of factors. First, 
the Francophone Africans were in a minority and had already 'lost' 
the argument within the African group. Secondly, they knew that 
the EEC would never implement any scheme detrimental to the interests 
of the Associates. Thirdly, Prebisch and the Secretariat were in 
favour of a generalised scheme and lobbied tirelessly on behalf of 
the proposition. Fourthly, apart from numerical inferiority the 
Francophone states lacked the diplomatic skill of larger ldcs in 
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favour of the abolition of vertical preferences. Finally, as one 
of the poorest constituent groups of the coalition the Francophone 
eta es needed the support of the majority for measures (in the 
commodity field) of direct relevance to their economic development. 
3.5.4 
The Insitutional Issue  
It was the institutional issue in the U.N. which had first helped 
form the solidarity of the developing countries and it was this issue 
at the conference which was mainly responsible for the creation of a 
permanent grouping. Two major reasons accounted for this. First, 
the lack of success on substantive issues made the developing 
countries realise that their efforts for real changmsin international 
distribution would fail unless a new organisation was created to 
oversee developments. Secondly, the response of the Western 
countries to the demands for a new institution and their stand on 
the voting issue angered many ides. Prior to the conference, the 
three ldc regional groups had all made proposals concerning future 
institutional developments. The most detailed consideration of the 
issue had taken place in Latin America and the common position was 
a call for a periodic conference with a standing committee and various 
subsidiary bodies. This new organisation to be serviced by an 
independent secretariat was very similar to the proposal contained 
in the Prebisch Report. The West bad also considered the issue in 
the OECD and although some states were in favour of some form of 
periodic conference and standing committee, serviced by the U.N.ls 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the general position was 
one of opposition to the tampering with existing institutions and 
outright hostility to any attempt to impinge on GATT's functions. 
122. 
The Soviet Union and the East European Countries had long made their 
view known, i.e. they wanted the creation of an ITO. (59) 
When negotiations on this issue commenced four (60)  different 
factions can be identified among the developing countries. First, 
those who wanted the creation of an ITO e.g. Burma and Ghana. 
Secondly, the vast majority who supported the idea of periodic 
conferences and a standing committee e.g. most of the Latin Americans 
and Syria and Thailand. Thirdly, those who felt that the existing 
institutions and a remodelled GATT would suffice, e.g. the Dominican 
Republic, India, Liberia and Malaysia. Finally, there was a fourth 
group of undecideds who could see merits in either creating a new 
organisation or expanding GATT's role e.g. Nepal, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Jamaica. No attempt was made at the outset to reach 
agreement among the different factions and this rather vague situation 
continued during the early discussions with focused on an assessment 
of existing organisations. It was not until the fourth week of 
deliberations that the issue began to assume the importance it 
subsequently gained. The immediate cause of the frantic negotia-
tions and acrimonious debates which were to last until the 
Conference ended came on the 20th April when Burma, Ghana, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Syria tabled a joint draft resolution (61) in the Fourth 
Committee. This envisaged the Conference becoming a standing organ 
of the United Nations. Established under A ticle 22 of the U.N. 
Charter, it would become the highest specialized forum in the U.N. 
dealing with international trade and cbvelopment. This new body 
would meet periodically, every three years and report directly to the 
General Assembly by-passing ECOSOC. It would have a Standing 
Committte (The Trade and Development Council) which would meet 
annually and be empowered to initiate, deliberate and execute policy 
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within the purview of the Conference. Provision was also made for 
• the creation of specialised commissions and an independent secretariat 
- GATT would become a Commission on Tariffs reporting annually to the 
Council. The Conference would harmonise the activities of governments, 
regional commissions and co-ordinate the activities of existing 
organisations. This resolution had been tabled without any prior 
consultations with other developing countries and the co-sponsors 
had been instructed by the secretariat to present such a strong 
resolution as an opening bargaining tactic in the attempt to get a 
unified ldc position. (62) As such the resolution was successful in 
that the 19 Latin American countries responded with their own draft 
resolution. (63) Based on the Charter of Alta Gracia it was milder 
in tone than the five-power draft. This draft resolution envisaged a 
Conference reporting to the General Assembly through ECOSOC; an 
Executive Council which would be an organ of the General Assembly; 
furthermore the independence of the Secretariat was not stressed and 
no mention was made of relations with GATT. The attempt to reconcile 
the two developing countries' drafts began and the delicate 
negotiations were affected by the submission of a Western draft 
resolution (64)  on Nay 6th which, whilst accepting the idea of a 
periodic conference and a standing committee, was nevertheless wholly 
negative in character and offered the minimum possible. According 
to this draft, the new organisation would be completely subservient 
to ECOSOC and the standing committee, a kind of updated CICT. The 
role of the Conference was limited to a forum for the consideration 
of trade and development problems, the Secretariat would be an 
integral part of the U.N. and GATT would lose none of its autonomy. 
After intensive negotiations the group of developing countries 
were able to agree on a joint draft resolution (65)  which was sub- 
mitted to the committee along with a revised Eastern European draft (66)  
(67) and a revised Western one. 	At this stage of the conference the 
failure to reach agreement on other substantive issues with the 
developed countries and the dynamic of conference procedure con-
tributed to the quest for compromise on the institutional issue among 
the ides. Subsequently the debate became polarised between the 
developed and developing countries. Debate centred around the follow-
ing concrete issues. (i) The developing countries draft argued that 
the new organisation should report to the General Assembly and be 
based on Article 22 of the U.N. Charter. The developed countries 
refused any mention of Article 22 and stated that the new organization 
should be created in accordance with Article 13 and Chapters IX and X 
of the U.N. Charter. (ii) The developing countries wanted the body 
to exercise overall responsibility for the promotion of international 
trade and development. The West argued that the C nference should 
concentrate on the trade problems related to international develop-
ment. (iii) Specifically the developing countries envisaged the 
Conference 
(a) developing policies for the expansion of trade between 
countries at similar levels of development; at different 
levels of development and with different economic and 
social systems; 
(b) establishing principles and policies relating to trade 
and development; 
(c) setting up the means to put these policies into action; 
(d) promoting the coordination of international, financial 
and commercial policies; 
(e) establishing machinery for the formulation and 
adoption of multilateral agreements; 
(f) reviewing, evaluating and coordinating the activities 
of other institutions; 
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(g) harmonizing the policies of government and regional 
economic groupings. 
The developed countries foresaw more limited aims, 
(a) the promotion of trade between countries at different 
stages of development or with different social and 
economic systems; 
(b) formulation of principles and policies and the study 
of the legal base of multilateral trade relations 
only between those two groups; 
(c) continuing review of organizational work 
(iv) The developing countries wanted the Standing Committeeto have 
52 members elected by the Conference. The developed Conference wanted 
a 40-member body whose membership would have to be confirmed by 
ECOSOC. (v) Furthermore the ides wanted three commissions - 
commodities, manufactures and financing and invisibles - the developed 
countries only wanted one on commodities. (vi) Finally, the ldcs 
proposed that all members of the Council should have one vote and 
decisions be taken by simple majority. The Western counties agreed 
with the single vote but wanted decisions to be reached only after a 
majority of the twelve major trading states present and voting had 
cast affirmative votes. 
In the negotiations which followed the fragile unity of the G75 
was severely tested. This paper unity of the G75 was to become a common 
feature of G77 politics i.e. agreement on broad principles which 
hide conflicting interests, perceptions and interpretations. The 
general orientations above were narrowed down to 
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(a) autonomy of the continuing machinery; 
(b) the size and composition of the standing committee 
and the principle of equitable geographic distribution; 
(c) areas in which other bodies should be created; 
(d) the voting arrangements. 
Certain members of the G75 sought to reach a compromise with tie 
developed counties on all these issues while more militant states 
refused to consider any changes to the draft resolution sponsored by 
the developing countries. Even on the voting issue which aroused most 
controversy between the groups some ldc delegates were willing to 
accept the dual voting formula. That they did not do so is attributed 
by Gardner, the U.S. negotiator, to the lack of preparatory diplomatic 
groundwork; delegates felt that they had no authority from their 
governments to accept such a major break with U.N. procedure. (68)  
To the radicals the political significance of the voting issue was so 
great that they could not countenance compromise. Gardner quotes one 
delegate as saying, 
"Those in possession must be relieved of 
their possessions. There are only two ways 
to do this - by force or by votes. We do 
not have the force, but we do have the 
votes. And you are trying to take away 
our votes!" (69) 
With time running out the radical states urged that the ides draft 
resolution be put to a vote. They could see very little benefit 
from continued negotiation and did not want the draft weakend by 
compromise. To preserve unity, the other members of the G75 agreed 
and the draft was passed in the Fourth Committee by 83 votes to 20 
with 3 abstentions on 2nd June. Many ides voting for the resolution 
despite reservations because they knew that without western support 
and hence funding no new organization would emerge. With the vote a 
new phase of negotiations was entered into. The developed countries 
argued that the vote was not definitive and an effort should be made 
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to seek some compromise. Given the unease expressed by developed 
countries' representatives and perhaps remembering the fate of the 
CICT the developing countries agreed to more consultations. Within 
the G75 there were two contrasting positions on these new negotiations. 
The mpTimalists e.g. Burma and Ghana believed that the resolution 
adopted should be adhered to whilst the moderates e.g. India and 
Brazil saw it as a negotiating position. (70) A small compromise 
group led by Prebisch attempted to reconcile the two sides but the 
radicals in the G75 refused to support the negotiators accusing 
them of a sell-out. The original ldc negotiators then withdrew and 
their place was taken by the maximalist states. Dissension within 
the group was at its most severe and at this juncture the group was 
on the verge of collapse. The uncompromising position (71)  adopted 
by the new negotiators failed to make any headway with the developed 
countries and realising the futility of their efforts the 'radicals' 
withdrew ensuring the return of the original negotiators who managed 
to secure a compromise with the developed states. This draft 
recommendation presented to the plenary was basically the Prebisch 
formula with a few concessions on decision-making (the creation of a 
conciliation mechanism) and coordination (the Conference would report 
to the General Assembly through ECOSOC) to the developed countries. 
The developing countries had forged a unity on the institutional 
issue where none existed at the outset and had succeeded in main-
taining this unity despite severe strains and conflicting interests. 
Those who did not want to jeopardise any gains in GATT e.g. India 
were prepared for compromise with the West and those who wanted an 
ITO e.g. Burma and Ghana, in the end sank their differences to 
preserve the fragile unity. It became clear that votes alone were 
insufficient to force change. Some measure of agreement with the 	• 
West was necessary. Attitudinal cleavages separated the G75 on this 
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issue and seriously threatened consensus formation. The tendency 
toward fractionalisation was curbed through persuasive appeals to 
shared values. 
3.5.5 
Group Dynamics  
The most striking and important feature of the Geneva Conference 
was the display of unity exhibited by the developing countries in the 
G75. (72) As The Observer noted at the time, 
"The emergence of the 75 as a united front 
is seen by the Western delegates as perhaps 
the most important political phenomenon of 
the last 20 years." (73) 
This coalition had not existed prior to the Conference and indeed at 
the outset of the meeting they were not organised as a group. (74)  
For the first two to three weeks there was little attempt at 
coordination and the delegations and regional groups worked at 
cross-purpose. The 1963 Joint Declaration and the regional meetings 
prior to Geneva had laid the basis for cooperation, but this had not 
developed into the institutional focus of a untied grouping. It was 
only as the Conference drew to a close and especially over the in-
stitutional issue that the divisions began to disappear and the 
impressive display of unity so noticeable in the voting on the 
recommendations and resolutions contained in the Final Act, emerged. 
The vmdlous participants had prior to the conference attempted to 
establish group positions - the three developing regions, the OECD 
and Comecon. The initial atmosphere, therefore, was one which 
encouraged group negotiations, and the size and complexity of the 
agenda, the type of issues under discussion and the modalities of U.N. 
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politics made a group politics approach inevitable. The developed 
capitalist states had been unable to agree on a coordinated strategy 
beforehand and during the Conference there were significant splits 
between the U.S. on one hand and the EEC (mainly France) and sometimes 
the U.K. on the other. As the Conference progressed, the western 
states made more strenuous efforts to act as a group. The socialist 
states had from the outset acted as a group and their marginality to 
the central issues made this solidarity easier to maintain. The 
development of a group approach to negotiations accentuated divisions, 
heightened tension and increased confrontation. This confrontation 
did not hamper the work of all the committees. In the Third 
Committee dealing with invisibles and financing there was much 
constructive dialogue and some draft resoltions were co-sponsored by 
the developed and developing countries. EVen the U.S. co-sponsored 
a draft resolution on guidelines for international financial 
cooperation 	CONF. 46/C.3/L.3/ with 12 ides. Harry Johnson 
cynically puts this agreement down to the difference between 
giving taxpayers money away and fighting powerful interest lobbies. (75) 
 The developing countries saw unity as a source of strength in that it 
aided in the articulation of demands and improved their negotiating 
capacity. The use of bloc voting and log-rolling tactics gave a 
greater appearance of unity than our investigations have shown. If 
unity can be conceived as having both positive and negative sources 
the unity achieved by the developing countries was founded on 
negative rather than positive factors. This unity was inspired by 
the negativism of the developed countries and the realisation that 
results would only be achieved through concerted pressure. The 
larger states lacked the means to negotiate change on their own and 
needed the diplomatic support of the smaller ones. The poorest 
states were in the weakest position of all and needed to belong to a 
larger coalition to make any gains. With more sophisticated spokes-
men and larger delegations the more advanced among the developing 
countries were able to exercise the greatest influence over group 
deliberations, hence the interests of the least developed tended to 
be down graded. The wide-ranging composite nature of the draft 
resolution allowed the inclusion of diverse and sometimes competing 
claims but the influence of the Prebisch Report with its bias towards 
the more advanced ldcs resulted in decisions favouring this group. 
On the other hand, the manner of reaching accommodation within the 
group, through persuasion and conciliation, meant that all opinions 
received an equal hearing, hence minorities could play a larger role 
than their numbers allowed. Two rules of behaviour giving equal weight 
to all members allowed countries to cooperate while preserving their 
interests. First, all proposals had to be agreed by the group before 
they were presented to the developed countries and, secondly, all 
proposals had to be endorsed by all group members. The wide- 
ranging nature of the coalition and the mutual support for different 
demands provided a unifying thread. In this sense the existence of 
cross-cutting :cleavages diminished the fragmentation within the 
group. The form of reaching agreement within the group and the 
nature of the issues ensured that the unity created was of a rather 
special kind. (76)  It was sufficiently strong to concert policies 
whilst retaining reservations of particular issues, but on the issue 
of preferences which was essentially one of distributive bargaining 
the conflict within the group was greatest. 
Within the G75 it is possible to identify various sub-groups and 
spaial interest groups. A detailed examination of the work of the 
plenary and main committees shows that, depending upon the issue and 
the relevant ascriptive or attitudinal cleavage, the G75 split into 
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different groups. (77)  In other words a division Ito radicals and 
moderates is too simplistic. We can distinguish between the more 
advanced ides and the poorer ones, between the countries contemplating 
an abolition of selective preferences and those favouring their 
retention, between those pressing for an ITO or at least a strong 
continuing machinery and those prepared for compromise; the land-
locked states also formed a special group insisting on special 
treatment. The existence of fluid alliance rather than stable ones 
within the group laid the development of a wider consensus. Brazil and 
India, for example, both led the argument against the retention of 
selective preferences but took different approaches on the 
institutional issue. India was more prepared to compromise with the 
developed countries. One can identify certain ideological differences 
of approach. Some states, for example, Burma and Ghana were more 
willing to blame the international capitalist division of labour for 
the ills of the ides than others. In so far as the institutional 
issue was the most highly politicised and polarised it is possible 
to identify differences which existed between those countries still 
having some faith in existing machinery and looking forward to the 
Kennedy Round and those who thought that only new machinery could 
help ldc trade problems. In this respect, a division can be made 
between radicals, e.g. Burma, Ghana and Indonesia and moderates 
e.g. India, Pakistan and Malaysia. 
The influential states at the Geneva meeting were generally 
those which were influential within the general politics of their 
region. Given the regional organisation of the group this is not 
surprising, in a context in which, the possession of the attributes 
and capabilities necessary for exercising ifluence at the Conference 
did not differ markedly from those which gave influence at the 
wider regional level. The major actors, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
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Philippines, Indonesia, Burma (Asian Group); Algeria, Ghana, UAR, 
Nigeria (African Group); Brazil, Argentian, Colombia (Latin American 
Group) and Yugoslavia, can with a few exceptions be identified as 
major regional actors. Influence depended upon the issue under 
consideration, the interest taken in it by a delegation, their 
technical expertise and the comprehensiveness of their preparation 
and the quality of the delegates. Within the group states played 
leading roles either through initiating programmes or acting as 
mediators. Although influential as a leading 'radical', Burma (and 
Afghanistan) nevertheless resented the influence of India and 
Pakistan within the Asian group. Another source of influence came 
from membership of the Steering Committee of the G75 which com-
prised 12 states, 4 from each of the 3 geographical regions. The 
members were Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, the UAR, Ceylon, India, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. Each 
member of the Steering Committee represented the group in one of the 
main committees and acted as spokesman. The Chairman was permanently 
in touch with the conference President and Prebisch. 
The degree of cohesion achieved within the group was certainly 
remarkable. An analysis of the voting records shows a very high 
degree of agreement. The resolutions passed can be divided into two 
categories: The General and Special Principles and the other recommenda-
tions. There were fifteen General Principles and Thirteen Special 
Principles. Of these, all except Special Principle 3 was passed by roll 
call vote. No developing country voted against any principle and 
there were only 18 abstentions. Of these Vietnam had 4 abstentions, 
Brazil 3, Korea and Rwanda, 2 each, and Cameroon, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Uganda, Venezuela, Jamaica and Syria one each. On the recommendations, 
it is difficult to give any fair impression of the voting. Of the 
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61 recommendations, 32 were passed without dissent and of the 
remaining 29, the roll-call vote is only recorded for 15. Thirteen 
of these have ldc abstentions. Apart from Recommendation A.IV.6 on 
Non-Financial Credit Arrangements for the Delivery on Non-Capital 
Goods which had 26 ides abstaining and Panama voting against, none 
have more than 4 states abstaining. Two have 4 states abstaining, 
one 3 states, one 2 states and the remaining eight have just one 
abstention each. 
In attempting to analyse intra-group voting a very simple 
method will be used. The states which dissent most from the norm 
will be used as an example of the highest level of disagreement. We 
have 41 (possible) roll-call votes and Thailand and Vietnam both 
have the highest number of abstentions, 6. Using any random state 
which does not figure in the abslentions column we can calculate a 
Lijphart Index of Agreement (78)on  how close the pair are in their 
voting patterns. Given that the most deviant state is one of the 
pairs this will give the greatest measure of disagreement between 
an abstainer and a state which followed the group line. The 
Lijphart Index is defined as follows:- 
I
A 
= (F +4.44.) x 100 
27t is the total number of roll-call votes that both states 
'participated in, F the number of identical votes they cast, g the 
number in which they showed partial agreement, i.e. where one 
member voted yes or no and the other abstained.2 We can, then, 
calculate the agreement between Thailand and Algeria: 
I
A 
 (Thailand - Algeria) = (35 + 	x 100 = 90 
41 
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The greatest measure of disagreement is found in Thailand, Vietnam 
pairing where there were 9 cases of disagreement. The measures of 
agreement here is 
I
A 
(Thailand - Vietnam) . (32 + 4,.9) x 100 = 89% 
41 
The measure of agreement is high in both oases and we can conclude 
that the solidarity displayed by the group was significant. 
3.5.6 
Results 
The major results of the Conference were the establishment of 
the continuing machinery of UNCTAD and the institutionalisation of 
the G77. (79) Although in hindsight it canbe argued that the 
creation of a new institution was inevitable it was a major 
achievement which, given the developed states' intransigence could 
not have been forecast with any certainty. The new organisation was 
the first major one created by the ides to serve their interests and 
many features first noticeable in 1964 were to become permanent in 
the ensuing years. The acrimonious nature of the Conference was to 
become a feature not just of UNCTAD deliberations but those of other 
bodies and the three-fold division - developed, developing and 
socialist states would become a permanent feature of international 
organizational activity. 
Apart from the creation of the continuing machinery no substan-
tive decisions were taken. The Final Act is a charter of the Third 
World's demands. It proposes increased access for the South's 
manufactured goods in Northern Markets; the regulation and stabilisa-
tion of primary commodity markets and an increase in the flow of 
financial resources from North to South. These were issues which 
would be debated in the coming decades: Northern protectionism, the 
creation of a generalized system of preferences, commodity agreements 
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and the 0.7%, GNP aid target all became major issues in the North-
South debate and within the UNCTAD forum. 
The coalition of the poor designed to articulate these demands 
and negotiate the transition in international economic relations was 
a direct product of this conference. The Joint Declaration of the 
77 Developing Countries at the end of the Conference pointed the way 
to a continued cooperation and harmonisation of views. Indeed, the 
decision-making structure of the continuing machinery provided a 
stimulus for continued cooperation with its group system. Phrthermore 
the conduct of multilateral negotiations on international economic 
relations were irrevocably changed. As U Thant recognised, 
" ... The South can be identified as a large 
group of more than 75 votes, when it chooses to assert itself. In demonstrating such a 
possibility, the Conference may have signalled 
a turn in the history of international 
economic relations." (80) 
3.6 
Conclusion  
The passage from the 1963 Declaration to the 1964 Declaration and 
decision to continue acting as a permanent group was not an 
inevitable one. This chapter has tried to describe and account for 
the major factors at work in this evolution. The importance of the 
regional groups and regional meetings; the Prebisch Report as a 
conceptual framework; Prebisch and the temporary secretariat as 
catalysts; the negativism of the West; the lack of progress on 
substantive issues and the subsequent political significance 
attached to the institutional issue; the relative weakness of the 
developing countries; all contributed to this process. The coalition 
constructed was a very fragile one with many conflicting interests, 
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but the form of the coalition and the nature of its decision-making 
enabled states to be members without sacrificing values. One 
cannot rank the causal factors involved; they were all important in the 
specific historical process. Underlying the historical survey in this 
and the previous chapter is an appreciation of the impoAhnce of 
organisational factors to political outcome. The following section 
develops the organisational perspective through an analysis of UNCTAD 
and the institutionalisation of the Group of Seventy-Seven. 
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CHAPTER 4  
The Institutional Framework of the United  
Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
The aim of this chapter is to describe and assess the importance 
of UNCTAD's institutional features for the growth and development of 
the G77. The institutional venue for multilateral diplomacy is a 
vital part of the policy-making process. (1)  In other words conference 
diplomacy is conducted within the confines of a particular structure 
and the legal and political characteristics of the structure condition 
policy outcomes. International organisations cannot be reduced to the 
attributes of the member states (2)  and therefore if our analysis is 
to escape the reductionist fallacy the salience of the organisational 
context has to be explored. Thus institutional growth and changing 
organisational structures influence inter-state relations in so far 
as organisational characteristics provide one type of constraint 
within which states may act. At the same time international organ-
isations also furnish states with the modalities and opportunities 
for cooperation and conflict. 
One approach to international organisation concentrates on the 
institution and the formal provisions enshrined in constitutions and 
charters. A highly descriptive approach, the institutional 
perspective is useful in tracing the effect of legal constraints on 
the decision-making process. Legal institutional analysis is a 
valuable starting point for the study of international organisations 
partly because development in the competence of an organisation is 
intricately connected with its constitutional provisions and partly 
because questions regarding authority and power cannot be addressed 
adequately without reference to constitutional provisions. Formal 
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legal structures then constitute an important part of an international 
organisation and therefore present a useful starting point for the 
study of organisations. The first part of this chapter, will 
therefore, examine BNCTAD's constitutional mechanism. 
The institutional perspective, however, is deficient in its 
ability to explain change. The mere delineation of institutional 
mechanisms (the skeletal framework) cannot provide the researcher 
with the political and psychological dimension (operational framework) 
of an international organisation. The orientation of institutional 
studies is to the static rather than the dynamic aspects of 
organisational behaviour and therefore key processes of organisational 
change are omitted. (3)  These include re-definitions of goals and 
tasks, conflictual processes, changes in the scope and level of 
organisational behaviour and changes in the relevant environments. 
The second part of this chapter, therefore, analyses the political 
process in UNCTAD. Finally, UNCTAD's role within the wider 
international system is assessed since any description of UNCTAD as 
an environment for the G77 which only concentrated on internal 
features would give a mislemiing picture of the possibilities and 
constraints affecting group cohesion. 
4.1 
The Institutional Machinery of UNCTAD  
4.1.1 The Institutional Structure  
UNCTAD was created as a permanent organ of the United Nations 
with the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1995 (XIX). (4) 
The Final Act of the Geneva Conference laid the basis for the 
establishment of a new organ in the field of trade and development. 
The compromise reached at UNCTAD I dictated the key features of 
UNCTAD's constitutive document. The new organisation was created 
by the General Assembly under the terms of Article 22 of the U.N. 
Charter which empowers the UNGA to establish such subsidiary organs 
as may be necessary to assist it in the performance of its functions. 
Membership is open to all states members of the United Nations and 
states not members of the U.N. but members of the specialised 
agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Within the terms of its legal instrument UNCTAD was given seven 
principal functions. These were 
" (a) To promote international trade, especially with a view to 
accelerating economic development between countries at 
different stages of development, between developing 
countries and between countries with different systems 
of economic and social organisation, taking into account 
the functions performed by existing international 
organisations; 
(b) To formulate principles and policies on international 
trade and related proplems of economic development; 
(c) To make proposals for putting the said principles and 
policies into effect and to take such steps within its 
competence as may be relevant to this end, having 
regard to differences in economic systems and stages 
of development; 
(d) Generally to review and facilitate the co-ordination 
activities of other institutions within the United 
Nations system in the field of international trade and 
related problems of economic development, and in this 
regard to cooperate with the General Assembly and the 
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Economic and Social Council with respect to the 
performance of their responsibilities for co-ordination 
under the Charter of the United Nations; 
(e) To initiate action where appropriate in co-operation 
with the competent organs of the United Nations for the 
negotiation and adoption of multilateral legal instruments 
in the field of trade with due regard to the adequacy of 
existing organs of negotiation and without duplication 
of their activities; 
(f) To be available as a cents for harmonizing the trade and 
related policies of governments and regional economic 
groupings in pursuance of Article I of the Charter; 
(g) To deal with any other matters within the rope of 
its competence." (5) 
In order to enable the organisation to fulfil the aforementioned 
functions a simple machinery was created which nevertheless contained 
both complex rules and innovatory techniques. A permanent feature of 
UNCTAD's history has been the different perceptions of its role held 
by the developed and developing countries. These divergent interests 
played an important part in both elaborating the functions and 
designing the machinery of the new institution. The necessity to 
stick to the'historic compromise' of the Geneva Conference was 
reflected in the debates concerning the powers to be dtributed to the 
fledgling organisation. The developing countries wanted an 
organisation with the ability to implement decisions over a wide range 
of international economic activity. The developed countries, on the 
other hand, were content with the global system management of the 
IBM, IMF and GATT and sought to restrict UNCTAD's effectiveness. (6) 
Hence the mandate given to UNCTAD is slightly schizophrenic in that 
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it asks the organisation to initiate action, to promote international 
trade and to formulate new principles, whilat at the same time 
exhorting it not to clash with existing organisations in the economic 
field. 
The principal organs of UNCTAD are the Conference, the Trade and 
Development Board and the Secretariat. The Conference which is the 
supreme plenary body of the organisation is its highest organ and to 
it is entrusted the task of carrying out the functions specified by 
the UNGA. Rather confusingly the Conference has the same name as the 
continuing machinery but is usually distinguished from it by the 
addition of a numeral expressing its historical specificity. The 
Conference can best be thought of as an assembly which is convened 
periodically. It is open to all member states and is supposed to 
meet every three years. In practice apart from UNCTAD V which was 
convened three years after the fourth UNCTAD, the Conference has met 
every four years. To date six conferences have been held - UNCTAD I 
in Geneva, 23rd March - 16th June 1964, UNCTAD II in New Delhi, 
1st February - 29th March 1968, UNCTAD III in Santiago, 13th April - 
21st May 1972, UNCTAD IV in Nairobi, 5th - 31st May 1976, UNCTAD V 
in Manila, 6th - 29th May 1979 and UNCTAD VI in Belgrade, 6th June - 
3rd July 1983. 
The agenda of the Conference is based on a provisional agenda 
drawn up by the Trade and Development Board after lengthy consultations. 
The supreme law-making body of the organisation it sets the 
priorities for future areas of work (consultation, negotiation and 
research) of the organisation as a whole. The Conference had un-
limited authority in adopting its rule of procedures, appointment 
of its Bureau and creation of sessional bodies. The work of the 
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Conference is guided by a President, Vice-President and Rapporteur. 
In order to facilitate negotiations various committees are created. 
The report of the Conference is transmitted to the UNGA. 
The Trade and Development Board (TDB) is a permanent organ of the 
Conference and therefore ensures continuity between the periodic 
conferences. The TDB a part of the 'United Nations machinery in the 
economic field' is the key decision-making unit in the intervals 
between the general conferences. Membership of the TDB orginally 
restricted to 55 states is now open to all members of the Conference. (7 ) 
Open membership makes reduntant the elaborate criteria for selection 
to the Board based on the principle of equitable geographical dis-
tribution and the necessity of representation for the major trading 
states. For the purpose of election to the Board and its main 
committees, states had been divided into four lists based on 
geographical and socio-economic factors (see Table 4.1.). List A 
contains the African and Asian states and Yugoslavia. List B the 
Western European states together with the developed countries of 
North America, Japan, New Zealand and Australia. List C is composed 
of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. List D contains the 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
Until 1970 the TDB met bi-annually in regular session but now 
it meets annually. (8)  It also holds special sessions which have 
been convened annually since the 6th Special Session in 1975 but until 
that period had been called erratically. Each member of the Board is 
entitled to one representative with as many alternates and advisors 
as they require. The TDB is also empowered to invite representation 
from intergovernmental agencies to participate in its deliberations 
and in those of its working groups and subsidary organs in a non-
voting capacity. 
Table 4.1 
The Grou•S stem in UNCTAD: Membershi 1964- 1979" 
UNCTAD I, 1964  
Group A  
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1. Afghanistan 
2. Algeria 
3. Benin 
4. Burma 
5. Burundi 
6. Central African 
Republic 
7. Chad 
8. China * 
9. Congo 
10. Democratic 
Kampuchea 
11. Egypt 
12. Ethiopia 
13. Gabon 
14. Ghana 
15. Guinea 
16. India 
17. Indonesia 
18. Iran 
19. Iraq 
20. Israel * 
21. Ivory Coast  
22. Jordan 
23. Kenya 
24. Kuwait 
25. Laos 
26. Lebanon 
27. Liberia 
28. Libya 
29. Madagascar 
30. Malaysia 
31. Mali 
32. Mauritania 
33. Mongolia 
34. Morocco 
35. Nepal 
36. Niger 
37. Nigeria 
38. Pakistan 
39. Philippines 
40. Republic of 
Korea 
41.Rwanda 
42. Samoa 
43. Saudi Arabia  
44. Senegal 
45. Sierra Leone 
46. Somalia 
47. South Africa* 
48. Sri Lanka 
49. Sudan 
50. Syria 
51. Thailand 
52. Togo 
53. Tunisia 
54. Uganda 
55. United Republic 
of Cameroon 
56. United Republic 
of Tanzania 
57. Upper Volta 
58. Vietnam 
59. Yemen 
60. Yugoslavia 
61. Zaire. 
Table 4.1 (Contd.) 
Additions at UNCTAD II, 1968. 
Group 	A 
1. Botswana 4. Lesotho 7. Mauritius 
2. Democratic Yemen 5. Malawi 8. Singapore 
3. Gambia 6. Maldives 9. Zambia 
Group 	B 
1. Malta** 
Group 	C 
1. Barbados 2. Guyana 
Additions at UNCTAD III, 1972. 
1. Bahrain 
2. Bangladesh 
3. Bhutan 
Group A  
4. Equatorial Guinea 7. Swaziland 
5. Fiji 	8. United Arab 
E 6. Qatar mirates 
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Additions at UNCTAD IV, 1976  
Group A  
1. Angola 	4. Democratic People's 7. 
2. Cape Verde Islands 	Republic of Korea 8. 
3. Comoros 	5. Guinea-Bissau 	9. 
6. Mozambique 
Oman 
Papua New Guinea 
Sao Tome and 
Principe. 
Group C  
1. Bahamas 	2. Grenada 	3. Surinam 
Group D  
1. German Democratic 
Republic 
Table 4.1 (Contd.) 
Group 	B 
1. Australia 11. Holy See 20. New Zealand 
2. Austria 12. Iceland 21. Norway 
3. Belgium 13. Ireland 22. Portugal 
4. Canada 14. Italy 23. San Marino 
5. Cyprus * * 15. Japan 24. Spain 
6. Denmark 16. Lichtenstein 25. Sweden 
7. Finland 17. Luxembourg 26. Switzerland 
8. France 18. Monaco 27. Turkey 
9. Federal Republic 
of Germany 
19. Netherlands 28. United Kingdom 
29. United States. 
10. Greece 
Group C 
1. Argentina 9. 	Ecuador 16. Nicaragua 
2. Bolivia 10. El Salvador 17. Panama 
3. Brazil 11. Guatemala 18. Paraguay 
4. Chile 12. Haiti 19. Peru 
5. Colombia 13. Honduras 20. Trinidad & Tobago 
6. Costa Rica 14. Jamaica 21. Uruguay 
7. Cuba 15. Mexico 22. Venezuela 
8. Dominican Republic 
Group D 
1. Albania 4. 	Czechoslovakia 7. Rumania** 
2. Bulgaria 5. 	Hungary 8. Ukranian SSR 
3. Byelorussian SSR 6. 	Poland 9. Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 
155. 
Table 4.1 (Contd.) 
Additions at UNCTAD V, 1979. 
Group A  
1. Djibouti 	2. Tonga 
Notes. 
1. Countries do not have to wait until the Conference to join 
the organisation and are admitted to the TDB. 
* Countries not members of the G 77. 
** Countries members of the G 77. 
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As the highest organ of the continuing machinery the Board 
performs all the functions of the Conference in the inter-sessional 
periods. Moreover, the Board is charged with keeping under review and 
taking appropriate action within its competence on the recommendations 
and other decisions of the Conference. The Board also serves as a 
preparatory committee for future sessions of the Conference and is 
therefore responsible for preparing a provisional agenda and the 
necessary documentation. Further in pursuit of this function the Board 
recommends to the General Assembly the date and venue of the Con-
ferences. The Board in conjunction with the Secretariat is responsible 
for establishing close and continuous links with other international 
organisations in the field of trade and development. The Board's 
relations with other agencies within the U.N. system is governed by 
the responsibilities for co-ordination established by ECOSOC. The 
Board may also initiate, inter alia, through the services of the 
United Nations system studies and reports pertaining to trade and 
development. 
The TDB's importance is enhanced by its ability to create subsidary 
organs 'as may be necessary to the effective discharge of its functions.' 
Initially the Board had four main committees Commodities, Invisibles 
and Financing related to Trade, Manufactures and Shipping. Task 
expansion within the organisation has led to the creation of new 
committees (see Figure 4.1). The membership of the committees have 
been enlarged over time to take cognisance of the increased membership 
of the organisation. The terms of reference of the committees were 
left to the Board to be adopted after consultation with the relevant 
U.N. bodies in order to avoid overlap with existing institutions(-0)In 
reality the committees have been entrusted with the task of promoting 
the decisions of the Conference and pursuing integrated policies in 
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their respective fields and co-ordinating the activities of relevant 
international institutions. The committees usually meet twice yearly 
but special sessions may be convened at the request of the Conference, 
the Board or as a result of its own deliberations. Committees are also 
enpowered to create their own subsidiary organs of a permanent or non-
permanent nature to assist them in their work. The main committees, 
their membership and subsidiary organs (1980) are given in Figure 4.1. 
The Board and its committees establish from time to time working 
groups and other standing committees to assist them in fulfilling their 
roles. These ad hoc bodies have varying life spans, depending on the 
subject under consideration. These ad hoc bodies are of two types - 
intergovernmental bodies e.g. the Intergovernmental Preparatory Group 
on a Conventionof International Intermodal Transport and groups of 
exports appointed on the basis of their professional expertise e.g. 
the Export Group on Export Credits as a Means of Promoting Exports 
from Developing Countries. The Board has also established the Joint 
Advisory Group on the UNCTAD/GATT International Trade Centre which 
helps to run the International Trade Centre. 
An important part of the continuing machinery is the secretariat. 
The UNCTAD secretariat is part of the United Nations secretariat and 
therefore subject to United Nations staff regulations. The UNCTAD 
secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General who holds the rank of 
Under-Secretary of the United Nations. He is appointed by the United 
Nations Secretary-General and confirmed by the General Assembly. 
During the period of this study there were three Secretaries-General of 
UNCTAD - Raul Prebisch (1964-1968), Manuel Perez-Guerrero (1969-1973) 
and Gamani Corea (1974-1984). The UNCTAD Secretary-General has overall 
control of the secretariat and is responsible for directing its work. 
Figure 4.1  
UNCTAD's Structure 1•  
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He oversees the smooth functioning of the contiming machinery through 
adequate servicing of the Conference, the Board and its subsidiary 
organs. This involves maintaining the record of meetings, the inter-
pretation and translation of speeches, the circulation of documents and 
the provision of the relevant reports and documentation. Apart from 
these technical functions the Secretary-General has a wider role to 
play within the deliberative process of the organisation. First, he is 
entitled to attend (or send his Representative) any meeting and to submit 
oral and written statements to the deliberative bodies. Secondly, he 
is involved in drawing up the agenda of the various organs. Thirdly, 
he can be called upon to use his good offices in relation to UNCTAD's 
conciliation procedures. Fourthly, he is entrusted with the task of 
convening commodity conferences within the U.N. system and is author-
ised to hold intergovernmental consultations on commodities. 
The secretariat comprises professional and general service staff 
and has expanded with the organisation's growth. It comprises a number 
of departments some of an administrative nature and others specifically 
engaged in research. (see Figure 4.2.) Apart from the servicing 
functions mentioned previously, it is the task of the secretariat to 
undertake research on topics suggested by member states. The 
Secretary-General is assisted by two Deputy Secretaries-General and 
each division is headed by a Director and a Deputy Director. 
4.1.2 
Decision-Making 
Decision-making in UNCTAD had developed away from the formal 
procedures and towards informal methods of negotiation and consultation. 
The decision-making procedures laid down under General Assembly Resolution 
Fig. 4.2  
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1995 (XIX) provide for a two-tier process. First, UNCTAD is given 
a majority voting procedure and secondly, there is provision for a 
conciliation mechanism. The Conference, the Board and all its main 
committees have been provided with an egalitarian system of decision-
making. At the Conference each state has one vote. Substantive 
decisions require a two-thirds majority of voting representatives 
present and procedural motions only require a simple majority. Each 
member of the Board has one vote. All decisions of the Board and its 
committees are taken by simple majority vote of those present and 
voting i.e. abstentions are excluded from this definition. Voting at 
the Conference or the Board is by a show of hands or roll-call if any 
members requests this procedure. The only deviation from these rules 
concerns elections which take place by secret ballot, unless otherwise 
decided by the Board. 
The process of conciliation envisaged in UNCTAD's constitutive 
document is a novel feature in international organisation decision-
making but it has never been used. These procedures were adopted 
because the irreconcilable positions adopted at the Geneva Conference 
seemed to foreshadow trial deadlock in the future. The process of 
conciliation is supposed to take place before voting and to provide an 
adequate basis for the adoption of resolutions with regard to 
proposals of a specific nature which call for action substantially 
affecting the economic or financial interests of particular countries. 
Conciliation can take place with regard to proposals before the 
Conference, the Board or on matters which the committees have been 
authorised to submit recommendations without further approval for 
action. The institution of the process of conciliation is automatic, 
however it is only appropriate for some subjects. The following 
subjects are considered appropriate for conciliation - economic plans 
or programmes of economic or social readjustments; trade, monetary or 
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tariff policies; balance of payments issues; policies of economic 
assistance or transfer of resources; levels of employment, income, 
revenue or investment. On the other hand the following are considered 
unsuitable for conciliation - procedural matters; proposals for study 
or investigation including those related to the preparation of legal 
instruments in the trade field; establishment of subsidiary bodies of 
the Board within the scope of its competence; recommendations and dec-
larations of a general nature not calling for specific actions; 
proposals involving action proposed in pursuance of recommendations which 
had been unanimously adopted by the Conference. (11)  
The group system is an important feature of the UNCTAD decisional 
process. Member states were divided into four geographical groups for 
the purposes of election to the Board and its main committees and for 
office holding in the Conference, Board and committees. The division 
into groups is not solely for electoral purposes but reflects instead 
a major organisational feature of UNCTAD. The group system originated 
during the Geneva Conference and the institutionalisation in the con-
tinuing machinery of a group method of negotiations is a direct result 
of this historical process leading to the creation of UNCTAD. Apart 
from various states which are peripheralmembers of their groups, (12) 
the group system forms the basis on which UNCTAD works. All delibe-
rations within the organisation take place on the basis of a group 
system. Before any meetings of the deliberative bodies the group 
members meet and attempt to co-ordinate their respective policies. 
The result of this process is the transformation of UNCTAD into a 
forum where intra-group consensus becomes as important, if not more 
important than inter-group agreement. The formal deliberations of 
UNCTAD organs are characterised by group spokesmen representing 
group decisions rather than a flowing open-ended process. 
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Zonference diplomacy becomes similar to parliamentary diplomacy 
operating under a three-line whir Although officially UNCTAD 
recognises four groupq in practice groups 'Al and 'C' combine to form 
the Group of 77. 
In this sketch of UNCTAD's institutional machinery three salient 
features have emerged. First, the legal basis of UNCTAD arose from a 
conflict between the developed and developing countries. The 
organisation is therefore inherently ambiguous and its competence and 
role subject to disputed interpretations. Secondly, politics within 
the organisation will rdlect these competing perspectives and the 
institutionalisation of the group system perpetuates the fractured 
nature of the organisation. Thirdly, UNCTAD is a dynamic organisation 
responding to changes in the international political economy. As a 
newcomer in the field of international economic relations it 
encroaches on the traditional preserves of the Bretton Woods orga-
nisations. Two further points ofiaterest from the perspective of the 
G77 are, first, the organisation was created by them and secondly, 
they provide its natural consituency. An important element making for 
consensus within the Group is the realisation that not only was it G77 
unity which effectively created UNCTAD but that only continued group 
unity is capable of contributing to the organisation's effectiveness. 
Moreover, the institutionalisation of the group system with its 
emphasis on intra-group consensus provides a structural constraint 
on disunity. The nature of the political process and the evolution of 
UNCTAD is the subject of the next section. The development of 
institutional and procedural arrangements within definite directions 
is the result of a specific historical process in which features local 
to the organisation and others arising from the wider environment • 
interact. 
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4.1.3 
The Political Process  
UNCTAD has three major interelated functions. Nevertheless in 
practice they are often treated as being distinct and separate tasks. 
These functions can be termed policy formulation, negotiation and 
implementation. Policy formulation refers to the creation of general 
and spec:bac principles pertaining to international trade and develop-
ment. The second function is the negotiation of concrete agreements 
through the decision-making process. UNCTAD is also charged with an 
implementation function is respect of the decisions reached. A fourth 
area, that of technical assistance can also be identified. In this 
respect UNCTAD is more than a forum organisation; (13) it has aspects 
of both a service organisation and a negotiating body. A crucial 
characteristic of UNCTAD's political process is the essentially con-
tested nature of the organisation. Unlike a stable political system 
in which core values are held in common and bargaining proceeds within 
a framework of established norms, the UNCTAD political process is 
inherently unstable and conflictual. Three groups of countries (14)  
- Western developed, socialist developed and developing countries - 
have different conceptions of the organisations's role in the fulfil- 
ment of its constitutional tasks. This clash of ideologies (15) 
 reinforces the group system of negotiations on one hand, but restricts 
the ability of the organisation to achieve significant goals on the 
other hand. 
Policy formulation has involved the elaboration of the agreed 
principles of the 1964 Conference and the subsequent development of 
further principles. These principles are arrived at through the 
deliberative process - the Conference, the Board and its subsidiary 
organs; and through the technical studies prepared by the Secretariat 
or requested by it. The avowed aim is the creation of a new trade 
and development policy for the international community. UNCTAD's 
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ability to achieve its goal is constrained not only by the attitudes 
and actions of member states but also by the activities of other 
international economic organisations. (16) Nevertheless, within the 
United Nations system, UNCTAD has been given the prime responsibility 
for the elaboration of new principles on development policy. (17)  
UNCTAD's role is nevetheless subject to the higher authority of the 
United Nations General Assembly (and ECOSOC) and it is here that the 
high level decisions regarding the Second Development Decade, the 
International Development Strategy and the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) were taken. (18)  
UNCTAD's role in the respect of new principles is both initiatory 
and revisionist in that it involves first, the adoption of new 
concepts which are supposed to underpin international economic relations 
and second, the revision of previously existing concepts. Policy 
formulation within this universal forum has covered a wide range of 
international economic activities including - commodity trade, 
development finance, the transfer of technology, trade in manufactures, 
the debt problem, monetary reform, the particularly disadvantaged 
developing countries (the least developed, landlocked and island 
countries), economic cooperation among developing countries, east- 
south economic cooperation, shipping and restrictive business 
practices. (19)  
In the deliberative process the enunciation of new principles and 
new concepts are usually the result of initiatives by the G77. One quan-
titative indication of this unique factor is a measurement of the 
number of resolutions initiated by the various groups in the TDB. (20)  
Table 4.2. gives a schematic picture of initiatives within that organ. 
Discounting co-sponsored resolutions G77 members sponsored 91.7% of 
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TABLE 4.2  
Initiation of Resolutions in the TDB, 1965-1979. 
Group 	Group 	Group 	Partial 	Group B/ G77/ B D 77 G77 G77 	Group 
D 
Regular 
Sessions  
1 x x x x x x 2 x x x 
3 x x 
4 x x 
5 x 
6 
7 x x 8 x x x 
9 x x x x 
10 x x 
11 x x x x 12 x x 13 x x 
14 x x x x 15 x x x 16 x 17 x x 18 x 
Special 
Sessions  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 x x 
6 x x x 
7 8 x 
9 x 
10 
Total No. 
of Res. 	15 	12 	98 	35 	5 	3 
Sources: Official Records of the TDB (1965-1979). 
x= resolution sponsored. 
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all the resolutions presented to the Board. Of course this is only 
a rough indicator of significance but the score is so high that a very 
wide margin of error could be admitted and the result would still stand. 
The main aim of the developing countries is to use UNCTAD to rewrite 
the prevailing rules of the international economic system. (21)  This 
is a collective exercise and requires the unity of the group. After a 
period of intra-G77 bargaining, draft resolutions are then submitted to 
the relevant organs of UNCTAD. During the ensuing debates and negotia-
tions the G77 maintain impressive displays of unity in the face of 
Group B's(and sometimes Group D) attempts to amend the proposals. 
It is debatable whether the decisions (22)  reached have a legal 
character. International lawyers and political scientists dispute 
the ability of the United Nations central organs and specialised 
agencies to create international law. (23)  Law, however should be seen 
not as a body of rules but as a dedbion-making process. (24)  
According to this perspective UNCTAD would have a legislative or at 
least quasi-legislative competence in the field of international 
development law. (25)  From our perspective the debate on the legislative 
competence of UNCTAD is important because of the continuing conflict 
between the G77 and Group B. The G77 arguing that UNCTAD resolutions 
have a legal character and Group B rejecting this claim. In some 
respects however this debate is of limited relevance. What is 
important is the degree of salience attached to these new norms by 
the members of the international community. Ben if the resolutions do 
not possess a quasi-legal character they can be used by the developing 
countries, international bureaucracies and pressure groups within the 
rich countries to argue the case for the implementation of programmes 
sympathetic to the aims of the developing countries. Ansari has 
detailed the political significance of interest groups in Western 
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democracies to UNCTAD's work. (26)  He concluded that for aid, trade 
in manufactures and commodity trade (27)  interest groups do exert an 
influence on the making of public policy. Our researches have shown 
that the obligation of the developed states to contribute 0.7% of their 
GNP in official development assistance to the ldcs although not adhered 
to by the rich does nevertheless provide a yardstick by which the 
efforts of the rich countries are measured. This yardstick has a 
moral and political force even if it is not the determinant of aid 
policies. 
The formal provisions relating to decision-making have already 
been outlined in the section on the institutional structure of UNCTAD. 
The purpose of this discussion is to investigate the political 
process involved and to aniyse the workings of the constitutional 
machinery. UNCTAD's decisional process has developed along relatively 
informal lines using flexible methods of consultation and negotiation. 
This development has taken place at the general conferences and in the 
continution machinery. After the Geneva Conference at which 65% of 
all decisions were taken by vote, voting has receeded into the back- 
(28) ground. 	At New Delhi and Santiago approximately one-third of all 
decisions were voted on but this figure dropped to 12% at Nairobi and 
only climbed to 26% at Manila (see Table 4.3). Another significant 
feature of voting at UNCTAD conferences is the low recourse taken to the 
use of roll-call voting. Roll-calls are the most formal of all voting 
procedures but as Table 4.4 shows after the Geneva Conference when they 
reached 48.8 % of all decisions taken and was the most important 
method of arriving at decisions, roll-call votes have not exceeded 
14.3% at any of the subsequent conferences. Table 4.5 reveals a 
similar process in the Trade and Development Board. Of the 185 
decisions taken from the first session in April 1965 to the tenth 
special session in March 1979 only 16 were taken by votes. Moreover 
TABLE 4.3  
DECISION-MAKING AT UNCTAD CONFERNCES, 1964-1979  
Session Number of Decisions Taken Of Which Adopted By Vote % Of 
UNCTAD I 
1964 86 56 65 
UNCTAD II 
1968 35 12 34 
UNCTAD III 
1972 49 17 35 
UNCTAD IV 
1976 16 2 12 
UNCTAD V 
1979 35 9 26 
Sources: Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. First, Second, Third, 
Fourth and Fifth Sessions. 
Table 4.4  
Typology of Decision-Making at UNCTAD Conferences 1964-1979  
Session No. of 
Decisions 
Roll Call Show of 
Hands 
(Adopted) a. 
 Without 
Objection 
Otherb. 
UNCTAD 1 
1964 86 42 (48.8) 14 (16.3) 29 (33.7) 1 
UNCTAD 2 
1968 35 3 ( 8.6) 9 (25.7) 20 (57.1) 3 
UNCTAD 3 
1972 49C• 7 (14.2) 10 (20.4) 29 (59.2) 2 
UNCTAD 4 
1976 d 16 .  1 ( 	6.3) 1 ( 6.3) 14 (87.5) 1 
UNCTAD 5 
1979 35 5 (14.3) 4 (11.4) 25 (71.4) 1 
Percentage in ( 	) 
Notes 
a. The formula"adopted without objection" is employed in accordance with the editorial instructions of ST/CS/SER.A/16 of 
October 1973 to replace "without dissent", by consensus or by 
unanimity" which appeared in the proceedings of the Conference. 
b. This category includes "no action taken" by acclamation", 
adopted with reservations from certain delegations", adopted 
without abstention. 
c. The figures do not add up because Resolution 82 III is 
un-recorded. 
d. The figures do not add up because the U.S. sponsored draft 
resolution on an International Resources Bank was defeated. 
Sources: 
Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and  
Development. First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Sessions. 
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Table 4.5  
Decision-Making in the Trade and Development Board (April 1964 - 
March 1979) 
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Session 	Number of decisions or 
Regular Special resolutions adopted 
of which by 
vote 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
10th 
11th 
12th 
13th 
14th 
15th 
16th 
17th 
18th 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
10th 
13 
8 
1 
7 
5 
1 
4 
1 
1 
8 
8 
9 
11 
1 
9 
8 
1 
11 
19 
3 
7 
0 
15 
2 
12 
12 
14 
4 
Total 185 16 (8.5%) 
Source: Trade and Development Board. Official Records (1965-1979). 
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the elaborate conciliation machinery has never been used and has fallen 
into desuetude. One reason for the non-use of conciliation procedures 
arises from the infrequent recourse to voting. \irthermore the 
developing countries recognised that the lengthy procedures involved 
could give the developed countries an excuse to delay arriving at 
decisions. This reluctance of the developing countries to resort to 
conciliation has inhibited the developed states from requesting the 
mechanism. (29)  On the other hand, the group system bast developed 
from being merely the lists on which states are based for voting pur-
poses into the very cornerstone of UNCTAD politics and decision-
making within the organisation. It might have been assumed that with 
the decline in voting the raison d'etre for the groups would have 
disappeared but -this has not been the case. Indeed, the existence of the 
group system has itself curbed the resort to the voting provisions. To 
understand decision-making in UNCTAD it is important to note the 
differing perceptions of the nature of the organisation, its role and 
its capacities for future action held by various groups. These points 
will be considered below when we examine the group system, the consensus 
method and the negotiation and implementation functions of the 
organisation. 
The group system is an integral part of the "UNCTAD decision-
making process as it developed over time. These groups, although 
highlighted within UNCTAD were not first developed there: The 
aggregation of states for voting and other purposes has for a long 
time been a feature of international organisational activity. (30)  
Indeed as chapter 2 above shows group politics were responsible for 
the creation of UNCTAD in the first place. In this international 
organisations are merely rdlecting an irreducible feature of modern 
politics. It would be virtually impossible to imagine modern 
political activity and organisational politics in particular without 
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the existence of groups. Where the UNCTAD experience is different 
within the context of international organisation is that first, the 
group system was built into the institutional machinery and second, 
all UNCTAD politics revolve around the groups. Furthermore, co-
ordination and cooperation take place on a continuing basis even 
when a deliberative body is not in session. (31) Coordination within 
the groups takes place before Conferences, meeting of the TDB, the 
committees and other subsidiary organs. 
This reliance on the group system has led to a number of 
criticisms. (32)  First, it is argued that the stridures of group 
discipline limits manoeuvrability by curtailing and inhibiting 
diplomatic intercourse. The argument is that without the constricting 
group discipline which makes it virtually impossible for states to meet 
each other on an individual basis more initiatives would be possible 
and a greater degree of compromises would be reached. Secondly, it is 
alleged that the rigidity of the group system leads bothin inflexibility 
and slowness in negotiations and is responsible for the failures of the 
conferences. (33)  This accusation has been denied by Koul who argues 
in respect of the New Delhi meeting that, 
"It would not be fair to attribute to the 
'group' system of negotiations the failure 
of the second conference to mach any conclusions. 
The fault lies rather on the three political 
'groups' themselves, before the conference who 
tried to crystallize their relative positions 
in the conference." (34) 
This argument is rather perplexing in that it seems to attribute both 
success and failure to the group system. It is rather unconvincing to 
argue that it was because they met as groups before the conference 
that the conference failed, but yet inset that the group system of 
negotiations was not at fault. This claim can only be made if the group 
system of negotiations was strictly confined to organs of the organise- 
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tion itself. This seems an unwarranted restriction since a novel 
feature of the UNCTAD group system is that group deliberations 
continue outside the framework of the organisation itself. The amp 
method of negotiations is both a structural and a process feature 
of UNCTAD's political process. Koul in concentrating on structural 
features fails tomalise that the negotiating process spills over out-
side the defined organisational context. In ether words group meetings 
prior to UNCTAD conference are part of the group system of negotiations 
and not separate from them. 
On the other hand it has been argued that the group system of 
negotiations contributes effectively to the UNCTAD decision-making 
process. First, it is argued that the group system facilitates the 
decision-making process because it provides for regular consultations 
and the coordination of positions. (35)  It is further argued that the 
procedure is simplified when a large group of countries can delegate 
one spokesman to speak for them. Secondly, the group system has been 
seen as an efficient and practical force in world politics. (36) 
Koul takes the argument a stage further when he writes, 
"The North-South confrontation has done 
nothing to aggravate tensions indeed in 
the present inter-dependent (sic) world, 
the 'group' method of negotiation has 
paved the way to make the United Nations 
and UNCTAD as its outstanding body, an 
instrument of reconciling differences of 
opinion." (37) 
Once again it is difficult to accept this as an accurate description 
of reality when the numerous examples of delay resulting from an 
inflexible group method of politics is considered. 
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The organisation, orientation and structure of influence in the 
three groups represent an important aspect of the political process 
in UNCTAD. This study is chiefly concerned with the G77 and extensive 
analysis of this group will appear below. At this point we will 
consider briefly the political processes operative in Group B and Group 
D. The Western countries had a history of consultation on economic 
matters beginning in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) which continued when that body was replaced by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The wide-ranging 
agenda of UNCTAD I and the impetus of the ldcs drive for reform of 
the international economic order forced the western countries to 
convene an OECD meeting for the purpose of establishing generally 
accepted guidelines to govern the response to the developing countries. 
After the Geneva conference a special ministerial decision was taken 
to institutionalise the OECD's role as an organising centre for 
Group B. Within the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, Trade 
Committee and Maritime Transport Committee special working groups 
were created specifically to deal with UNCTAD matters. The OECD 
secretariat has the task of collecting information, doing relevant 
research and anaysis and servicing Group B meetings in the OECD and 
UNCTAD. Although not all members of Group B are full members of the 
OECD and some are not members of the Development Assistance Committee, 
the OECD functions as the secretariat of Group B. 
The leadership role is shared between the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. Japan 
although it has the capacity to exercise influence usually takes a 
passive role. The EEC creates problems for decision-making in Group B 
because the EEC countries tend to develop a common position outside • 
the group framework and then prove inflexible in negotiating with other 
group members to arrive at a common position. (30 Another important 
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sub-group in Group B's decision-making process in the Nordic group. 
Initiatives from Group B countries in UNCTAD normally have to go 
through the complex internal group bargaining system before it is 
communicated to the wider forum. Agreement among the Group B countries 
is normally reached on the basis of the minimum common denominator 
i.e. the group position tends to coalesce around the country or group 
of countries prepared to make the least generous offer. No conscious 
trade-off strategy exists but sometimes trade-offs can be sought within 
an agreed package of topics. A favoured method of reaching agreement 
is to arrive at a procedural solution whereby countries are allowed to 
dissent from the common group position. It is difficult to separate 
the positions in the group into neat left, right and centre divisions 
depending on the degree of sympathy with the aims of the G77. There 
are many cross-cutting interests but over the period of this study broad 
alignments can be discerned. The United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany and Japan on the one side have espoused a free market, anti-
interventionist philosophy largely unsympathetic to the demands of the 
G77. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands have been more willing to 
seek some form of compromise. France has played a floating role; on 
financial issues the French have lined-up with the conservative states 
but on more overtly political issues have tended to side with the 
'liberal' European perspective. A large number of Group B countries 
can't be identified with either grouping and hold an amorphous middle 
position. The dominance of the United Statesin world affairs gives 
the U.S. a powerful voice in Group B deliberations and it is often 
said that many countries shield behind the United States. In so far 
as U.S. opposition is likely to kill any proposal, some countries 
can appear to be sympathetic to G77 demands because they know that 
these demands have little realistic chance of being accepted. The aim 
of the dominant countries in Group B is to deflect ldc demands, to 
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exploit cleavages in the G77, to minimise the political costs of 
opposition to G77 demands and to make the minimum possible concessions. (39) 
Typical Group B tactics include attempts to limit UNCTAD's expansion, 
requests for studies and reports in preference to direct action and 
frequent accusations aimed at the low-level support given by the 
Eastern bloc countries to development aid and development issues. (40) 
The Group D countries also have a long history of cooperation. 
As socialist countries in the postwar period they have been in the 
minority in international organisations and until the upsurge in Third 
World membership of the United Nations in the 1960's were permanently 
on the losing side of the in-built American majority vote. (41) The 
socialist countries consistently formed a bloc on procedeural as well 
as substantive issues, as a means of overcoming this isolation. In the 
economic field the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) 
acts as an organising forum for the socialist countries. Unlike the 
G77 and Group B, Group D is rather small and so the problems of co-
ordination are easier. Problems of coordination have also been eased 
by the fact that until the Manila conference (1979) most of the G77 
demands have been directed towards the capitalist countries and Group 
D countries have not been particularly concerned with most of the 
issues on the agenda. Comecon's coordination is restricted to calling 
meetings prior to important UNCTAD meetings such as the Conference, the 
TDB and its committees. Group D has had little difficulty in arriving 
at a common negotiating position. The main source of dissent within 
the group was Romania and with its defection to the G77 in 1976 
coordination problems became easier for the members. The Soviet Union's 
hegemony over Eastern Europe gives it the dominant position in 
Group D. (42) 
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The existence of the OECD and Comecon gives Groups B and D 
institutional advantages over the G77. These organisations have 
secretariats which conduct research,prepare reports, services 
meetings and obtains information on the other groups. Moreover the 
existence of a formal body provides for the possibility of continuous 
intra-group consultations on a wide range of issues. This combined 
with a high level of expertise and a long experience in mutual 
consultations contributes to enhanced bargaining skills. This 
asymmetry in the group system is not remedied by the efforts of the 
UNCTAD secretariat on behalf of the G77. 
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the major exception to 
the group system. The PRC acts as an independent party in UNCTAD politics. 
China invariably supports the G77, occasionally engages in polemics 
with the Soviet Union but overall adopts a low profile. Chinese 
participation is hampered by the group structure (43)  but also 
curtailed by a lack of interest. One study of Chinese behaviour in 
UNCTAD concluded that the PRC behaviour showed the following 
characteristics, 
"a relatively extensive participation in a 
wide variety of meetings; a passive and 
reactive support of the Group of 77; an 
occasional intervention to rebut and reject 
the Soviet linkage of development with 
disarmament; an uncharacteristically active 
participation in any debate relating to 
tungsten; and a generally modest, diligent 
and self-effacing behavioural posture." (44) 
The group system institutionalised in G A resolution 1995 (xix) 
is the foundation of UNCTAD's decision-making process. The voting and 
conciliation procedures envisaged in UNCTAD's constitutive document 
have, however been overtaken by changes during the history of the 
organisation. The main development in the process of decision-making 
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in UNCTAD has been in the use of the consensus methodAhis approach 
more flexible than conciliation, in formal terms means the adoption 
of a decision without recourse to voting. In institutional terms this 
means that after a resoltion has been debated the presiding officer 
after consultation with the various groups informs the meeting that 
there is no opposition and the resolution is therefore carried. The 
process of consensus takes place at two different levels. At the 
first, consultations and negotiations are conducted at the group level. 
This can be either meetings between groups or within the individual 
groups. The groups have also developed smaller negotiating bodies 
known as contact groups which meet to explore common areas of agreement 
and to try to reach agreement on points of dispute. At the second 
level, the consensus method is reflected in a draft resolution which 
is submitted to the organ concerned as a result of the deliberations 
of the contact groups. The proposed text is then adopted if there is 
no dissent. The work of the contact group is to some extent similar 
to that envisaged for the conciliation committee. The conciliation 
process has de jure recognition but the consensus method has become 
the de facto method of decision. Quasi-legal recognition has been 
given to this method by the organisation whose two main organs have 
recognised the importance of these informal developments. The consensus 
method was welcomed by Conference Resolution 80 (III) which stated 
that, 
"Pull use should be made, wherever is considered 
desirable, of flexible techniques for intergroup (440 ) consultations in order to facilitate agreement." 
In a similar vein Board Decision 45 (VII) states, 
"The Board recognised the task of negotiation 
including consultation and agreement on 
solutions, is a single process." (47) 
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Consensus developed within UNCTAD because it is the most 
effective method of negotiation given the subject matter with which 
the organisation is concerned, its membership and its powers to 
implement its decisions. UNCTAD's redistributivist aims can only be 
achieved through attitude change, the development of international 
trade law and the negotiation of new economic agreements. It doesn't 
make much sense for the G77 to use its voting majority to pass 
resolutions calling for changes in the international economic order 
when its members lack the effective means to implement these suggested 
changes. Hence the inbuilt voting majority enjoyed by the G77 is 
irrelevant and counter-productive to a decisional process which would 
usher in genuine reform. New methods of decision-making which stressed 
accommodation had to be developed. The consensus method also has 
positive appeal to some Group B members. It enables thom more sympa- 
thetic to G77 demands to use contact groups to press a more accommodating 
and less confrontational strategy. (48) The consensus method however 
often sacrifices form for content. In other words so much stress is 
placed on the texts of resolutions that substantive issues which 
divide the participants are glossed over. Consensus gives the illusion 
of progress where none has been achieved. 
Negotiations in UNCTAD are severely constrained by the perceptual 
foci of the different participants. The G77 perceive UNCTAD as a 
negotiating body with the authority to preside over commodity agree-
ments and a forum in which binding agreements on international economic 
issues can be taken. The Group B countries see UNCTAD as a 
communication forum i.e. one without a negotiating role. For them 
UNCTAD is an organisation which can study the bases of multilateral 
agreements but the actual negotiations must be conducted elsewhere 
e.g. GATT and the IMF. Where the existing machinery proved inadequate 
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new bodies could be created by ECOSOC although the West has generally 
not been in favour of the proliferation of the U.N. system. Group B 
is reluctant to concede UNCTAD a negotiating role because it does not 
control t 	(49) he organisation. 	This dispute over UNCTAD's role and 
the exact meaning of the term negotiation has bedevilled UNCTAD's 
decision-making process from the outset. Since 1974 and the explicit 
recognition of UNCTAD's competence under the NIEO, there has been an 
unavoidable expansion of UNCTAD's negotiating role. Although the 
dispute continues concerning UNCTAD's negotiating function, the NIEO 
resolutions have increased the organisations' legitimacy in this area. 
The case studies, below, reveal for example the crucial importance of 
this issue in the debate over the Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) and the way in which it played a less salient role in the conflict 
over the Common Fund (CF) and Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC). 
The meaning of negotiation within the United Nations context is 
unclear. The best definition, perhaps, is that given by Kaufmann, 
"The sum tdS1 of talks and contacts intended 
to solve conflicts or to work towards the 
common objectives of a conference." (50) 
It is a moot point whether the U.N. is a negotiating body in the 
economic field apart from the specific commodity conferences convened 
periodically by the UNCTAD Secretary-General. The developed countries 
argue that economic negotiations entail a quid pro quo bargaining 
process with an end result of mutual concessions. The UNCTAD process, 
Group B claims does not contain this element of reciprocity instead it 
is one of deliberation with an end result of a non-committed resolution. °-0 
For the G77 the deliberations within UNCTAD have the status of negot-
iations and UNCTAD resolutions are conceived as agreements of a 
quasi-legislative nature which should commit the parties concerned to 
specific action. (52) 
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Theiwo main areas of negotiation under UNCTAD auspices have been 
commodity trade and trade in manufactures. Both the Generalised System 
of Preferences and CF/IPC negotiations are the subjects of later 
chapters and it is therefore of interest to discuss the relevance of 
the negotiation issue to these topics. The G77 viewed the deliberations 
as negotiations (53) but Group B insisted that these talks amounted to 
no more than discussions of their unilateral offer. (54)  The 
phrasing of the resolution on preferences adopted in N ew Delhi (55) 
reflected Group B's approach since it described the discussions to be 
held in the Special Committee on Preferences (SCP) as consultations. 
The Group B countries insisted that the deliberations within the SCP 
were not negotiations since they, Group B were making unilateral 
concessions and discussions were only held to agree thetype and range 
of concession. Group B argued that parties to a negotiation agree on 
something which is binding on both; the process of the SCP concerned 
the search for an understanding on the type of voluntary contributions 
which would be made by the rich countries. This dispute on exactly 
what term should be applied to the activities of the SCP should not be 
overstressed. The reality was that de facto negotiations took place, 
as states engaged in complex and hard bargaining over the technical 
and specialised issues. 
Resolution 93 (IV) taken at the Nairobi Conference ushered in a 
series of negotiations on international commodity policy. It would 
be futile to pretend that the deliberations on the Common Fund were 
not negotiations. Furthermore negotiations on the individual commodity 
agreements under the IPC clearly took place under UNCTAD auspices. 
Before the impetus of the Integrated Programme tin, sugar, olive oil 
and wheat agreements had all been concluded under UNCTAD's umbrella. 
This is an area in which UNCTAD is less circumscribed since 
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international commodity agreements (ICAs) are reciprocal by nature 
and previous negotiating conferences on ICAs had been held under U.N. 
auspices. All preparatory work can be undertaken in UNCTAD up to the 
signing of the agreement. An independent ICA is then established to 
supervise the arrangements and the connection with UNCTAD is broken. 
Renegotiations on a new agreement, when the existing agreement is near 
expiry can take place within UNCTAD although it need not do so. 
Similarly an agreement may be renegotiated under UNCTAD even if it had 
not initially been negotiated within the organisation e.g. the Olive 
Oil and Tin Agreements. In these cases the content of the previous 
agreements were not much changed. 
Other agreements negotiated under UNCTAD auspices are the 
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked Countries (1965), the Code 
of Conduct for Liner Conferences (1974) and the Convention on Inter-
national Multimodal Transport (1980). 
The competing perspectives held by Group B and the G77 concerning 
UNCTAD's organisational competence also affects the organisation's 
role in the implementation procedure. The developed countries feel 
that their political and economic interests would be affected by 
strong implementation procedures whilst the developing countries 
argue that without effective implementation UNCTAD's resolutions are 
worthless. (56)  The issue of implementation was raised at the very 
first session of the TDB (April 1965). The G77 requested the 
creation of a surveillance system for the implementation of the 
proposals of the Final Act (of the Geneva Conference). The developed 
countries countered that the lack of unanimity expressed in the 
decisions taken on the Final Act rendered it non-implementable. (57) 
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This dispute was resolved through a compromise reached at the second 
session of the TDB (August-October 1965). (58) A compromise resolution 
was adopted (59) which provided that in the UNCTAD Secretary-General's 
Annual Report the TDB would fulfil its task of periudically reviewing 
and assessing the progress of the implementation of the Final Act. 
The UNCTAD secretariat prepares its implementation reports on the 
basis of replies submitted by governments together with information 
collected from various non-governmental agencies. After hearing 
criticisms from Group B governments of the first report (for being too 
critical of their policies and for its reliance on non-governmental 
information) subsequent reports have been milder in tone. 
This review function of the secretariat is only one part of the 
implementation process. Crucial to this process is the binding nature 
of resolutions. The obligations conferred by UNCTAD resolutions is 
dependent on:- (i) how specific or broad the issue (resolution) is; 
(ii) the commitment of the parties in the negotiations; (iii) the 
existence of multilateral or unilateral sanctions; (iv) the political 
atmosphere in which decisions are taken; (v) the existence of a 
supervisory body to which complaints can be taken; (vi) the perceived 
equity of the gains to be made. 
UNCTAD's resolutions as we have shown fall into two categories - 
(i) those adopted by majority vote (ii) agreed resolutions which 
express the tacit consent of all states. The analysis of decision-
making shows that the latter is the preferred method of settlement. 
In those cases where resolutions are of the former type little 
positive action is taken. Although it seems as though resolutions 
conforming to the latter type would have greater chance of being 
implemented the nature of the consensus method is such that this 
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inference is incorrect. Within an agreed resolution there still 
exists significant differences on the extent and meaning of 
implementation. FUrthermore, although many resolutions and recommend-
ations are adopted without a vote, a high proportion of these are 
severely diluted in the operational context because several important 
states enter reservations. (60) 
Another important aspect of the political process in UNCTAD is 
the secretariat. The impotence of the secretariat in the political 
process of the G77 will be discussed in the next chapter. Here I am 
concerned with the influence of the secretariat on organisational 
dynamics. A number of points can be made very briefly. First, the 
UNCTAD secretariat is an active political grouping interested in 
structuring outcomes in its immediate environment. From the outset 
the secretariat has been the guardian of an organisational ideology (61) 
with a distinct view of the world economy and the solutions to global 
poverty. The task of the secretariat has been to create a constituency 
which would support such proposals. The G77 is the effective 
constituency for the UNCTAD secretariat. Secondly, the close relation-
ship between the secretariat and the G77 further exacerbates the 
distrust of the organisation held by Group B. Thirdly, the 
secretariat has been the active source of and generator of ideas - 
both the GSP and IPC had their origins in the respective Secretaries-
General - Prebisch and Corea. The secretariat contributes to the 
formulation of policy objectives through its servicing role as well 
as through the preparation of reports and technical studies. (62) 
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4.2 
UNCTAD in the International Environment  
4.2.1 
The Global Context  
UNCTAD's area of concern is vast and continually expanding. The 
relationship between trade and development becomes not less complex, 
but more so as time progresses. The interdependence of the global 
economy and the interrelationships discovered by research tends to 
lead to increases in UNCTAD's activities in the trade and development 
field. UNCTAD's work programme has expanded because of the desire of 
the ldcs to make it the premier body in the trade field, the empire 
building of the secretariat and Group B's tactic of introducing issues 
divisive to the G77. (63)  The increase in the membership of the 
organisation as the decolonisation process proceeds also enlarges 
the scope for action. 
Between 1964-1980 there were significant changes in the inter-
national political economy which affected UNCTAD's capacity for action. 
Changes in the international political economy occur at two levels. 
The material level refers to changes in the international division of 
labour and international production processes. The political level 
refers to the efforts of states and other actors to adjust to these 
infrastructural changes. The political process is underpinned by a 
discourse which includes ideologies, norms and other forms of mental 
and speech acts. International organisations provide states with one 
way of adjusting to global processes of change. It is not our 
intention to analyse the changes in the global capitalist system but 
instead to delineate some of the major occurences which have structured 
perceptions and behaviour. Among these are 1) the internationalisation 
of production through the transnational corporation 2) the growth 
of private capital markets e.g. the airomarket; 3) changing 
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international productivities e.g. the rise of the newly industrialis-
ing countries NICs); 4) the oil price rises of 1973-1974 and 1979; 
5) the increased indebtedness of Third World nations; 6) the end of 
the long boom of capitalist economic growth in 1973; 7) the recession 
of 1974 onwards; 8) the collapse of the Bretton Woods system; 
9) various monetary crises in the leading countries; 10) the decline 
of the United States as the leader of the capitalist world; 11) the 
differential impact of the oil price rises; 12) increased inter-
dependence. The developed states have responded to these changes by 
becoming more introspective. Although the rhetoric of helping the 
developing countries was still the same and a declared sensitivity to 
their aims was exhibited the flow of resources declined in real terms 
and trade policies became more protectionist. 
The decline in development assistance, the loss of export markets, 
the turbulence in the international monetary system pushed the develop-
ing countries to increase their campaign for a transformation of the 
international economic order. Just as this campaign was getting 
underway the enormous increase in the oil price provided a double spur 
to action. First, it heralded (falsely) the promise of a new poor 
power and secondly it made the imperative of change even more drastic. 
The Third World coalition increasingly placed stress on the institu-
tional framework and the necessity for a democratisation of the 
international decision-making process. These demands were made mainly 
through the U.N. system and are known collectively as the call for a 
NIEO. (64) This concern with the institutional framework is of 
course not new and was evident in the creation of UNCTAD. The 
importance of these developments for UNCTAD and the G77 are two fold. 
In the first place, the salience of organisational priorities was 
increased. In other words conventional 'low politics' became issues 
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of 'high politics'. (65)  Secondly, increased activity presented both 
opportunities and problems for theiwo organisations. 
UNCTAD must thus be seen in a dynamic sense, responding to 
political, economic and institutional changes. Although possessing 
influencemsources of its own, the organisation is primarily dependent 
on the activities of state actors. Changes in the rules and norms 
governing international economic relations are initiated mainly by 
state actors. This claim does not imply that these environmental 
changes can be reduced to state actors. It does, however, recognise 
the privileged position of the state in international relations. The 
remainder of this chapter discusses the relationship of UNCTAD to 
other organs of the United Nations and international organisations 
concerned with problems of trade and development. 
4.2.2 
UNCTAD Within the United Nations System 
UNCTAD was created as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. 
Its annual reports are submitted to the General Assembly and are 
considered in the Second (Economic and Financial) Committee. The 
organisation is supposed to act in accordance with Assembly recommenda-
tions and to participate in the preparation and implementation of 
Assembly decisions on trade and development. On the whole the 
relationship between UNCTAD and the General Assembly has worked well 
and has been relatively trouble-free. (66) The Assembly reflecting 
as it does a Third World majority takes a favourable view of UNCTAD's 
activities. This relatively harmonious relationship has veen very 
well described by Cordovez, who writes that, 
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"The Assembly has not shown any tendency to 
exert strict and detailed supervision over 
the activities of UNCTAD but rather to 
serve as a forum which lends political 
support to particular aspects of the Board's 
work regarding which delegations feel that 
such support is needed." (67) 
According to General Assembly resolution 1995(XIX), the Trade and 
Development Board reports to the General Assembly via ECOSOC. This 
is adhered to but no real discussion of the report takes place in 
ECOSOC, it is used merely as a transmission belt. (68) 
Within the United Nations family UNCTAD is only one of a large 
group of organisations concerned with questions of international trade 
and development and issues of central concern to the developing 
countries. These include organisations created by the General Assembly 
itself such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); the specialised agencies such 
as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPC), the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the 
International Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMC0), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). 
UNCTAD was created to fill an institutional hiatus in inter-
national economic affairs but entered an arena with three major 
organisations, the IMF, IBRD and GATT, functioning to the satisfaction 
of the major trading states. Since its creation new organisations 
with salience for its own activities have been created e.g. UNDP and 
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UNIDO. With such a large number of organisations operating over such 
a wide range of issue-areas it is obvious that there will be problems 
concerning overlapping, waste of resources, disputes over organisational 
jurisdiction and the possibility of coordination. (69)  All of these 
problems are compounded by the decentralised nature of the United Nations 
system. Certain problems of coordination are inherent in the United 
Nations system. (70) First, the geographical separation of the 
organisation affects the efficiency and costs, and increases the 
difficulties of coordination. Secondly, the vast increase in the number 
of activities and programmes places a severe strain on the technical 
and personnel resources of the member statea (71)  Thirdly, the 
Economic and Social Council which is the pivot of the system has 
never operated in the way it was supposed to do. Instead of being 
the initiator of developments it has often found itself as a mere 
follower. Fourthly, it is perhaps impossible to agree a coherent 
international programme when the starting point is a set of independently 
conceived programmes each with its own objectives and administration. 
Fifthly, the lack of any central authority with the competence to 
settle disputes has resulted in a system of dispute settlement by 
compromise. This form of distributive justice leads to solutions 
which favour particular agencies rather than the needs of the system 
as a whole. Sixthly, this results ilfloverlaps in the range of 
activities of different organisations sanctioned by their respective 
constitutions and desired by their national counterparts - a problem 
compounded by difference in structure 	 and membership." (72) 
Finally, the absence of coordination at the national level with 
respect to international policies and programmes also hinders efforts 
at international coordination. It leads governments to take diver-
gent positions on the same issues in different international forums 
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and sometimes to divergent decisions being reached. 
Apart from these inherent problems affecting coordination certain 
developments in world politics and international organisational change 
have also contributed to an intensification of these problems. First, 
there has been the increase in the scope and interdependence of 
international activities. This increase reflects the increasing inter-
dependence of international economic activity and also the increasing 
use made of international agencies to solve problems which formerly 
would have been considered within the domestic jurisdiction of nation-
states. Secondly, there has been a rapid and unprecedented growth in 
the operational activities of international organisations. The 
development of the technical assistance activities of international 
organisations led to changes in structure and the development of new 
ways of organising activity. Many organisations developed their own 
methods and this created problems in subsequent years for cooperation. 
A third development affecting coordinatialwithin the U.N. system has 
been the proliferation of activities at the regional level. There has 
been unwarranted duplication and a lack of effective cooperation between 
the regional commissions and the 	agencies with their sectoral 
approach. Another development affecting coordination problems has been 
the increase in the membership of the international organisations. 
Most of these new members are poor, underdeveloped states who want to 
use international agencies as transfer mechanisms in their struggle to 
improve their economic conditions. This has meant an increase in the 
tasks of existing agencies and a proliferation of new agencies. 
Furthermore, these countries as previously stated want to increase their 
influence in the decision making organs of these organisations. This 
has also accentuated the question of ECOSOC's competence as the 
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developing countries have used the General Assembly to bypass the 
Council. Fifthly, the institutional fragmentation of the 1960s has 
also affected the functioning of the U.N. system. The General Assembly 
in creating first UNCTAD and later UNIDO and the merging of the 
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance with the Special Auld to 
create UNDP and the later decision to establish a UNEP added to the 
confusion. There has been considerable debate over competences and 
overlapping jurisdiction with ESA, the regional economic commissions 
and the agencies. The wide ranging activities of the World Bank Group 
and the UNDP also pose potent problems for efficient administration of 
the entire system. Finally, the budgetary fragmentation in the 
system i.e. the rise in the growth of voluntary funds means that over 
half of the economic and social activities of the United Nations is 
financed in this way. These activities are not subject to the same 
kind of central programme, administrative and budgetary control as is 
exercised over regular budget activities. (73)  
Within this administrative jungle UNCTAD has a variety of re-
lationships with other international organisations. Some are 
relatively straightforward, but others reflect all the defects of the 
system. Excluding the speialised agencies within the U.N. family the 
organisations with the greatest relevance for 'UNCTAD are the 
regional economic commissions, UNDP, UNIDO and UNCITRAL. The interest 
of the regional economic commissions in the trade policies and 
problems of their members brings them immediately into close contact 
with UNCTAD. UNCTAD cooperates closely with the regional economic 
commissions, but this takes the form of functional relations between 
UNCTAD headquaters and the headquaters of the regional commission 
because UNCTAD has no regional offices of its own. 
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General Assembly Resolution 2152 (XXI) (74) which established 
UNIDO provided for cooperation between UNCTAD and UNIDO. Cooperation 
between the two organisations takes two forms, a) coordination of 
activities with respect to the implementation of technical assitance 
projects with which they are concerned; b) consulation on the 
execution of certain independent development projects. UNCTAD 
became a participating agency of UNDP through General Assembly 
Resolution 2401 (XXIII). (75)  UNCTAD participates in the preparation 
and execution of certain UNDP financed projects. At the national 
Wel UNDP resident representatives act as UNCTAD representatives in 
matters concerning UNCTAD's technical assistance activities. UNCTAD 
also cooperates with UNCITRAL which was created by General Assembly 
Resolution 2205(211) (76) to further the progressive harmonisation and 
unification of international trade law. Cooperation between UNCTAD 
and UNCITRAL has taken the form of coordination on joint international 
shipping legislation, for example. 
4.2.3 
UNCTAD and the Specialised Agencies  
UNCTAD's relationship with the specialised agencies was es-
tablished on the basis of Articles 57 and 63 of the United Nations 
Charter which authorises the United Nations through ECOSOC to 
coordinate the activities of these agendes. The large number of 
specialised agencies with relevance for UNCTAD's work has already 
been listed above. The three agencies of the greatest interest from 
our perspective are the IMF, the World Bank and GATT. 
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Concern over the reform of the international monetary system 
provides the prime focus of overlap between the concerns of UNCTAD and 
the IMF. UNCTAD has been concerned with the workings of the inter-
national monetary system from its early years (77) and UNCTAD III was 
dominated by the question of international monetary reform. It was as 
a direct result of pressure at UNCTAD III that the composition of the 
Interim Committee on the Reform of the International Monetary System 
(the Committee of Twenty) was changed to include eight representatives 
of the developing countries. The role of the IMF in the provision of 
compensatory finance has also aroused UNCTADis interest. There is some 
cooperation between UNCTAD and the IMF on these maters but basically 
the relationship is one in which UNCTAD attempts to mobilise its 
members to pressure the IMF to take policies more favourable to the 
developing countries. UNCTAD is not particularly successful in its 
influence attempts but continues to pressure the IMF for favoured 
policies e.g. changes in IMF conditionality provisions. 
The World Bank has expanded its scope considerably (78) in the 
past thirty years and has also changed its emphasis in response to 
changes in the international environment and now its operations are 
almost entirely concentrated in the field of development assistance. 
As the largest multilateral lending agency it is of direct concern to 
UNCTAD which is concerned with the flow of funds, the geographical 
disbursement of loans, the rate of interest and other considerations 
affecting the flow of development assistance to the developing 
countries and their ability to repay these loans. The diversification 
of the World Bank into such areas as trade expansion, and economic 
cooperation and research on commodities and substitutes means that 
there is an area of overlap with UNCTAD. Inter-secretariat 
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cooperation is maintained in the examination of these problems but the 
UNCTAD secretariat and the developing countries are mainly interested 
in using the organisation1D influence the World Bank's priorities and 
decisions. 
The relevance of GATT both to the origins of the Third World 
coalition and the creation of UNCTAD and GATT's responsibilities in 
the trade field make GATT the single most important existing 
international organisation from UNCTAD's perspective. (79) The 
UNCTAD-GATT relationship has been largely determined by the historical 
circumstances surrounding UNCTAD's birth and the lack of a central 
authority to adjudicate the competing claims of the rival organisations 
for jurisdictional competence in the trade field. On the first point it 
is sufficient to recall that the developed countrieseLd not want the 
1964 Conference to create a permanent machinery. They argued that 
there were enough organisations in the trade and development field 
without creating further institutional congestion and furthermore, that 
GATT as a negotiating body could be sufficiently extended and developed 
into an agency capable of implementing the new trade and development 
policy. To this end Part IV of GATT, containing similar provisions 
to UNCTAD's Final Act was added in February 1965. This attempt at 
preventative expansion by the developed countries was fully supported 
by the GATT secretariat and led in the early years of UNCTAD's 
existence to frequent clashes over areas of competence and responsibil- 
(80) ity. 	With the establishment of the UNCTAMATT International 
Trade Centre (ITC) in January 1968 relations between the two 
organisations began to improve. 
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The importance of GATT from the perspective of our study is two-
fold. First, it has a wide area of competence and overlaps with UNCTAD 
in a number of fields. As such it is used by Group B in an attempt to 
by-pass the UNCTAD framework. Secondly, in so far as UNCTAD and GATT 
clash developing countries are presented with a choice between the two 
organisations. Emphasis on GATT leads to lack of interest in UNCTAD. 
Nevertheless this picture of conflict although of importance does not 
describe the sum total of UNCTAD-GATT relations. Apart from the ITC 
there are areas in which the organisations complement each other. For 
example, the GSP negotiated in UNCTAD is only made possible through 
a waiver in the GATT. And the Global System of Trade Preferences among 
developing countries (GSTP) currently in progress in UNCTAD cannot 
make adequate progress without significant input from GATT. (81)  
4.2.4 
Relations with other International Organisations. 
The Conference is open to any inter-governmental organisation 
concerned with trade and development problems. The representatives 
of such institutions may participate without a vote in the Board's 
deliberations. UNCTAD also has ties with a number of non-governmental 
organisations. (82)  The criteria for the participation of these 
organisations in UNCTAD's work was decided at the seventh session of 
the TDB. (83) In order to establish continuing consultative 
arrangements with UNCTAD a non-governmental organisation must be 
particularly concerned with the problems of trade and development; 
have aims and purposes which are in conformitymith the spirit, purposes 
and principles of the U.N. Charter; be of recognised standing and 
represent a substantial proportion of organised persons within the 
particular field in which it operates; have an established 
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headquarters and be international in its structure. A distinction is 
made between non-governmental organisations with a basic interest in 
UNCTAD's activities (General Category) and those with an interest in 
specific matters only (specific category). A register exists for 
recording national non-governmental organisations which can make a 
significant contribution to the work of UNCTAD. In December 1976 
there were 59 inter-governmental organisations participating in 
UNCTAD's work, 32 international non-governmental organisations in the 
general category, 39 in the special category and 2 national non- 
( 84) governmental organisations inscribed on the register. 
4.3 
Conclusions  
UNCTAD provides a specific environment for the North-South debate. 
Politics in the organisation reflect fundamental divergencies con-
cerning the competence and role of the organisation. The political 
process although based on the formal procedures has developed 
organisational decision-making in a manner different from that 
originally envisaged. The most significant features are the group 
system and the development of a consensus method of decision-making. 
Organisational structure and process place the emphasis on group 
solidarity and this is enhanced by the conflicting ideologies. There 
is thus a strong organisational bias in favour of G77 unity. The 
nature of the deliberative process, the issues discussed and the form 
of decision-making enhance southern solidarity. Few gains can be made 
from breaking ranks and the political costs would be high. The G77 is 
able to maintain unity because the negativism of Group B and the in-
difference of Group D offer little in the way of positive inducement.to 
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defect. Furthermore UNCTAD's scope of effective decision is so 
limited that the economic costs of maintaining unity in the face of 
economic disadvantage are low. Conversely the importance of UNCTAD 
within the VIM and global institutional reform reinforces and main-
tains group unity. UNCTAD was created by the G77 and the maintenance 
of the organisation requires the continued existence of the group. 
Despite its many shortcomings UNCTAD remains the only organisation 
which the ides effectively control. The coalition is necessary for 
control to be maintained and therefore states will attempt to reconcile 
their differences in order to hold on to their prize asset. The 
importance I'm referring to is not only a material one but also 
psychological and symbolic. In other words although UNCTAD clearly 
fails to provide the G77 with tangible economic gains it nevertheless 
fulfils an important symbolic role. The existence of rival organisa-
tions encroaching on UNCTAD's territory strengthens rahter than 
weakens political support unless substantial tangible gains were to 
accrue from these rival organisations. 
The absence of voting not only makes intra-G77 cooperation seem 
greater, it also contributes towards increasing cohesion and lessening 
fractionalisation. Persuasion is the most significant way of arriving 
at collective decision in the consensus method of decision-making. 
Persuasion in intra-G77 bargaining is further enhanced because of the 
existence of shared group norms in contradistinction to Group B. G77 
unity is also maintained through institutionalisation. UNCTAD provides 
a defined pattern of interaction and the negotiating groups and contact 
groups a stable and persistent setting for negotiations. After UNCTAD 
IV the committees became open ended and this removed one sanction 
(election to office) from group politics but elections for officers and 
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nominations to negotiating groups still provide measures through which 
to enforce discipline. 
The conclusion of this chapter is that the UNCTAD framework 
provides a setting in which the pressures for group conformity and 
group solidarity act as effective bulwarks against the centrifugal 
tendencies in the G77. The next chapter analyses the organisation of 
the group itself in order to assess the extent to which its own 
organisational dynamics contribute to the resolution of conflictual 
strains within the coalition. 
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83. Board Decision 43(VII) - See Official Records of the Trade  
and Development Board, Seventh Session. Supp.1. 
84. TAD/INF/PUB/76.8(December 1976). 
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CHAPTER 5  
The Group of 77 : Organisational Structure and Political Process  
Organisational performance depends upon the initial organ-
isational structure, the political process and changes in these two 
features over time. Organisational theorists refer to two specific 
aspects of structure and process as being of most importance. These 
are the 'scope' and 'level' of the organisation. Philip Schmitter 
defined the scope of an international organisation as "a mixture of 
two dimensions: the number of social groups or policy sectors 
potentially involved (in making and elaborating the policy of the 
international organisation) .... and the importance of these policy 
sectors for the attainment of national actor-defined goals". 1. The 
impact of the organisation on its environment varies in direct 
proportion to the number of groups involved in policy articulation. 
The level of an international organisation "refers to the extent of 
commitment to mutual decision-making both in terms of continuity i.e.  
the obligation to meet recurrently and to re-evaluate periodically 
joint policies, and in terms of techniques i.e. the nature of the 
policy making process itself."2. As Ansari notes, "the greater the 
commitment to the institutionalization of decision-making processes, 
subordinating national autonomy in specific issue areas, the greater 
the likelihood that the organization will transform the environment 
in accordance with its ideology." 
These concepts cannot be applied to the G77 without some degree 
of adaptation but nevertheless are suggestive of further lines of 
analysis. The continued existence of the G77 and its ability to 
maintain cohesion is dependent upon changes in its scope and level. 
The unique nature of the G77 i.e. it is an informal yet highly 
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institutionalised mechanism suggests a redefinition of scope and level 
along the following lines. Scope is defined as the number of groups 
and issue-areas involved in policy making and the importance of these 
groups and issue-areas for national actor-defined goals. Level 
refers to both the continuity of joint decision and the decision-
making techniques involved. But the less the threat to national 
autonomy of joint decision making the greater the potential stability 
of the organisation. In other words, the development of sub-groups 
within the G77 along relevant issue-areas will enhance rather than 
disrupt organisational stability provided decision-making protects 
national autonomy. The accommodation of sub-groups within the organ-
isation will provide certain members with potential benefits not 
generalisable to all members. This is important because the hetero-
geneous nature of the coalition ensures that few general policies 
will benefit all members. This does not mean that the mere pro-
liferation of subgroups contributes to coalition maintenance. Rather, 
it is the institutionalisation of sub-groups, provision of gains and 
access to decision-making which is crucial. 
The first part of this chapter examines the organisational 
structure of the G77 and its development over time. The foaus will 
be on the G77 in Geneva, the headquarters of UNCTAD but features 
relevant to the wider G77 and its operation in other regional centres 
will also be discussed. 
5.1. 	Organisational Structure  
5.1.1. Membership, 
The G77 expanded from its origins , membership in 1964 to number 
122 in 1980 4. (see TabI5,5.1.). Apart from a few exceptions, the 
membership of the G77 is synonymous with UNCTAD's Groups A and C. 
Cyprus and Malta, members of Group B, are members of the G77 and 
• 
TABLE 5.1. 
The members of the Group of 77, September 
1980  
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Afghanistan * 
Algeria * 
Angola 
Argentina * 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Benin * 
Bhutan 
Bolivia * 
Botswana 
Brazil * 
Burma * 
Burundi * 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic * 
Chad * 
Chile * 
Colombia * 
Congo * 
Costa Rica * 
Cuba 
Cyprus * 
Democratic Kampuchea 
Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 
Democratic Yemen 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic * 
Ecuador * 
Egypt * 
El Salvador * 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia* 
Fiji 
Gabon * 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala * 
Guinea * 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti * 
Honduras * 
India * 
Indonesia * 
Iran * 
Iraq * 
Ivory Coast * 
Jamaica * 
Jordan * 
Kenya * 
Kuwait * 
Laos * 
Lebanon * 
Lesotho 
Liberia * 
Libya * 
Madagascar * 
Malawi 
Malaysia * 
Maldives 
Mali * 
Mauritania * 
Mauitius 
Mexico * 
Morocco * * 
Mozambique 
Nepal * 
Nicaragua * 
Niger * 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan * 
PLO 
Panama * 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay * 
Peru * 
Philippines * 
Qatar Republic of Korea * 
Romania 
Rwanda * 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia * 
Senegal * 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone * 
Singapore 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia * 
Sri Lanka * 
St. Vincent & Grenadines 
Sudan * 
Suriman 
Swaziland 
Syria * 
Thailand * 
Togo * 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago * 
Tunisia * 
Uganda * 
United Arab Emirates 
United Republic of 
Cameroon * 
'United Republic of 
Tanzania * 
Upper Volta * 
Uruguay * 
Venezuela * 
Vietnam * 
Yemen * 
Yugoslavia * 
Zaire * 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
*Original members of the 
G77. 
212. 
Romania a member of UNCTAD's Group D has been a member of the G77 since 
1976. China, Israel and the Republic of South Africa, although members 
of Group A are not members of the G77. The Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) is the only non-state (non-UNCTAD) member of the 
G77. The criteria for membership of the Group has never been made 
explicitly clear. 	The founder members were those states which signed 
the Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries at UNCTAD I in 1964. 
Subsequently, all developing countries joining UNCTAD have joined the 
Group. The basic requirement for membership is a commitment to sup-
port the agreed positions of the Group 77 in all forums. The 
acceptance into the G77 of the newly-independent states and their 
willingness to join can be explained in institutional terms by 
reference to the division of states in UNCTAD into groups based on 
geographic and socio-economic factors. The existence of the UNCTAD 
group system and its salience for decision-making in the organisation 
constituted a major reason for the expansion of the G77. On entry 
into UNCTAD the new states automatically became members of List A or 
List C. Apart from the exceptions previously mentioned the combined 
membership of lists A and C from the G77. Since it is the G77 
which is the actor in UNCTAD politics, membership of the G77 became 
a necessary requirement for effective participation in UNCTAD decision-
making. 5. 
Membership of the G77 is closely related into its sub-division 
into three geographical groups - Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
Until the Third Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 (26 January-
7 February 1976) in Manila, Philippines, the sole basis for member-
ship was regional. To become a member of the G77 a state first had 
to be admitted to one of the three regional groups. Any country 
admitted to one of the three regional groups automatically becomes a 
full member of the G77. This practice proved uncontentious until 
the admission of the PLO to the Asian Group at its Third Ministerial 
Meeting at Jakarta, 19-21 January 1976. 6.  At the Third Ministerial 
Meeting of the G77, the Latin American Group expressed private reser-
vations about PLO membership of the Asian Group and by extension of 
the G77. The African Group concerned to uphold the principle of 
regional group autonomy on questions of membership supported the Asian 
Group's decision and the PLO's membership was never offically chal-
lenged. 
Apart from the regional basis of membership it is possible for a 
country to become a non-regional member of the G77. To do so it has 
to submit a written application directly to the Chairman of the G77 
stating its reasons for joining, its intention to subscribe to the 
objectives of the Group and to abide by the conditions of its member-
ship. The application is then submitted to the three regional groups, 
after which the G77 as a whole takes a decision on the basis of con-
sensus. A non-regional member is entitled to participate in all 
meetings of the G77 and may be invited to participate in the work of 
a regional group on an informal basis. Proposals from non-regional 
members have to be channelled through one of the regional groups. 8. 
The issue of non-regional membership of the G77 first arose at 
the Third Ministerial Meeting in 1976. 9 ' Malta and Romania both 
applied for membership without having first been accepted into one of 
the three regional groups. 10 ' The African Group at first refused to 
accept the principle of non-regional membership, 11. but eventually a 
compromise was reached whereby Malta and Romania were admitted as non-
regional members, with the proviso that this decision "should not in 
any way or under any circumstances be considered as a precedent for 
the future". 12 
21 3. 
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In order to establish clear guidelines for future practice the working 
group on membership (mentioned above) was established to study and make 
recommendations on the rules and procedures governing the admission of 
new members to the G77. The criteria for the admission of non-regional 
members outlined above result from the deliberations of this working 
13. 	 14. group. 	Although non members of a regional group, Fhlta 	and 
Romania had their applications for membership sponsored by the Asian 
and Latin American groups respectively. Membership was granted at 
Manila on the following conditions, 
"(a) The countries in question should agree to 
participate in the work and positions of the 
Group of 77 in all forums and not only on 
specific topics and aspects of international 
relations; 
(b)The fact of continuing to belong to the 'B' 
or 'D' lists would not constitute a problem, 
provided that the country in question did not 
aspire to elective offices; 
(c)The initiatives of developing countries 
members of the Group of 77 which do not 
belong to any of the three regional groups 
should be endorsed and channelled through 
any one of them" .15. 
The stipulations of provision (b) above have not been adhered to since 
it was drawn up. Subsequent practice has conformed to the view that 
as long as non-regional members do not clash with G77 priorities then 
they can hold 'offices' in their UNCTAD group and be spokesmen for 
the G77. 
It is possible that although a country may be a formal member of 
the G77 its active participation in the relevant regional group may 
be discouraged. Cuba was admitted to the G77 at the Second Minister- 
ial Meeting of the Group of 77, Lima, Peru 28 October - 7 November 
1971. Cuban membership was sponsored by the African and Asian Groups. 
The Latin American Group did not oppose Cuban membership mainly because 
of the pressure brought to bear by the Allende regime in Chile, the 
hosts for UNCTAD III in 1972. Although a member from 1971, Cuba was 
not invited to attend certain meetings of the Latin American Group in 
Geneva until Summer 1973. 16.  A legal fiction was employed in this 
regard; Cuba was never stopped from attending formal meetings but 
was not invited to informal ones. Since these informal meetings 
constituted the bulk of the Latin American Group's activity, Cuban 
participation was kept minims]. Cuba's integration into fully 
active membership came at the insistence of Mexico, Jamaica and Chile 
and coincided with a less hostile attitude towards Cuba in the Carib-
bean and Latin America. 
5.1. %a Representation in Geneva 
The total membership of the G77 does not give an accurate picture 
of group dynamics with respect to the G77 in UNCTAD. Not all states 
have missions in Geneva and this is an important consideration to note 
when discussing the organisational structure of the Group. The dif-
fering levels of development manifested by the G77 membership is 
reflected in the relative sophistication of the various foreign 
ministries, economic departments and the general bureaucratisation of 
governmental machinery. This essential heterogeneity results in a 
constantly changing organisational scope. In other words, although 
all states are theoretically involved in all major decisions, the day-
to-day machinery is effectively entrusted to those states with 
representation in Geneva. 
Divergencies in economic and technical resources are noticeable 
in three different ways with respect to the representation of indiv-
idual states to UNCTAD. The first concerns the establishment of 
permanent missions in Geneva. For foreign exchange and other reasons 
developing countries usually cannot afford to have many foreign 
missions. Geneva is a major centre of international organisational 
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activity and a mission situated there can be accredited to many 
organisations, thus minimising cost and maTimising access to a variety 
of international institutions. Despite the importance attached to 
UNCTAD by the developing countries and despite Geneva's position as a 
nexus of international organisational activity there is a serious 
underrepresentation of the G77 in Geneva. 17. Table 5.2. presents 
data on G77 representation in Geneva for two years - 1978 and 1980. 
In March 1978 only 56 per cent of the Group had missions in Geneva 
and in March 1980 this had risen slightly to 59 per cent. The largest 
regional group, Africa, also contains a greater proportion of the 
poorest states and, consequently, has less representatives in Geneva 
than the other two regional groups. This lack of representation 
affects the politics of the African Group since the members always 
have to renegotiate their group position, before any major meeting, 
after the arrival of delegates from national capitals. The lack of 
adequate representation in Geneva also leads to an element of dis-
organisation within the African Group since to canvass as many opinions 
as possible the Chairman of the group always circulates current issues 
to the resident missions in Paris, Brussels or Bonn of those countries 
without a mission in Geneva. 
Members of the G77 not represented in Geneva are consulted bfore 
any major UNCTAD meeting e.g. the Trade and Development Board or one 
of the main committees. The Chairman of the G77 consults the capitals 
of the countries lacking missions in Geneva who respond by sending 
delegates. A meeting to reassess the common agreed position of the 
G77 is usually held a day or two before the relevant UNCTAD meeting 
between the resident G77 members and the newly arrived participants. 
The common agreed position can then be changed in response to inputs 
made by these delegates. Despite the lack of on-the-spot represent-. 
ation members of the G77 are, therefore, always provided with an 
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TABLE 5.2. 
Diplomatic Missions in Geneva, March 1978 and March 1980 1 
1978 	1980  
	
Number of Percentage Number of 	Percentage 
Missions of total 	Missions 	of total 
Africa (48) 
(48) 
Asia 
41 
Latin 2 America 28 	21 
30  
Group (116) 65 
of 
77 
(119) 
() represents the total group membership. 
The first figure is for 1978. 
1. Included are those missions in Geneva or its 
immediate vicinity. 
2. Including Romania. 
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17 
27 
35.4 
	18 	37.5 
67.5 	30 	73.2 
75 
	 22 	73.3 
56 	 70 	 58. 8 
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opportunity to register their views before a major meeting. Further-
more, states without a permanent mission in Geneva sometimes designate 
another state from its regional group to act on its behalf within the 
regional group and the G77 as a whole. Failing these provisions, 
the regional group occasionally designates on an ad hoc basis, a 
spokesman for a non-represented state. 
Secondly, the size and strength of the missions vary enormously 
from the large and highly efficient missions such as Argentina, Brazil 
and India, to the small and poorly staffed ones like Nicaragua which 
once operated for some time with only one professional diplomat. The 
larger, better staffed missions are more able to cope with the huge 
volume of complex information that needs to be processed and can more 
effectively represent their interests within the G77. In 1979, the 
staff at G77 missions in Geneva had to cover 2,083 official meetings 
in UNCTAD, numerous meetings of other international organisations, and 
countless regional group and plenary G77 meetings. The documentation 
is also overwhelming e.g. from January to November 1979, apart from 
summary records, UNCTAD produced approximately 14,000 pages of docu- 
ments. 18. 
Thirdly, the relationship between the permanent missions and their 
national capitals is not a uniform one. Some countries maintain close 
contact between the home capital and the mission in Geneva. These are 
generally the larger countries with sophisticated foreign services and 
good channels of communication. In this relationship, the ambassador 
is very dependent on orders from the centre. On a declining scale 
of bureaucratic control come those countries which attempt to maintain 
some control over the ambassador's freedom of action but lack the 
necessary communications system to do so as effectively as the former 
group. In this situation a general directive is usually given to the 
mission, providing it with a certain orientation. The ambassador 
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then has a certain degree of freedom in the interpretation and 
execution of state policy. 19. Finally, some ambassadors have a 
completely free hand, state policy being effectively decided by the 
mission in Geneva. All states from those with a high degree of 
centralisation to those with a high latitude of discretion for the 
Geneva mission frequently strengthen their diplomatic team by sending 
experts from the home state to take part in important negotiating 
conferences. 
5.1.2. 	Organisational Infrastructure of the Group of 77  
5.1.2a. 	Organisational Infrastructure in Geneva 
The basic organisational unit of the G77 is the regional group 
which represents the most fundamental decision-making centre in the 
G77. All organisational features are based on the three regional 
groups. The final G77 position on any issue is first discussed in 
the regional groups and only when the regional groups have arrived at 
separate decisions on the specific items are they discussed at the 
level of the G77 as a whole. 
As the previous chapter showed, UNCTAD is both a periodic conference 
and a continuing machinery. First, we will discuss the organisational 
aspects of the G77 pertaining to the continuing machinery and then we 
will examine the G77 in relation to the UNCTAD four-yearly conferences. 
The organisation of the G77 exhibits elements of flexibility and in-
formality and also specific patterns of institutionalisation. At the 
level of the G77 as a whole certain rules have to be obeyed by all 
regional groups but each individual group is left to organise its 
activities as best as it sees fit. 
In Geneva the regional groups meet frequently to discuss common 
issues and to reach a group position to be presented to the G77 as a 
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whole. Of the three regional groups, the Latin American Group is the 
most structured meeting informally once a week and formally at least 
once every two months to elect a new Chairman. The African Group 
meets at least once a month to elect a new Chairman. The Asian Group 
does not have a timetable for regular meetings; if a matter of suf-
ficient importance arises the Chairman of the Group convenes a meeting. 
The G77 meets in plenary before meetings of the Trade and Development 
Board and the main UNCTAD committees. The agenda for these meetings 
are based on the results of the regional groups meeting separately. 
In Geneva most of the intra-G77 bargaining is conducted in small 
negotiating groups, usually composed of equal representatives from 
the three regional groups. To maintain the balance of equality between 
the three regional groups the chairmanship, vice-chairmanship and 
rapporteurship of any G77 working roup or sub-committee is always 
distributed so that each regional group holds one of these offices. 
Table 5.3. presents the membership of the nine working groups operative 
in September 1980. Apart from the regional groups, then, the G77 in 
Geneva consists of an interlocking web of working groups and sub-
committees, mainly of a transient nature. These working groups are 
created to consider a specific proposal or series of proposals currently 
being debated in UNCTAD or of interest generally to the G77. When 
UNCTAD's deliberations on the specific item is completed the working 
group is then disbanded. The ad hoc creation of sub-groups is 
presented in Figure 5.1. which shows the organisational structure of 
the G77 between UNCTAD IV and UNCTAD V. It shows a preparatory 
committee, four working groups, a coordinating committee and four 
sub-committees. The organisational proliferation is not restricted 
to these formal working groups. Numerous contact groups of an in-
formal nature exist for the conduct of serious negotiations between 
G77 members. These informal contact groups are formed by members of 
TABLE 5.3. 
Membership of Working Groups of the G77 in UNCTAD September 1980 
Member 
Group Africa Asia Latin America 
Algeria Bangladesh Argentina 
Working Group of Egypt India Bolivia 
33 on the Inte- Gabon Indonesia Brazil 
grated Programme Ghana Iran Chile 
for Commodities Ivory Coast Kuwait Colombia 
and the Common Libya Malaysia Ecuador 
Fund. Nigeria Pakistan Jamaica 
Sudan Philippines* Mexico 
Tunisia Sri Lanka Peru 
Zaire Syria Trinidad 
& Tobago 
Yugoslavia Venezuela 
Working Group of Algeria Bangladesh Argentina 
15 on Instit- Egypt India Brazil 
utional Ethiopia* Iraq Colombia 
Questions. Ghana Malaysia Trinidad 
& Tobago 
Libya Yugoslavia Venezuela 
Working Group of Algeria Bangladesh Argentina 
30 on Economic Egypt India Brazil 
Cooperation Gabon Indonesia Colombia 
among Developing Ivory Coast Iran Cuba 
Countries. Libya Iraq Ecuador 
Nigeria Pakistan Guatemala 
Somalia Philippines Jamaica 
Sudan Sri Lanka Mexico* 
Zaire Thailand Peru 
Yugoslavia Venezuela 
Working Group of Egypt Bangladesh Bolivia 
15 on Monetary Ghana* India Chile 
and Financial Nigeria Iran Honduras 
Issues Sudan Pakistan Jamaica 
Zaire Yugoslavia Venezuela 
/contd 
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TABLE 5.3. 
Member 
Group Africa Asia Latin America 
Co-ordinating Algeria India Argentina 
Committee on Egypt Indonesia Brazil 
Multilateral Ethiopia Iraq Bolivia 
Trade Gabon Iran Colombia 1 Negotiations. Ghana Malaysia Cuba 
Ivory Coast Pakistan Chile 
Senegal Philippines Dominican 
Republic 
Tunisia Singapore Ecuador 
Zaire Sri Lanka El Salvador 
Thailand Jamaica 
Yugoslavia Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Peru 
Trinidad 
& Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Working Group of Algeria India Argentina 
15 on Transfer Egypt Indonesia Brazil* 
of Technology. Ivory Coast Iraq Chile 
Kenya Pakistan Colombia 
Nigeria Philippines Jamaica 
Senegal Sri Lanka Mexico 
Zaire Yugoslavia Venezuela 
Working Group of Burundi India Argentina 
15 on Egypt Malaysia Brazil* 
Restrictive Ghana Pakistan Chile 
Business Tunisia Qatar Colombia 
Practices. Uganda Sri Lanka Trinidad & Tobago 
Working Group of Burundi India* Argentina 
15 on the Ghana Indonesia Brazil 
International Libya Iraq Colombia 
Development Nigeria Pakistan Mexico 
Strategy. Sudan Thailand Venezuela 
OAU2 Yugoslavia2 El Salvador 
SIECA2 Jamaica2 
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/contd 
TABLE 5.3. 
Member 
Africa Asia Latin America 
Working Group of Algeria Bangladesh Brazil 
15 on Ghana India* Chile 
Manufactures. Morocco Iraq Cuba 
Nigeria Malaysia El Salvador 
Zaire Philippines Mexico 
Source : K.P. Sauvant - The Group of 77 - Table 17 
*The country in the chair 
1 No fixed membership 
2 Other Participants 
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FIGURE 5.1. 
Organisational Structure of the Group of 77 : Geneva 1976-1979  
Group of 77 
African Group Asian Group 
1 
Latin American Group 	. 
Working 	Working 	Working 
Group. 33 Group. 15 	Group. 30 
Integrated 	Institu- 	Economic 
Programme 	tional Cooper- 
for Questions 	ation 
Commodities/ Among 
Commond Fund 	Developing 
Countries 
Preparatory 
Committee 
Working 	Working 
Group. 15 	Coordinating 
Money & 	Committee 
Finance 
Sub-Cttee 	Sub-Cttee 	Sub-Cttee 
Sub-Cttee 
Organisational 
Matters 
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the G77 on specific issues in which they have an interest. Member- 
ship of these contact groups are determined by the interested states 
themselves and includes states which are members of the formal working 
groups and states outside the formal structure. The creation of 
specifically G77 contact groups arises from the general nature of the 
UNCTAD political process where informal and formal contact groups 
consisting of members of the G77, Group B and Group D are a general 
feature of the negotiating process. 
Prior to the expansion of the TDB in 1972, coordination of G77 
activities in Geneva had been entrusted to the Group of 31. After 
UNCTAD I, the Group of 31 developing countries members of the TDB 
began coordinating G77 policy. However, because (a) prior to 
UNCTAD II in 1968, meetings of the TDB were split between New York 
and Geneva, (b) the G77 had first arisen in New York - a jurisdictional 
dispute arose over leadership of the G77 between the New York and 
Geneva delegations. 20.  The First Ministerial Meeting of the G77 in 
Algiers, 1967, decided that the Group of 31 should be the official 
coordinating body for G77 activities. The Algiers Charter stated, 
"In all matters relating to the preparation for 
Ministerial Meetings of developing countries, 
and, during the intervals between these Ministerial 
Meetings, and for the formulating of joint positions 
on issues within the purview of UNCTAD, the competent 
authority of the Group of 77 is the Group of 31 
developing countries". 21. 
With the demise of the Group of 31 coordination functions have been 
passed to the Chairmen of the regional groups and the Chairman of 
the G77. 
Although the chairmanship of the G77 is in principle elective as 
are those of the regional groups, these offices rotate on a geo-
graphical or alphabetical basis. In Geneva, the office of the 
Chairman of the G77 is held on a three-monthly basis by a delegate 
from the African, Asian or Latin American Group. Each group therefore 
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holds the chairmanship once every nine months. This is done on an 
alphabetical order within the groups. The Chairman of the G77 is 
responsible for coordinating the work of all the G77 working groups, 
sub-committees and regional groups. He becomes the spokesman for 
the G77 in all forums and during all negotiations with Groups B and D. 
Each regional group has different rules for the rotation of the 
chairmanship. In the African and Latin American groups, the Chair-
manship rotates on an alphabetical basis. Despite the automatic 
nature of the changeover a formal meeting is still held to approve the 
change. A state may relinquish its period in the Chair if it feels 
that it lacks the resources to do the job properly. In the Latin 
American Group, the office of Chairman is held for two months and in 
the African Group for one month. In the period covered by this study 
the Asian Group only had one Chairman - Ambassador Hortencio Briidantes 
of the Philippines. This deviation from the practice of the other two 
regional groups developed after 1964 and remained so because no member 
of the Asian Group ever felt the necessity of challenging it. This 
fixed chairmanship developed a momentum of its own and it became 
increasingly difficult as time passed to find a valid reason for 
objecting to the practice. Furthermore, the Asian delegates recog-
nised that Brilliantes had been an astute and efficient Chairman. 
The Chairman of a regional group is responsible for convening the 
meetings of his group. These normally are held at the mission of 
the country currently occupying the chairmanship. Meetings of the 
G77 are convened by the Chairman of the G77. There are no set time-
tables of meetings. These are dependent on need and are convened 
either at the request of one of the regional groups or when the 
negotiation of a specific issue in UNCTAD has reached a stage where 
it is deemed necessary to have a G77 meeting. 
227. 
5.1.3. 	Organisational Infrastructure in UNCTAD 
The organisational infrastructure of the G77 shows an increasing 
degree of institutionalisation over time. The first Ministerial 
Meeting in Algiers, 1967 began a process which has served to maintain 
the existence of the group. 22. The key organisational elements are 
the Preparatory Committee, the regional groups, the Senior Officials 
Meeting and the Ministerial Meetings.of the G77. These developments 
are indicative of increases in both the scope and level of the G77 as 
an organisation. The discussion below will examine the development 
of these institutional features. The importance of the regional 
groups in the organisational structure of the G77 has already been 
discussed and therefore this will not be repeated here. The aim of 
the organisational developments is the coordination of G77 negotiating 
positions for UNCTAD conferences. The sequential development of this 
process for the post-Algiers period is outlined in Figure 5.2. 
During the third session of the TDB (25 January-17 February 1966) 
the Group of 31 decided that the G77 should be convened at ministerial 
level prior to UNCTAD II in 1968. Pursuant to this decision the G31 
decided in September 1966 23. to create a co-ordinating committee to 
carry out 'the effective preparation' for the ministerial meeting. 
The Co-ordinating Committee met in Algiers on 10 October 1967 to 
consider the agenda items of the Algiers meeting. 24. This initiative 
by the Group of 31 to hold a preparatory meeting priorto the Algiers 
Ministerial Meeting became a key feature in the institutionalisation 
of the G77. Prior to UNCTAD III, the Group of 31 decided that a 
Preparatory Committee should be established on the basis of equitable 
geographical representation of the three regional groups (ten countries 
from each region) but that its deliberation be kept open to all members 
of the G77. 25. The Preparatory Committee meets in Geneva and its 
FIGURE 5.2. 
Preparation for UNCTAD Conference : The G77 1 s Policy-Making Process 
Regional 
Groups 
in 
Geneva 
Preparatory 
Committee 
Ministerial 	Senior 	Ministerial 
Meetings 	Officials Meeting 
of the Meeting 	of the 
Regional 	 G77 
Groups 
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sessions last on average for eight months. The Preparatory Committee 
for the Second Ministerial Meeting met from 10 March - 7 November 1971, 
that for the Third Ministerial Meeting from 13 March - 22 December 1975 
and that for the Fourth Ministerial Meeting from 21 April - 15 December 
1978. 
The main task of the Preparatory Committee is the production of the 
documentation required for the Ministerial Meeting and a draft agenda. 
The work of the Preparatory Committee is carried out by a number of 
working groups and sub-committees. The expansion of these groups and 
their specific areas of concern reflect the major issues dominant in 
UNCTAD and scheduled to be discussed at the forthcoming Conference. 26. 
The work of the Preparatory Committee proceeds in three stages. In 
the first stage organisational details are discussed i.e. the organ-
isation of the Preparatory Committee - the creation of sub-committees, 
etc. At this stage the chairmen of the existing working groups and 
senior UNCTAD Secretariat officials brief the Preparatory Committee on 
the major policy issues for the forthcoming conference. In the 
second stage, the Preparatory Committee begins the formulation of the 
G77's position on Conference agenda items. The third stage is con-
cerned with the drafting of position papers and recommendations for 
the Ministerial Meeting. 27 ' 
The members of the G77 had met at the regional level prior to the 
Geneva Conference and it became customary for the regional groups to 
meet at ministerial level prior to all subsequent UNCTAD Conferences. 
At these meetings (see Table 5.4) the common positions of the region 
are arrived at before the Ministerial Meeting of the G77. The regional 
basis of G77 politics determines this organisational feature and even 
if coordination did not take place on other levels, it would have to 
be done on the regional level. 
TABLE 5.4. 
Regional Groups Ministerial Meetings Prior to UNCTAD Conferences 1963-1979  
Regional 
Group 
UNCTAD I UNCTAD II UNCTAD III UNCTAD IV UNCTAD V 
Africa OAU, Niamey 
9-13 Dec 1963; 
ECA Addis Ababa 
Feb 1964 
ECA/OAU, 
Algiers 
1-15 Oct 
1967 
ECA/OAU 
Addis Ababa 
1-14 Oct 
1971 
OAU Trade 
Ministers, 
Algiers 
24-20 Nov 1975 
OAU Trade 
Ministers, 
Addis Ababa 
30 Jun-1 Feb 1979 
Asia ECAFE, 
Bangkok 
March 1964 
ECAFE, 
25-27 Sept 
1967 
Ministerial 
Meeting of the 
Asian Group, 
Bankok 5-7 Oct 
1971 
Ministerial 
Meeting of the 
Asian Group, 
Jakarta 19-21 Jan 
1976 
Ministerial 
Meeting of the 
Asian Group, 
Colombo 15-17 Jan 
1979 
Latin America OAS, Alta 
Gracia 
Feb-March 1964 
CECLA, Bogota 
25-30 Sept. 
1967 
CECLA, Lima 
20-27 Oct. 
1971 
SELA, 
Caracas 
12-15 Jan 1976 
A 
SELA, 
Caracas 15-19 Jan 1979 
i 
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The next stage in the process is the Senior Officials Meeting. 28. 
This has developed from a meeting concerned almost exclusively with 
procedural and organisational matters at Lima, 1971 29 to one in 
which detailed substantive work was undertaken at Arusha, 1979. 30.  
The turning point in this process came with the Senior Officials 
Meeting in Manila, 1976 31.  when consideration was given to the sub-
stantive items on the provisional agenda of UNCTAD IV; rules of 
procedure of the Second Ministerial Meeting were adopted and working 
groups created to prepare a draft declaration and draft programme of 
action. 
The highest policy-making organ of the G77 is the Ministerial 
Meeting held before the four yearly UNCTAD Conferences to coordinate 
the position of the G77. In the period covered by this study, 
Ministerial Meetings have been held at Algiers, 1968, Lima, 1972, 
Manila, 1976 and Arusha 1979. The supreme authority of the Ministerial 
Meeting was decided by the Algiers Conference. The Charter of 
Algiers states that, 
"The Group of 77 should meet at the ministerial 
level as often as this may be deemed necessary, 
and in any case always prior to the convening of 
sessions of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, in order to harmonize 
the actions of developing countries and to 
formulate joint programmes of action in all 
matters related to trade and development".32. 
The Ministerial Meeting as the supreme organ of the G77 sets the policy 
guidelines until the next meeting at ministerial level. The outcome 
of the Ministerial Meeting is two-fold. First, a declaration which 
provides an overview of the global economy, reaffirms the solidarity 
of the G77 and demands certain changes in the international economy. 
Secondly, a programme of action which sets out in an itemised fashion 
the various areas in which 'technical' change should be forthcoming.33• 
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The Ministerial Meetings usually has before it a synoptic table 
comparing the texts of the three regional groups, 34. the report of the 
Preparatory Committee and the report of the Senior Officials Meeting. 
Discussions are held in plenary and in a series of working groups 
established to prepare the declaration and the programme of action. 
The organisational infrastructure of the Ministerial Meeting has 
changed over time (see Figure 5.3.). First, with the increased 
participation of the Senior Officials Meeting in substantive areas 
since Lima 1971, the work carried out by the Drafting Committee and 
the four main committees of the whole have decreased. Secondly, the 
composition of the Bureau has changed. At Arusha the Bureau was 
enlarged from the normal composition of President, ten Vice-Presidents 
and rapporteur-general to include the regional coordinators and the 
Chairman of the Senior Officials Meeting. 35 ' These developments in 
the organisation of the ministerial meeting are a result of the 
increased institutionalisation of the group and the mode of decision 
making. Unlike Algiers, when the foundations of the group were still 
shaky, by 1979 the existence of the group was not in doubt and working 
methods clearly established. The ministers could delegate the 
preparation of a common group position to politically junior officials. 
It was unlikely that a severe crisis would arise and the consensus 
method of decision-making effectively protected national autonomy. 
Highlevel officials (ministers) were necessary for the final agree-
ments but negotiations could be entrusted to their subordinates. 
5.1.4. 	The Relationship Between The Group of 77 in UNCTAD and 
the Group of 77 in Other Geographical Centres 
The organisation of the developing countries into the G77 for the 
purpose of coordinating policy positions in international institutions 
has not been confined solely to UNCTAD. International economic policy 
is discussed in a number of global forums and the interest of the 
FIGURE 5.3. 
The Structure of the Ministerial Meeting 1967-1979  
Ministerial Meeting 	1967 Algiers 	1971 Lima 	1976 Manila 	1979 Arusha 
Ministerial Meeting 
Proper 
Bureau Bureau Bureau Bureau 
Senior Officials 
Meeting 
Drafting Committee 
(to prepare the 
declaration) 
4 Main Committees 
of the whole (to 
prepare the programme 
of action) 
Working Group 
(to prepare the 
declaration) 
4 Main Committees 
of the whole (to 
prepare the pro-
gramme of action) 
The meeting as a 
whole dealt with 
organisational 
matters 
Co-ordinating 
Committee 
(to prepare the 
declaration) 
4 Main Committees 
of the whole (to 
prepare the programme 
of action) 
Drafting Group 
(to draft the 
declaration) 
4 Working Groups of 
the whole (to draft 
the programme of 
action) 
Drafting Group 
(to prepare the 
declaration) 
3 Working Groups 
of the Whole 
(to prepare the 
programme of 
action) 
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developing countries in all areas of international economic relations 
has led to the mushrooming of the G77 in other international institu-
tions. This process has been aided by the relationship of UNCTAD 
itself, to other international organisations, most notably the United 
Nations. The close constitutional relationship between UNCTAD and 
the General Assembly of the United Nations and the general importance 
of the General Assembly in initiating strategies of economic development 
led to the creation of the first centre of the G77 away from Geneva in 
New York. 
The G77 is now a multi-centric organisation with further branches 
in Rome (Food and Agricultural Organisation), Vienna (United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation, and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency), Washington (the IMF and World Bank), Paris (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation), Nairobi 
(United Nations Ehvironment Programme) (see Figure 5.4). The develop-
ing countries meet as the G77 in all the specialised agencies and 
during various global conferences e.g. the Law of the Sea negotiations. 
Even when the Group is not recognised by the organisation concerned 
e.g. in GATT, the developing countries still act in concert. The 
organisation and structure of the G77 varies in the different regional 
centres and at ad hoc global negotiations. In this thesis we are not 
concerned with the operation of the G77 in other fora. 36. We are, 
however, interested in the problem of coordination between these 
different Groups of 77. These different Groups of 77 are not sub-
sidiaries of one central organisation but rather autonomous bodies 
with certain minimal features in common. These include a similarity 
in membership, the use of the group system and the ministerial meeting 
as the highest decision-making body. 
FIGURE 5.4. 
The Organisational Structure of the Group of 77  
Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77  
Ministerial Meeting 	Ministerial Meeting 	Ministerial Meeting 
of the of the of the 
African Group Latin American Group Asian Group 
Regional Centres : Geneva, New Ybrk, Vienna, Rome, Washington, Paris. Nairobi. 
African Group 	Latin American Group 	Asian Group 
Committees, Sub-Committees and Working Groups 
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This autonomous development is reflected in the relations between 
these different centres of G77 activity. Despite the interrelationship 
between the activities of the different organisations within which the 
G77 acts, no formal methods of coordination have been created. To 
date, there has been only a few attempts at coordination and these 
have proved to be singularly ineffective in developing any flows of 
communication. Many delegates in Geneva are aware of the lack of 
effective coordination but no consensus exists on the problems caused 
by this, or on the necessary measures to improve consultation between 
the different centres of the G77. 37. Some delegates regard the lack 
of coordination as being serious, and would like to see some insti-
tutional development to remedy what they consider to be an impediment 
to the effective working of the Group of 77, whilst others are quite 
happy with the existing situation which in their estimation does not 
hinder the working of the G77. Even those delegates who would like 
to see effective coordination have not as yet proposed any specific 
plans detailing what form amy attempt at coordination should take. 
In my interviews with diplomats in Geneva the most elaborate form of 
coordination proposed was the creation of a liaison group, but one 
whose functions were never explicitly defined. 
The need for liaison between the different centres of the G77 
arises from the similarity of the issues considered and the insti-
tutional links between the different organs of the United Nations 
system. However, as shown in the previous chapter there is a lack 
of effective coordination with the U.N. system and this spills over 
into intra-G77 affairs. There are two main arguments concerning the 
necessity of liaison between the different regional centres. The 
first, concerns the need fer consistency in national policy. Some 
delegates claim that individual delegations in one city are often 
unaware of the position taken by their counterparts in another city, 
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on the same issue. This schizophrenia in national policy can arise 
when missions in different cities attach different priorities to the 
same issue. 38' Secondly, it is argued that coordination would increase 
the consistency of the G77's policy. Given that questions of interest 
to UNCTAD are discussed in other international forums, it is only 
natural to ask for a consistent policy in all forums. At present this 
is not the case and no means exist for discovering what is happening 
in other international organisations. 39• 
There are two main arguments against the creation of a liaison 
group. The first is that it is unnecessary and would be needless 
bureaucratisation. Proponents of this view deny that there has been 
any evident contradiction in G77 policy. The second is that it would 
be illogical to ask the representatives of a government in one inter-
national organisation who gets the same set of instructions as another 
group of representatives of the same state in a different international 
organisation to confer. This would be tantamount to asking a govern-
ment to confer with itself. It should be noted that proponents of 
this view do not accept that a state may follow inconsistent policies 
in two different organisations. They argue that the national policy 
has already been decided in the home capital and all contradictions 
resolved. This argument, however, contains a serious flaw in assuming 
that there is a single model of governmental behaviour. That is, 
some governments will have resolved differences between departments 
and will maintain a consistent policy but this will not be so for all 
governments. Furthermore, many ambassadors have a great deal of 
leverage and are not dependent on their national capitals for text 
book instructions. 
To date there have been two attempts at some form of coordination 
between the developing countries acting as a group outside Geneva and 
the Group of 77 in Geneva. The first occurred during the Conference 
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on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), 1975-1977. The CIEC 
talks were convened by the members of the International Ehergy Agency 
(IEA) in response to the actions of the OPEC producers in quadrupling 
oil prices between 1973-1974. Nineteen developing countries were 
invited to these Paris-based talks. 40.  The selective nature of LDC 
participation created a division between those countries who wanted 
to make the Group of 19 in Paris responsive to the demands and wishes 
of the G77 as a whole and those who did not. 41.  
On one side were countries which expressed misgivings at what 
they felt was a deliberate attempt by the developed countries to weaken 
the unity of the Group of 77. They did not see the need for the 
creation of a separate and distinct enterprise and therefore argued 
that the Group of 19 in Paris should be seen as representative of the 
Group of 77, that is, they should be delegates of the G77 reporting 
back to it and mandated by it. These states subsequently proposed 
that some link should be made between the Group of 19 in Paris and 
the G77 in Geneva. 42. The push for closer consultation between Paris 
and Geneva was supported by some members of the Group of 19 who felt 
that they needed to be backed up by the weight of numbers of the Group 
of 77. 43' These countries argued that they would have a stronger 
bargaining position in Paris if they could be seen to be representing 
the G77 as a whole. They were therefore in favour of establishing 
an institutional link between the CIEC talks in Paris and the G77 in 
Geneva. 
Conversely, most members of the Group of 19 wanted to maintain a 
free hand in negotiations with the developed countries and so resisted 
the creation of any institutional link with the G77 in Geneva. These 
states argued that they were not engaged in a separate and distinctive 
enterprise but were acting within the guidelines of the resolutions 
passed at the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the United Nations 
General Assembly.44. 
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This issue was finally resolved at the Third Ministerial Meeting 
of the Group of 77. It was brought to the Manila Conference as a 
result of a decision adopted at the Third Ministerial Meeting of the 
Asian Graup45. which, inter alia, called on the Chairman of the Group 
of 77 in Geneva in coordination with the Chairman of the Group of 77 
in New York to ensure closer cooperation and coordination with the 
Group of 19 and invited the Co-Chairman of the Paris Conference 
representing the Group of 19 to report on a regular basis to the Group 
of 77 in Geneva and New York on the progress and developments at the 
Conference on International Economic Cooperation. At Manila a 
compromise agreement was reached on the creation of a Liaison Group 
between Paris and Geneva. It was decided, 
"1. That arrangements should be made for the constant 
exchange and flow of information between the Group 
of 19 participating in the Paris Conference and the 
Group of 77 in Geneva and in New York; 
2. That the Group of 77 in Geneva establish a liaison 
group composed of the countries members of the 
Bureau of the Ministerial Meeting under the chair-
manship of the representative of the country holding 
the presidency of the Ministerial Meeting, to trans-
mit to the Group of 19 such information and views 
as the Group of 77 in Geneva or in New York may 
deem necessary fora more effective participation 
of the Group of 19 at the Paris Conference". 46. 
This compromise satisfied those countries wanting some kind of a link 
and at least an acknowledgement that the Group of 77 could make an 
input into the Paris Conference. It also satisfied those countries 
which 	resented G77 interference because the role of the Liaison 
Group was left ambiguous and vague. At best, it could be interpreted 
as giving the members of the G77 not represented in Paris an advisory 
role, but it did not specify how the inputs from the Group of 77 would 
be useful to the Group of 19 or how this advice would be used. The 
Group of 19 was not bound in any way to respect the suggestions of the 
G77 in Geneva. Moreover, the chairman of the liaison group was 
Ambassador Brilliantes of the Philippines who was known to be lukewarm 
about the proposed link. 47. 
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The second attempt to initiate some form of coordination between 
the different sections of the G77 was taken in March, 1978. Arising 
from an initiative of the Jamaican Mission in Geneva, 48. the Jamaican 
Ambassador in New York, Mi. Donald Mills, who was then the Chairman of 
the Group of 77 in New York, convened a meeting of the G77 represent-
to the 
atives/bommittee of the Whole 49. to discuss the problem of coordination. 
It was decided to hold talks on closer cooperation with the Group of 
77 in Geneva. These talks were held after the summer session of 
ECOSOC, but did not lead to any important institutional developments. 
The initiative of the Committee of the Whole was resented by many 
ambassadors in Geneva50. many of whom treated the committee with a 
certain humorous disdain. 51 ' Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1980 
a limited amount of co-ordination was instituted and agreement reached 
that co-ordination sessions would be held twice yearly - January and 
July. The first meeting of co-ordinators took place in Geneva on 
14 February 198052' and the second meeting on 24 July 1980. 55' This 
is a limited form of consultation and falls short of instituting an 
effective system of coordination. 
Four related explanations can be given to account for the failure 
of any effective network of consultation to develop between the dif-
ferent geographical locations of the Group of 77. First, the petty 
jealousies and rivalries between diplomats in the major cities un-
willing to forego any of their prestige has inhibited any moves toward 
closer coordination. Secondly, most of the G77 ambassadors in Geneva 
feel that UNCTAD is the centre of the G77's activities and they are 
unwilling to allow outside interference in their activities. It is 
also argued that the Group first emerged within UNCTAD and it is felt 
that if any precedents are made then they should be made in Geneva. 
Thirdly, rivalries between the missions in New York and Geneva inhibits 
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efforts at increased coordination. It is alleged that delegates in 
New York, with accreditation  to the General Assembly with its emphasis 
on political matters, consider that they should take precedence over 
those in Geneva with their essentially economic concerns. Finally, 
the UNCTAD secretariat has been lukewarm to the idea of greater 
consultation because it fears that some of its influence might be eroded. 
The co-ordination issue was part of a wider debate on strengthening the 
organisation infrastructure of the G77. In the next section we 
examine that debate. 
5.1.5. 	The Debate on the Creation of a Secretariat  
As is apparent from this chapter, the Group of 77 has a very 
skeletal if changing organisational framework. The major debate on 
institutional reform within the Group of 77 has centred on the creation 
of a permanent secretariat. Within the three regional groups there 
are conflicting views on the necessity for and/Cr desirability of a 
secretariat. If one were to aggregate the views of the regions, 
however, then the campaign for a secretariat can be identified with 
the Asian Group54. and resistance to the idea with the Latin American 
and the African Groups. 
Those countries in favour of a secretariat argue that one is 
necessary in order to enhance the expertise of developing country 
delegations in negotiations with the developed countries. 55' The 
poor economic knowledge and tactical skill of many LW negotiators is 
openly acknowledged. Only a handful of developing countries Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico and India have the administrative and professional 
expertise to service their delegations to a sufficiently high level 
on all major policy questions. In negotiations with the developed 
countries, the developing countries start with inbuilt handicaps. The 
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developed countries have not only their substantial national resource 
pools of expertise but are also able to draw on their collective 
expertise. Group B in the shape of the OECD and Group D in the 
shape of Comecon. This asymmetry in national and collective research 
facilities between the Group of 77 and Groups B and D and the need to 
lessen it has been the main motive force of those countries who argue 
the case for the creation of a secretariat of the G77. A secondary 
consideration related to an increase in bargaining power is the 
increased scope for coordination between the G77 in Geneva and the 
different regional centres that such a secretariat would provide. 
Those countries which oppose the creation of a secretariat do so 
for a variety of reasons. Some are hesitant about the extent of any 
proposed operational functions. These states are worried not only 
about the nature of its role, according to its constitutive instru-
ment, but also the course of its future development. Other countries 
are apprehensive concerning the financial implications - the source 
of financing and the extent of individual countries' contributions. 
Other states express concern over the exercise of influence within 
the secretariat - what would be its administrative structure? Would 
it reflect the present equal balancing of the three regional groups? 
What scope would a Secretary-General have for independent initiative? 
They would require satisfactory answers to these questions before 
committing themselves to supporting the creation of a secretariat. 
Some states express doubts about the ability of any G77 secretariat 
to service meetings in the different regional centres of the G77. 
Allied to this is the problem of agreeing a suitable headquarters 
for the location of the secretariat. 56. Finally, although never 
explicitly stated, some of the larger countries are against the 
creation of a secretariat because they do not need its research 	• 
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resources, but more importantly perceive that their influence within 
the G77 and their region would be lessened. 57. For example, within 
the Latin American Group it is the three most advanced states Brazil, 
Argentina and Mexico which currently dominate the Systemo Economica 
de Latino Americano (SELA) and it is the Latin American Group which 
is most vehemently opposed to the creation of a secretariat. 
The creation of a secretariat represents the most advanced form 
of infrastructural change and therefore the debate has included con-
sideration of less radical alternatives. The perception of organ-
isational inadequacy and the debate on the creation of some kind of 
support machinery can be dated to the Second Ministerial Meeting of 
the G77 in Lima in 1971 at which it was decided to establish a smalll 
"Service Bureau" to be located in Geneva. The G77 in Geneva was 
requested to undertake a study of the proposal and to report to the 
G77 at UNCTAD 111. 58. However, no action was ever taken on this 
proposal. The initiative taken by the Asian Group at the Third 
Ministerial Meeting in Manila resulted in Decision (2) which requested 
the G77 in Geneva to 
"establish a working group under the chairmanship 
of the representative of the country holding the 
presidency of the Third Ministerial Meeting to 
carry out a comprehensive study on the proposed 
establishment of a secretariat of the Group of 77, 
including its terms of reference and means of 
financing, and to make available the conclusions 
of the study to member states before the fourth 
session of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development in Nairobi." 59. 
A working group of 16 member states produced a report which identified 
the objectives of a possible secretariat and considered five possible 
institutional mechanisms.60.  The objectives were twofold - the 
promotion of economic relationships or cooperation among the develop-
ing countries and the achievement of a common front of developing 
■ countries vis-a-vis the developed countries in international 
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negotiations: The five possible mechanisms were: 
a) The present informal arrangement; 
b) Modified present informal arrangement; 
c) Reinforced present informal arrangement; 
d) Establishment of Intra-Mission Servicing Secretariat; 
e) Establishment of a fully fledged and independent secretariat. 
After a consideration of each of these approaches, the Working Group 
concluded that a fully fledged and independent secretariat 
"would not fit well with the Group of 77. The 
group is an informal and flexible association of 
developing countries and the secretariat set up to 
serve it should also be informal and flexible. 
There is also political opposition by some members 
of the Group to the establishment of such a 
secretariat". 61. 
The report of this working group was considered at the G77 meeting in 
Nairobi prior to UNCTAD IV and it was decided to implement the pro-
posal to establish an Intra-Mission Servicing Secretariat. However, 
the proposal proved unworkable and was shelved. 
The question of a secretariat for the G77 surfaced again at the 
Fourth Ministerial Meeting in Arusha. 63 ' It was decided to establish 
an ad hoc Committee of 21 to study the "desirability or otherwise of 
the creation of a technical support machinery which will provide 
adequate back-up for the Group of 77 in their negotiations with other 
groups on the programme for the New International Economic Order and 
in programmes for mutual co-operation among them". 64. The committee 
located in Geneva but receiving inputs from New York and other regional 
centres was deputed to consider the nature, scope, role, location and 
financial implications of a technical support machinery. The report 
argued in favour of creating a Technical Support Unit which would be 
"advisory and responsible to the Group of 77 organising its detailed 
work programmes strictly at the request of the group". 65. This 
proposal, however, fared no better than the previous ones and was 
killed by political opposition. 66. 
The lack of concrete action is a result of the conflicting 
political interests and perceptions outlined above. Another obstacle 
to this type of organisational reform is presented by the UNCTAD sec-
retariat. First, the existence of the UNCTAD secretariat and its 
performance of a variety of secretarial type functions for the G77 
masks to some extent the need for an independent secretariat. 
Secondly, the UNCTAD secretariat itself is opposed to the creation 
of a G77 secretariat because it feels that one can only develop at 
the expense of its own influence. The UNCTAD secretariat uses its 
considerable political influence within the G77 to support those 
states sceptical about the benefits to be gained by the creation of 
a G77 secretariat. Although the UNCTAD secretariat is not part of 
the G77's organisational structure, an examination of the relationship 
between the G77 and the UNCTAD secretariat is vital for understanding 
the operation of the Group in Geneva. It also provides a link with 
the political processes of the G77 which will be examined in the 
second half of this chapter. 
5.1.6. 	The UNCTAD Secretariat and the Organisation Machinery 
of the Group of 77. 67. 
The UNCTAD secretariat can extend its services to all groups 
and individual countries within its budgetary limitations. In 
practice, Groups B and D have not made much use of the UNCTAD 
secretariat's services, relying on the OECD and Comecon respectively 
instead. The relationship between the Group of 77 and the UNCTAD 
secretariat is conditioned by the absence of an independent secre-
tariat of the G77 and the political commitment of the UNCTAD 
secretariat to the developing countries. 68 
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Although some members of the secretariat and some representatives 
of the developing countries deny the existence of any formal link 
between the Group of 77 and the UNCTAD secretariat and insist that 
only informal channels of communication exist, this is not the case. 
Within the Office of the Secretary-General a Liaison Office has been 
in existence since 1971 69. specifically to provide a channel of com-
munication and to facilitate liaison between the G77 and the secretar- 
iat. Communication between the members of the G77 and the secretariat 
occurs through a variety of channels,but the Liaison Office is the 
nodal point of the system. 
The UNCTAD secretariat provides three different types of services 
for the G77. First, it fulfils a logistic role for meetings of the 
regional groups and also of the G77 as a whole. These services 
include note-taking, the provision of interpreters, the collection, 
duplication and dissemination of documents and the provision of 
records of these meetings for the participants. Secondly, the 
secretariat fulfils a research function for the G77 - conducting 
research and preparing reports requested by individual members of the 
G77, by one of the regional groups or by the G77 as a whole or by 
initiating such studies itself. The secretariat also gives economic 
briefing sessions to members of the G77. Thirdly, the secretariat 
provides an input into the strategic-political operations of the G77. 
It helps the Group to draft its resolutions and it often mediates in 
intra-G77 disputes. 
The logistic provisions are not only confined to the activities 
of the Group of 77 in Geneva. The Secretariat also provides con-
ference facilities for the minixterial meetings of the G77 and has done 
so at Algiers, Lima, Manila and Arusha, and these services include the 
preparation of a synoptic table of the Preparatory Texts of the three 
regional groups. The costs of the services provided to the minWerial 
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meetings are borne by the host state. Apart from this open provision 
of services, the secretariat also gives discrete informal advice 
bilaterally to the regional groups and to the G77 as a whole. 7° ' 
This relationship between the Group of 77 and the UNCTAD secre-
tariat is subject to differing assessments by state members of the G77. 
Three different perspectives are discernible — (i) satisfied; (ii) 
dissatisfied and (iii) critical. These views are summarised below: 71. 
(i)The UNCTAD secretariat performs a valuable and important role 
for the G77. Its positive commitment to the developing countries 
ensures that it produces relevant and helpful research. It is 
a unit which is useful in getting the developing countries to 
articulate their interests. Its research facilities are adequate 
for the needs of the G77. 
(ii)The UNCTAD secretariat does perform some important functions for 
the G77; however, these services do not go far enough. 	The 
UNCTAD secretariat as part of the United Nations secretariat 
has inherent limitations which restricts it from developing into 
an adequate secretariat of the G77. Officials of the secretariat 
are international civil servants and are bound by United Nations 
rules. The organisation itself has to serve the interest of all 
its members; it is a global body and cannot therefore be a last-
ing organisation of LDC interests. Further, the UNCTAD work 
programme is a political compromise resulting from the interplay 
of the G77,Group B and Group D. To support the contention that 
despite all that it has done for the developing countries UNCTADts 
role is still a restricted one, certain limitations are pointed to 
in its research programme. For example, although much of its 
research is critical of the policies of the developed countries 
in the trade field and, furthermore, its organisational ideology 
critical of the present organisation of the world trade and payments 
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system, it still operates within the confines of the liberal 
economic paradigm i.e. a concentration on the merits of comparative 
advantage and economic specialisation. UNCTAD's research is 
directed towards the freeing of trade and the integration of the 
world economy, therefore it cannot research for example the best 
methods available for the creation of primary producer cartels, 
nor can it recommend policies of national self-reliance. 
(iii) This perspective on the UNCTAD secretariat is almost indistinguish-
able from that of the developed countries. First, the secretariat 
is criticised for overstepping its constitutional provisions, 
initiating when it should be responsive to the needs and wishes 
of its members. Secondly, its staff are said to be of low 
calibre, and its economic judgements called into question. 
Thirdly, it is criticised for producing too many reports. One 
ambassador reported that when he complained to Manuel Perez-
Guerrero, the then Secretary-General, about the unnecessary amount 
of documentation he was told that it was necessary for the poorer 
developing countries who lacked the staff to produce their own 
reports. The ambassador questioned the logic behind this reason-
ing because if his country, a large and sophisticated LDC, could 
not adequately process and digest the large number of documents 
with its huge staff then the poorer countries surely could not. 72. 
The UNCTAD secretariat then, despite its close working relationship 
with G77, does not enjoy the full support of all members of the 
Group. 
The second half of this chapter examines the political process of 
the G77. Once again the focus is on the G77 in UNCTAD. Growth and 
change in organisational characteristics provide an important dimension 
for the study of conflict and consensus in the G77. Processes of • 
decision-making, the structure of influence and political dynamics 
fill out organisational characteristics and make outcomes more 
intelligible. 
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5.2. 	The Political Process  
5.2. 1. Theoretical Considerations  
To study adequately the political processes of the G77 within 
UNCTAD the researcher has to consider features and developments extran-
eous to the organisation. That is to say, the political process of the 
G77 cannot be confined wholly to the operation of the Group within 
UNCTAD partly because of the wider dimensions of the issues discussed 
there and partly because the G77 within UNCTAD is merely part of a 
larger G77. To provide as thorough an analysis as possible of any 
international organisation it is imperative to discover the various 
political and organisational networks within which the organisation is 
embedded. In this chapter, the analysis of the political process of 
the G77 therefore takes account of the networks surrounding both the 
G77 in UNCTAD itself and UNCTAD as an international organisation. (73) 
For UNCTAD we can identify the following networks - (1) the 
United Nations system - this includes the relationship between UNCTAD 
and all members of the U.N. family; (2) other international organ-
isations - all intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations 
which participate in UNCTAD's work and/or whose activities impinge 
upon UNCTAD's performance of its duties, or debates within the UNCTAD 
forum; (3) UNCTAD itself - that is, political relations within the 
organisation - this encompasses the Group System, the Committees, the 
Secretariat, the Trade and Development Board, the Conference and the 
various Ad Hoc bodies; (4) the wider international political system - 
that is, the changing balance of forces and changing power 
configurations and international political alliances; (5) the inter-
national economic framework - including not only the actual process 
of international economic exchange (the movement of goods and 
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services) affecting the wealth and poverty of nations, individuals and 
groups, but also the rules governing these relations. 
Thus within UNCTAD, the structure of influence, decision-making and 
conflict resolution will be conditioned by impute from and outputs 
into these networks. 
Apart from the above mentioned environmental impacts, there are 
certain specific networks which impinge on the political process of 
the G77 in UNCTAD. These are (1) the current state of North-South 
relations (74);  (2) views within the South about present and future 
South-South contacts (75) ; (3) specific bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements between members of the G77 and individual market 
economy or centrally planned developed countries. 
In all that follows the importance of (any of) these networks 
for a particular pattern or characteristic feature will be explored. 
It should be obvious that the relationship between the networks and the 
political process is not a static but a dynamic one. On any given 
issue one or more of these networks may provide a specific environ-
mental impact or constraint. In most cases all the networks de-
lineated will form part of the general environment, although it is 
conceivable that in a few cases a particular network might be 
irrelevant to a specific problem under discussion. Similarly, the 
configurations of the networks themselves change over time e.g. the 
international economic environment changed from a relatively favour-
able one in the early 1960's to an unfavourable one in the late 1970s. 
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Before we proceed further it would be helpful to attempt to 
identify the overriding organisational characteristic of the G77, so 
that we will have a theoretical framework within which to structre our 
discussion. The G77 is clearly an organisation of developing countries 
with an institutional structure but without any formal centralised 
machinery, i.e. a secretariat; which coordinates positions both before 
and during international conferences on a wide variety of issues. At 
these conferences the G77 attempts to bargain and to vote as one 
group. (76) As well as this coordination and voting function at ad 
hoc conferences, the G77 meets regularly and performs these same 
functions within the continuing machinery of permanent multilateral 
bodies. (77)  Thus in purely organisational terms the G77 would fulfil 
the conditions for two and possibly three of the six types of groups 
which Hovet identified in the context of the General Assembly. (78)  
The identification of the G77 as a bloc, caucussing group or even a 
common interest group, however, does not contribute significantly to an 
analysis of its political process, but merely describes one of its 
behavioural characteristics. 
In attempting to develop a theoretical perspective three other 
concepts suggest themselves:- alliance, coalition and pressure group. 
In the international relations literature the first two terms are 
generally used synonymously or interchangeably to mean a collective 
organisation of states pursuing a common goal or set of goals. The 
terminological confusion within the literature can be overcome if 
coalition is seen as a generic term referring to a grouping of two or 
more actors (states) who have decided to pool certain resources for the 
pursuance of a common goal. (79) If it is accepted that coalitions 
refer to any partnership, then partnerships with specific features can 
253• 
be seen as special cases of coalitions. That is, if all groups are 
coalitions, then particular characteristics will define and distinguish 
different types of coalitions. Thus alliances and pressure graups can 
be seen as specific types of coalitions. The central feature of an 
alliance appears to be the contemplation of military engagement and the 
specification of certain enemies. Whether offensive or defensive, 
alliances commit the members to the armed defense of their common 
territory. (80)  Whilst alliances have been a constant feature of 
international relations international pressure groups at least composed 
of states is a relatively new phenomeneon. (81)  In the domestic 
context a pressure group is a set of individuals, organisations etc. 
putting pressure on the government for a particular purpose. At the 
international level a pressure group can be thought of as a group of 
states (individuals etc) applying pressure as a political device to 
secure a change (or the maintenance of the status quo) on a particular 
set of issues. In this respect the G77 is a pressure group exerting 
pressure for the reform of the international economic system, the 
creation of new international norms and rules and the transfer of 
resources from the richer states to the poorer ones. As a coalition 
the G77 represents a temporary conjoining of interests between more 
than one hundred states who can increase their individual bargaining 
power through joint action. 
Another important consideration relevant to the political 
process is the nature of the Group's activity. A central assumption 
of group theory is that organisations exist to further the aims of 
their members. In any given group the members will have purely 
individual as well as common interests. It is the task of the group 
to further the common interests. Individual interests are often left 
to individual action and are usually best served in that way. 
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Nevertheless, because of the existence of a wide range of interests 
an organisation may further the individual interests of some members 
and if the organisation itself is divided into sub—groups it may seek 
to serve various sectional interests as well as the joint interests of 
all its members. It is the tension between the pursuit of the common 
goal and the pursuit of purely individual ones which makes the study 
of groups interesting. The analyst may be interested in either the 
centrifugal or centripetal forces and s/he may approach the problem 
from the standpoint of the collectivity as the decision—making unit or 
from the standpoint of the individual participant in the decision- 
(82) 
making process. 	But from whatever angle and whether emphasising 
conflict or consensus, the focus is on collective decision or collective 
choice; therefore all groups engaged in some form of collective 
decision—making in respect of the pursuit of a common interest. In 
terms of economic theory this common interest can be seen as a common, 
collective or public good. (83)  A collective good has two 
distinguishing characteristics. First, if the common goal is 
achieved all who share the goal automatically benefits; and secondly, 
if the good is made available to any one member of the group it can 
be made available to others at little or no marginal cost. (84) But 
as previously noted the membership of organisations may be such (and 
this is more true of large than small coalitions) that in order to 
pursue the collective good non—collective goods must be provided for 
some of the membership either as incentives to join or as incentives 
to remain within the coalition. The G77 as a coalition is by 
definition engaged in the pursuit of collective goods for its members. 
As a large and heterogeneous grop, it is therefore necessary for it to 
provide selective (non—collective) goods for some of its members. 
Within the context of the international political economy, the members 
of the G77 feel that they have certain interests which are not only 
shared with other members of the coalition but which by their very 
nature could not be pursued on an individual state basis. (85) Thus 
although the mass level of aggregation at which the G77 operates is 
held to be a sham and essentially a non-productive exercise, (86) it 
is precisely thecentral element of commonality. In other words from 
its inception the G77 has been seeking changes in the rules which 
govern international economic relations and where it has not been 
seeking such changes it has been campaigning for the introduction of 
new norms and new policies related to economic development. These 
type of demands can only be pursued through concerted multilateral 
pressure because existing instruments and modalities are multilateral 
in nature. It is of course possible for a single powerful state to 
effect changes in international law and conduct e.g. President 
Truman's declaration (1947) on the Continental Shelf; but this course 
of action is not available to the weak, powerless states which 
comprise the membership of the G77. Conjointly with these general 
demands and shared interests the member states of the G77 have 
different interests and needs arising from their specific levels of 
development, the structure of their economies, their political and 
social systems, and thir political and economic philosophies. (87) 
 Hence, they have specific interests which often conflict and within 
the wide area of agreement there is divergence concerning the 
application or interpretation of any proposed change. 
Given the occasional non-coincidence or non-congruence between 
individual interests and common interests the coalition had to devise 
procedures whereby the common interest would be determined (since it is 
not always patently obvious) and in which the conflicting interests of 
various members can be reconciled. In the pursuit of their national 
interests (88) states will not retain membership in a coalition if 
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there is a continued divergence between the national interest and 
the collective interest. (89) Neither will states continue to retain 
membership in a coalition if the costs of membership begin to outweigh 
the benefits. Integration theory argues convincingly that coalitions 
will disintegrate if the division of benefits are perceived to be 
unequal. (90)  Thus there must be a striving of a conscious political 
nature to equilibrate the gains. All of these standard points from 
coalition theory are of prime importance in any study of the political 
processes of the G77, but it should be remembered that these 
stipulations relate not to any 'objective' criteria but to a perceptual 
process. That is, to say, we cannot stipulate certain divergencies 
between the national interest and the collective interest or quantify 
the costs and bents of membership of the G77 in numerical terms 
because any division is essentially a political one. The decisional 
calculus of any group of policy makers will contain elements which it 
will not be possible to know and therefore include in one's calculations. 
The costs of membership will vary from state to state and although 
one can categorise them e.g. economic, political etc. a cost is not 
one until it is perceived as such by the relevant decision-maker. 
Similar considerations affect the perception of benefits. Hence it is 
both naive and bad scholarship to upbraid states for remaining in the 
G77 when it can be shown that according to some calculations they would 
be better off outside it. (91) One of the main faults with this type 
of analysis is its unidimensional nature. 
The argument is not that we cannot know in advance the likely 
outcome of the strains and stresses on any coalition and can only as 
it were engage in post-event analysis. Rather the point is that there 
is a need for extreme caution in making predictive statements and that 
one needs to go beyond 'objective' quantifiable criteria and examine 
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the perceptual and psychological processes involved. Furthermore 
decisions are never taken in a vacuum but within an institutional 
context. Institutional arrangements can either encourage or dis-
courage conflict. The relative decentralisation of decision-pinking 
within the G77 and the necessity for unanimity although it introduces 
elements of rigidity and time consumption into the decisional process 
is also valuable in moderating conflict to a certain medium level. 
This coupled with bureaucratic inertia and ignorance (of what is being 
discussed in Geneva) in many Third World government departments 
combines to make conflicts within the G77 less dangerous from the 
perspective of coalition maintenance than it would otherwise be. 
Another important point related to coalition maintenance is the 
existence of other possible coalitions and the question of side payments. 
Within UNCTAD there are two other coalitions - Group B and D. 
Membership in an UNCTAD group is largely based on ascriptive character-
istics. Membership of Group D is not a viable option for most members 
of the G77, even those Group members with centrally planned economies 
are not likely to join. (92) Romania defected from Group D, 
Yugoslavia was a founder member of the G77 and a staunch supporter of 
Third World unity and the other developing countries of a socialist 
orientation lack the geographical and institutional features which 
the Group D countries have in common. Membership of Group B would be 
a viable option for the more advanced countries members of the G77, (93) 
but to do so would require a conscious and in many respects brave 
foreign policy decision. Membership of the B Group would involve a 
declaration that the state in question no longer desired to be 
considered underdeveloped. Any benefits which were currently 
accruing as a result of membership of the G77 would have to be 
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abandoned. Between 1964 ,-1980 the countries which ranked highest as 
possible deviationists were Brazil, India, Argentina, Mexico, 
Nigeria and Yugoslavia. The decision to upgrade would have political 
consequences and for at least three of the six countries - India, 
Nigeria and Yugoslavia would be in a fundamental conflict with their 
aspirations to leadership of the Non-Aligned and Third World movements. 
The three Latin American states (94) have been engaged in a struggle 
for supremacy in the Latin American sub-system. They have continually 
stressed their similarities with the countries in that region in 
contradistinction to the United States, and therefore any attempt to 
upgrade their status would probably lead to a dimunition of their 
regional influence. Moreover, since there is an element of 
competition any state unilaterally upgrading would lose out. 
Side payments can be understood in this context to operate in two 
distinct ways. The first occurs when outside the UNCTAD structure 
major developed countries attempt through bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements to provide a developing country or group of developing 
countries with certain benefits which will either lead to direct 
conflict within the G77 e.g. preferential trailing arrangements or will 
make the country concerned lessen its support for a common position 
e.g. the conclusion of a commodity agreement. The second type of side 
payment occurs directly in UNCTAD where a developed country may make 
an offer to some members of the G77 designed to reduce these countries 
support for a common position, e.g. at UNCTAD V Australia made 
certain concessions on air transport to the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Indonesia which caused them to withdraw their previous support for a 
Singapore sponsored resolution which was sharply critical of Australian 
air transport policies. (95) 
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Considerations of coalition maintenance and coalition disinte-
gration are important not only for the light this throws on the 
internal political process but also on the power of the coalition 
within any bargaining context, (96)as  the previous illustration shows. 
Consideration of coalition dynamics stresses the negativeds-
integrative tendencies within the G77 and tends to ignore the positive 
reinforcing bonds. There are however, strong, solidarist tendencies 
within the group. The precise nature of the common interests of the G77 
can best be garnered from the various declarations and collective 
statements issued by the Group at the four ministerial meetings held 
between 1967 and 1980. Fi.om the Charter of Algiers (1967) to the 
Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for 
Negotiation (1979) there are certain oft repeated demands for reform 
of the international economic system based on an analysis which views 
the international economic order as working inequitably to the benefit 
of the developing countries. This view may be expressed differently, 
"The rate of economic growth of the developing 
world has slowed down and the disparity (97) between it and the affluent world is widening." 
the inequities and injustices in the 
prevailing order (which) have cast an avoidable 
and intolerable proportion of the global 
burden of readjustment on the developing 
countries and seriously retarded their 
development effort." (98) 
but to a large extent the demands of the developing countries have 
remained constant since 1964. More concretely, the common interests of 
the G77 members may be summarised as follows. (i) in the commodity 
field these countries would like the creation of orderly and stable 
markets which provide for an equitable renumeration to primary 
producers. The organisation of commodity markets should aim at an 
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increase in prices (99)  and the stabilisation ofavenue. The means 
envisaged are multiple, they include International Commodity Agree-
ments, diversification programmes and the provision of compensatory 
and supplementary financing. (loo) (ii) on trade in manufactures 
and semi-manufactures the developing countries are united in 
demanding a standstill on tariff and non-tariff barriers and the 
gradual removal of existing barriers to products of special interest 
to developing countries. More specifically they demanded the intro-
duction of a GSP and since its introduction a liberalisation of its 
f conditions and an extension of its life. (101) ( iii) the states are 
also united around calls for the greater accountability of multi-
national corporations, sovereignty over their natural resources and 
changes in the international rules governing the transfer of 
technology. (iv) in the field of financing and invisible trade they 
have campaigned for increased flows of economic aid (specifically the 
fulfilment of the 0.7% GNP target) (102)  on more generous terms i.e. 
a higher grant element with longer repayment and grace periods and 
lower interest rates. (v) on shipping, demands have centred around an 
increase in developing countries share of world tonnage. (vi) the 
ldcs have a common interest in increasing their effective participation 
in international decision-making. Developing countries are generally 
not consulted when major international economic decisions are taken 
e.g. the decision-making structure of the IMP inhibits this (but 
even if the decision-making structure of the IMF gave greater weight 
to the developing countries the developed countries would circumvent 
it through recourse to the General Agreements to Borrow, the Bank of 
International Settlements, the Basle Group and the OECD's Group of 
Ten). The nature of tariff negotiations in the GATT means that 
developing countries are generally excluded from effective partici-
pation - the main provisions of the Tokyo Round for example were 
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mAinly negotiated between the United States, the European Community 
and Japan, despite the provisions of the Tokyo Declaration of 
September 1973 which tried to ensure effective participation for the 
developing countries. (103)  
Apart from these common interests support for the G77 can result 
from the calculation that membership of the G77 provides indirect 
benefits. The concerted pressure of the G77 on international 
economic issues in one institution has a spillover effect on other 
institutions. Thus, some of the more advanced countries within the 
Group can use the G77 pressure as a bargaining leer in its 
negotiations with the developed countries. As a Brazilian delegate 
observed, 
"If Brazil speaks on its own in GATT it would 
be by-passed by the developed countries. But 
with the weight of the Group of 77 behind it, 
although the Group of 77 is not formally ( 104) constituted in GATT it will be listened to."  
Thus even though a concrete multilateral agreement e.g. a buffer 
stock mechnnism, might not result from Group of 77 pressure in UNCTAD 
individual states may perceive political and economic gains in other 
fora to be a result of G77 pressure. 
We have identified the G77 as a coalition engaged in the pursuit 
of collective goods. The major source of power possessed by the 
coalition comes from its aggregation of over 100 states in a multilateral 
bargaining context. Members share certain common interests which can 
only be pursued through the pressure group. Nevertheless the member-
ship is diverse and this heterogeneity makes the coalition subject to 
splintering since members may defect to the winning coalitions or 
accept side payments. The stability of the group is therefore 
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dependent on the development of procedures which negate or contain 
the conflictual tendencies and which provides a basis of accomodation 
satisfactory to the entire membership. (105)  The following sections 
of this chapter assesses the manner in which these considerations 
affect group dynamics. 
5.2. 2. Political Dynamics of the Regional Groups  
The previous section on organisational structure demonstated that 
the regional group is the basic organisational unit of the G77. The 
importance of the regional group is one which has developed over time, 
with the present structure forming around the time of the Algiers 
Conference (1967). Today all proposals discussed by the G77 originate 
within the regional groups and there is a very high level of group 
discipline. Moreover, the three geographical groups have precise 
identities of their own and often within the various UNCTAD bodies 
designated spokesmen present the regional view as contradistinct from 
the G77's view. Thus on any single issue it is possible to have four 
views emanating from the G77 presented in plenary - those of the African, 
Asian and Latin American Groups and the coordinated position of the 
G77 as a whole. The pattern of institutionalisation varies between 
the regional groups. Salient factors relating to conflict and 
consensus in UNCTAD relate to a) the experience of cooperative 
ventures in the region; b) the influence of extra-regional powers on 
regional politics; c) the homogeneity of the region; d) the level 
of institutionalisation in the region. In this section we assess the 
relevance of these factors on political dynamics and identify 
inflential regional actors and their sources of influence. 
The Latin American Group is the most structured with a long 
history of diplomatic cooperation. However most of the Latin American 
cooperation in the past had been in a Pan-American vein and it was 
only with the focus provided by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) that the underdeveloped countries of the region began 
to develop a separate identity. The first major development in 
creating a more solid framework for coordinated Latin American trade 
policy matters was the creation of the Special Latin American 
Coordinating Committee (CECLA) in February 1964 at the meeting of the 
Latin American nations at Alta Gracia, Argentina to discuss a joint 
Latin American position for UNCTAD I. The decision to create CECLA 
was the result of developments which had been underway since 1962 
when a proposal had been made at the first annual meeting of the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES) of the Organisation 
of American States (OAS) in Mexico. The proposal initially met with 
failure due to the opposition of the United States. CECLA existed 
from 1964 until December 1975 when it was replaced by the Latin 
American Economic System (SELA). The initial purpose of CECLA was 
to plan for UNCTAD meetings, but by 1968 it had become a permanent 
arrangement with a mandate to negotiate with the United States and 
the European Economic Community and to coordinate bloc action in 
multilateral frameworks such as the IBRD and IMF. 
Most of the debate an economic issues in the Latin American 
Group takes place within a framework of dependence on the United 
States (106) and a conscious striving torromote regional integration. 
Traditionally Latin America has depended on the United States as its 
largest single export market and the source of its largest single 
flows of private capital. The United States influence over its 
southern neighbours was recognised as early as the nineteenth century 
263. 
with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. But official U.S. 
government commitment to Latin American ecatiomicthvelopment through 
public in contradistinction to private channels was reavised only in 
1961 with the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este on August 17th. 
inaugurating the Alliance lbr Progress. (107)  In their relationships 
with the developed world the Latin American countries have a pre-
disposition to respond to U.S. initiatives and during the 1960's the 
Alliance for Progress provided a rudimentary framework within which 
to conduct developmental efforts. 
Most of the inter-Latin American economic diplomacy has been 
concerned with the creation of3egional infrastructural trade and common 
market arrangements. ECLA philosophy emphasised small market size and 
the lack of economies of scale as being prime hindrances to Latin 
American industrialisation. The favoured solution to these problems 
was the creation of regional markets to supersede national markets. 
Following this doctrine the Latin American states initiated a series 
(108) of cooperative projects in the 1950s and 196ms 	the Latin 
American Free Trade Area (LUTA), the Central American Common Market 
(CAM), the Andean Common Market (ACM), and the Cuenca del Plata 
River Basin Project. 
Within these two frameworks however the potential for conflict 
was not diminished. The supervisory role of the United States 
meant that until 1971 one traditional member of the Latin American 
sub-system - Cuba was excluded from these activities and occasional 
attempts by some states to change their internal political systems 
led to conflict with the dominant power and its satellites e.g. 
Guatemala, 1953, the Dominican Republic, 1965 and Chile, 1973. (109) 
The efforts at increased regional economic integration and 
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cooperation led to a series of conflicts both economic and political. 
The conflicts of an economic nature mainly arose from the disparate 
size and levels of development of the partners and the consequent 
unequal distribution of gains and losses. Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico generally benefited disproportionately from trade and were 
unwilling to grant concessions to the less advanced countries in LAFTA. 
Conflicts of an ideological and political nature centred around 
specific inter-state disputes e.g. the 197• 'Football War' between 
E1 Salvador and Honduras and the struggle for regional power between 
the more economically prosperous states - Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
The relative cultural homogeneity of the Latin American Group 
has been disrupted by the rise in membership with the attainment of 
sovereign statehood by the English speaking Caribbean states, with 
traditional links to Europe and not the United States. For example, 
the Caribbean states are linked to the EEC through the Lome Agree-
ments. These countries are also outside the Latin American 
integrative system having their own regional economic arrangements 
- the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the 
Caribbean Development Bank. The political processes within the 
Latin American Group is therefore influenced by relations with 
different metropolitan powers; two separate common historical 
experiences (Latin America was independent in the nineteenth century , 
the Commonwealth Caribbean from the nineteen sixties); local 
conflict and rivalry and different levels of development. 
Leadership within the group is related to these extraneous 
factors and to the calibre of national representatives in Geneva. The 
main actors within the group over the period of this study have been 
the largest, most developed states - Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
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Venezuela. Other major actors for more limited periods of time have 
been Colombia and Jamaica. Colombia's prominence in the Latin 
American Group And the G77 between 1976-1980 was due in large 
measure to the personal qualities of Ambassador Jaramillo. His 
influence stemmed from his expert chairmanship of the G77's Coordina-
ting Committee on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN). Jamaica 
played a leading role in the G77 and in wider Third World politics 
under the government of Michael Manley (1972-1980). Jamaica's 
position arose from a leadership role in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
Manley's interest and occasional forays into Third World issues, 
and the calibre of its diplomatic staff in Geneva and New York. 
It is not an easy task to assess the influence exercised by any state 
in a regional group or the G77 as a whole partly because the larger 
states afraid of appearing too dominant occasionally get a smaller 
member of their region to represent their views. Thus, for example, 
at UNCTAD V although Costa Rica was the main proponent of the view 
that petroleum should be included in the agenda item 8 many delegates 
have privately expressed the view that it was Brazil which was 
behind the mave. (lio) 
As a group the Latin Americans can be differentiated from the 
others by their collective views on preferences, lddcs, commodity 
problems and the institutionalisation of the G77. Within the group 
there are specific conflicts e.g. between Bolivia and Chile over 
the right of land-locked countries to have a guaranteed access to 
the sea (Bolivia lost its coastline in the 1879 War of the Pacific 
with Chile and refuses to reconise the permanency of Chile's acquisi-
tion) On the other hand there are certain specific alliances e.g. 
the coffee producers of Brazil, Colombia and Central America 
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generally present a common front against the African coffee producers. 
The Latin American Group is the most homogenous of the three regional 
groups and was the first to develop regular institutional processes 
in the G77. 
Two issues dominates policy-making in the African Group. First, 
the existence of a rift between the French speaking countries and the 
English speaking ones. (111)  With the accession of the United Kingdom 
to the EEC and the widening of the relations between the EEC and its 
African Associates to include the U.K.'s former territories in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, a bond of interest was forged 
between the former African associates and the new ones. This was 
successful in dampening down the rift between the two groups of 
countries over the question of trade preferences but a basic split 
continues because of fundamental differences in outlook. This is 
especially related to relations with the developed countries. For 
example, whereas the ex-British colonies have largely freed them-
selves from direct control over their economies the Francophone 
countries are still largely dependent on the French Treasury and 
the French Central Bank to handle their monetary and financial 
affairs. 
Secondly, the under-representation of African states in 
Geneva, e.g. in 1980 only 18 of the 48 member states had missions 
there, seriously affects decision-making. Problems arise because 
before decisions can be taken it is frequently necessary to consult 
missions in Bonn, Brussels and Paris thus prolonging the time the 
process takes. Furthermore, even when consensus has been reached 
there is the necessity of reopening the issue when delegates from 
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other Ekiropean capitals or national capitals arrive for any import-
ant meeting. 
Like the Latin American Group the African Group has an insttu-
tional focus separate from UNCTAD. This is provided by the OAU 
which through its Liaison Office in Geneva services the meetings of 
the group and prepares position papers to be discussed at higher 
levels. This is a function which has evolved over time. In formal 
terms the OAU Liaison Office is not a coordinating body but rather 
the representative of the OAU to the cluster of international 
organisations in Geneva. (112) Nevertheless, the chairman of the 
African Group normally asks the OAU Liaison Office to arrange 
meetings and to perform secretariat type duties such as note-
taking. The OAU officials also provide a policy framework through 
the provision of limited research facilities. A further institution-
al feature of the African Group is that issues discussed in UNCTAD 
can be transmitted to African Ministerial Meetings and OAU Heads of 
States Meetings in order to providea sharper political thrust to the 
group's work. The history of institutional cooperation on economic 
matters in Africa is very recent. The Economic Commission for Africa 
provides one forum and the OAU'S Economic Committee another. 
The history of regional integration schemes in Africa is even 
more dismal than in Latin America. Indeed the integrative scheme 
that looked on paper to have the greatest chance of success, the 
East African Community collapsed in 1976 under the weight of 
ideological differences having struggled for years to find a more 
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equitable distributive system for the allocation of benefits. (113) 
The most ambitious scheme currently operating the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) has not to date produced any 
meaningful results. (114) 
Between 1964-1980 the leading members of the group in UNCTAD 
were subject to change. The major causal factors related to the 
personal qualities of diplomats and the importance attached to 
UNCTAD deliberations by governments. Between 1964-1970 Algeria and 
Egypt were in the forefront of the group's activities mainly because 
of the importance attached to UNCTAD and Third World issues by 
those governments and their high profiles within the region. The 
Algerian contribution slackened in the early 1970s but a leadership 
role was again assumed after 1974 in the wake of President Houari 
Boumedienne's initiative in launching the North-South dialogue. With 
the death of Nasser Egypt became less prominent. Nigeria was 
constantly in the forefront of group politics from 1966. Tanzania 
played an effective role from 1979. Some states whilst not influent-
ial on a wide range of issues were held to be so on specific issues. 
For example, Ethiopia on lddcs and Ghana on commodity negotiations. 
The African Group is fairly homogenous in terms of levels of develop-
ment, and also contains the majority of countries belonging to the 
special interest groups of the lddcs and land-locked countries. 
The Asian Group is the least homogenous of the three regional 
groups. It has no common history of pre-UNCTAD regional cooperation 
similar to that of Africa or Latin America. Its membership is 
extremely diverse ranging from oil rich states such as Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar andthe United Arab Emirates to the 
small islands lacking in resources such as Fiji, Samoa and the 
Maldives, to the large pcpulousstates such as India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. The Asian Group also has three European members - 
Cyprus, Malta and Yugoslavia. With this wide-ranging and diverse 
membership regional integration scheme015) where they exist 
provide low level institutional patterns. The most notable scheme 
is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Arab 
states are members of an Arab sub-system which stretches to encompass 
Arab members of the African Group. ECAFE and its replacement the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) have never 
provided an institutional focus for the complete membership of the 
group. A significant sub-grouping within the Asian Group consists 
of those countries which are also members of the Organisation of 
Petoleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
Overall leadership of the Asian Group remained relatively 
constant in the period. under review and resided in the more develop-
ed states in the region - India, Pakistan and Yugoslavia; and the 
Philippines through Ambassador Brilliantes position as Chairman of 
the Asian Group. After the rise in oil prices in 1973 Saudi Arabia 
played a more prominent role within the group's deliberations. For 
the smaller states influence is heavily dependent on the personal 
attributes of their delegates e.g. Indonesian influence between 
1976-1978 was largely due to Ambassador Alatas and his work on 
the Common Fund negotiations. On specific issues certain states 
are recognised as being influential. In this category would come 
Afghanistan on the problems of land-locked states and Malta on the 
problems of developing island economies. An extraneous input into 
decision -making arises from the influence of competing external 
powers - the United States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and 
Australia. 
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5.2.3. 	Decision-Making  
The process of arriving at collective decisions among a group of 
sovereign states is never an easy one. States are generally unwilling 
easily to forego their right to a unit veto and although in many formal 
bodies the principle of majoritarianism has triumphed, in informal 
arrangements unanimity still prevails as the basic method of arriving 
at decisions. The decision-making structure of the G77 reflects this 
reluctance to submit to majority decisions. It is not surprising that 
this is so, given the diversity of interests among the members and the 
over-protective attitude most new states have toward their newly 
gained sovereignty. Moreover, it must be remembered that the G77 is 
not a policy-making holy, although in practice this often happens, it 
is principally a forum for the harmonisation and coordination of 
individual viewpoints. To change from a unanimous to a majority rule 
would to a large extent sanction a policy-making role. 
The method by which actors seek to reconcile conflicting object-
ives or to reach agreement on common positions without the resortto 
force is negotiation. That is to say, in negotiations the parties 
aim at reaching a collective agreement through the discussion of pro-
posals on certain issues identified as salient for the negotiative 
116. 	 eement on a set of issues The G77 strives to reach agr  
where it is felt that agreement is better than no agreement at all. 
In doing so they use techniques of mixed bargaining. Mixed bargaining 
encompasses features of distributive bargaining (bargaining over the 
way something should be divided with emphasis on one's own share) and 
integrative bargaining (trying to increase the joint gain without 
worrying about distribution). 117 ' 
In the G77 both within and between regional groups the emphasis 
in bargaining has been on a mixed strategy. States are concerned to 
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preserve their interests and reluctant to forego any present benefit 
without some equivalent advantage. This can be illustrated by the 
refusal of the Francophone African countries to surrender their 
preferential access to the European Economic Community without 
adequate compensation. 118. But on the question of international 
financial transfers the G77 has followed an integrative approach, try-
ing to increase the total quantNy of aid and to improve the terms of 
this transfer. This integrative approach was seriously tested over 
the question of debt relief because when the G77 presented proposals 
for Generalised Debt Relief, the developed countries' response was one 
which forced the developing countries into a distributive framework. 
The resulting clash in the G77 at the Ninth Special Session of the 
Trade and Development Board 119.  arose as a result of a dispute between 
those states which were most likely to benefit from my scheme to re-
schedule debt and those states which would only benefit from a scheme 
of comprehensive Generalised Debt Belief. 120. 
The mode of intra-G77 bargaining therefore is as much a reflection 
of the issues under discussion as of the political attributes of the 
states themselves. Negotiations between the G77 and Groups B and D 
whilst of a mixed nature correspond more closely to distributive rather 
than integrative bargaining. 
Decision-making in the G77 is based on consensus and this applies 
to all aspects of the organisational infrastructure. In Geneva, the 
first stage of decision-making is the regional group, and after con-
sensus has been reached at the regional level attempts are made to 
form a common group position. Often within specific UNCTAD bodies it 
is the regional groups which present a common position rather than the 
G77 at the beginning of the negotiations. Indeed, the necessity of 
getting regional group consensus is such an important part of the 
decision-making process that plenary and other meetings are often 
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postponed because one or more regional group has not arrived at a 
consensus. 121. This necessity for regional consensus and the compro-
mises that are necessary to achieve it makes it difficult to reach a 
common G77 position since the regional compromises have to be safe-
guarded. (A similar process occurs in Group B where the EEC common 
position has to be safeguarded. )122. In this context issues are 
viewed not in terms of individual country interests but in terms of 
regional group interests. 
The origination of a common G77 position is both a simple and a 
tortuous process. Within the framework of DNCTAD the demands of the 
G77 on any issue is first the result of pressures by one state or a group 
of states. A country with an interest in a particular issue will first 
present a draft resolution to a meeting of its regional group. Nor-
mally, before a resolution is formally presented informal consultations 
are held with several members of the group to see what the likely 
reaction to the proposal will be. The draft resolution is then debated 
in the regional group. This process can last either for one meeting 
or several meetings depending on the nature of the proposal and the 
positive or negative response it elicits from other states. If the 
resolution fails to gain consensus within the regional group it gener-
ally dies at that stage, but it is possible for states to resurrect 
their proposal at a meeting of the G77 as a whole especially if members 
of other regional groups are likely to give support to the proposal. 123 
If the resolution is successful it is then adopted as an official 
position of the regional group for presentation to the G77 as a whole. 
Within the regional group the resolution is debated by states from 
the perspective of their individual interests. Objections to any 
proposal are generally based on two divergent types of reasoning. On 
the one hand states will invoke considerations of their national 
interests and, on the other, they will invoke the likely reactions 
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of Groups B and D to the proposal; either as a call for moderation 
or to argue in favour of more far-reaching demands. Because decisions 
are by consensus every state has a theoretical veto. The possession 
of this automatic veto would severely restrict the activities of the 
G77 if the custom had not been adopted of states entering reservations 
on any resolution with which they fundamentally disagreed. Persuasion 
is the normal method of arriving at collective decisions in a context 
of minimal sanctions. This is done through appeals to higher shared 
values or longer run self-interest considerations and through the use 
of economic argument to show that the proposed policy really would 
benefit the state in question. There is very little conscious trade-
offs between different proposals. Any trade-offs take place within 
the parameters of a specific issue. There is an inbuilt hostility 
to the use of a conscious trade-off strategy. Negotiations among the 
G77 are conducted in a hard-headed bargaining atmosphere, and within 
these negotiations two different approaches may be emphasised. I 
have termed these approaches maximalist and minimalist. Maximalists 
argue that G77 positions should contain the most far-reaching demands 
to be made of Group B. Proponents of this approach argue that this 
would force Group B to upgrade its offers. Maximalists criticise the 
present G77 approach which is based on obtaining group cohesion. They 
argue that it provides Group B with the opportunity of making offers 
below the G77 position which will be acceptable to some countries. 
Given the internal G77 negotiating processs, it is difficult to 
envisage circumstances in which the resulting negotiating position 
cannot be undercut to the satisfaction of some members. Minimalists 
argue that G77 positions should provide a meaningful basis for negot- 
iations with Group B and therefore should not contain excessive demands. 
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It is not really possible to identify which method pertains most 
widely over the range of G77 decision-making. Decision-making within 
regional groups is a closed process and it is not possible to arrive 
at firm conclusions regarding the type of outcome reached. 124. The 
accommodation of regional positions into that of the group as a whole 
is a more open process (especially at the ministerial level) and some 
more definite conclusions can be drawn. Nevertheless all results 
should be treated with caution. Although decision-making here seems 
a compromise between maximalists and minimalists because it tends towards 
portmanteau resolutions covering all points of view, it approximates 
more readily to the maximalist strategy. Once compromise has been 
reached at the regional level, it usually proves difficult to re-
negotiate positions in the G77 as a whole. This inflexibility 
arising from the need to balance the intricacies of the regional 
(internal) agreement gives G77 final positions a forceful and un-
compromising air. 
The plethora of working groups and sub-committees created to 
cover specific negotiations also provide centres for G77 decision- 
making. These working groups, although formally composed of a limited 
number of members, are all in practice open-ended. Decision-making 
is again by consensus and when agreement has been reached it is 
forwarded to the regional groups for approval. 
It is often claimed that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) plays an 
important role in G77 decision-making. 125. This research does not 
support that conclusion. In Geneva the NAM is not constituted as a 
formal group and does not have an input into G77 deliberations. 126. 
Nevertheless, at the global level, the NAM links into the global 
negotiating process and together with the G77 forms part of a Third 
World coalition seeking global reform. Since the NAM took a decisive 
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interest in international economic issues following its Third Heads 
of State conference at Lusaka (8-10 September 1970), it has provided 
an input into the ideas of the G77. The continued support for the 
objectives of the G77 given by successive NAM conferences represents 
some input into G77 decision-making at the global level. But this 
process is diffuse and difficult to isolate. Enumerating a coincidence 
of objectives and similarity of topics discussed by the NAM and the 
G77 is not the same as showing the influence of the NAM on G77 decision-
making. The NAM has been useful in agenda setting for the NIEO. But 
the deliberations of the G77 in UNCTAD have not been affected by 
specific NAM inputs. 
5.2.4. The Structure of Influence  
The concepts of power and influence central as they are to political 
science have as yet not been reduced to definitions widely acceptable 
to political theorists. 127. In what follows, influence will be defined 
as the ability to affect the distribution of goods and services and the 
formulation of value consensuses within the negotiating process. Two 
types of influence are possible - negative influence and positive 
influence. Negative influence is exercised when an actor plays a 
blocking role preventing some proposal from being accepted and positive 
influence is exercised when an actor initiates a successful proposal. 
We are primarily concerned with the exercise of influence over time 
and not specific, discrete acts. The major source for the findings 
which follow is the series of interviews conducted in Geneva in 1976, 
1978 and 1979. Within the G77 in UNCTAD two distinct types of in-
fluential actors can be identified - states and the UNCTAD secretariat. 
The sources of and the nature of these two types of influence are dif-
ferent. Having made a preliminary characterisation it still remains 
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toprepare adequately for UNCTAD meetings. 128. In these circumstances, 
those G77 members with the administrative capacity equipped to cope 
with these demands enjoy a tremendous advantage over the others who 
are unable to respond. As J.M. Thomas and W.G. Bennis argue "power 
will accrue to those organisations and positions within organisations 
which can develop access to and control of the knowledge and inform-
ation needed for complex problem-solving". 129. Between 1964 and 1980 
only a handful of countries enjoyed this administrative advantage - 
Brazil, India and Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent Argentina, Nigeria 
and Pakistan. Harrassed missions with one or two professional staff 
members cannot cope with the wide range of issues with any degree of 
competence and so they specialise in a few areas and rely on a general 
approach in others. 130' Since only the few countries mentioned can 
discuss adequately all questions under UNCTAD jurisdiction their 
leadership role in the G77 is greatly enhanced. 
The converse of influence being a function of size, level of 
development and administrative excellence 131 ' is the influence result-
ing from the personal qualities of the ambassador or other members of 
the delegation. The influence of delegates132. is the result of a 
combination of factors not all being present in any given instance. 
Influence exerted by a delegate may be due to his diplomatic skill 
and wide range of experience making him a consummate negotiator in 
the type of consensus politics so prevalent in UNCTAD. The ability 
to be a moderator, to facilitate agreement between opposing sides and 
to construct compromises can contribute to the esteem in which a par-
ticular representative is held. At various times over the course 
of this study, Lail (India), Silveira (Brazil), Maciel (Brazil), 
Walker (Jamaica) and Brilliantes (Philippines) have all been in the 
forefront of G77 politics. 133 ' The possession of expert knowledge 
in a certain area and general economic expertise may contribute to a 
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representative's high standing within the group e.g. Alatas (Indonesia) 
on the Common Fund and Jaramillo (Colombia) on the multilateral trade 
negotiations. The two categories are not mutually exclusive and some 
factors are common to both - long tenure, importance of the problem 
area to the diplomat's government and his personal interest. Some 
diplomats are able to exercise influence because they are not con-
strained by orders from their national capitals (e.g. Alula, Ethiopia). 
Because of this, they are relatively free to initiate proposals and 
are not subject to the confusion that can stymie national policy due 
to jurisdictional or political conflicts between different ministries. 
Influence within the G77 is exercised not only in a general manner but 
also on specific issues. Thus Malta and Fiji on developing island 
countries, Afghanistan and Bolivia on land-locked states and Brazil 
and India on market access for manufactures, are examples of states 
which play leading roles in certain issue areas. 
The influence of individual states within the G77 therefore varies 
over time. For the larger states it has been relatively constant and 
for the smaller states it is largely dependent on the expertise of its 
mission staff and the importance attached to any particular issue. 
States which are main actors within their regional group are not 
necessarily major actors in the G77 as a whole. Between 1976-1979 
the following states, although major regional actors, were not in 
the forefront of the group as a whole - Egypt, the Ivory Coast, 
Morocco, Tunisia (African Group), Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
(Asian Group) and Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia (Latin 
American Group). Influence within the Group can also stem from out-
side factors; for example, both Algeria and Cuba have used their 
chairmanship of the NAM to exercise an effective degree of persuasion. 
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The influence of the UNCTAD Secretariat 134. is a direct result 
of its operation as a de facto secretariat of the G77. In fulfilment 
of this role it exercises two particular functions which contribute 
to its influence in the Group of 77's decision-making process - 
(i) as an intellectual hothouse of ideas and (ii) as a mediator in 
G77 conflicts. Beginning with Prebisch's 'Towards A New Trade Policy 
For Development', the UNCTAD secretariat has consistently provided 
the developing countries with an economic rationale for their political 
objectives. It is the secretariat which conducts the research on 
which the common G77 positions are so often dependent. Over the 
years some countries have become less dependent on secretariat 
research (e.g. Brazil and India) and there have often been denunciations 
of the secretariat's work, 1 35 ' but most countries lacking the technical 
expertise still depend on the secretariat for almost all their economic 
arguments. Thus G77 policies are largely formulated on the basis of 
the UNCTAD secretariat's statistical information and economic inter-
pretation. Secondly, secretariat members through their informal 
contact with delegates are often able to get delegates to sponsor 
resolutions largely drawn up by the secretariat. 136. 
The secretariat also plays a brokerage role within the decision-
making process of the G77 and also in the contact groups established 
in the various UNCTAD organs. For example, Prebisch played a sig-
nificant role in the compromise on institutional issues at UNCTAD I 
and on the GSP agreement at UNCTAD II and Corea was instrumental in 
securing consensus on the Common Fund resolution at UNCTAD IV. Finally, 
the Special Unit for Liaison with the G77 within the Office of the 
Secretary-General (UNCTAD) plays a day-to-day brokerage role and is 
important in reconciling the diverse interests of the group members 
at the various ministerial meetings and UNCTAD conferences. 
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The potential of an international secretariat to influence the 
workings of an international organisation should not be underestimated. 
The brokerage role is perhaps the most visible sign of this influence 
but the informational role is just as important. As Nicholas has 
written, 
"The collection, ordering and providing of information 
at the points where it is most needed and can produce 
its greatest effect is one of the most important 
services that U.N. officials discharge. It is much 
more than an archivist's or a statistician's function, 
it is political in the highest degree, calling for 
qualities of political judgement and forethought no 
less than of accuracy and integrity." 137. 
In his study of UNCTAD, Nye neglected the informational role and 
underestimated the brokerage function. 138 ' 
5.2.5. 	Conflict and Conflict Resolution 
The conflictual process within the G77 is a reflection of the 
three types of cleavages 139 ' found within the group - ascriptive 
(different levels of development, and the differing structures of 
individual economies); attitudinal (ideology and preferences); and 
behavioural (activities within UNCTAD, and membership in other organ-
isations and groupings). 
Ascriptive cleavages determines the heterogeneity or homogeneity 
of a group. The G77 is a very heterogeneous group because of the 
great economic and political differences between the members. 140 ' 
Economic differences can be measured in terms of G.N.P. or other 
economic indicators or they can be plotted in terms of any specific 
issue area being discussed. But while ascriptive cleavages do mean 
that different states will have different interests on particular 
issues it is the intensity of the cleavage which is important. That 
is to say, it is not only the particular trait cleavage which is 
important but the political importance which is attached to it which 
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will determine the unity or disunity of the G77. Examples of 
ascriptive traits to which political importance has been attached in 
the G77 are levels of development most specifically the least develop-
ed of the developing countries; geographical disadvantages - the land-
locked states and the island developing countries. The issue of the 
least developed countries has always been a sensitive one within the 
group because it strikes at the very heart of one fundamental con-
ception of group unity. As a pressure group which accepts its 
necessary heterogeneity of membership but subordinates this to the 
pursuit of common interests, the identification of sub-categorisations 
within the group based upon a separate developmental axis poses 
fundamental problems for the maintenance of group unity. Thus some 
of the more advanced countries, particularly in Latin America, have 
resented the creation of this category and have only grudgingly agreed 
to the provision of special measures for the lddcs. 141. Moreover, 
identification of the lddcs constituted a serious political problem 
for the G77. It was apparent at the outset that those countries 
designated lddcs would receive special (favourable) treatment from the 
developed countries, therefore there was an incentive for countries to 
be included within that category. 142. Further, the identification of 
lddcs caused a cleavage along regional lines within the Group since 
most of the designated countries belonged to the African Group. This 
gave the African Group a vested interest in supporting this categorisation 
and the special measures for it whilst the Latin American Group which 
felt that it was underrepresented in this category a political interest 
in opposing any special measures. The dispute over special measures 
for the lddcs is not only an inter-group affair but also leads to 
intra-group conflict e.g. between Bangladesh and India in the Asian 
Group. 
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a difficult task to assess the structure of influence within the group 
given its large membership, relatively informal character and the 
possession of a veto (a source of negative influence) by all its 
members. But it is possible to trace some patterns of consistent 
effects on the group's decisional outcomes. Given the decision-
making structure of the group the exercise of influence is first notice-
able within a regional context. Here it has been found that during 
the period of the study there was a correlation between the main actors 
within the UNCTAD regional groups and within the regional sub-systems 
at the global level. Thus within the Latin American Group Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela were consistenly regarded as the most 
influential states. Similarly in the African and Asian Groups Nigeria, 
Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, India and Pakistan were acknowledged as being 
influential at various times. The relative high status of these 
states in the political and economic institutions of their regions and 
their wide-ranging interests and political activity contributes to 
their prestige and effectiveness within UNCTAD. Further, it is 
precisely those attributes which contribute to their regional pre-
ponderance which enhances their roles within UNCTAD. 
The ability to maintain a diplomatic mission in Geneva with a large 
and competent professional staff with good communication links with the 
national capital is an invaluable asset for any state member of the 
G77. This is important because despite the outpourings of rhetoric 
UNCTAD is essentially an organisation concerned with technical issues, 
the understanding of which is important if any meaningful negotiations 
are to take place. As the UNCTAD work programme has expanded mainly 
at the request of the developing countries themselves, the ability to 
read all the reports and to prepare an informed response become in-
creasingly more difficult. With issues and attendant meetings 
proliferating monthly, even the developed countries find it difficult 
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The conflict over special treatment for land-locked countries 
does not suffer an identification problem similar to that of the lddc 
category since it is patently obvious which countries are land-locked. 143. 
The conflicts concerning land-locked states centre around their relations 
with their transit neighbours and the drafting of rules to safeguard 
the right of access to the sea for the llcs. However, security con-
siderations are as important as economic ones in this context thus 
adding a degree of political intensity to the debate; e.g. India and 
Nepal, and Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Latin America, the land-
locked issue is highly politicised because of the territorial dispute 
between Bolivia and Chile. Chile annexed a part of Bolivia during 
the War of the Pacific in 1879 causing Bolivia to lose its coastline, 
an annexation that Bolivia refuses to recognise. 
The category of developing island economies is one that by it 
very nature creates a high degree of political opposition. Many 
states, particularly those in the lddc category resent the creation of 
another special interest group within the G77 which detracts from their 
own needs and, more importantly, diverts resources away from the lddcs. 
The category of die is so wide as to be intellectually meaningless but 
it is politically impossible to get a category that makes more sense 
economically. By creating such a category in the first place the 
island countries were ascribing a political commitment to their geo-
graphical status 144. and it is difficult to foresee a narrowing down 
of the category. 
The existence of cleavages poses problems for G77 unity but the 
proliferation of interest groups in the coalition does not necessarily 
create disunity. 	Interest groups are contained in the G77 and 
become enmeshed in its political process. The fact that states can 
pursue specific interests in an organisational forum, to some extent 
enhances the degree of unity achieved by the G77. The mode of 
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decision-making protects national autonomy and the proliferation of 
interest groups increases the scope of the G77 as an international 
organisation. It also provides a stable pattern of expectations 
concerning the behaviour of disaffected group members. 
Attitudinal cleavages within the G77 are of two types. First, 
those of a political nature relating to the relations betwe en member 
countries and developed countries and the bearing this has on the 
collective efforts of the developing countries and, secondly, those 
resulting from particular ideological and political conflicts between 
developing countries themselves. Within the G77 there is a continuum 
of opinion on relations with the developed countries which stretc 
from a desire for closer cooperation at one end to a rejectionist 
position at the other. The developed countries attempt to exploit 
these attitudinal differences in order to undermine the degree of 
unity achieved by the G77, which they find an irritant. Attempts to 
increase these divergent tendencies are made by designing bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements with specific developing countries on 
issues which directly affect G77 demands. 145• 
Whilst at the regional and global levels, there are many disputes 
of a political nature between states members of the G77; these are 
very rarely allowed to intrude into the Group's deliberations in 
UNCTAD. The unwritten agreement is that UNCTAD is a technical body 
not 
and extra-political considerations should /interrupt its work programme. 
Nevertheless, there are occasionally disputes of a political nature 
which surface and lead to a degree of antagonism between states e.g. 
at the fourteenth session of the Trade and Development Board Algeria, 
Cuba, Hungary, Libya, Mexico and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolut- 
. 146. Ion 	which condemned the imprisonment of Clodomiro Almeyda, the 
President of the Third Session of the Conference and requested his 
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release by the Chilean authorities. This resolution was strongly 
opposed by the Chilean delegation which objected that the resolution 
constituted interference in its internal affairs. 147 ' Similarly at 
UNCTAD V in Manila, there was a political dispute over the correct 
representation for the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea - some states 
were unwilling to recognise the government of the Vietnamese backed 
Heng Samrin which controlled most of the territory preferring to 
support the representatives of the de jure government of Pol Pot. 148. 
There are also ritual exchanges of animosity between the South Korean 
and North Korean delegations but these are seemingly a matter of form. 
Political jealousies do play a part in the election of members to a 
committee and in the election of officers to serve the various com-
mittees, but the open-ended nature of the committees and the regional 
rotation of offices is helpful in diminishing some of the conflict 
that could possibly arise from this source. 
Behavioural cleavages are of two types. Those relating to 
behaviour within UNCTAD itself has been covered throughout this chapter 
and reflects the ascriptive and attitudinal cleavages found within the 
group. The other type of behavioural cleavage relates to the con-
flicting membership some states have outside the UNCTAD framework. 
For example, the existence of the Yaounde Convention and its successor, 
the Lome Convention, by which certain developing countries benefit 
from trade and preferential arrangements with the Buropean Community 
has caused a great deal of divisiveness within the G77. Those 
countries not benefiting 	from the preferential arrangements have 
attacked these arrangements as imperialistic and divisive. The main 
attack against the Yaounde Conventions came from the Latin American 
countries and against the Lom4 Convention from India. 
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It is clear that these three types of cleavages overlap and that 
the definitional boundaries are not clear but they are helpful in 
analysing the conflictual process within the group along the follow-
ing continua - homogeneity/heterogeneity; consensus/dissensus; and 
cohesion/fractionalisation. 
The section on decision-making has already outlined the main 
features of conflict resolution within the group. The avoidance and 
diminution of conflict is a continuous process within the G77 and of 
utmost importance for its continued unity. Given the general level 
of common interests variations are bound to arise on matters of detail. 
The slow nature of much of the decision-making within the group is a 
result of efforts to arrive at consensus resolutions. No dispute 
settlement procedures exist within the group because the nature of 
conflicting objectives does not require this type of institution. 
Whenever there is a major dispute a working group is created to try 
to formulate a compromise solution. The tortuous and slow nature 
of the conciliation process arises from the fact that the general 
method used is one of persuasion. The issue is debated until some 
measure of agreement is reached through fatigue or a change in position 
by one of the parties to the dispute. This necessity to seek agree-
ment through persuasion with its resulting slowness and the fact that 
failure to reach agreement on one issue usually means that other 
issues also suffer at conferences (by the refusal of one side to 
negotiate until the outstanding issue is resolved), givesthe G77 
decision-making an air of crisis. The conscious use of a trade-off 
policy would alleviate some of these problems of conflict resolution. 
The level of conflict and dissensus within the group has not 
produced any defections from the coalition. This is not because 
there have not been severe strains on G77 unity but because the 
benefits to date outweigh the costs. The economic costs of membership 
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are minims] and do not have to be borne, by the states. In other 
words, there are no real direct participation costs, although the 
cost of a mission in Geneva is a high one it it not an essential 
prerequisite of membership. Moreover, a mission in Geneva is 
located there not only for G77 activities but to represent the state 
to a cluster of international organisations. The economic cost of 
sending missions to ministerial meetings and UNCTAD conferences are 
not unduly high. 149. Another set of economic costs are those 
benefits which would accrue from bilateral or multilateral agreements 
but are foregone because of membership of the G77 and adherence to 
its principles, but to date membership of the G77 has not in practice 
prevented states from making such deals. 150. A political cost can 
exist if a country feels that a G77 resolution or common position is 
unwise and likely to lead to a souring of relations with the developed 
countries. But in that case a government can ignore those positions 
in which it has no interest and those which it finds embarrassing. 
5.3. 	Conclusions  
The G77 experienced a 58 per cent increase in its membership between 
1964 and 1979 and a steady growth in its organisational infrastructure. 
Change was incremental rather than revolutionary. Proposals for major 
organisational change - the creation of a secretariat or technical 
support machinery were rejected. The G77 responded to changes in its 
environment e.g. a minimal form of coordination between the regional 
centres only became possible after the proliferation of global 
negotiations and the increased profile of the United Nations General 
Assembly. 
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We began this chapter by considering the importance of changes in 
scope and level for organisational performance. Having considered 
the evidence it is now possible to assess the relevance of our amended 
concepts for an understanding of the nature and stability of the G77. 
The scope of the organisation has increased considerably. Beginning 
with the First Ministerial Meeting in Algiers in 1967, a permanent 
structure has gradually developed for the group. Secondly, the number 
of groups involved in policy making increased with the proliferation 
of the G77 in various international fora (permanent and transient). 
Moreover, this proliferation can be taken to signal the importance of 
the G77 as a coordinating body for national governments. Thirdly, 
within the UNCTAD context two sets of groups developed (i) organisation-
al bodies e.g. working groups and (ii) interest groups e.g. developing 
island countries. These developments have contributed to the con-
tinuity of joint decision-making, thus increasing the level of organ-
isational activity. Creation of the Preparatory Committee and the 
changes in the Ministerial Meeting signalled not only increased in-
stitutionalisation but the creation of a stable pattern of expectations. 
We have argued that the consensus method of decision-making because 
it protects national autonomy contributes to the stability of the G77. 
This argument is the reverse of the findings of organisational theory 
but far from being perverse merely recognises the special character-
istics of the G77. From the viewpoint of organisational development 
i.e. increasing the autonomy of the G77, this stress on national 
sovereignty had an inhibiting effect on the development of a secre-
tariat or implementation of co-ordination between the various regional 
centres. 
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The regional group and UNCTAD Secretariat are key features of the 
organisational process of the G77. The regional group provides the 
basic organisational unit around which other features revolve. All 
G77 bodies are based on the three regional groups and convened accord-
ing to the principle of equal geographical representation. 151 ' In 
the absence of a secretariat of the G77 the UNCTAD secretariat, 
through its command of UNCTAD resources, material and ideological, 
exercised a significant degree of influence over the group. 
Developments in organisational structure and the mode of decision-
making provided effective checks on the tendency toward disunity. The 
importance of cleavages for the G77's stability cannot be inferred 
from rational actor assumptions. The enmeshment of state actors in 
a complex organisational web and the methods of reconciling conflict 
(and safeguarding national action) significantly condition group out-
come. The development of issues, nature of cooperation and manage-
ment of conflict reflect organisational characteristics of UNCTAD and 
the G77. Part 3 of the thesis is a detailed examination of two case-
studies (the most important issues discussed in the period 1964-1980). 
We will be examining the importance of organisational context on the 
outcomes of these two sets of negotiations. 
290. 
FOOTNOTES  
1. P.C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About Inter-
national Integration", International Organization (Winter 1969) pp. 161-166. 
2. Ibid., p. 163. 
3. Ansari op. cit. p. 183. 
4. The current membership of the group is 127. 
5. China, being the exception which proves the rule. China has 
enough resources at its command and sufficient influence 
potential to eschew membership of the G77 and still make an 
effective contribution to UNCTAD politics. 
6. See Jakarta Declaration 1976. 7741KIII)A. Annex I 
Resolution on the PLO. 
7. Interviews, March 1976 
8. See Working Group on Membership : Report on Procedures for the 
Admission of New Members to the Group of 77 and on Membership of 
the Group. (Geneva, 28 April 1976) in K.P. Sauvant (ed.), The 
Collected Documents of the Group of 77, vol. III hereinafter 
referred to as Collected Documents with volume numbeil. 
9. This issue had previously been discussed at both the Ministerial 
Meetings of the African and Latin American groups. 
10. Malta had applied to the Asian Group for membership but had been 
refused. The Third Ministerial Meeting of the Asian Group had 
suggested that Malta apply for non-regional membership. See 
Jakarta Declaration, ibid. 
11. See Senior Officials Meeting Manila 26-31 January 1976, Report 
and Annexes, in Collected Documents, vol. II pp. 522-587; 
Sauvant, The Group of 77, op. cit. p. 24. 
12. Manila Declaration and Programme of Action.  Tp/195 and 77/1114(111)/ 
49. Decision I. Annex I. p.9. 
13. The membership of the Working Group consisted of (Africa) -
Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, The Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal; (Asia) -
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar; (Latin America) -
Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago. The 
chairman was Mr A. Kherbi of Algeria. 
14. During the course of the Manila Conference, Malta was accepted 
as a member of the Asian Group. 
15. Manila Declaration ibid., Annex I p. 9. These stipulations were 
made because Romania's application had been greeted unfavourably 
by some countries who were annoyed that at a UNIDO meeting 
immediately preceding Manila it had consistently supported the 
Group D position. 
291. 
16. Interviews, March 1967. 
17. This is compounded by a) lack of professional staff; 
b) a rapid turnover of important officials. 
18. Sauvant, op. cit. p. 52. 
19. This is the case with middle-ranking countries like Nigeria and 
Pakistan. 
20. See B. Gosovic, "UNCTAD : North-South Encounter", International  Conciliation (May 1968) p. 17. 
21. The Charter of Algiers, TD/38. Add. 1. p. 28. 
22. Prior to the Algiers Meeting the G77 was riven by disunity 
particularly over the GSP and lddc issues. See Dick Wilson, 
"Unity of the South", Far Eastern Economic Review (Oct. 20, 1966) 
p. 130; Edith Rebecca Lenart, "The Algiers Charter", Far Eastern  
Economic Review (Nov. 9, 1967) p. 266. 
23. TD/B/Misc.60/Rev. 2 (23 Sept 1966). 
24. See MM. 77/t/4. and Add. 1 (3 Oct. 1967); MM. 77/t/)/Rev. 1 and 
Corr. 1 and Add. 1 (11 Oct. 1967); MM. TO sc. 6 Rev. 1 
(12 Oct. 1967) ZEn Collected Documents, vol I 
25. TAD/31(X)/Misc.6/Rev. 3 (10 March 1971) 2:&11ected Documents vol.7 
26. See the reports of the Preparatory Committees for the second, 
third and fourth ministerial meetings in Collected Documents  
vol. I. pp. 476-96; vol. I. pp. 337-378; vol. III. pp.151-241. 
27. Sauvant, op. cit. p. 32. 
28. The Group of 31 in its preparations for the Second Ministerial Meeting requested a preparatory meeting of "high officials", See 
TA0/31(X)/Misc. 6/Rev. 3. 
29. See MM/77/tI/4 (27 Oct 1971), Report on the Meet 	of Senior 
Government Officials gollected Documents, vol. II . 
30. See 77/kM(IV)18 (4 Feb. 1979). 
gollected Documents, vol 
31. See 77/MM(III)/2 (27 Jan. 19/6). 
gollected Documents vol. II/. 
32. TD/38. Add. 1. p. 28. 
Senior Officials Meeting 
Senior Officials Meeting 
33. See The Charter of Algiers (1967), The Declaration and Principles of the Action Programme of Lima (1971), the Manila Declaration 
and Programme of Action (1976) and the Arusha Programme for 
Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations (1979). 
34. For the Manila Ministerial Meeting 77/kM(III)/4. and Add 1-7; for the Arusha Ministerial Meeting see 77/MM(IV)/5 - 77/MMAIV)/15. 
35. See Sauvant op. Cit. pp.38-43 for more details on the institut-ionalisation of the ministerial meeting. 
292. 
36. See Sauvant op. cit. pp. 54-86. 
37. Interviews March 1976, September 1978, October-November 1979. 
38. For example, the Yugoslavian missions in New York and Geneva 
held differing views pertaining to the agenda of UNCTAD V; 
those in New York wanted a broad agenda and those in Geneva a 
limited one. The views of the New York mission prevailed and 
became official Yugoslav policy. (Interview with Yugoslavian diplomat 21 September 1978.) 
39. One Jamaican diplomat reported that in eighteen months in Geneva 
he had never seen nor heard anything of the G77 in Rome or Vienna (Interview 22 September 1978). Despite the common interests of 
UNCTAD and FAO with respect to the IPC no coordination took place 
between the regional centres of the G77. 
40. Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, 
Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. 
41. These divisions sometimes surfaced publicly. See TD/B/SR.461 for an expression of India's dissatisfaction. Also see TD/B/SR. 
477 for Afghanistan denunication of CIEC because of the lack of representation for lddcs. 
42. For example the lddcs, the African group and the smaller states. 
43. For example Algeria, Jamaica, Zaire, Zambia. 
44. For example Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina and India were the leaders of this group. 
45. "Co-ordination between the Group of 19 at the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation and the Group of 77 as a 
whole". Jakarta Declaration 1976. Part V, II (d). 
77/MM (III)/6. p. 91. 
46. "Co-ordination between the Group of 19 and the Group of 77", 
Manila Declaration and Programme of Action.  Annex I. p. 10 
(TD/195)• 
47. Thus ensuring that no concrete action would be taken. 
48. Information obtained in an interview with a Jamaican diplomat 
(22 September 1978) 
49. The Committee of the Whole was created by UNGA Resolution 32/174 "Assessment of progress in the establishment of the New Inter-
national Economic Order" (19 December 1977). 
50. For example the Ambassador of Bangladesh stated that it had no right to interfere in the affairs of the G77 in Geneva. (Source: 
Interviews September 1978) 
51. The acronym of this committee is COW and constant jokes are made about the COW that delivers no milk. (Interviews September 1978) 
293. 
52. This was attended by the Chairman of the G77 in Geneva, New York, 
Paris, Rome and Vienna. 
53. This was attended by the Chairman of the G77 in Geneva, New York, 
Paris, Rome, Vienna and the Chairman of the Group of 24 in Washington. 
54. See for example Decision C of the Third Ministerial Meeting of 
the Asian Group "Establishment of the international secretariat 
of the Group of 77" where the Asian Group recommends that an 
international secretariat with headquarters in Geneva be 
established. Jakarta Declaration 1976. 77/1M(III)/6. Annex II, p. 90. 
55. See Kenneth O. Rail, "Technical and Organizational Support for 
Developing Countries on International Economic Negotiations : 
A Report" in The Group of 77 : Strengthening Its Negotiating  Capacity (Nyon : Third World Forum 1979) p. 18. 
56. States are afraid that if the headquarters are situated in a 
developing country then that country might be able to exert 
unwanted influence on the secretariat. On the other hand 
although Geneva is the most obvious site some countries are 
certain to campaign for the headquarters to be situated in the 
Third World. 
57. A Brazilian diplomat attacked the creation of a G77 secretariat 
as "unnecessary bureaucratisation" and added somewhat revealingly 
that a secretariat would be unhelpful or too efficient". 
(Interview, 24 March 1976). Emphasis mine. 
58. The Declaration and Principles of the Action Programme of Lima. 
Part Four (IV). 
59. Manila Declaration and Programme of Action.  (TD/195). Annex I. p.10. 
60. See Working Group of the Group of 77 - Manila Decision No. 2: 
Report on the Proposed Establishment of the Group of 77; Geneva 
27 April 1976. UNGTAD/C4/843 (28 April 1976). Zollected Documents pp. 75-827 
61. Ibid. para 30. 
62. See Committee of 21 of the Group of 77 at Geneva 'Report on a 
Special Technical Support Machinery for the Group of 77', 
Annex I - History and Analysis of Proposals to Equip the Group 
of 77 with Support Machinery'. (Mimeo) p.2. Sauvant however 
says that the issue was never discussed at Nairobi. See Sauvant 
Op. cit. pp. 48-49. 
63. Prior to this meeting a proposal had been made at the First Meeting 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (September 1977) that a technical 
support machinery be set up. 
64. Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for  
Negotiations. Annex I.B. Decision - "Future Activities and organiz-
ation of the Group of 77". TD/236. 
294. 
65. Report of the Committee of 21 op. cit. p. 4. 
66. The report was first submitted to the September, 1979 Meeting of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 in New York. It 
was then shunted to the Group of 27 in New York; then on to the 
September, 1980 Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They 
in turn referred it to the continuing machinery of the Group of 
27. 
67. The influence of the UNCTAD secretariat in G77 decision-making 
is discussed below in section 5.2.d. 
68. See Richard N. Gardner, "the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development" International Organization (Winter 1968) pp. 
99-130; A.K. Bhattacharya, "The influence of the international 
secretariat : UNCTAD and generalized preferences", International 
Organization (Winter 1976) pp. 75-90. 
69. Regularised contact between the secretariat and the G77 had been 
taking place before then but in 1971 the process was given an 
institutional focus. The Liaison Unit consisted of two profes-
sional staff members (1971-1980). 
70. Source - Mr M.T. Adebanjo, then Secretary of the Trade and 
Development Board (Interview 5 April 1976). 
71. These assessments are based on interviews. 
72. Ambassador Maciel (Brazil). Interview, 12th September 1978. 
73. For a different interpretation of the environment within which 
decision-making in international organisations occur see Robert 
W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence (New 
Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1974) pp. 25-36 and 
37-58. 
74.This has been much more to the fore following the onset of the 
so-called North-South dialogue ushered in by the Sixth Special 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly in May 1974. 
75. This includes all forms of South-South associations including 
the NAM and ECDC. 
76. For example the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences, the 
1972 Conference of the Environment and the 1974 World Food 
Conference. 
77. For example UNCTAD, the UNGA, IMF, FAO. 
78. See Thomas Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations (1960) 
pp. 30-46 where he distinguishes between the bloc, caucasing 
group, geographical distribution group, regional group, common 
interest group and temporary interest group. The Group of 77 
would fit the criteria for a bloc- 'a group of states which meets 
regularly in caucus and the members of which are bound in their 
votes by the caucus decision'; a caucusing group - 'any group 
of member states .... which has some degree of formal organisation, 
/contd. 
295. 
78. holds fairly regular meetings and is concerned with substantive 
issues and related procedural matters'; and possibly a common  
interest group defined as one in which states although not 
bound together by any sort of formal arrangement or membership 
in a regional body nevertheless have someelements in common 
which tend to provide a common outlook on certain types of 
issues. 
79. This definition is similar to that of William Riker who defines 
coalitions as partnerships which emerge in decision-making in 
which "several persons must for the sake of winning, come to-
gether, for common action without much regard for considerations 
of ideology or previous friendship". W.H. Riker, The Theory of  
Political Coalitions (New Haven & London : Yale University 
Press 1962) p. 21. 
80. See J.R. Friedman, "Alliance in International Politics" in 
Friedman, Bladen and Rosen (eds.), Alliance in International  
Politics (Boston, Mass : Allyn & Bacon Inc 1970) pp. 4-5. 
81. See Carol Lancaster, The Politics of the Powerless (Ph.D. Uni-
versity of London 1972), for an application of the pressure 
group concept to development diplomacy. Also see P. Willetts 
(ed.), Pressure Groups in the Global System (London : Frances 
Pinter 19 82 ). 
82. See J.M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann 
Arbor : The University of Michigan Press, 1962) p. 31. 
83. As Olson says "the achievement of any common goal or the satis-
faction of any common interest means that a public or collective 
good has been provided for that group". Mancur Olson, The Logic  
of Collective Action (New York : Schoken Books, 1968) p. 15. 
84. For definitions of a collective good see Olson ibid. pp. 14-15; 
M. Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, 'An Economic Theory of Al-
liances', Review of Economics and Statistics, (August 1966) 
pp. 266-279; John G. Head, 'Public Goods and Public Policy', 
Public Finance,(1962), pp. 197-219. 
85. See Address by Julius Nyerenetoiburth Ministerial Meeting of the 
G77 reproduced in TD/236. Annex II. 
86. See Roger D. Hansen, Beyond The North-South Stalemate (New York; 
McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1979) pp. 87-
125 for an elaboration of this view and Branislav Gosovic and 
John G. Ruggie, 'On the creation of a new international economic 
order: issue linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. 
General Assembly', International Organization (Spring 1976) for 
a more sympathetic treatment of the G77's mass aggregation. 
87. Much of the literature on the G77 stresses this heterogeneity. 
See e.g. C. Geldart & P. Lyon, "The Group of 77 : A Perspective 
View", International Affairs (Winter 1980-1981) pp. 79-101; 
S. Krasner, "Third World vulnerabilities and global negotiations", 
Review of International Studies (October 1983) pp. 235- 249 and 
Hansen ibid. 
296. 
88. A rather confusing term. See H.J. Morgenthau, Politics Among  Nations (New York : Knopf 6th. ed. 1972). K.J. Holsti, 
International Politics (Englewood Cliffs N.J. 1st ed. 1967) 
PP. 124-154. S. Krasner, Defending the National Interest  
(Princeton N.H. : Princeton U.P. 1978). 
89. J.G. Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Action", 
American Political Science Review (September 1972) pp. 874-893 
makes an interesting point when he claims that "in keeping with 
the interstate system states prefer to limit their dependence 
upon others to the least necessary level above that assumed by 
all states". p. 878. 
90. See L.K. Itrtelka, "The Salience of Gains in Third World Inte-
grative Systems"World Politics (January 1973) pp. 236-250. 
91. Hansen ibid., ch. 4; Krasner ibid. 
92. Cuba and Mozambique are members of Comecon but unlikely to join 
Group D. 
93. The Newly Industrialising Countries or OPEC states. 
94. The debt crisis of the 1980s revealed the unfeasibility of the 
graduation scenario. 
95. Interview (31 October 1979) with UNCTAD Secretariat official. 
96. For a formal demonstration of the relationship between coalition 
cohesion and coalition power see Anatol Rapoport, N-Person Game 
Theory (Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan Press, 1970 
PP. 234-253. 
97. The Charter of Algiers. 
98. Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework  
for Negotiations  
99. It is debatable whether commodity agreements can affect the long-
term trend. For discussions of this issue see for example, 
Ervin Ernst, International Commodity Agreements. (The Hague : 
Martinus Nijhofp 1982); C.P. Brown, Pri 	Commodity Control  
(Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press 1975 . 
100. For a detailed discussion of the developing countries and inter-
national commodity policy see chapter 7. 
101. For a more detailed exposition of the Group of 77 and the GSP, 
see chapter 6. 
102. See Conference Decision 27(11). 
103. See e.g. Bela Balassa, "The Tokyo Round and the Developing 
Countries", Journal of World Trade Law (March/April 1980) pp.95- 
118; Multilateral Trade negotiations: evaluation and further 
recommendations arising therefrom. Report by the UNCTAD Secre- . 
 tarltTD/227 (2 April 1979). 
297. 
104. Interview 12 September 1978. 
105. It is conceivable that the G77 can survive a few defections but 
the psychological mood (in the period under study) was such _ 
that no defections could be accepted. 
106. See V.A. Agor, "Latin American Inter-State Politics : Patterns 
of Cooperation and Conflict", Inter-American Economic Affairs  
(August 1972) p. 19. 
107. For a succint analysis of the Alliance for Progress see L.J. Gay, 
The Alliance For Progress : An Interpretation In The Context Of  Inter-American Relations (M.A. Thesis, University of Sussex 1979). 
108. See e.g. E.S. Milenky, The Politics of Regional Organization in  
Latin America (New York : Praeger 1973) W.R. Cline & E. Delgado 
(eds.), Economic Integration in Central America (Washington 
D.C. : Brookings Institution 1978). M.S. Wionczek (ed.), Latin 
American Economic Integration (New York : Praeger 1966). 
109. See Jenny Pearce, Under The Eagle, (London : Latin American 
Bureau 1982). 
110. Marc A. Williams, "The Group of 77, UNCTAD V and the North/South 
Dialogue, IDS Bulletin (January 1980) p. 7. 
111. Interviews.  
112. The head of the mission has ambassadorial rank. 
113. See A. Hazelwood, Economic Integration : The East African Experi-
ence (London : Heinemann 1975); J. Ravenhill, "Regional Inte-
gration and Development in Africa : Lessons from the East African 
Community", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics  
(November 1979). 
114. See T.O. Elias, "The Economic Commission of West Africa" Year-
book of World Affairs (1978); D.C. B h, "The Politics of West 
African Economic Co-operation : CEA() and ECOWAS", Journal of  
Modern African Studies (December 1983). 
115. Integration in Asia is poorly developed compared to Africa and 
Latin America. See M. Wionczek (ed.), Economic Cooperation in  
Latin America, Africa and Asia  (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press 
1969); also see S.W. Arndt & R. Garnaut "ASEAN and the 
Industrialization of East Asia" Journal of Common Market Studies  
'March 1979) pp. 191-212. 
116. See K. Midgaard, "Co-operative Negotiations and Bargaining : 
Some Notes on Power and Powerlessness" p. 117 in Brian Barry (ed.), 
Power and Political Theory (London : John Wiley 1976). 
117. See Peter Warr, Psychology and Collective Bargaining (London: 
Hutchinson 1973, pp. 17-20). 
118. This was usually phrased as follows, 'The new system of general 
preferences should ensure at least equivalent advantages to 
developing countries enjoying preferences in certain developed 
countries'. The Charter of Algiers. 
119. 5-10 September 1977; 23-27 January 1978 and 6-11 March 1978. 
120. See TD/B/SR. 478-494. 
121. See e.g. the complaints of the French delegates at the 
fourteenth session of the TDB. TD/B/SR.431. 
122. Interviews with Canadian, British and American delegates 
775771Tov. 1979). 
123. This occurs when membership of interest group cross-cuts the 
regional groupings. 
124. Interviews. The information received was inconclusive. 
125. See Odette Jankowitsch & Karl P. Sauvant, "The Initiating 
Role of the Non-Aligned Countries" in K.P. Sauvant (ed.), 
Changing Priorities on the International Agenda : The New  
International Economic Order (Oxford : Pergamon 1981) 
PP. 41-77. R.A. Mortimer op. cit. pp. 74-94. 
126. Interviews.  
127. See Cox & Jacobson op. cit. pp. 20-21 for an attempt to 
operationalise the concept of influence and power in inter-
national organisations. See also S. Lukes, Power : 
Radical View (London : Macmillan 1974). 
128. Interviews October-November 1979. 
129. J.M. Thomas & W.G. Bennis (eds.), Management of Change and  
Conflict (Harmondsworth, Middx. : Penguin Books 1972) 
pp. 9-10. 
130. For example, during the 1979 Code of Conduct on the Transfer 
of Technology negotiations, some African delegations had no 
negotiating expertise. They presented a position which 
stated 'We support the position on a legally binding code in 
principle' but were unable to discuss details. Brazil and 
India who were against a legally binding code were able to 
argue their case persuasively. 
131. This argument is more sophisticated than Kenneth RA11 op. cit. 
who only discussed personal qualities as a source of influence. 
132. For an interesting argument on the influence of delegates in 
international organisations, see Chadwick F. Alger, "Personal 
Contact in Intergovernmental Organisations" in Herbert G. Kelman 
(ed.), International Behaviour (New York : Holt, Reinehart & 
Winton 1965) PP. 521-547. 
133. These were the ambassadors most consistently mentioned by 
G77 delegates during the course of my interviews. 
298. 
299. 
134. See Leon Gordenker, "Policy Making and Secretarial Influence 
in the U.N. General Assembly : The Case of Public Information", 
The American Political Science Review (September 1960), for 
a discussion of influence and international secretariats. 
135. Note, for example, the arguments over the identification of 
the lddcs. 
136. Interviews. 
137. H.G. Nicholas, The U.N. as a Political Institution (Oxford : 
Oxford University Press 1959) p. 149. 
138. J.S. Nye, "UNCTAD : Poor Nations Pressure" in Cox & Jacobson 
op. cit. pp. 334-370. 
139. See Rae and Taylor op. cit. and chapter 1.2 above. 
140. See also Jean-Phillipe Colson, "Le Groupe Des 77 et Le 
Problbme De L'Unite Des Pays Du Tiers Monde", Revue Tiers  
Monde (Oct-Dec 1972) pp. 813-830. B. Gosovic, "UNCTAD : 
North-South Encounter"International Conciliation (May 1968) 
pp. 1-80; B. Gosovic, UNCTAD : Conflict and Compromise  
(1972) pp. 297-286. 
141. See the various debates at the Trade and Development Board. 
142. The Latin American region had traditionally differentiated 
in their regional integration programmes between the more 
developed countries, those with insufficient markets' (Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) and the 'least 
developed' (Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay) none of which 
were included in the UNCTAD secretariat's list. 
143. Although Zaire with only a small outlet to the sea and one 
which is insufficient considering its large size would like 
to be included in this category. 
144. Although I have been informed privately that this category 
was created by the Latin American countries in an attempt 
to proliferate special categories. The rationale behind 
this is to limit any special benefits mined from special 
status. 
145. For example CIEC. 
146. TD/B/D.361. 
147. Adopted as TDB Resolution III(XIV). 
148. See Proceedings (1976) vol.l. Report and Annexes, Part 2, 
paras 1-229. 
149. Ansari did, however, find that between 1964 and 1976 there was 
a relative decline in the level of participation of key ldcs 
states in UNCTAD. Ansari op. cit. p. 232. 
150. On the other hand some states do feel that there are 
economic constraints involved. A Pakistani delegate 
has said that Pakistan had refrained from making some 
bilateral deals because of its G77 commitments. He 
admitted however that Pakistan gained from pressure the 
G77 exerts in fields outside UNCTADIs immediate range 
because bilateral deals reflect the multilateral agree-
ments of organisations such as UNCTAD. Interview  
19 September 1978. 
151. Equitable representation i.e. weighted to provide for the 
numerical strengths of the regional groups had by 1979 been 
effectively replaced by equal representation. 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: The Negotiations  
for a Generalised System of Preferences. 1964-1970  
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the way in which the G77 
position on a Generalised System of Preferences was formulated. Two 
central questions are posed for the analysis: (1) How given the 
initial differences did agreement come about? (2) What effect did 
the existence of various cleavages have on the shape of the final 
agreement? The analysis concentrates on two separate but interrelated 
levels. First, the joint negotiating strategy of the G77 and secondly, 
the UNCTAD decision to implement a GSP. Two outcomes are therefore 
being examined - a common G77 position and agreement with Group B 
countries. In order to examine intra -G77 bargaining on the preference 
issue and its effect on negotiations with the industrialised countries, 
the chapter will begin with an analysis of the economic debate on 
preferences and a delineation of the cleavages within the group. The 
major section of the chapter will be concerned with a study of the 
bargaining process from 1964-1970. During this period the issue of 
preferential treatment for the manufactured and semi-manufactured 
exports of the developing counties dominated the UNCTAD forum. The 
major political commitment was invested in this area and an examination 
therefore will illuminate 	overall group cohesion and fractionalisation. 
6.1. Economic Analysis and the Debate on Preferences  
Before discussing the bargaining which took place over the issue 
of preferences it is important that some attention is given to the 
economic considerations underlying the proposed generalised system of 
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preferences. It is not the aim of this section to assess the benefits 
which have flowed from the actual operation of the scheme (1)  or to 
debate the limitations of the scheme that was agreed. (2)  Rather it is 
to examine the underlying economic arguments for and against the 
granting of wide ranging preferential access for the manufactured 
and semi-manufactured exports of the ldcs to the markets of the 
developed counties. (3)  Negotiating positions are based to a large 
extent on economic analysis and therefore it is necessary to examine 
the economic debate. We will be examining divergent opinions on two 
sets of arguments. First, those relating to any form of preferential 
access for ldc manufacture exports (to developed markets) and secondly, 
those relating, more specifically to the concept of the GSP. Thus 
we will discuss economic arguments advanced between 1964-1970 and 
arguments likely to be raised during any discussion of economic 
preferences. 
The immediate rationale for theimplementation of discriminatory 
preferences (4) in favour of developing counties rests on the infant-
industry argument. However, lying beneath the infant-industry 
argument, so to speak, are a number of broader objectives and goals. 
At the highest level of generality the aim is to increase economic 
growth and dyelopment. Historically the major engine of growth has 
been industrialisation; a development reinforced by the limited 
gains available from the agricultural sector. (3)  Agricultural 
procuctivity so vital to development prospects proceeds through 
technological innovation with the resulting increased output being 
produced with a reduced workforce. The displaced agricultural workers 
migrate to the cities seeking employment in the industrial and service 
sectors thus creating a demand for increased job opportunities in 
these sectors. Moreover, one of the primary obstacles to third world 
industrialisation is the limited size of domestic markets which means 
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that essential economies of scale cannot be realised. (6) Access to 
the markets of the industrialised states is therefore a prerequisite 
for economic growth. Furthermore, increased production of manufactured 
goods is needed in order to diversify the structure of developing 
countries economies. Over dependence on primary commodity exports act 
as a constraint on growth. (7)  First, because primary commodities 
face declining export prices and secondly, because the demand for 
primary commodities is less income-elastic and less price-elastic 
than for manufactures. The growth prospects for manufactured goods 
are more dynamic and increased ldc export of manufactures and send 
manufactures would improve their terms of trade and contribute to 
closing the 'trade gap' between them and the industrialised world. (8) 
 The ability of the developing counties to sustain economic 
growth being a function of their capacity to earn foreign exchange. 
Thus, at base, proposed preferential schemes seek to expand ldc 
exports and export earnings. This objective would be accomplished 
through static price advantages which would make the developing 
countries goods more competitive vis2'avis domestic producers and 
third country non-preferred exporters; and also bring dynamic 
incentives for investment in export capacity. 
Following on from these considerations two types of measures 
are envisaged in order to stimulate the export of manufactures, semi-
manufactures, processed and semi-processed goods from developing 
countries - (a) Those aimed at improving access to Northern markets 
through the elimination of obstacles; (b) export promotion measures 
in developing counties. The economic case for preferences is based 
on, and extends the first consideration. Three aspects of the 
economic argument in favour of preferences can be distinguished - 
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i) the infant-industry argument; ii) the structure of tariff pro-
tection in the developed world; iii) welfare considerations. We now 
consider each of these in turn. 
i) The infant-industry argument rests on three considerations. (9)  
First, increasing returns to scale i.e. as output grows costs diminish 
until the point is reached when the industry becomes competitive; 
second, "externalities" i.e. an industry tends to produce secondary 
industries, services and infrastructure investment; third, learning 
effect in the development of technical, organisational and managerial 
skills. In the specific context of developing counties it is argued 
that without preferential treatment they would be unable to compete 
on equal terms with developed countries' manufacturing producers 
because of the existence of certain conditions germane to underdevelop- 
(10) ment. 	For example, underdeveloped countries have high import 
costs for machinery, equipment and components necessary to produce 
manufactures and semi-manufactures. In the labour field, they have 
high labour costs aAbing from the necessity of training and the costs 
of foreign technicians and this is coupled with the traditional low 
productivity of domestic labour. There is, also, a lack of internal 
economies arising from poor infrastructural facilities and inadequate 
financial and marketing organisation. The small size of local markets 
does not permit scale economies, and low productivity is accompanied 
by low wages. Further, specific disadvantages arise from high 
transport costs, high quality-control rejection rates and excessive 
power interruptions. Preferences would neutralise the above 
competitive disadvantages. 
ii) The tariff structures of developed countries act as a disin-
centive to ldc exporters. Tariff structure rather than tariff rate 
is the crucial variable. In other words the effective degree of 
protection given to domestic producers is often far in excess of the 
nominal rate of protection. One of the basic features of tariff 
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regimes in the developed countries is the escalation of rates from the 
lower to the higher stages of processing. (11) Duties on imported 
raw materials tend to be low or even nil, but increasingly higher 
duties are levied on products manufactured from the same raw material% 
The nominal tariff is the duty charged on a product when it is 
imported. The effective protection given to domestic industry however 
depends upon the value added in processing. A nominal tariff of 10% 
on a product .with 	20% value added during processing gives a real 
rate of protection of 5096, (12)  whereas a nominal tariff of 10% on a 
good in which half the value is added in domestic processing yields an 
effective rate of protection of 20%. This kind of tariff structure 
discourages the processing of raw materials in the exporting country 
and encourages the export of raw materials instead. (13) Taking the 
steeply escalated tariff structures of developed countries in con-
junction with the high dependence on imported materials and components 
characteristic of developing countries, tariffs do then provide a 
sizeable barrier to ldc export of manufactured and semi-manufactured 
products. Preferential tariff reductions would give developing 
country exporters advantages in two categories. First, the degree of 
protection given to domestic producers in the preference giving 
country would be reduced. Second, they would gain a competitive edge 
over competing exports from non-preferred third countries. (14)  
The first type of advantage is gained because the GSP provision 
eliminates the e3calation properties of the tariff structure of the 
developed countries. The disincentives for ldc exports would be 
removed and developed country producers would lose their protection. 
In fact the resulting preferential system may give ldc exporters an 
advantage over domestic producers. This would arise if NFN duties 
still applied to developed country trade and domestic producers had 
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to import some of their materials from other developed countries. 
If the 'dos get some components free of duty then they would enjoy a 
competitive advantage vis-a-vis domestic producers of preference giving 
countries. (15) Developing country exporters would also gain an 
advantage over non-preferred exporters which is greater than that 
indicated by the rate of duty Since the entire price advantage can be 
applied to local processing industries and this is not offset by 
preference giving country duties being imposed on non-preferred country 
materials and components. The magnitude of advantage vis-a-vis non- 
preferred exporters is greater than that vis-a-vis domestic producers. (16) 
iii) The concepts of trade creation and trade diversion (17) have been 
used to analyse the impact of preferential arrangements on world 
welfare. An increase in trade creation enhances world welfare and an 
increase in trade diversion diminishes world welfare. These effects are 
likely to be negligible for any system of tariff preference introduced 
by the industrialised countries for the developing countries. Trade 
creation is likely to be small since the economic structure of the 
preference giving and the preference receiving countries are dissimilar. 
Similarly trade diversion is also likely to beninimal since the 
economic structure of the preference receiving countries and the non-
preferred countries differ. Although the overall effects on world 
welfare are likely to be negligible the redistributionist effect could 
be significant. That is "redistribution of world income in favour 
of developing countries might increase the welfare value of a 
constant (or even declining) level of world income." (18)  Moreover, 
the welfare argument based on trade creation and trade diversion 
assumes that factors of production have alternative employment 
opportunities but this need not be the case in developing countries. 
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In fact the new exports may use previously unemployed or under-
employed factors thus increasing wlfare i.e. welfare equals producer 
surplus plus the entire factor wage bill. It is also possible that 
factors displaced in preference giving and preference receiving 
countries are likely to be re-employed. (19)  
In addition to the three major economic arguments for preferences 
outlined above some additional arguments tangential to and supplement-
ary to the main case can be put forward. Increased productivity in 
developing countries would lead to increased income which in turn leads 
to increased market size, investment etc. Improved access to world 
markets leads to improved opportunities for large scale production and 
enlarged domestic markets. Furthermore, there might be a new export 
flow of new products which were previously non-competitive in the 
preference giving conditions and of products previously only exported 
to other developing countries. Indirect dynamic gains would include 
incentives for investment by local firms and transnational corportations; 
the establishment of new market linkages in developed countries; and 
the diversification of supply source by the developed country 
importers to include developing countries. Finally, given the wide-
ranging import substitution policies in developing countries any 
scheme to encourage promotion would be desirable. (20)  
The economic rationale for preferences rests on a number of 
considerations - the most important being the infant industry case, 
the structure of protection in developed countries and the redistributio-
nist welfare case. Preferences can be conceived as a subsidy to 
foreign producers. If after a tariff out is made, the price remains 
the same, extra profits are passed back to the exporter. Domestic 
producers lose to the extent that imported goods replace domestic 
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production or supply the new demand created. If prices fall then 
consumers will benefit. As an extension of the infant industry 
argument temporary preferences can be viewed in io ways: (i) 
Protectionism is the norm and the test of international competitive-
ness is whether foreigners can compete effectively with home producers. 
Preferences granted to some countries treat them like domestic 
producers. (ii) In an atmosphere of trade liberalisation preferences 
would be temporary prior to the widespread reductiancf tariff 
barriers. The foregoing arguments were used to support the demand 
for a GSP. The specific concept of a GSP was supported because it 
was seen as the best method of providing wide-rargng gains for a 
majority of the ides. 
The objection to the GSP rested on three main arguments. Two 
were questions of general principle i.e. a) the inappropriateness of 
the proposed measures and b) the existence of better alternatives to 
reach the same objectives. The third was a specific objection to 
the concept of a GSP. It was argued that the complexity of the 
negotiation and administration of a GSP was too costly. 
now examine each of these arguments in turn. 
i) Tariff preferences for developing countries are held to be an 
inappropriate policy instrument for a variety of reasons. First, it 
is argued that the case that is presented is too general. The infant 
industry argument cannot be generalised to cover the wide range of 
industries and countries proposed. The proposition that preferential 
terms are necessary for a breakthrough to Northern markets while true 
in some cases is therefore debatable in others. (21)A  distinction 
has to be made between the case for free access to Western markets 
and preferential access for the developing countries as a group. 
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Secondly, if infant industries cannot compete then this is primarily 
because of internal problems in developing countries, which will not 
be solved by changes in the commercial policies of the developed 
countries. (22) Any attempt to do so would increase economic 
inefficiency. The appropriate remedy is subsidies not tariff 
protection. Thirdly, the developing countries' failure to compete 
effectively in the markets of developed countries does not arise from 
high tariffs because developed country tariffs are not prohibitive. 
The bulk of ldc exports is comprised of products with low duties or 
those facing rigid non-tariff barriers. Prior to the completion of 
the Kennedy Round it was argued that tariff reductions in GATT would 
be beneificial. Subsequent to the conclusion of the Kennedy Round 
it was argued that the OECD countries had very low tariffs. Moreover 
it can be argued that preferences would be eaten up by transport costs, 
ldc productive inefficiencies and the import costs of materials and 
components. As Handley observed (23) ldcs failure to be competitive 
arises from their lack of complementary factors, capital, technical 
know-how, managerial and marketing skills which in turn are magnified 
by overvalued exchange rates and other policy measures. Fourthly, 
the creation of preferences could be double-edged and backfire in 
that they could give producers in the developed countries a better 
opportunity to press for legislation implementing restrictive safe- 
guards than would be possible under a non-discriminatory regime. (24) 
ii) Three alternative preference systems have been proposed. First, 
in so far as preferences attempt to stimulate exports then devaluation 
is a better alternative. Devaluation as an export-stimulating 
measure only fails when trading partners take retaliatory measures. 
Given the relative insignificance of developing countries in world 
trade, it is unlikely that the industrialised states would risk upsetting 
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the structure of exchange rates to retaliate against an individual 
developing country. And as Murray argues, it would be much easier 
for the developing countries to negotiate joint currency devaluations 
than to negotiate tariff preferences. 	 The argument against 
this policy can be stated simply. There is a conflict between the 
exchange rate requirements of the primary sectors and the manufacturing 
sectors of a developing country. In developing countries the exchange 
rate reflects the level of money costs of production in the primary 
sectors (the dominant sector) of the economy and not in the manu-
facturing sector. Given the low price elasticities of most primary 
commodities devaluation would reduce export earnings from these 
products and it is unlikely that increased earnings from manufacturing 
exports will be sufficient to offset this shortfall./ Secondly, 
some method of subsidising industrial exports could be used. But 
here developed countries would have to agree not to apply counter- 
vailing duties. Thirdly, from the perspective of global redistribution 
preferences are an inferior form of aid giving, and results in aid 
costs being distributed unequally. (26)  Therefore, if the aim is to 
increase revenue accruing to ides then this could best be satisfied 
by an increase in aid. 
iii) The date over the granting of preferences involved consideration 
of the complexity of any system agreed. These difficulties will be 
discussed later when examining the negotiations. Some critics of 
the GSP argued that such a system would be difficult to negotiate 
and administer and therefore was a costly and time-consuming exercise 
best abandoned given the previous arguments against preferences. 
Johnson (27)  identified seven main problem-areas. (1) If the GATT 
non-discriminatory rules were followed then goods in which some 
ides were already competitive would be included, hence making it 
necessary to build-in some degree of exclusion. But this would be 
a very difficult enterprise because developed countries differ in 
their vulnerability to ldc competition. (2) Equity in the burden 
shared by developed countries in importing ldc goods i.e. quantities 
to be imported by specific developed countries to be subject to 
restriction. (3) Developing countries have differential abilities 
to make use of preferential treatment. This raises the possibility of 
conflict over discrimination among the developing countries and further 
raises the question of the equitable distribution of benefits among 
them. (4) The duration of the preferences — this depends on whether 
one is looking at the economy as a whole or at the infant industry in 
question. (5) How does one define equal degree of preference by 
developed countries given their different tariff rates? (6) Develop-
ing countries already enjoying selective preferences would need to be 
compensated but it is difficult to work out a satisfactory formula. 
(7) Which countries would give preference? The fewer countries that 
did the greater would be the impact on their economies. 
The case against preferences rests on a denial of the benefits 
claimed by the proponents of the scheme and an argument that the 
objectives could be gained through more cost effective means. 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to remember that the rationale for 
preferences does not rest entirely on its contribution to financing 
the stimulus for increased exports or on the static gains from trade. 
Instead it attempts to overcome a structural imbalance and stresses 
the dynamic effects of trade liberalisation. 
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6.2. Cleavages  
In this section the specific cleavages which existed in the G77 over 
preferences will be examined. The nature and salience of particular 
cleavages were of crucial importance in the bargaining process. The 
signifciant ascriptive traits are those relating to the ability of a 
country to benefit from the operation of a GSP. This is dependent 
on the level of development achieved and the ability to export 
manufactured and semi-manufactured products. It is also dependent 
upon whether aCEP might interfere with existing patterns of trade in 
a detrimental manner. The significant attitudinal traits relate to 
the perception of whether a general system or a more selective arrange-
ment might enhance a country's access to maiets. The significant 
behavioural traits relate to the use made of organisational membership 
auidde the UNCTAD framework and to actions within the UNCTAD 
institutions. Although inevitably there is an element of overlap 
involved the analytical separation of the three categories rests on 
distinctions between material conditions (ascriptive), perceptions 
(attitudinal) and actions (behavioural). 
An examination of the immediate or short-term potential of the 
developing countries to benefit from the introduction of a preference 
scheme shows that only a handful of them were sufficiently competitive 
to be able to take advantage of the improved access to developed 
country markets. The ability to benefit from the GSP was also 
dependent on the extent of product coverage and here on the wider 
question of principle there was an argument for extending the system 
to cover processed and semi-processed agricultural products. The 
expansion of manufactured and semi-manufactured exports from developing 
countries to the developed countries between 1961 and 1965 was confined* 
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to a small number of countries. The biggest growth in exports was 
achieved by Hong Kong, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, Israel, South Korea, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Chile. The principal manufactured exports consisted of 
a limited range of products, mainly textiles and other light 
manufactures. In 1961 five developing countries supplied 51.8 per 
cent of all developing countries manufactured exports. In 1965 these 
same five (Hong Kong, India, Yugoslavia, Mexico and Algeria) supplied 
50 per cent. With the addition of Taiwan and Brazil these seven 
countries accounted for 56.7 per cent and 57.7 per cent of developing 
countries exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures in 1961 and 
1965 respectively. As Table 6.1 shows twenty-five devdbping countries 
account for 85.9 per cent of total exports of manufactures and semi-
manufactures from this group in 1965. 
In 1965 the export of processed agricultual products accounted 
for the total (100%) manufactured and semi-manufactured exports of 
Somalia, El Salvador, Togo and Yemen; and for more than 50% for CUba, 
Algeria, Paraguay, Sengal, Iraq, Morocco, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, 
Argentina, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic. (28) 
There were two (29)  main special preference systems in operation 
- the EEC preferential system and the Commonwealth preference system. 
The relevant EEC preferential system was part of its agreement with 
the AASM. (3° Commonwealth preferences were an outgrowth of the 
British Imperial preferences and by 1964 although their structure 
had not altered their scope had been modified through successive 
agreed reductions in the MEN duties and also as a result of rising 
world prices and British abolition of duties on industrial inputs from 
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TABLE 6.1  
Imports of manufactures and semi-manufactures into developed market economy 
countries from developing countries, by main countries of origin. 1965. 
Major supplying developing countries Exports in value 
(4 US million) 
Per cent 
Distribution 
Developing countries total 3585.3 100 
Hong Kong 723.6 20.3 
India 472.2 13.2 
Yugoslavia 255.7 7.1 
Mexico 178.2 5.0 
Algeria 161.8 4.5 
Taiwan 146.0 4.1 
Brazil 130.5 3.6 
Argentina 101.4 2.8 
Iran 101.0 2.8 
Israel 95.5 2.7 
Malaysia/Singapore 87.4 2.4 
Philippines 87.4 2.4 
Morocco 72.7 2.0 
Pakistan 71.2 2.0 
Republic of Korea 61.2 1.7 
Chile 61.0 1.7 
Jamaica 50.6 1.4 
Thailand 41.2 1.1 
Panama 37. 8 1.1 
United Arab Republic 34.0 0.9 
Peru 25.6 0.7 
Guinea 25.1 0.7 
Paraguay 21.3 0.6 
Cameroon 21.0 0.6 
Trinidad and Tobago 16.4 0.5 
Sub-Total 3080.1 85.9 
Others 505.2 14.1 
Source: UNCTAD Review of Trade in Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures. 
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the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) areas. Evaluation of the 
importance of these selective preferences for the developing countries 
beneficiaries at the onset of discussion is difficult given the limited 
evideence available. The UNCTAD secretariat attempted an analysis in 
1968 (31) and the following discussion is based on that source. (32) 
Preferential imports from the African and Malagasy States mounted 
to some %580 m. or about half the total EEC imports from this source 
in 1965. But manufactures (SITC 5-8) constituted a very small part of 
the tdal exports from the African and Malagasy states. Although 
virtually all their exports to the EEC were covered by preferences, 
trade was only about PO m. ie. 2% of total preferential trade flows. 
About 60% of the preferential imports into the EEC came from three of 
the eighteen associated countries. The Ivory Coast, Cameroon and 
Senegal had preferential exports of more than POOm. each. At the 
other end of the scale, six countries had preferential exports of 
less than Pm. — Burundi, Chad, Nhli, Mauritania, Rwanda and Upper 
Volta. There was also a wide variation in market concentration from 
country to country. The associated states as a group shipped on 
average nearly 60 per cent of their total exports to the EEC; but 
Dahomey, Senegal and Togo had an 80 per cent concentration in the EEC 
market whereas export concentration for Mali and Upper Volta was 17 
per cent and 6 per cent respectively. 
The pattern of preferences and the preference mamgin enjoyed by 
individual Commonwealth developing countries was determined by the 
composition of their exports to Commonwealth developed countries. In 
the United Kingdom most manufactured products entered duty free. In 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, although preferences fell short of 
duty free entry, there was still a considerable margin of preference 
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over third countries. But it was the United Kingdom which was the 
most important market since in 1965 this market accounted for 79 per 
cent all exports of Commonwealth developing countries to the more 
developed members of the Commonwealth. In the U.K. preferential 
system manufactured products (including foodstuffs) accounted for 
about half the total preferential trade. Preferential trade in 
manufactures was spread over a wide area. The bulk of the trade 
consisted of manufactures of SITC classes 5-8 - %360m. or 63 per cent; 
food industry products contributed $200m. or 35 per cent; and processed 
raw materials %14m. or 2 per cent. The main preferred suppliers among 
the developing Commonwealth countries were India and Hong Kong followed 
by Nigeria; about one-third of the countries had preferential exports 
of about OrlOm. or less. Some countries e.g. Hong Kong, Malta and 
Gibraltar enjoyed preferences for a relatively high share of their 
manufactured exports. Trade dependence was less than that of the EEC's 
African associates. The developing Commonwealth countries only 
relying on the U.K. market for one fifth of their exports. Con-
centration of exports also varied widely from country to country. 
Only a few countries shipped more than half their exports to the U.K. 
- Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Barbardos, and the Gambia whereas for 
Malaysia and Singapore the proportion was less than 10 per cent each. 
In terms of the relationship between preferential trade and world 
exports the EEC Associates exhibited a higher level of dependence. 
For about a third of them (notably Senegal, Cameroon and Dahomey), 
preferential trade amounted to between one-half to two-thirds of 
their world exports; for another third this proportion ranged between 
10 and 40 per cent. For the remaining six countries - Burundi, Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda and Upper Volta, the proportions were between 
1 and 10 per cent. Only for three Commonwealth countrieseLd prefer-
ential trade exceed half of their world exports - Mauritius, Gambia 
and Barbados; for most countries the proportion ranged between 1 and 
10 per cent. For countries such as Ghana, Malaysia, Singapore, South 
Yemen and Zambia, preferential exports to the U.K. were insignificant. 
The heterogeneity of the group then varied not only across these 
two trait cleavages - ability to export manufactures and semi-
manufactures and beneficiary of an existing selective preference 
system - but also within these identifiable groups. 
In the absence of any concrete evidence to support or refute the 
proposition that selective preferences seriously damaged the export 
prospects of third countries, the G77 was divided between those 
countries which felt that the existing system of selective preferences 
were detrimental to their own development efforts and the preference 
holders who refused to countenance giving up their "advantages" 
without some form of compensation. The Latin American countries, 
particularly Brazil, (33)  Argentina and Chile called for the 
immediate abolition of existing preferential schemes upon the intro-
duction of the new scheme. (34) Some Latin American states frustrated 
at the continuation of vertical preferential schemes proposed as a 
counter, the creation of a preferential system linking the U.S. and 
Latin America. It is difficult to assess whether this was viewed as 
an alternative to the GSP or if it was being used to put pressure 
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on developing countries in receipt of special preferences to 
abandon their systems. In this context, given that most ldc 
preference receivers did not stand to gain much from the GSP it seems 
more a serious proposal than a bargaining ploy. 
This counterbalancing policy was especially favoured by Colombia 
and it was a Colombian national, Carlos Saenz de Santamaria, who as 
Chairman of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress 
(CIAP), proposed such a scheme in a letter of 10 August 1965 to the 
Presidents of the American Republics. (35)  The view was also taken 
that existing preferential arrangements were exploitative since they 
perpetuated colonial structures of production and export. However, 
not all countries currently enjoying vertical preferences took the 
attitude that these should be preserved. In the Commonwealth the 
Asian members were willing to forego this special arrangement in 
return for a satisfactory GSP. (36)  The AASM countries on the other 
hand although having no significant preferential exports into the EEC 
market, insisted on the granting of equivalent advantages. (37) 
Apart from different perceptions concerning existing preferential 
arrangements there were conflicting viewpoints in relation to a number 
of other issues. These included the purpose of the scheme, the likely 
duration of the scheme, country coverage and the treatment to be 
accorded to theEdcs. These conflicts of interest will be discussed 
in greater detail later. 
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The behavioural cleavages are really the substance of the rest 
of this chapter and arise from the trait and attitudinal cleavages 
discussed above. Nevertheless, one can point to membership of other 
organisations and the attempt to mobilise support within these 
organisations for particular positions within the debate as evidence 
of behavioural cleavages. In this respect the African associates of 
the EEC were able to use both their diplomatic missions in Brussels 
and also the institutionalised structure of association to put 
pressure on the EEC to safeguard their special interests. The 
relevant joint institutions were the Association Council, the 
Association Committee and the consultative Parliamentary Conference. (38) 
Latin American states used their membership of GATT and two regional 
bodies the CLAP and the Inter-American Special Committee for 
Consultations and Negotiations (CECON) to exert institutional pressure 
on the United States. (39) Similarly, developing Commonwealth 
countries belonged to an exclusive organisation through which they 
could exert pressure. 
The regional group structure of the G77 tended to produce con-
flicts in the GSP along regional lines. The degree of fractiona-
lisation was greatest between the African and Latin American groups 
but within each group a diversity of interest and attitude also 
existed. For example, not all Latin American countries supported the 
demand for a. vertical preference system with the U.S. (40)  In a 
similar vein in the African Group both Ghana and Guinea argued against 
the continution of vertical preferences. (41)  In the Latin American 
Group Bolivia and Ecuador stressed the necessity to build safeguards 
for lddcswithin any agreed GSP. 
6.3. The Bargaining Process  
The global discussion concerning trade in manufactures and semi-
manufactures was wide-ranging but concentrated around the need to 
increase the rate of growth of export earnings of the developing 
countries. After consideration of the salient features of exports of 
manufactures from developing countries attention was focused on 
three broad areas - the obstacles to trade faced by developing country 
exporters viz tariff and non-tariff barriers; (42)  the removal of 
these obstacles; and structural adjustment in developed countries. 
Among the measures considered for improving the market access of 
developing countries' manufactures and semi-manufactures exports was 
the creation of a preferential tariff system. The rapid enlargement 
of the export of manufactures from developing countries was aimed at 
increasing industrial production within these countries and hence 
economic growth. In 1964, when UNCTAD I was convened the share of 
developing countries in the total export of manufactures was small, 
representing only 5 percent of the world total. (43) This position 
had only marginally changed since the launching of the first 
Development Decade. In 1961, total exports from all developing 
countries amounted to A.6 billion out of total world trade of %62.3 
billion i.e. 4.2 per cent (see table 6.2). Furthermore, manufactures 
continued to remain low as a proportion of total exports as table 
6.3. shows. The developing countries as a group then had an interest 
in any measure proposed which would expand their exports of 
manufactures and semi-manufactures. 
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TABLE 6.2  
World: Exports of manufactures. by origin 1955 and 1961  
Amount in billions of dollars Index, 1961 Percentage Distribution Exporting group 1955 1961 (1955 100) 1955 1961 
World 37.8 62.3 165 100 100 
Developed market economies 32.0 52.0 162 85 83 
Developing market economies 1.8 2.6 146 5 4 
Centrally planned economies 3.9 7.7 196 10 12 
Source: United Nations, Handbook of International Trade Statistics, (E/CONF. 46/12/Add.1.) 
TABLE 6.3  
Percentage of Manufactures in Total Value of Exports by Developing Countries  
1955 1960 1963 
All developing countries 8 9 10 
Latin America 3 3 4 
Africa 6 6 7 
Far East 17 21 25 
West Asia 4 5 6 
Source: ECOSOC, World Economic Trends, (E/4o59,1965), Table 22, p.50. 
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Prior to the convening of UNCTAD there had been discussion of 
the preference issue within the 2amework of GATT. (44) Of most 
importance in this context was the GATT Ministerial Meeting of May, 
1963, (45) at which two separate proposals concerning special tariff 
treatment for developing countries were considered. The first 
suggested a 50 per cent reduction of MEN tariffs over a three year 
period on a list of manufactures and semi-manufactures of special 
interest to developing countries. In keeping with GATT non-
discriminatory rules these concessions would also apply to developed 
country exporters of such goods. In the absence of agreement the EEC 
and the Associates proposed the creation of a Working Party to investi-
gate the problems and possibilities of the granting of preferences 
from the developed to developing countries and from developing 
countries to cther developing countries. (46) The second proposal 
came from Mx Maurice Brasseur, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Trade 
and Technical Assistance. (47) 
Subsequently developed and expanded, the Brasseur Plan as these 
proposals became known were submitted as part of a French memorandum 
to the Geneva Conference. (48)  Brasseur envisaged the creation of 
temporary, selective and degressive preferences. A series of bilateral 
negotiations would be held between individual preference givers and 
preference receivers. On a case by case basis they would reach agree-
mentcn the preferential margins, duration of the preferences and the 
size of tariff quotas. Each preference giver, although engaged in 
ostensibly solely bilateral talks with interested developing countries, 
would nevertheless be making its decisions in the light of what other 
developed countries were doing. In this sense an element of multi-
lateral negotiations would be imposed on the bilateral system. 
Preferences would be selective in respect of country and product and 
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a declining level of preferences would be given for industries in 
developing countries that were not yet competitive. The rationale 
behind the scheme was two-fold - (i) it would create a quick and 
effective machinery for negotiating preferences since this would be 
done by individual countries; the alternative was a list of goods 
which all preference givers had to agree on and this would prove 
difficult to negotiate; (ii) the scope of preferences would be limited 
to those products in which agreement could be reached between 
individual countries, hence overcoming fears of market disruption aid 
unfair competition. However, there were two sustainable objections 
to the scheme. First, it would prove administratively and diplo-
matically cumbersome, e.g. if twenty developed countries granted 
preferential treatment to seventy developing countries on one 
thousand products then 1.4 million separate agreements would have to 
be negotiated. Secondly, it was feared that the selective nature 
of the scheme might result in increased economic and political 
dependence by certain developed countries on some developed countries. 
6.3.1. 	UNCTAD 1964 
Thus when the Geneva Conference convened the subject of 
preferential treatment for the manufactures and semi-manufactures 
exports of developing countries had been on the international agenda 
for about a year. It was being discussed in GATT, had been examined 
in material prepared for the conference, (49)  andcountries had 
already adopted positions on the subject. At the regional meetings 
which preceded UNCTAD I, the members of the G77 had all discussed 
the subject. The respective common group positions as expressed in 
the Ni ►ey Resolution, the Tehran Resolution and the Charter of Alta 
Gracia show the existence of differences within the G77. The African 
group urged, 
” 	 the acceptance by the developed countries the 
principle that the developing countries should be 
accorded preferential treatment, particularly in 
the protection of infant industries based on the 
recognition that even with a complete liberalization 
of trade the developing countries would not be in 
a position to compete on even terms with the 
industrialized countries;" (50) 
Many African states already enjoyed preferential access to western 
markets either through association with the EEC or through the 
Commonwealth. This resolution welcomed the creation of a wider 
system of preferences specially aimed at manufacturing products. The 
Asian states passed an ambiguous resolution which seemed to be wel-
coming a system of selective preferences. They urged, 
"extending non—discriminatory preferential treatment 
to imports of selected products originating in the 
developing countries as a whole;" (51) 
The Latin American preparation for the Conference was more 
extensive than the other two regional groups and on the preference 
issue they had a more developed and clearly articulated position. 
Emphasis was placed on a generalised non—discriminatory system which 
would ensure the dismantling of existing vertical preferences. As 
the Charter of Alta Gracia stated, 
"The developed countries shall guarantee the access 
of developing countries to their markets on non- 
discriminatory bases. With regard to the benefits 
derived from such preferences and discriminations in 
force as are considered indispensable to maintain 
the export income of certain developed countries, 
they shall be gradually replaced by others to 
compensate for them;" 
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"Steps should be taken forthwith to eliminate the 
preferences granted to some of the underdeveloped 
countries by certain developed countries, provided 
that these preferences have not already led to the 
creation of trade flows. When such trade flows have 
been established, the developed countries should 
limit the application of preferences to the volume 
of trade attained in the last few years, without 
prejudice to the gradual reduction and eventual 
elimination of such preferences." (52) 
The stress on trade flows is important since many of the African 
states enjoying preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures 
had to date attained only nominal benefit. The Latin American 
proposal would effectively cut them off from achieving any benefit 
which they might gain • 	in the future when they had established 
the relevant industries. These divisions were reflected in the 
general debate at the conference (53)  and in the deliberations of the 
Second Committee concerned with Trade in Manufactures and Semi-
Manufactures. 
Agreement among the developing countries could not in itself 
bring into being a generalised system of preferences. The developed 
countries had to be convinced of the economic sense and practicality 
of the idea. Among these countries a variety of -dews prevailed 
concerning the subject of preferences with a majority, however, being 
in favour of some kind of scheme. The May, 1963 Ministerial Meeting 
of GATT had accepted the principle of non-reciprocal tariff con-
cessions to the developing countries and in doing so had opened the 
door for a consideration of a GSP. It is also pertinent to remember 
that at this time preparations were under way for the Kennedy Round 
of tariff negotiations in GATT and developed countries were anxious 
that nothing should distract from those negotiations. Given the 
hoped for level of tariff reduction (50 per cent) any consideration 
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of preferences had to be undertaken in relation to the outcome of the 
Kennedy Round. Among the industrialised countries the United States 
was vehemently opposed to the idea of a preferential system for ldc 
manufactured exports. (54) United States officials argued that the 
implementation of preferences would seriously hamper efforts at 
dismantling barriers to trade being pursued in the context of the 
Kennedy Round, partly because developing counties once they have been 
granted preferential margins would not want them eroded by further 
cuts in the MFN rates and partly because developed countries having 
opened their markets by granting preferences might argue that they 
had reached the limit of trade liberalization. Hence agreement on 
preferences would inhibit the lowering of MFN reductions. Secondly, 
they argued that the developing countries would be better served by 
the long-term general erosion of duties which would enlarge Northern 
markets rather than the limited treatment likely under any preference 
scheme. Thirdly, it was feared that the change of law that would be 
necessary (existing U.S. law prohibited new preferences) might lead 
to a surge of protectionism from special interest groups bent on 
protecting their share of the market. Furthermore, the U.S. viewed 
preferences within the overall context of global political relations 
and argued that there were two competing ways of organising relations 
between developed and developing states. One stressed the 
responsibility of all developed countries for all developing countries 
and the other emphasised the creation of different "regional" 
groupings. George Ball, then Under-Secretary of State in addressing 
the delegates to UNCTAD I stressed that existing and past preferential 
systems had been of the latter type, 
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	 We should conduct our discussion during the 
coming weeks in full awareness that special trading 
arrangements have historically evolved in the 
context of special political relationships, and 
that special responsibilities in the area of trade 
are likely to carry with them special responsibilities 
in the area of politics and even of defence." (55) 
Preferences as Ball said later were neo-colonial, created spheres of 
influence and carried "special political, financial and economic 
relations" that impaired the "freedom of choice or action" of the 
developing countries. (56)  The United States position did not change 
during the Geneva negotiations and it remained in 'apparent' isolation 
among the rich countries. The U.S. position was also dictated by a 
desire to stand up to the G77. (57) 
Among the other major industrialised countries (apart from Italy) (58) 
 whilst there was a cautious welcome for the idea of preferences in 
principle there was a sharp division concerning the type of scheme 
envisaged. Belgium and France, favoured the introduction of selective 
preferences. Maurice Brasseur put forward his plan for temporary 
selective and depressive preferences which should have the following 
characteristics, "Firstlm to avoid the formation of permanent links 
which might distort the flow of trade; Secondly, to encourage the 
protected industry to use the preference period to improve its 
production methods, output and commercial processes." (59) 
The French position as expounded by Valery Giscard D'Estaing, 
then the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, was in support 
of selective preferences but not necessarily the Brasseur Plan. 
Giscard D'Estaing argued that apart from preferences further 
measures were needed. Be suggested a lowering of tariffs for semi-
processed goods and semi-manufactures. He proposed, that in respect 
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of manufactures the developed countries agree to accept a fixed 
percentage of their imports from various developing regions. The 
United Kingdom and West Germany both favoured generalised preferences 
against the selective scheme. The United Kindom was prepared to 
extend preferences currently granted to Commonwealth countries on 
the proviso that the other major industrialised countries also in-
stituted afoheme thereby ensuring benefits in these markets for the 
Commonwealth developing countries. Any preference scheme should fit 
in with plans for a continued lowering of tariff rates. 
111 .... preferences should therefore be created, not 
by raising tariffs against other countries, but by 
lowering or abolishing tariffs for developing 
countries." (60) 
West Germany which had not really gained from EEC preferences 
with the Associated States supported the British approach and 
Mr Kurt Schmuker, the Federal Minister of the Economy stressed the 
need to decrease preferences, "beyond the general reduction of 
tariffs which we expect from the Kennedy Round of negotiations." (61)  
Japan adopted an equivocal position, pointing out that such a 
proposal would only prove effective when all the developed countries 
agreed to it and that an equitable distribution of benefits among 
developing countries could only be secured if special account was 
taken of those industries in some developing countries which were 
already competitive on the world market. 
For the developing counties to secure agreement on a preference 
scheme they would have to first secure agreement among themselves 
- this meant reconciling the different group positions and accommodat-
ing the particular interests of individual members and, secondly, 
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persuading all the developed countries of the necessity of the 
general scheme. Two major conflicts existed within the G77. First, 
between countries in receipt of vertical preferences and those out-
side such schemes. Secondly, between the lddcs and the more advanced 
developing countries. We have already discussed the influence of 
Prebisch and his report to the conference and it is worth noting that 
on this issue his report argued firmly in support of a general, 
non-reciprocal preference system. Indeed the concept of a GSP which in 
its integrated aspects went a stage further than previous discussions 
was Prebischts idea. He was an astute politician and discussed 
differences between developing countries in relation to preferences. 
He argued that although it was the more advanced countries which would 
benefit from the scheme and that it would therefore be more equitable 
to limit their access by either control of quotas or a gradation of 
preferences, such refinements would increase the administrative 
complications of the scheme which might make it unworkable and lead 
to all (or most) countries failing to benefit. (62)  The importance 
attached to the arguments of the report by all developing countries 
meant that the Prebisch view on preferences tended to become if not 
a point of agreement at least a point of convergence. The developing 
countries had come to Geneva with a new found solidarity but one 
which had not as yet been tested on any substantive issue. The 
conflict over preferences was thus very important for the unity and 
effectiveness of the group. On one hand the very diversity of the 
group created disagreements and on the other there was an intense 
belief that it was only through solidarity that they could hope to 
extract any concessions from the industrialised countries. The 
problem was therefore posed in terms of improving their effectiveness 
in the inter-group discussions and adjusting their conflicting 
interests so that the distribution of any gains would be shared 
equitably. This necessitated compromise on the part of all regional 
groups. 
The nature of a preference scheme is such that discussion must 
take place on product coverage; country coverage (both donor and 
recipient); the place of quantitative restrictions in any scheme;the 
duration of preferences (not only the time period but whether this 
should be related to products or an entire economy and the date from 
which the exports of developing countries are monitored); preference 
margins; the relationship between the preference system end existing 
schemes; rules of origin. A further complication was introduced 
at UNCTAD I by the demand for the abolition of existing vertical 
preferences. This was because the greatest value derived by the 
existing preference receivers was in terms of their primary commodity 
exports and not their manufactured exports. It thus seemed as if they 
were being asked to give up something of definite export interest to 
their economies in favour of something that was at best peripheral. 
The two main areas of disagreement at the Conference concerned the 
abolition or retention of the special peferences enjoyed by the EEC 
African Associates and the Commonwealth developing countries and the 
insistence of the lddcs that any scheme should be tailored to fit 
their special needs. 
The majority of countries enjoying special preferential access 
to major Western markets did not countenance the loss of their 
privileged treatment. The NEC African associates were the most 
militant members of this group. This is not too difficult to under-
stand when one considers the close relatiamhip between France and 
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many of its ex-colonies and the fact that these countries had only 
recently negotiated as independent states their first aid and trade 
agreement with the Community - the Yaounde Convention - which only 
entered into force whilst the conference was underway. Apart ADM the 
criticism of vertical preferences, the EEC was often attacked by some 
developing countries for its supposed negative impact on world trade. 
The African associates reacted angrily to this explicit criticism. 
As the delegate from the Cameroons stated, 
... These various forms of association 	 
provide our countries with definite advantages 
Their purpose is to facilitate internal trade 
between associated countries rather than to erect 
barriers against those outside; such barriers are 
a means not an end. This observation is plainly 
borne out by the development of the foreign trade 
of certain states, whose dealing with third 
countries sometimes increase more than their 
dealings with the countries in the zone of 
association. We do not think it constructive, 
therefore, to engage in systematic criticism 
of the groupings in which we are associated, 
for they are our best guarantees of development 
at present, and they will remain so until we 
find better remedies, world-wide in scope and 
which can be more effectively applied." (63) 
Sometimes a note of exasperation would creep into the Associates' 
tone, 
"These preferences are criticised as hampering 
exports to the EEC by countries which are not 
associated with the Community, and so of inter-
fering with the natural flow of world trade. 
Since that criticism was expressed we have been 
waiting for factual data to justify it." ( 64) 
The EEC associates received strong support from some Commonwealth 
countries, in particular, the Commonwealth Caribbean. The Jamaican 
delegate declared that, 
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"In all frankness we cannot identify ourselves 
with the proposal to dismantle all the existing 
preferences for the developing countries 	 
we would strenuously resist any effort to bring 
about the removal of the preferences we now enjoy 
so long as Britain is prepared to continue their 
application." (65) 
The Commonwealth countries had to be slightly more cautious in their 
opposition since whilst France and the associates broadly supported 
selective preferences, the United Kingdom was quite willing to dilute 
Commonwealth preferences into a wider system. India, with one of the 
more developed industrial bases among developing countries, announced 
that it was willing to forego Commonwealth preferences for access to 
a wider generalised system. The non-preference receivers on the 
other hand called for the abolition of existing vertical preferences 
with some compensation being paid to the countries losing their 
preferential access. The Ecuadorean delegate made the novel suggestion 
that non-preference receiving ides should be financially compensated. 
He argued that, 
"Present systems of preferential and discriminatory 
access which are considered essential for main-
taining the export earnings of some developing 
countries, should be continued temporarily, 
financial compensation be* granted to the other 
developing countries." (66)  
These discussions were continued in the Second Committee where 
the differences were expressed in four draft resolutions (67)  
reflecting the various regional positions. The EEC associates 
argued that they could not be sure that new preferences in developed 
country markets would compensate for the loss of existing preferences; 
that their existing industries would have to undergo a long and 
costly adjustment process if they lost their special access and that 
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they had experienced difficulty in expanding tropical exports to 
other EEC states despite preferential treatment and therefore did 
not think that a new general system for the export of manufactured 
goods would be much use to them. They favoured the Brasseur Plan of 
selective preferences whichruld ensure both their continued pre-
ferential access and guaranteed that any new system would also bring 
them benefits at no further cost. This minority position was 
eventually submerged into a compromise proposal (E/CONP.46/C.2A.40 
and Add. 1-8) when compensation was promised for the loss of existing 
preferences. Disagreement was settled by an appeal to unity and by 
accommodating within the proposal the various special interests. 
Paragraph 18 of the draft resolution stated that, 
"Preferential arrangements between developed countries 
and developing countries which involved discrimination 
against other developing countries and which are 
essential for the maintenance and growth of the export 
earnings and for the economic advancement of the 
less developed countries at present benefitting 
therefrom, should be abolished maxi passu with the 
effective application of measures L described in 
paragraphs 5,6 and 1217 providing at least equivalent 
advantages for the said countries." (68) 
It was quite obvious that preferences would benefit the more 
advanced among the developing countries. The economically weaker 
countries (and once again this included the EEC Associates) pressed 
for some recognition of their special problems. (69) The more 
advanced developing countries fearing that the preference givers 
might discriminate against them and their products argued in favour 
of a non-discriminatory scheme among all preferred suppliers and for 
the category of preferred supplier to be self-selecting. The poorer 
countries were worried that they would be unable to compete with the 
more advanced ones and that even if the Y became competitive in a 
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few years under a general scheme with a fixed duration, they would 
find it difficult to break into developed country markets. They 
therefore argued in favour of some system which would reserve some 
of the market for themselves by means of a system of quotas, higher 
preferential margins or selective preferences. The suggestion of a 
system of national quotas for each preference giver and each preference 
receiver was dismissed as being too administratively complex. India 
and Pakistan and the Latin American countries 4ected to the proposal 
that preferences could be granted on a sliding scale with the higher 
margins being given to the least developed by arguing that the 
slding tariff scales in existence in developed countries would render 
the preferential concessions received meaningless. Since the more 
advanced countries needed the support of the least developed they 
came prepared to compromise and in the draft resolution accepted 
in paragraph 13, that, 
"Without prejudice to the general provisions 
made in paragraph 7 special treatment may be 
granted by developed countries to the less-
developed amongst developing countries in 
accordance with criteria to be determined 
and/or established by an appropriate body 
designated by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development." (70) 
Operative paragraph 7 had stated, 
"The preferential treatment described above 
shall be extended uniformly by all developed 
countries to all developing countries in a 
non-discriminatory manner." (71) 
The contradictory nature of these two paragraphs reflected the deep 
division within the group and the consensual nature of group decision- 
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making. The Associates had insisted on paragraph 13 and they were 
not prepared to support the resolution without its inclusion. On 
the duration of preferences it was agreed that preferential treatment 
began from the date that a particular industry in a developing country 
began to benefit from the application of the preferential tariff. 
This method of reconciling group diversity was to become a favoured 
way of solving group conflict. In this case all parties could go away 
reasonably satisfied. There was a commitment to abolish vertical 
preferences which pleased those countries currently not receiving 
any favoured treatment. On the other hand, this formula was an empty 
agreement which allowed each group to continue supporting its pre—
agreement position. Agreement in principle to protect lddc interests 
VW not wholly satisfactory to them since in the absence of concrete 
proposals there was no guarantee that they would benefit. 
The developing countries maintained solidarity by aggregating all 
their interests. The confused nature of the final G77 position can 
be seen in the fact that although supporting the abolition of special 
preferences in conceding equivalent compensation for countries 
currently enjoying special preferences and in accepting that special 
measures could be taken in respect of the least developed developing 
countries it recognised that these arrangements would continue. 
The pressure applied to developed countries was unable to change 
the positions as they existed at the beginning of the Conference. 
There was no agreement in principle on a general system. General 
Principle 8 which embodied this idea found the developed countries 
either abstaining45) (72 voting against(10. (73) In fact, even 
within the G77 there was no unanimity; Brazil, Republic of Vietnam, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Venezuela all abstained. Recommendation A.III.5. 
marked the highest degree of unanimity possible on the preference issue 
at Geneva. Adopted without dissent, it called on the U.N. Secretary-
General to set up a committee of government representatives to look 
at preferences and to work out the best method of implementing non-
reciprocal preferences. Special Principle 3 which concerned 
preferences was shelved. Agreement had thus been reached only on the 
necessity of investigating the issue further. The developing countries 
had reconciled their differences but only at the very high level of 
principle. No serious consideration had been given to the precise 
nature of equivalent advantages or to the special measures to be 
initiated for the lddcs. A start had been made but a GSP still had 
to be negotiated; the fragile solidarity of the G77 still had to be 
cemented and the developed countries still had to be convinced of the 
merits of the scheme. Events between the first and second UNCTAD 
conferences created the circumstances so that when UNCTAD II con-
vened in New Delhi the prospects for agreement on the GSP were 
propitious. 
6.3.2. Between UNCTAD I and UNCTAD II (1964-1968) 
Events here show the increasing institutionalisation of the 
group and its influence on the G77's bargaining strategy and tactics; 
the limited discipline imposed by group membership i.e. outside 
UNCTAD G77 members are 'free' to pursue policies which conflict with 
their stated aims within that forum; and the limitations of G77 
336. 
pressure politics in changing developed countries' positions. The 
search for a preferential system had to find a solution to two 
conflicting objectives in order to make it accepta1 to both develop-
ing and developed countries. It had to give adequate safeguards to 
the latter against market disruption and at the same time offer 
increased access to the former. This search for agreement was pursued 
within three different interactive frameworks; developed-developing 
country consultations within formal organizations; developed-
developing countries political and economic interactions; and 
intra-developed country consultations. 
Discussions among the major industrialisdicountries on the 
subject of preferences took place within the framework of the OECD. (74) 
Initially consultations were carried out within the Working Party of 
the Trade Committee but this was soon transferred to a group known as 
the 'Four Wise Men' consisting of senior trade officials of the United 
States, France, West Germany and United Kingdom. Two working sessions 
were held - 26 July-5 August 1966 and 4-18 July 1967 and two reports 
produced, first an interim report in November 1966 with a final report 
submitted to the OECD Council in December 1967. (75) At the first 
session it proved impossible to arrive at any agreement, positions 
remaining roughly where they had been at the time of the Geneva 
Conference. The U.S. opposition to any preference scheme was 
supported outside the group by Canada, Switzerland, Japan and to a 
lesser degree by Sweden and Norway. The U.K. and West Germany 
supported a general system and France and Belgium a selective one. 
337. 
U.S. opposition killed any serious exploration of the problem. 
President Johnson's announcement on April 14, 1967 that the United 
States would "explore the possibility of temporary preferential 
taeff advantages for all developing countries in the markets of all 
the industrialized countries", (76) opened the way for a serious 
discussion. France dropped its insistence on selective preferences 
since it could find little support either among the developed or 
underdeveloped countries. The resulting OECD consensus was presented 
in the report of the 'Four Wise Men'. (77)  This report set the OECD 
position which was maintained throughout the subsequent negotiations. 
Agreement was reached on the following main features of a non-
reciprocal general scheme of preferences: (a) product coverage 
- this would conform with chapters 25-99 of the Brussels Tariff 
Nomenclature (BTN), but other products could be negotiated on a case-
by-case basis; (b) beneficiary countries - by the method of 
self-election i.e. any country claiming developing country status; 
(0) duration - an initial period of ten years. Preferences should be 
temporary and depressive; (d) donor countries - all major developed 
countries. Agreement was not possible, however, on safeguards and 
exceptions, tariff arrangements then in force and the depth of tariff 
cuts. 
Members of the Group of 77, notwithstanding the compromises 
reached at UNCTAD I continued to pursue individualistic policies in 
respect of the preference issue. Some African countries entered into 
negotiations with the EEC to create special preferences for themselves. 
Nigeria concluded a separate agreement, (78)  the East African 
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Community countries, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda embarked on the talks 
that would lead to the Arusha Agreement (79) and the Maghreb countries, 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia began discussion in 1968. In response 
to this potential widening of the existing discriminatory EEC 
preferential arrangements the majority of Latin American countries (80)  
pressed the United States government to establish a selective 
preference system for the region. (81)  Prebisch waged a vigorous 
campaign against this sectarianism both inside and outside the UNCTAD 
framework. He used his reports to the sessionscf the TDB to argue 
against special preferences and to put his weight firmly behind the 
GSP. (82)  Outside UNCTAD Prebisch lobbied Latin American statesmen. 
In response to a call by Roberto Campos for defensive hemispheric 
preferences he made a speech on 22 March 1966 in Vina del Mar (Chile) 
where he argued that a special preference scheme would increase U.S. 
influence in Latin America. (83) He continued to stress this 
neo-colonial aspect of special preferences and urged the Latin 
American states to use concerted political pressure on the U.S. and 
European Community in order to seek redress for their grievances. The 
major proponent of selective hemispheric preferences was Colombia and 
he used a variety of tactics to personile the Colombian president 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo to support the GSP. On his frequent trips to 
Santiago Prebisch made stopovers in Bogota in order to discuss 
preferences with Lleras. (84)  Moreover, Prebisch created an informal 
group of LatinAnerican diplomats to convince the U.S. that general 
preferences were needed to supplement the Kennedy Round results. 
The change of policy by the United States was a response in part 
to the actions of the developing countries. First, in the context of 
Latin America, it was a response to the pressure for a GSP or 
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selective preferences. Unless the Johnson administration did 
something, U.S.-Latin American relations looked like being soured. 
The U.S. government, with its global responsibilities, did not want 
to institute vertical preferences for Latin America, it feared the 
reactions of developing countries in other regions. Secondly, opting 
for the GSP was an attempt to prevent the spread of the EEC selective 
preferential schemes and to try and control them under the GSP. 
Moreover, the U.S. was becoming increasingly isolated on this issue 
among developed and developing countries. A general scheme made 
political sense if the impact on domestic industry could be minimised 
through safeguards and exceptions. The U.S. could them minimise its 
political losses and use the GSP as a bargaining counter in its push 
for a free trade system. (85)  
Within the formal organizational structure two sets of meetings 
specifically concerned with preferences took place. First, in May - 
June 1965 the U.N. Special Committee on Preferences (created by 
UNCTAD I) was convened. No progress was made and the positions 
rehearsed at the Geneva Conference were once again paraded. Nine 
developing country members of the Committee (Argentina, Brazil, India, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, United Arab Republic and 
Yugoslavia) submitted the main working paper which called for the 
creation of a preference system covering all the manufactures and 
semi-manufactures exported by the developing countries. After an 
inconclusive three week session, the Group submitted a report to the 
U.N Secretary-General which recommended that the matter be studied 
further. (86)  
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Discussions in UNCTAD were conditioned by the prevailing political 
dynamics of the organisation in its formative years. On one hand the 
G77 and Group B were polarised and an air of confrontation pervaded 
deliberations. On the other hand the G77 (and the G31 members of the 
TDB) had not yet achieved tight group discipline. Individual 
country or regional group positions were more frequently expressed 
than common G77 ones. The UNCTAD Trade and Development Board at its 
second session established a Group on Preferences as a subsidiary 
body of the Committee on Manufactures. (87) At its two meetings, 
26 July-5 August 1966 and 4-18 July 1967, the Group concentrated on 
the technical aspects of the granting and extension of preferences in 
favour of the developing countries. In considering the principal 
elements in a scheme of preferences, the developing countries were 
able to agree a joint position on some issues but there were 
significant points of disagreement on others. The developing 
countries argued that product coverage should include those products 
alraeady subject to quantitative restrictions in the developed 
countries and processed and semi-processed products. The developed 
countries refused to accept the inclusion of sensitive items. On the 
subject of eligibility the developing countries also found a common 
interest. They argued that they as a group should decide which 
countries would receive preferences: this was to prevent the dilution 
of benefits gained by extending coverage to countries such as Hong 
Kong, Israel and Turkey. DevAbped countries on the other hand insisted 
on self-election. Three kinds of safeguards for developed countries 
were considered: (a) the use of an escape clause to exclude products 
from preferential treatment, (b) tariff quotas and (c) duty reduction 
instead of a zero duty. The G77 representatives argued that any 
agreed safeguard should be determined through "objective" inter-
national consultations. The developed countries insisted that they 
341. 
342. 
could not forego the right of a country to act unilaterally. On the 
remaining issues the G77 was unable to present a united front. The 
division over vertical preferences within the group led to three 
different positions being taken. The Latin American group called for 
the immediate abolition of existing preferences; some countries 
argued that it was premature to discuss the relationship between 
existing preferences and a future scheme until the exact nature and 
coverage of the new scheme were known; whilst the EEC associates 
refused to consider the end of special preferences without equivalent 
advantages being provided by the new scheme. Similarly, the more 
developed of the developing countries felt that the attempt by the 
least developed to have the scheme tailored to fit their needs was an 
irrelevance which hampered agreement. Both developed and developing 
countries were in agreement that preferences should be temporary 
and should be initially granted for a ten year period. (80 
It was with these various deliberations as a background that the First 
Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 was held, 10-25 October, 1967 
in Algiers. The Algiers Conference was a very important one for the 
G77 coming as it did at a decisive time in its history. (89) The G77's 
strategy was based on the analysis that concessions could only be 
wrested from the rich countries through collective action by the 
developing countries. Solidarity and unity were essential for this 
strategy to work and initially it seemed that the mere application of 
collective pressure would be sufficient to get significant concessions. 
Yet, the period since UNCTAD I had been one of almost unmitigated 
disappointment. The recommendations of 1964 still remained to be 
implemented. In the commodities field universally agreed as the 
most important for development purposes only a handful of agreements' 
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had been concluded and not all of these could be attributed to 
UNCTADc 9°) The confrontational attitude within UNCTAD was not 
conducive to the resolution of differences between the G77 and 
Group B. And within the G77 itself the various conflicts had made the 
unity more apparent than real. Algiers was important then first to 
reestablish G77 uni491) and, secondly, to help improve the chances 
of the New Delhi meeting having a successful outcome. This desire 
for unity and compromise in the G77 had an important influence on the 
deliberations at Algiers. To ensure the success of the conference 
the G31 in Geneva established a Co-ordinating Committee under the 
chairmanship of the Brazilian ambassador, A.E. Azeredo da Silveirac92) 
 This committee prepared the documentation for the conference and 
outlined two broad aims. These were to clarify the positions of the 
G77 on the whole of the New Delhi agenda and to identify the 
crucial issues on which action was urgently needed and negotiations 
were most likely to be productive.(93)  
Prior to the meeting in Algiers the three regional groups had 
met to prepare their individual group positions. The various group 
positions as expressed in their respective final documents clearly 
reveal the existing differences between the groups. They all called 
for the developed countries to institute a general, non-discrimina-
tory and non-reciprocal preference scheme for all manufactured and 
semi-manufactured products of developing countries. But whilst 
the African Group affirmed, 
"that the general system of preferences should 
provide at least equivalent advantages to those 
developing countries which are at present enjoying 
preferences in certain developed countries so as to 
enable them to agree to the suspension of their 
preferential arrangements,(94)  
the Charter of Tequendema prepared by the Latin American Group 
did not mention compensation and stated, 
"The discriminatory prefences granted by developed countries 
to developing countries for manufactures and semi—
manufactures will be absorbed in the general preferential 
system". (95) 
The Bangkok Declaration of the Asian countries did not even 
mention this issuec 96) All of the regional declarations recognised 
the special needs of the least developed countries but the African 
Group went further than the call for technical and financial assist-
ance and urged the institution of tariff quotas and a safeguard 
clause to protect the lddc interests. As usual the Latin American 
proposal was the most ambitious setting out a twelve paragraph 
recommendation in distinction to the single paragraph items of the 
African and Asian groups. 
Negotiations at the Algiers Conference were structured around four 
main committees. The preference issue was discussed in Committee 2, 
a committee of the whole which considered agenda item 11(c) of the 
New Delhi Conference — 'Thcpansion and diversification of exports 
of manufactures and semi—manufactures of developing countries'. 
The committee established a working group composed of Algeria, Brazil, 
Guatemala, India, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru and the 
Philippines to consider the preference issue. Although convened in a 
spirit of compromise the entire conference was wracked by dissension 
and disagreement. It had been agreed in the rules of procedure that 
all decisions would be taken without a vote-following the practice of 
G77 meetings in Geneva and New Yorkc 97) The agreement that all 
decisions should be by consensus was important in the conflict 
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resolution process. Without the recourse to majority vote decisions 
could only be taken on the basis of approval by the entire membership 
of the G77. This meant that decisions would reflect the lowest common 
denominator; be the result of a splitting of the difference; or an 
aggregation of conflicting demands. After exhaustive discussions, a 
compromise on vertical preferences was reached which involved splitt-
ing the difference. The Latin American states gave up their demand 
for the immediate abolition of special preferences and the African 
Associates accepted that they would give up their special preferences 
because the new scheme would ensure them at least equivalent advantages. 
This compromise which did not really advance the stage reached in 
1964 was brought about mainly through the mediatory efforts of 
ambassadors Lall (India), Brillantes (Philippines) and Stanovnik 
(Yugoslavia)c 98) But in another sense the agreement was an advance 
since in papering over the cracks and restoring the level of unity to 
1964 it marked the end of the "free-for-all" period which had been in 
existence from the close of the Geneva Conference. Paragraph g of the 
principles relating to preferences in the Algiers Charter, stated, 
"The new system of general principles should ensure at 
least equivalent advantages to developing countries 
enjoying preferences in certain developed countries to 
enable them to suspend their existing preferences on 
manufactures and semi-manufactures. From the beginning, 
provision should be incorporated in the system of general 
prefences„for the developed countries to redress any 
adverse situation which may arise for these developing 
countries as a consequence of the insttution of the 
general system of preferences."(99) 
Given the salient factors this was the most likely result. The 
Latin American and more advanced countries wanted a GSP and had prior 
to Algiers identified it as a possible area for progress at New Delhi. 
All the developed countries had moved towards accepting a general 
preferential scheme. There could be no possibility of creating 
'defensive hemispheric preferences' now. But if therwanted an 
agreement theyneeded the support of other members of the G77 for 
bargaining purposes and therefore would have to accept some of their 
demands. 
The lddcs also used the Algiers Conference to press their 
demands that any GSP must secure advantages for them as a distinct 
sub-group in the G77. At this stage an official list of lddcs had 
not been compilePW) and the issue of differentiation within the G77 
was an intensely political one. Tensions within the G77 were heigh-
tened because differentiation also ran along regional lines with most 
states claiming lddc status originating in Africa. In the Latin 
American Group Bolivia, Ecuador and the Central American countrieg 1 01) 
 (none eventually classed as lddcs) vigorously supported and defended 
the claims of lddcs. Prior to the Algiers Conference the lddc 
delegates to the TDB had used every available occasion to demand 
special treatment in any GSP.(102)  At Algiers, the lddcs formed a 
distinct sub-group which pressed not only for recognition within the 
G77 but for the initiation of_ a series of wide-ranging measures 
tailored to suit their needs.(103)  The cross-regional alliance 
between African, Asian and Latin American lddcs was a novel 
feature of G77 politics. The lddcs stressed the need for continued.  
G77 unity but argued that this could not be maintained if they were 
unable to benefit from any measures negotiated in UNCTAD.(104)  
The intransigence of the least developed succeeded in persuading the 
more advanced countries that some safeguards must be written into the 
GSP which would protect the poorest countries. Hence the inclusion 
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in the Algiers Charter of special measures for the lddcs on 
preferences and a widening of product coverage to include processed 
and semi-processed products. 
On the other hand the African Associates were lending their 
support to a measure that was unlikely to be of immediate benefit 
to them and were more interested in damage limitation than in 
seeking any benefits from the proposed scheme. It is interesting 
to note that the whole issue of vertical preferences was clouded in 
speculation and only loosely based on statistical reasoning. The 
Latin Americans claimed that EEO preferences damaged their export 
prospects despite the fact that their exports to the EEC were rising 
faster than to the world as a whole. The Associates claimed that 
preferences benefitted their industries and the EEC argued that 
their selective preferences were neutral in their impact on third 
countriesc 105) Within the context of the Algiers Conferenc 106) 
the agreement on preferences was vital for the continued unity of 
the G77. Preferences for manufactured goods had become the most 
important issue in international trade negotiations between North 
and South. In the light of the well publicised divisions within the 
Southern coalition it had become the acid test of unity. A common, 
if somewhat fragile, negotiating position had thus been agreed 
before UNCTAD II convened. 
Between 1964 and 1968 there had been some important environmental 
developments in the G77's campaign for a general prferential scheme. 
In under four years from the end of UNCTAD I all the'major develop-
ed countries had come out in favour of such a scheme. The extension 
of the European Community's preferential schemes meant that any 
general scheme would have to co-exist with these vertical preferen- 
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ces. From being a somewhat subsidiary issue in the whole area of 
improving manufactured exports from developing countries, it had 
become the main issue in North-South relations. This was a result 
both of the abject failures experienced in commodity negotiations and 
the seemingly imminent agreement on a GSP. As the President of the 
Trade and Development Board had said at the Boards's fifth session, 
it was a question mature for consideration.(107)  There was, little 
doubt that agreement would be reached on this salient task at New 
Delhi. At the very least the main outline of such a scheme would be 
agreed. New Delhi would mark the culmination of one stage in the 
debate. As we have seen these considerations did not however mean 
that differences ceased to exist either between the G77 and Group B 
or within the G77. A wide gap still separated the G77 position and 
that of the OECD countries and the agreement reached at Algiers was 
not a particularly firm one; in fact it did not constitute a 
negotiating document. The Algiers agreement on preferences was a 
broad set of principles which would need considerable tightening up 
before it could serve as a joint negotiating platform for the G77. 
6.3.3. 	UNCTAD II, New Delhi 1968  
The historical judgement on UNCTAD II which met from 1February - 
2911arch, 1968 is that it was a failureP °8) High hopes had been set 
prior to the conference opening on the possibility of concrete 
negotiations and definite outcomes. The immediate Trade and Develop-
ment Board session before the Conference had seemed to point in this 
direction. Nevertheless, the developed capitalist countries did not 
view UNCTAD as a proper negotiating forum. To them it was simply an 
organisation in which trade policy issues could be discussed and 
principles formulated. The developing countries„on the other hand 
had come seeking positive reults on specific agreements. The UNCTAD 
secretariat pointed to the need to move from generalities to specifics 
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and to this end drew up a list of issues on which concrete agreement 
seemed feasible. Apart from these conflicting perspectives on the 
nature of the "negotiations" and the aims of the conference, the 
common positions of both Group B and the G77 had been arrived at 
after hard internal bargaining and group members did not want to 
unravel the compromises. Thus two opposed positions were presented 
face-to-face with little prospect of agreement. The resultant delib-' 
erations were acrimonious. The developing countries accused the 
developed world of indifference to their plight and the developed 
countries accused the developing countries of presenting unreasonable 
demands. Confrontation persisted within the five Committees establish-
ek109) and in the "Rimalayan" contact groups established at the end 
of every committee's deliberation to try to work towards consensus. 
But within these contact groups the search for consensus was hindered 
by the continued repetition of positions already stated.(110)  It was 
within this atmosphere that agreement was sought on the preference 
issue. 
The group positions arrived at prior to New Delhi, especially the 
report of the OECD Working PParty, created conditions: which made some 
agreement on preferences a likely outcome of the conference. Despite • 
this initial agreement no detailed progress was made in New Delhi and 
this was a result of the serious divisions which still existed between 
the two groups. It is, perhaps, naive to have expected a fully worked 
out scheme to emerge from so ramshackle a conferenece as UNCTAD II.(111) 
 Nevertheless this hope was entertained by G77 delegates and the media. 
Consequently, resolution 21 (II) which, inter alia, recognised 
'unanimous agreement in favour of the early establishment of a 
mutually acceptable system of generalized non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory prefrences' and which established a Special Committee 
on Preferences to finalise the arrangements for such a scheme was 
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held to be a disappointment. 
As we have observed the Charter of Algiers did not provide the G77 
with an adequate negotiating platform on this issue and therefore the 
developing countries had to reach agreement on a joint resolution which 
could be tabled in the Second Committee. This, however, proved very 
difficult to accomplish and it was not until 11th March at the twenty-
sixth (out of thirty-two) meeting of the committee that a G77 draft 
resolution(112) was presented. From 2nd February until 11th March the 
main G77 text was the unsatisfactory Charter of Algiers. Indeed, it was 
not until the contact group had been established to consider in greater 
detail the main elements of a scheme of preferences and to disauss a 
patsible timetable of implementation that the G77 draft resolution 
entitled 'Basic principles and procedures covering an agreement on the 
general system of preferencestwas produced.The paper agreement of 
Algiers proved difficult to turn into a draft resolution because of 
continued disagreements over special preferences and the problems of 
the least developed. It was in New Delhi that the special interest 
groups in the G77, the land-locked countries and the lddcs made sig-
nificant advances concerning special measures in their favour. (113) 
The least developed developing countries realising that an agreement on 
preferences was imminent insisted that it should cover products of 
export interest to their economies otherwise they would not benefit. 
Following on from their limited success in Algiers they were , determined 
not to retreat and made support for the G77 1 6 position conditional on 
the granting of certain concessions. They, therefore insisted on a 
G77 position which stressed wider 'product coverage. The OECD report 
had suggested that preferences only be granted to products 
BTN 25-99. The lddcs argued in the intra-G77 negotiations for the 
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inclusion of categories 1-24 (BTN) and succeeded in having their demand 
accepted by the other members of the coalition although the more 
advanced countries such as India were prepared to accept the limited 
product coverage offer made by the OECD countries. This draft 
resolution went a very long way towards attempting to meet the needs 
of the lddcs. Articles 5 8 12 and 13 all sought either toexempt the 
lddcs from the general exceptions clauses or to provide specific 
commitments which would enable them to benefit. 
The conditions relating to special preferences were more exten-
sively spelt out than they had ever been and constituted a definite 
advance on the Algiers -Charter. It is worth reproducing the relevant 
section of article 14 - 
"The body that will be charged with the implementation 
of the general system of preferences shall, at the end 
of five years of application of the general system of 
preferences, examine and review the situation of deve-
loping countries now enjoying special preferences with 
a view to accelerating the process of merging of the less 
advantageous system without adversely affecting the global 
export opportunities of any developing countries. 
If the general system proved detrimental to countries 
benefitting from special systems, the body given the task 
of implementing the general system will also have to 
determine satisfactory compensatory measures to be taken 
by the developed countries while at the same time the 
special preferences are progressively eliminated, in 
order to ensure at least equivalent advantages for the 
beneficiary countries".(114)  
This article shows two advances on previous compromises. First, it 
accepts that a transitory period of at least five years will be 
necessary before special preferences are abolished. Secondly, the 
safeguards for those states enjoying special preferences would be 
adjudicated by an impartial international body. In addition two new 
elements appeared in this draft resolution. The initial time period 
over which preferences were to run was raised from ten to twenty 
years in an obvious attempt to strengthen the G77ts negotiating 
position. Furthermore, recognising that a framework agreement would 
not be concluded at New Delhi the G77 proposed that a Special 
Negotiating Committee on Preferences be established. The G77 
included the 	term negotiating in the title of the proposed body 
because they wanted to stress that they would be involved in 
negotiations concerning the precise nature of the GSP; it was not 
going to be left to the discretion of the developed countries. 
Negotiation as a concept entailed a vision of equality which the G77 
was anxious to promote in relations with the developed market economy 
countries. This joint negotiating text was an umbrella document 
which on the one hand crystallised a number of points on which 
definite advance had been made in terms of reconciling differences 
and on the other it merely aggregated divergent interests. 
It proved impossible at UNCTAD II to reach agreement beyond the need 
to set up a system and to create appropriate machinery to enable 
countries to continue consultations regarding the schemec 115) The 
developed market economy countries refused to go beyond the position 
worked out in the OECD. The minimal OECD compromise did not cover 
important elements of any future preference scheme, viz. safeguards, 
exceptions, the depth of tariff cuts, and reverse preferences. Major 
differences between Group B and the G77 existed on all significant 
elements of a preferential scheme — product coverage, exceptions, 
safeguards, duration and existing preferences. The highest level of 
disagreement was recorded over product coverage where the developing 
countries demanded the inclusion of processed and semi—processed 
352. 
353. 
products within the GSP with a bare minimum of exceptions which 
would be determined on a case-by-case basis. Although theetECD 
agreement envisaged a case-by-case approach for items in BTN 1-24 
some developed countries, including the United States expressed an 
interest in considering the inclusion of these products on an 
a priori basis within the scheme. New Delhi thus marked the beginn-
ing of another new stage in the process of "negotiating" a GSP. 
From a maverick concept it had become the centrepiece of internatio-
nal economic diplomacy. After UNCTAD II this was particularly so 
since it was one of the few positive achievements of a disappointing 
conference. Not only was the concept now agreed it would soon be 
operationalised and agreement on principle would become a new 
instrument of trade policy. The G77 had survived its internal 
dissension and had managed to preserve its unity. Discussion on 
lofty questions of principle were now finished. A concrete agreement 
had to be negotiated in which intra-G77 conflict would prove largely 
irrelevant. In this new phase the developed countries would present 
their preference schemes to be scrutinised by the developing countries. 
This was a process of negotiation(116)  and consultation fundamentally 
different from what had taken place to date. 
6.3.4. 	1968-1970 : Towards Implementation 
At the second part of its fourth session 21 September - 
12 October 1970, the Special Committee on Preferences adopted 
"Agreed Conclusion" in respect of a GSP.(117)  The culmination of the 
post New Delhi process was greeted as an important event. Mr. Manuel 
Perez-Guerrero, the UNCTAD Secretary-General, acclaimed "a far-
reaching and unprecedented undertaking. Never before to the best of 
my knowledge, has there been such a concentration of concerted 
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efforts in favour of the developing countries in the field of 
trade".(118)  The time-table envisaged by Resolution 21(II) had been 
exceeded but that was not altogether surprising, given the complexity 
of the process involved. 
The period between 1968 and 1970 was characterised by activity 
on two different levels. On the first the developed country prefer-
ence givers - Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzer-
land, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany - 
negotiated within the OECD framework to harmonise the various 
'national' offers.(119)  It was soon obvious that the GSP would never 
be general in the sense of all the developed countries having  
identical schemes. The specific circumstances of the individual 
countries made harmonisation rather than uniformity a more realistic 
choice although until May 1970 the U.S. administration insisted upon 
uniformity. U.S. opposition to reverse preferences and special 
preferences also slowed down the decision-making process. But once 
broadly comparable schemes were agreed the next stage of the process 
could be entered into. This was the presentation of the schemes to 
the G77. The second level was within the UNCTAD Special Committee 
on Preferences (SCP) where the developing countries responded to 
offers made by the donor countries. The SCP proved unable to 
make any progress until the first submissions were received in 
March 1970. The first part of the fourth session of the SCP (March-
April 1970)( 120) was  spent in examining these initial preference 
offers. Incremental changes were suggested by the spokesmen of 
the developing countries who adopted a pragmatic approach. Realising 
that they were not in a position where confrontational tactics 
would work they sought to make realistic suggestions in order to 
improve the benefits they would gain from the proposed schemes.(121) 
 After detailed discussions the donor countries reconsidered their 
(122) proposals and made revised offers in September of that year. 	The 
new mood of realism and pragmatism running through the G77 affected 
those who stood to benefit most from the new scheme and felt that 
something was better than nothing. It was better to accept a flawed 
agreement which would be implemented quickly rather than to continue 
arguing for an ideal scheme which might never materialise. Six years 
of more or less fruitless discussions in UNCTAD had proved that any 
minimal gains had to be accepted. 
Those states which had been keen to preserve the benefits they 
gained from existing preferential systems realised that the GSP as 
envisaged would not hurt their market access. The EEC Associates so 
worried previously: about losing'their privileged access to the 
Community market were assured that the Community's scheme did not 
seriously threaten their interests. The rearguard action that they 
had mounted had been successful in preserving their interests. And 
the qualified schemes which the other OECD countries were implementing 
gave only limited benefits to the more advanced ides. The Associates 
could therefore agree within the SCP that, 
"Developing countries which will be sharing their 
existing tariff advantages in some developed countries 
as the result of the introduction of the generalised 
system of preferences will expect the new access in 
other developed countries to provide export opportunities 
to at least compensate them. 
As a result of the periodic reviews in UNCTAD and of 
bilateral or multilateral consultations between the 
countries concerned, those counlkies'grafiting tariff 
advantages will give careful consideration to the 
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extent to which the developing countries enjoying 
tariff advantages have benefitted overall from the 
system when reviewing the operation of the generalized 
system of preferences". (123) 
Partly as a result of their pressure on the EEC, its GSP offer 
excluded those processed agricultural goods of major interest to 
:7 the Yaounde Associates.(12 	For their part the lddcs realised that 
the GSP, as it stood, although not helping their export earnings, 
VW the best that could be achieved. It was also unlikely that they 
would be able to mount a successful campaign to improve the schemes 
in their favour. The lddc sub-group was now a weaker one in the G77 
decisional process because official identification had weakened the 
cross-regional alliance. The official list of lddcs only included 
one country from the Latin American group - Haiti. The least 
developed countries also shifted their pressure during this period 
from concentration on preferences which only held marginal gains at 
best and these were all in the future to issues such as aid in 
which gains were both immediate and substantial. The unity of the 
G77 was important for the Rides in terms of wresting further 
concessions from the industrialised states. Any attempt by the 
lddcs to try and delay the agreement would therefore be self-
defeating. The different nature of the bargaining process, the 
move away from questions of principle to practical issues of 
commercial policy, the shift of the discussions from intangibles 
to tangibles, helped to transform the manner in which conflicting 
interests in the G77 were expressed and its effect upon the 
strategies pursued by individual group members. 
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6.4. Conclusions  
Negotiations on the GSP presented the first, concentrated challenge to 
the maintenance of effective G77 unity. From the outset attitudinal, 
ascriptive and behavioural cleavages threatened to undermine the 
coalition. The salience of the GSP negotiations for intra-G77 
relations arose from the centrality of these negotiations in the 
development dialogue between 1964 and 1970. The negotiations were 
crucial for both the G77 and UNCTAD because they became the most 
conflictual arena in the North/`South debate. Analysis of the origins 
and development of conflict and conflict management therefore 
contributes significantly to an understanding of the wider activities 
of the coalition. 
The demand for a GSP originated with the G77 and the UNCTAD 
secretariat but the implementation of any agreed scheme depended on 
the industrialised states. The UNCTAD forum therefore although 
important as a centre for discussion was largely irrelevant as a 
decision-making body. UNCTADts main role lay in providing a forum 
through which pressure could be exerted and as a legitimising 
instrument through which any agreement needed to be ratified. 
These constraints arising from the global distribution of power and 
the organisational context were important conditioning factors on the 
behaviour of the G77. 
The fact that the GSP was a collective good necessitated joint 
action on the part of the G77. Nevertheless, the group members were 
forced into a distributive bargaining mode because of the unequal 
distribution of gains. On the other hand, because an overall increase 
in trade liberalisation would benefit all members the coalition was 
also engaged in integrative bargaining. Hence a mixed bargaining 
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strategy prevailed in which group members oscillated between stressing 
the distributive and integrative effects. A purely distributive 
strategy would have caused even greater strains on group unity but the 
possibility of common gain and the necessity to press Group B members 
to agree as wide-ranging a scheme as possible provided a degree of 
solidarity and a cause around which the G77 could coalesce. 
Two further elements tended to unite rather than increase 
the divergent strains in the group. The first stems from the nature 
of the coalition. The solidarity achieved by the G77 is first and 
foremost a diplomatic solidarity which exists for the purposes of 
multilateral commercial diplomacy. Group members agree on common 
positions for the purposes of multilateral negotiations but possess 
the freedom to pursue on a bilateral basis policies which may 
conflict with agreed joint ventures. Members of the coalition were 
prepared to accept this dualism in national policy during the period 
of the GSP negotiations. This was justified partly on the grounds of 
safeguarding vital national interests and partly because the coalition 
was able to functiom despite these deviations from the common position. 
Moreover, the G77's organisational structure developed considerably 
over this period mainly in response to these fissiparous tendencies. 
The development of structures and decision-making procedures 
widened and deepened the levels of interest,aggregation and interest 
articulation. The political process of the group ensured that 
members could effectively represent their interests. The development 
of common institutions and the institutionalisation of procedures 
created a framework in which a stable pattern of expectations could 
develop. Thus the G77 became not just a constant factor in national 
politics but also the relevant body for the discussion of the GSP 
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and other issues. But the level of coordination achieved i.e. 
diplomatic solidarity in so far as it did not jeopardise vital inter.- 
ests made it easier for governments to accept compromise. The G77 
could reconcile divergent viewpoints because effective decision-
making lay elsewhere and because growth in organisational competence 
enmeshed members without threatening autonomy. 
Disintegrative tendencies, however, continued to have an 
effect on the bargaining process. Coalition members were hesitant to 
sacrifice real or perceived benefits without engaging in strenuous 
defence of their interests. Hence the lddcs and the preference 
receiving countries insisted on special treatment. Recognition of 
these claims by Group B undermined the position of those members of 
the G77 opposed to differential treatment of GSP beneficiaries. 
urthermore, the commitment to special measures for disadvantaged 
countries although discussed mainly as a matter of principle was 
in the final analysis a practical question. Preference givers were 
free to design schemes which contained exceptions from the standard 
principles. The hard fought battle by the lddcs and preference 
receivers resulted in some minor concessions but the final agreements 
reached owed less to G77 interests , and pressure than the autonomous 
action of Group B members.states. 
Negotiations on the GSP showed the limited role of UNCTAD as 
a negotiating forum. Third World pressure politics had succeeded in 
procuring a new device in the trade field but the design, implement-
ation and execution of the GSP was largely a result of deliberations 
among the industrialised states. The G77 had campaigned for a reform 
which would only benefit a few of its members and had managed to 
maintain a degree of unity despite widely - conflicting interests. This 
pragmatic unity recognised the demands of special interest groups 
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in the coalition. Common G77 positions of necessity had to accommodate 
diverse interests. The success of the Group in maintaining a united 
bargaining front in the context of UNCTAD negotiations was a result 
of an organisational process which favoured group bargaining. In 
addition the UNCTAD group system tended to push the developing 
countries together. The powerlessness of the G77 to effect meaningful 
change in international trade rules and the international economic 
system underlines the weakness of individual members of the coalition. 
Joint action may be a second best solution but it does offer the 
possibility of limited gain. The GSP negotiations demonstrate the 
necessity for collective action and the limits to cooperation. 
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CHAPTER 
Conflict and Conflict Management : The Negotiations Ibr An 
Integrated Programme For Commodities 1974-1980  
The Integrated Programme For Commodities (IPC) was the next 
major issue after the GSP to dominate UNCTAD politics. The two 
sets of negotiations are comparable in respect of the salience of 
the issue for intra-77 relations; their centrality within the 
North-South dialogue; and the degree of political commitment ex-
pended in the organizational context i.e. UNCTAD. A major dif-
ference between the two sets of negotiations resides in the wider 
environmental setting and this is one of the key variables in 
explaining the higher degree of politicisation encountered in the 
later bargaining process. The aim of this chapter is to examine 
the internal divisions within the G77 in relation to the IPC and 
the attempts to maintain unity in the face of these differences. 
Two central questions are posed for the analysis: (1) How, given 
the existence of various cleavages, did the group manage to maintain 
unity and what was the exact nature of this unity? (2) What 
effect did the existence of these divisions have upon the G77's 
negotiating position and how did they affect the "final agreements" 
covering the Common Fund and the individual commodity agreements? 
In order to answer these questions the investigation will explore 
two distinct but interlinked levels of political activity. First, 
negotiations in the G77 leading to a common negotiating strategy 
and, secondly, the range of negotiations covered by the IPC umbrel-
la which took place in UNCTAD. To understand intra-77 bargaining 
on the IPC it is necessary to examine the economic arguments surround-
ing international commodity policy, and the cleavages within the G77. 
372. 
373. 
before proceeding to study the negotiating process. But before 
discussing the IPC proper we will take a brief look at the com-
modities issue-area within the UNCTAD framework from 1964 until 
the launching of the Integrated Programme. This will not only 
illuminate the subsequent analysis, by shedding light on the 
frustrations felt by the developing countries at the slow progress 
made in the Committee on Commodities, at the UNCTAD general conferences 
and in ad hoc commodity conferences but also give an historical 
dimension to the specific set of negotiations begun in 1974. The 
Integrated Programme was the centre-piece of the New International 
Economic Order proposals but many of these demands were far from 
new(1)  having been on the international agenda since 1964 and 
the commodity debate must be understood within this context. Fail-
ure to do so leads to mistaken conclusions (2) concerning the appro-
priateness of making this issue-area the centre of the demands for 
a New International Economic Order. 
7.1. UNCTAD and Commodity Trade 1964-1974  
Although the major political commitment and drive was expended 
in the creation of a Generalised System of Preferences between 1964 
and 1970 the subject area of the most importance to the majority of 
the developing countries was commodity trade and it was in fact the 
failure to make substantive gains in this field which invested the 
GSP negotiations with added significance. The interest of the 
developing countries in primary commodities stemmed from the import-
ance of agriculture and mining within their domestic economies (3) 
 e.g. in 1960 72.9 per cent of the labour force was employed in 
agriculture and 34.4 per cent of GDP was accounted for by this 
sector and although there were declines in both variables by 1970 
-66.6 per cent employment of the labour force and 28.2 per cent 
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of GDP(4) - they nevertheless remained high. Moreover, primary 
commodity export provided the principal source of their foreign 
exchange earnings. See Table 7.1. below: 
TABLE 7.1. 
Value of primary products and manufactures as percentage of total  
exports of developing countries 1960, 1961, 1964. 1965 and 1967. 
Product Category 	Year 
2 361 DIA  
Primary Products 
Manufactures 
Sources : UNCTAD : Review of International Trade and Development, 
TD/5/Rev.1; J. Clifford & C. Osmond. World Develop-
ment Handbook, Table 6.3. p.57. 
Note 	: Percentages do not add exactly, because of rounding, 
and because 'miscellaneous' exports which are neither 
primary products nor manufactures are included in the 
totals. 
Given this heavy export concentration, reforms in the commodity 
field offered the major hope for an improvement in ldc development 
prospects. (5) Secondly, many ldcs felt that serious economic 
problems arose from this over-dependence on primary commodity exports 
viz. instability of export earnings and declining terms of trade. (6) 
But whatever one's views on problems arising from this type of export 
concentration the slow growth in the aggregate demand for ldc com 
modities resulted in increased concern on commodity policy. 
The political economy of international commodity trade does 
not support a crude division of the world into developed and develop-
ing countries. Nevertheless, this was one of the issues around 
which the G77 coalesced and attempted to present a united front within 
86 85 83 80 79 
14 14 16 17 20 
375. 
the UNCTAD context. Despite the existence of specific interests 
arising from their positions as producers and consumers of particu-
lar commodities; interests which often led to conflicts between 
producers and/or conflicts between producers and consumers the 
developing countries identified a common interest arising from their 
dependence on commodity exports, the state of the international 
market, the prevailing !rules of the game' and the weak instituional-
isation in the raw material field. Their major aim was a complete 
revision of the principles which governed action in this area. 
Until the creation of UNCTAD, the principles which guided behaviour 
in commodity trade were those embodied in the Havana Charter, (7) 
especially chapter VI - Inter-Governmental Commodity Agreements. 
Firmly grounded in free market principles the Charter provided for 
control of production only in exceptional circumstances i.e. when 
"a burdensome surplus has developed" or where there is "widespread 
unemployment or under-employment" (Article 62). In pursuit of 
price stability around the long-term trend international commodity 
agreements could be created but would have to include an equal 
weighting of producer and consumer governments although the financing 
would fall solely on the producers. The developing countries through 
UNCTAD sought to relax the conditions under which international com-
modity agreements (ICAs) could be set up, to get equal financing by 
both producer and consumer governments for ICAs and to use ICAs as 
an aid mechanism i.e. to change the focus from the stabilization 
of prices to one of raising prices higher than the long-run trend. (8 ) 
Underlying the planned revision of international norms were con-
siderations based on a) the long-term foreign trade difficulties 
experienced by the developing countries especially after the 
commodity boom accompanying the Korean War had been replaced by a 
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slump which led to a fall in their export earnings; b) the existence 
of a wide variety of market imperfections many of which arose from 
discriminatory practices followed by the developed countries; c) 
the lacunae in the existing institutional framework and the failure 
of available machinery to meet their needs; (9) d) the realisation 
that major changes in policy were necessary if they were to achieve 
and sustain the rates of growth set in the First Development Decade. 
Four different types of measures were proposed to meet the declared 
objectives. First, and perhaps most important was the revision of 
existing international law and the creation of new rules and norms. (10 
This of course has been a constant feature of Third World states' 
practice at the U.N., and elsewhere since 1960. Apart from those 
aims mentioned above it was hoped to establish the importance of 
inter-governmental cooperation on this issue and the necessity for 
intervention to become an integral part of development planning. 
Secondly, the proliferation of individual ICAs based on the belief 
that management of international markets was both possible and neces-
sary. Thirdly, the promotion of studies on individual commodity 
markets and the problems faced by ldc exporters. Finally, autono-
mous and collective action by the developed countries to dismantle 
protectionist devices against ldc commodity exports and to prohibit 
the erection of any new barriers. (11) 
It is perhaps a testament to the comprehensiveness of the 
demands made at UNCTAD I and the recommendations contained in the 
Final Act (12)as much as to the lack of progress between 1964 and 
1974 that there were no innovations in the intervening period which 
had not been foreshadowed in Geneva. We will not discuss the 
debate on commodities at UNCTAD I since this has already been done 
in Chapter 3. The recommendations of the Conference concerning 
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international commodity trade covered all aspects of the Integrated 
Programme except for the Common Fund. These recommendations called 
inter alia for i) 'remunerative, equitable and stable prices' for 
primary commodities, ii) a standstill on trade barriers in the de-
veloped countries, the reduction of direct obstacles (e.g. quantitative 
restrictions, custom duties) and a modification of domestic policies 
(e.g. subsidies); iii) action to be taken as speedily as possible, 
iv) the creation of ICAs. Although these recommendations were 
adopted unanimously the lack of progress in implementation shows the 
real nature of the consensus achieved. 
Between Geneva and New Delhi very little was accomplished either 
in creating new principles or in the negotiation of specific 
commodity agreements. Within the Committee on Commodities there was 
a realisation that the attempt to devise universal solutions for 
commodity problems was futile and although not abandoned completely 
it was integrated with a new pragmatic commodity by commodity approach. 
Two specialist groups were created by the Committee on Commodities 
- the Sub-Committee on Commodities and the Permanent Group on 
Synthetics and Substitutes. No new commodity agreements were 
negotiated. A major attempt was made in cocoa and two conferences 
were held, the first, May-June 1966 and the second, November 
December 1967 but producer conflict and U.S. objections killed any 
hope of a satisfactory outcome. There was an attempt to renegotiate 
the 1958 International Sugar Agreement under UNCTAD auspices in 
Septembee-October 1965 but this, too, failed; but when the New Delhi 
conference convened hopes were high that the U.N. Sugar Conference 
to be held later that year would be successful in establishing a 
new Agreement. These hopes were fulfilled in the 1968 International 
Sugar Agreement. Three commodities with existing agreements were 
successfully renegotiated during this period. The Third Inter-
national Tin Agreement was negotiated in April 1965; the 1963 Olive 
Oil Agreement (but this had no provisions for the regulation of 
price or supplies) was extended by Protocol until September 1969 as 
a result of the U.N. Conference on Olive Oil, March 1967; and the 
International Wheat Conference (outside UNUTAD auspices) adopted an 
International Grains Arrangement (replacing the International Wheat 
Agreement) in August 1967 comprising a Wheat Trade Convention (WTC) 
and a Food Aid Convention (PAC). Informal market share agreements 
were also concluded for sisal and henequen (1967) and abaca (1968). 
The New Delhi conference adopted five resolutions on commodity 
problems and policies (14) The most important resolution 16 (II) 
detailed specific courses of action to be taken on some 20 commoditiies 
and commodity groups. (15)  This demand had, of course, originated 
with the G77 and is contained in the Algiers Charter. The second key 
issue for these countries aoncerned the financing and pre- 
financing of buffer stocks. The Algiers Charter called for the 
participation of the international financial institutions and the 
developed countries in the pre-financing of buffer stocks and for 
an equal sharing of costs between producers and consumers for the 
financing of buffer stocks. (16)  No agreement was reached on the 
financing issue at the conference. Resolution 16 (II) in collating 
these individual commodities together at one and the same time 
recognised both common problems and the need for an integrated 
approach and the different palms facing each commodity and there-
fore the necessity for specific remedial measures for particular 
commodities. This was the first time action had been agreed upon 
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at the international level concerning an integrated approach to 
international commodity policy. Resolution 16 (II) set in motion 
a series of discussions, negotiations and studies on a wide range 
of commodities. (17)  
Achievements in the field of international commodity policy 
were mixed between New Delhi and Santiago. On . .rie hand some slight 
noticeable progress was made in the area of norm creation but on 
the other, ICAs failed to materialise and those that did had 
variable degrees of success. In the Committee on Commodities two 
decisions were reached in 1968 and 1969 which represented signifi-
cant gains on the New Delhi meeting and raised the level of 
agreement between Group B and the G77. In November 1968 it was 
agreed that buffer stocks should be financed by both producers and 
(18) consumers. 	The pressure exerted in this forum also paid 
dividends when the IMF created a buffer stock financing facility in 
1969-70. The tortuous nature of commodity negotiations and the 
lack of symmetry between principles and practice is illustrated 
by the refusal of the consuming countries to assist in the financing 
of the buffer stock provisions of the fourth International Tin 
Agreepent concluded in 1970 but the producer countries had recourse 
to the IMF facility. (19) In May 1969 the Committee on Commodities 
reached agreement on a text (20)  which inter alia called on the 
developed countries to reduce trade barriers on those natural pro-
ducts which faced competition from synthetics. At the first part of 
the tenth session of the Trade and Development Board (19 August - 
24 September 1970) a comprehensive resolution (21) with the objective 
of leading to the adoption of an international policy on primary 
commodities, was passed without objection. It included, among other 
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things, a set of guidelines for pricing policy and measures to be 
taken for the liberalisation of trade and improved access to markets. 
In this period four international commodity agreements were 
concluded and one informal arrangement. The four agreements were 
all renegotiations of existing ICAs. A new International Sugar 
Agreement was finally agreed in 1968 which included innovative pro-
visions relating to national stocks, supply commitments and special 
measures for the developing countries. The 1962 International 
Coffee Agreement was successfully renegotiated in 1968 but was 
experiencing serious difficulties by the time UNCTAD III was 
convened because of the operation of two factors. First, the 
devaluation of the United States dollar in August 1971 and the 
subsequent floating of major currencies led to an inability to 
adjust prices under the agreement and, secondly, the disappearance 
of Brazil's huge coffee surplus removed the persistent market 
surplus over demand. (22) The fourth International Tin Agreement 
was concluded in 1970 but the consuming countries refused to 
contribute to its financing. The 1967 International Grains Arrange-
ment was replaced in 1971 by an International Wheat Agreement which 
had no price control provisions. Within the FAO informal export 
quota schemes were agreed by the tea producers in 1969 and sub-
sequently renewed. Efforts to conclude an International Cocoa 
Agreement in pursuance of Resolution 16 (II) were unsuccessful and 
immediately prior to Santiago, the first session of the U.N. Cocoa 
Conference in March 1972 ended in failure not even the incentive of 
having a positive outcome for the forthcoming UNCTAD conference 
being sufficient to reconcile the national positions. Nevertheless, 
in September of that year agreement was reached at the second 
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session on an International Cocoa Agreement with a three year life 
span beginning from October 1973. 
With the background of slow progress and Minimal gain, the G77 
in Santiago continued to press forzmich the same kind of package as 
they had presented in Geneva. This time there was a greater stress 
on access to markets and trade liberalisation measures reflecting 
the concerns of the Latin American group. At the second Ministerial 
Meeting of the G77 in Lima, Peru (28 October - 7 November, 1971) the 
Declaration and Principles of the Action Programme of Lima had 
adopted wide ranging recommendations concerning commodity problems 
and policies, (23) which produced a compromise between the demands 
of the African group for ICAs and the Latin Americans for improved 
market access. The commodity debate at UNCTAD III could not rise 
above the acrimony which pervaded the entire conference. The de-
veloped countries were unwilling to go beyond the consensus reached 
in September, 1970 at the TDB. Although five resolutions (24) 
 concerning commodity trade were passed they hardly represented a 
consensus (25)  and could not really be taken to indicate that action 
would follow. Resolutions on access to markets, pricing policy, 
price stabilization measures, the mechanism and effectiveness of 
existing ICAs showed how little progress had been achieved since1964. 
The UNCTAD Secretary-General felt that, 
"The reasons for this general lack of progress may 
be traced to the inherent complexity of many primary 
commodity markets, the nature of existing inter-
governmental machinery and the lack of political 
will on the part of interested governments." (26) 
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Whatever the reasons, this sense of failure is important when 
assessing the proposal to create an Integrated Programme, the de-
veloping countries support for such a scheme and the history of 
the subsequent negotiations. On the other hand during this period 
many studies and reviews had been implemented increasing knowledge 
of the workings of individual commodity markets; there had been 
increased consultation with FAO; UNCTAD had increased its sphere of 
competence in this field; (27)  there was increasing awareness of 
problems connected with ldc commodity trade; and there had been a 
minimal revision of international law and the acceptance of new 
principles. The Havana Charter provisions no longer guided inter-
national discussion and it was agreed that ICAs had a role to play 
in development policies. Onapractical level the IMF now provided 
financial assistance for buffer stock financing. 
7.2. Economic Analysis and the Commodity Debate  
The attitudes of countries and the positions they adopt to 
the reform of the international political economy is based to a 
large extent on thdr economic analysis of the relevant subject 
matter. Economics, many aaimq to the contrary, notwithstanding, is 
not and cannot be a value-free science. The conclusions reached as 
a result of economic reasoning is based on a number of stated and 
unstated assumptions. In the field of international political 
economy, no subject is more subject to controversy, conflicting 
research findings, inadequate methodologies and a general paucity of 
research as commodity policy. Subsequently, when the Integrated 
Programme was launched by the UNCTAD Secretariat, a fierce polemic 
arose between supporters and defenders of the scheme based in 
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large part on ignorance and prejudice. By the time an agreement 
was reached on the Common Rind in June 1980 a voluminous literature 
had been created in support of various positions in the debate. 
The existence of these conflicting views and the tentative state 
of much of the existing knowledge was used by many governments 
(mainly Group B) as a stalling device in the negotiations. The aim 
of this section is not to reproduce the argument between defenders 
and opponents of the IPC but to look closely at the competing theories, 
methodologies and research results in order to establish the 
intellectual uncertainty which was an important environmental 
variable circumscribing the negotiating process. The creation of an 
IPC was essentially a political problem but economics set the 
parameters to what could be done since ceteris paribus, no state 
would consciously establish an institution that would be unworkable, 
expensive and inefficient. (28) Doubts over the economics of 
commodity policy and specifically the IPC affected the negotiations 
throughout their history and at different levels. 
The analysis will proceed in two stages. First, the con-
flicting perspectives on the problems faced by developing countries 
as exporters of primary commodities and the objectives of 
stabilisation and other Irma of commodity arrangements will be 
discussed. Secondly, the adversarial positions taken in respect 
of the IPC proposals and the supporting economic arguments will be 
examined. For reasons of space it will not be possible to discuss 
many of the arguments advanced or to look in any depth at the 
technical issues in this very complex subject. These omissions, it 
is hoped, will not seriously affect the argument since the object 
is not to assess the merits and demerits of various theories but 
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rather to show the effect of these disagreements on the political 
process. 
There is no generally agreed definition of what consitutes a 
primary commodity. But all definitions whether statistical (e.g. 
SITC classification) or not stress that they are natural products 
produced by agriculture or extracted by mining and including some 
element of processing. (29)  The extent of processing varies accord-
ing to the country and product but for most commodities conventions 
exist which define the stage at which they cease to be primary 
products. The classification of commodities, also does not conform 
to any generally accepted usage. Primary commodities have been 
classified according to the geographical location of production 
(wholly or mainly in developed or developing countries); the nature 
of international competition (whether they face competition from 
synthetics and/or substitutes); climatic zone (temperate or tropical 
products); market access (protection in developed countries' markets); 
whether they are farmed or mined; whether they are renewable or 
non-renewable; and whether they are foodstuffs or raw materials. (30) 
This analytical complexity is reinforced by empirical reality 
where contrary to popular opinion it is not the developing countries 
which are the main exporters of primary commodities but the 
developed countries. The developing countries share of primary 
commodity exports is only some 40 per cent in total and under 
30 per cent if fuels are excluded. In the postwar period the 
developing countries share of total world exports of primary 
commodities has declined steadily (excluding fuel from 36% 
in 1960 to 24% in 1975). The identification of developing countries 
with raw material exports arises from the concentration of their 
export earnings in this sector. They depend for over three- 
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quarters of their export earnings on such products, the majority 
of which are exported to rich country markets, hence creating 
another form of dependence. Apart from these two types of 
dependence many developing countries also depend heavily on one or 
two export crops for the majority of their foreign exchange 
receipts. The low share of developing countries in primary exports 
is put into a different perspective, however, when their market 
share of products of major export interest is taken into account. 
Table 7.2 shows the market share of 35 primary commodities of 
major interest to developing countries. As can be seen, the 
developing countries achieve over 50 per cent concentration in 23 
products, and of the twelve most important, their export share is 
only less than 50 per cent in two cases (iron ore and rice). The 
products with low market share are mainly from the temperate zone 
e.g. wheat, wool, beef and maize. 
This cursory glance at the starting points for an economic 
analyis of international commodity policy reveals the analytical 
and empirical difficulties in a multi-commodity and multi-country 
world. Generalizations concerning the experience of developing 
countries as primary commodity exporters and the effects of this 
dependence on domestic economic activity is unlikely to meet with 
general agreement and it follows that international policy pre-
scriptions will also be the subject of disagreement. 
The IPC proposals were based on the general principle of 
producer-consumer cooperation thus rejecting any cartel-like action. 
The broad objectives were the promotion of orderly conditions in 
commodity trade in respect of prices and volume of trade; the 
reduction in the export earning fluctuations of ldcs; increased 
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Table 7.2  
Primary Commodities of Major Interest to Developing Countries  
1967-69 Averages  
(Percentages) 
Commodity 	Commodity Share ppvelo.pl cAlyntry elmagignilgts 	or .1 .r sor ,,s 
Petroleum 
Coffee 
Copper 
Sugar 
Raw Cotton 
Rubber 
Iron Ore 
33.09 
5.62 
5.69 
3.65 
3.17 
2.34 
1.99 
76.04 
94.37 
56.44 
75.31 
57.07. 
72.28 
39.41 
Cocoa Beans 1.59 100.00 Timber 1.57 87.92 Tin 1.37 80.71 Tea 1.28 82.55 Rice 1.22 43.09 Bananas 1.16 95.35 Maize 0.98 26.39 Beef 0.86 26.09 Tobacco 0.70 21.99 Fishmeal 0.55 60.04 Wool 0.54 13.72 Phosphate Rock 0.54 60.15 Hides and Skins 0.53 30.65 Groundnuts 0.52 81.99 Copra 0.50 99.07 Bauxite 0.45 79.61 Wheat 0.41 4.22 Jute 0.38 93.81 Zinc 0.33 23.38 Silver 0.32 23.56 Lead 0.28 27.02 Coconut Oil 0.28 79.56 Groundnut Oil 0.25 81.99 Manganese Ore 0.24 60.49 Palm Oil 0.23 82.76 Sisal 0.18 96.24 Linseed Oil 0.07 65.84 Abaca 0.04 98.92 
Total 35 Commodities 72.80 60.10 
Other LDC Exports 27.20 5.93 
Total 100.00 100.00 
§ource: 
.T. Thoburn - Primary Commodity Exports and Economic Development 
(London:John Wiley & Sons 1977) Table 1.3. p.6 
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market access in devioped countries for the primary and processed 
products exports of ldcs; and adequate growth in the real commodity 
export returns of individual ides. (31)  In relation to commodity 
arrangements seven specific objectives were enumerated - (i) re-
duction of excessive fluctuations in commodity prices and supplies 
(ii) establishment and maintenance of prices remunerative to 
producers and equitable to consumers (iii)improvements of access to 
supply for importing countries (iv) improved market access 
(v) expansion of processing of commodities in developing countries 
(vi)improved competitiveness of natural products vis-a-vis 
synthetics (vii) improved food aid provisions. The two key 
objectives can be seen as price stabilization to diminish fluctua-
tions and price increases above the long term trend to improve real 
income. The UNCTAD scheme aimed at price stabilisation rather than 
revenue stabilisation and this immediately raised doubts concerning 
its efficacy. Elementary economic analysis shows that stabilisation 
of price and stabilisation of revenue are not commensurate and can 
in fact be opposed objectives. Price stabilisation may destabilise 
revenue or may lead to revenue stabilisation at the cost of a 
reduction in revenue. This is not a question that can be settled 
by theory, it is an essentially empirical issue depending on the 
shape of the demand and supply curves, risk aversion, elasticities 
and the causes and nature of the shifts i.e. multiplicative or 
additive. (32)  Price stabilisation would not lead to income 
stabilisation if competition increased or higher prices led to 
substitution. The costs and benefits of price stabilisation to con-
sumers and producers can be calculated using different approaches. (33) 
According to the Waugh-Hassell-Oi Theory producers will benefit from 
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price stabilisation if the origin of the price fluctuations is 
variations in supply, consumers will lose in this case. Conversely, 
consumers will gain from price stabilisation in cases where it is 
demand fluctuations which cause prices to vary and producers will 
lose. The costs and benefits of price stabilisation can also be 
calculated by considering the moderation of the rate of inflaction, 
the stabilisation of macro-economic activity, the gains as a result 
of risk-aversion and greater effidency of production. (34) Recent 
analysis (35) which considers multiplicative and additive disturb-
ances in the supply function arrive at varying conclusions 
depending on the technical assumptions made, thus highlighting the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding any conclusions concerning the 
welfare effects of price stabilisation measures. 
There is one issue in this jungle of assumptions, methodolgies, 
computer simulations and research findings on which all serious 
economists are agreed. Attempts to increase prices above the long-
term trend are bound to fail because consumers will turn to 
substitutes. It might be possible to have short-run success in 
commodities that are demand inelastic but even here the welfare and 
equity implications argue against adopting such a strategy. As the 
OPEC example so clearly demonstrates some Third World importers will 
suffer economic losses. Of course this depends from the global 
welfare point of view on the importance of the commodity in world 
trade and on the share of developed and developing countries as 
import markets. From the perspective of individual developing 
countries hurt suffered is dependent on thdr import dependence. 
The goals of price stabilisation and price augmentation are 
based on an analysis of developing countries trade problems arising 
from their export dependence on primary commodities which 
identifies instability of export earnings and declining terms of 
trade as the major defects which need to be remedied. The meaning, 
nature and economic implications (for development) of these two 
concepts became the subject of heated theoretical and empirical 
debates reflecting the tentative state of knowledge in this area. 
Some of the controversy surrounding the terms of trade debate were 
raised in Chapter 3 when Prebisch's report to UNCTAD I was examined 
and a familiarity with these issues will be assumed in the dis-
cussion which follows. Stated simply, the terms of trade refer to 
the exchange of commodities or the 'price' in physical terms of one 
good for another. There are three conceptions of the terms of trade 
and seven different measurement indices. The gross barter, net 
barter and income terms of trade relate to the ratio of exchange 
between commodities, the single-factoral and double-factoral terms 
of trade measure the interchange between productive resources and 
the real cost and utility terms of trade interpret the gains from 
trade in terms of utility analysis. Results tend to vary depending 
upon which measurement is used and, in so far as one indice might 
show a deterioration in terms of trade and another an improvement 
over the same time period, there is widespread disagreement amongst 
economists aboitthe usefulness of any data collected. (36)  The 
factual evidence is also open to dispute and at best can be called 
inconclusive. Rangarajan (37) concluded that the facts do indicate 
a downward trend in the terms of trade of developing countries and 
Behrman (38) found that for the UNCTAD core commodities and others 
of interest to developing countries there was a negative secular 
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trend in prices between 1950-1975. Paul Bairoch, on the other hand, 
in an analysis of the period 1948-1970 found that a marked fall in 
the terms of trade was a phenomenon limited mainly to the period 
1952-62 and concluded that the evidence did not support the thesis 
of a long-run deterioration in ldc terms of trade. (39) A Group 
of Experts convened by the UNCTAD Secretary-General came to a 
similar conclusion. (40) The healthy scepticism felt by most 
economists on this issue is clearly expressed by John Spaos who 
concluded a survey article with the opinion that, 
ft .... though the relative price of the developing 
countries' primary products has had its ups and 
downs since the war, it has on average done quite 
well by the standard of pre-second-war decades, 
even when petroleum is excluded as a special case 
since 1973. So, while the deteriorating tendency 
cannot be decisively refuted, it is open to doubt 
when the record up to the 1970s is taken into 
account." (41) 
Traditionally it was thought that primary commodities were 
significantly more unstable than manufactures and that for 
countries heavily dependent on primary commodities for their export 
earnings, such instability hindered long-range planning of invest-
ment both in the public and private seders. By the time the IPC 
was formulated this pessimism has been challenged by a number of 
studies and there were, broadly speaking, two schools of thought on 
the problem of export instability. Three key questions can be 
identified - does instability exist? i.e. do developing countries 
experience larger fluctuations in their export earnings than 
developed countries?; what are the causes of instability?; and does 
instability matter? i.e. is it detrimental to economic growth? 
Coppock and MScBean (42)  argued that developing countries did not 
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experience greater instability than developed countries. Using data 
for the period 1946-58, Coppock's export revenue instability index 
showed that primary proceeds were not more unstable and the difference 
in price instability between primary and manufactured goods was 
insignificant. MacBean rejected the identification of deVeloping 
countries with primary producers and concluded that the 30 per cent 
difference in instability experienced by developing countries was 
not significant. These conclusions have been challenged by a number 
of later studies which, using avvariety of indices, different time 
periods and assessing a wide range of effects (export prices, 
quantities and proceeds), have found the export instability of 
developing countries to be more than twice as high as that of 
developed countries. (43) Most economists would now agree with 
Thoburn's statement that, "There is little doubt that primary 
commodity markets exhibit considerably greater instability than 
those of manufactures." (44) Even greater confusion surrounds the 
causal explanation of instability. No single explanatory factor 
has been found with sufficient power to explain the phenomenon and 
to some extent this reflects the lack of definitional clarity with 
regard to the concept i.e. instability of income or export pbceeds? 
Numerous variables have been investigated including commodity 
concentration, geographic concentration, primary product dependence, 
food export dependence, raw materials dependence, country size and 
economic structure. (45) 
The variables currently thought to be of most relevance are 
the size of domestic markets, the openness of the economy and the 
relationship between aggregate export earning and earnings derived 
from particular commodities subject to high levels of instability. 
Empirical research on the effects of export instability has also 
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produced inconclusive findings. Proponents of the view that in-
stability matters stress the damaging effects on domestic investment, 
consumer incomes and government revenue and expenditure inhibiting 
orderly long-term patterns of investment and reducing real per capita 
income growth. A variety of inter-country and country studies have 
been undertaken to test these hypotheses. Support for the pessimistic 
case has been provided by Glezakos who found that real per capita 
grwoth of GDP and the rate of growth of exports were negatively 
affected by instability. (46) Kenen and Voivodas discovered a 
strong inverse relationship between levels of investment and export 
instability. (47) MacBeants study found no significant relationship 
between export instability and economic growth finding no relation-
ship between fluctuating proceeds and national income, investment, 
prices or foreign exchange reserves but a positive relationship 
with imports. (48) Knudsen and Parnes actually found a positive 
relationship between instability, levels of investment and economic 
growth. (49) The relationship then between export instability and 
overall economic activity and/or an important domestic variable is 
not clear from the available evidence. And, of course, countries 
can suffer adverse effects even if domestic variables are left 
untouched e.g. the competitiveness of their exports could suffer in 
relation to substitutes with more stable prices. 
The inconclusiveness and contradictory nature of these 
findings is due to poor theoretical formulation and inadequate 
methodologies. Wilson, in his survey of export instability theory, 
argues that the failure to specify the transmission mechanism 
envisaged and to link this with testable structural and behavioural 
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hypotheses sufficiently grounded in economic theory especially the 
theory of choice under uncertainty, results in serious shortcomings. (50 
In his survey of the empirical work he notes the problems of 
comparison inherent in using highly aggregative cross-section 
meirdology and suggests greater disaggregation. The casual adoption 
of instability indexes, failure to link the empirical work strongly 
enough with economic theory and crude quantative methods contribute 
to the ambiguity surrounding the concept. (51)  These criticisms, I 
would contend, have a wider relevance to the enter commodity debate 
and are not specific to analyses of instability. 
Support or Opposition to the IPC was based in large part on 
analysis of the terms of trade and export instability but it was also 
based on an examination of the specific proposals. Once again 
the aim is not to discuss these issues in any depth but rather to 
highlight the different conclusions reached by economic analysis. 
Doubts about the economic wisdom of a particular course of action 
affected the degree of support forthcoming. The costs and benefits 
of instituting the UNCTAD programme were relevant to the 
negotiating process. As the debate progressed different arguments 
were discussed at different times. It is not the aim of this 
section to rehearse the debate but rather to concentrate on what 
are perceived to have been the most important lines of economic 
reasoning discussed. For these purposes the Integrated Programme 
can be though of as containing four main elements - the integrated 
approach, the Common Fund, buffer stocking and 'Second Window' 
measures. 
It was argued that a Common Fund was necessary in order to 
generate financial savings given the negotiation of a series of 
ICAs. This would be accomplished through offset savings if the 
stockable commodities moved in variance. Behrman's computation of 
the correlation coeffecients of the ten core commodities supported 
the idea of a Common Fund (C.F.) since he found that less than a 
third were significantly positively correlated over the period 
1954-72. (52) It was also hoped that the C.F. would be able to 
attract investors, command better borrowing terms and play a 
catalytic role in the conclusion of commodity agreements. In 
respect of the latter point it was held by many that, "the 
greatest constraint on the operation of buffer stock schemes has 
been the high cost to the producing countries of financing the stock- 
(53) funds". 	Critics argued that the 'offset' savings would be 
dependent on the number and type of commodities 	 (54) odities stocked 	and 
the provision of a C.F. would generate unnecessary buffer stocks. 
The UNCTAD Secretariat's estimate of A bn. capital funding 
was universally dismissed as being inadequate. (55) The Common Fund 
negotiating conferences were concerned with a variety of technical 
issues relating specifically to the points raised above. These 
included the source of finance for the Fund, the capital require-
ments, capital subscriptions, off-setting operations and profits 
and the use of the C.F. for activities other than buffer stock 
financing. 
The integrated approach was based on an analysis which 
stressed the failure of commodity by commodity negotiations, the 
financial gains to be had from a common source of funds and 
increased management of the market. Many critics doubted whether 
the causes of the failures both to conclude and maintain commodity 
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agreements arose from the lack of an integrated approach and 
doubted the wisdom of market intervention on this scale. Technical 
considerations of the costs and benefits of an integrated approach 
focused on attempts to calculate financial gains for both producers 
and consumers. Estimates of the effect of price stabilisation 
measures depends on the macro and micro-economic variables taken 
into account and the assumptions built into the model. It is not 
my intention to delve into these technical issues but to show the 
existence of various estimates. Paul MacAvoy and John Cuddy both 
assessed the expected annual net benefits accruing to producers and 
consumers as a result of the stabilisation of the ten core 
commodities. MacAvoy estimated producer gain at X250 m., 
consumer gain at %75 million but a net global loss $590 million 
because of storage and interest costs of %915 million. Cuddy, on 
the other hand, estimated that producers would gain %1022 million, 
consumers would gain %1097 million and there would be a net global 
benefit of %1204 million. (56) Behrman calculated that imposing 
- 15 per cent bands on prices would reduce inflationary pressure in 
the U.S. by at least 0.2 - 0.4 per cent for several years in a 
decade of operation. Such a reduction using domestic policy tools 
would lead to an increase in unemployment of between 0.03 and 0.3 
per cent which translates into a 0.1 - 0.9 per cent reduction of 
GNP. The gain for the U.S. economy (if the middle of the range is 
taken) was calculated at %e - 9 bn. for 1975 and %15 bn. for the 
decade at the most conservative estimate. (57)  According to 
these estimates the major beneficiaries from the IPC would be 
consumers in developed countries! 
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In the IPC proposals buffer stocking was frequently mentioned 
as the most appropriate instrument for market control in that it 
was more flexible, intervened less with the market, was more easily 
negotiable and was capable of covering a wider range of commodities 
than either of the other two types of commodity agreements - 
multilateral contracts and export restriction agreements. (58)  
Critics in looking at the historical experience doubted whether 
the evidence suggested that buffer stock operations had been 
successful in the past. The only agreement with any degree of 
success was the International Tin Agreement and wren here the success 
was a higly qualified one. (59) Doubts were expressed concerning 
how many commodities were capable of being stocked. The World 
Bank and OECD thought that only five commodities (coffee, cocoa, 
copper, tin and rubber) were good candidates with sugar, tea, 
cotton and tin as possible candidates. The EEC doubted the 
possibility of buffer stocking jute, hard fibres, tea and rubber. (60) 
The technical aspects of buffer stocking - the prediction of price 
trends, consumer-producer conflict over the determination of 
ceiling and floor prices, the relationship between the buffer 
stock and national stocks and the relationship between buffer 
stocking and instability - raised questions to which there were no 
conclusive answers. 
A wide variety of "other measures" which subsequently became 
'integrated' under the Second Window were envisaged. These high-
lighted diversification, increasing productivity, supply management, 
promotional measures, transport and marketing improvements and 
compensatory finance. These activities are distinguished by a 
low-rate of return and long-term lending requirements. In the 
light of this it was not these measures per se which were 
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criticised but the source and size of the financing requirements 
and given the cost the allocation of priorities among them. (61) 
This discussion of economic analysis and the commodity debate 
has been concerned with outlining the various controversies and 
differing interpretations of ldc trade problems and international 
arrangements for commodity trade. No attempt has been made to 
assess the merits of the various arguments partly because this is 
widely available in the literature and partly because considerations 
of space does not permit the dtailed technical discussion which would 
be necessary but such discussion has been excluded mainly because 
the aim of the section was to establish the existence of competing 
perspectives, the inconclusiveness of economic research and the 
wide range and complexity of issues involved. This was done 
because the contention is that economic analysis did not present a 
ready-made set of answers to which governments and policy-makers 
could turn but was itself an integral part of the attempt to create 
an IPC. How governments and bureaucrats supported their case, the 
use they made of evidence and skill in refuting economic arguments 
was an important feature of the detate. We have shown that it was 
unlikely that any particular proposal would attain widespread 
support given the state of economic knowledge. Moreover, the 
political response of concerned pressure groups tended to provide 
support for analysis hostile to the IPC. (62)  The intellectual 
support for most of the G77 demands came from the UNCTAD 
Secretariat and their failure to be sufficiently aware of and 
respond creatively to academic critics of their proposals strongly 
influenced the course of the negotiations. (63)  Certain under-
lying issues viz. the conflict over the market principle and equity 
considerations have not been discussed because, although relevant 
to a general discussion of this topic, they do not seem germane to 
the thrust of the analysis. 
7.3. Cleavages  
This section will examine the specific cleavages which existed 
in the G77 in relation to the IPC. The cohesion of the group was 
dependent on its ability to suppress the effects of these 
cleavages. The aim therefore is to provide a clot outline of 
situational variables of crucial importance to the bargaining process. 
The significant ascriptive traits relate to the role of a country 
as a producer or consumer of the commodities included in the 
Integrated Programme (and any benefits they might gain from 
Second Window activities). Positions within specific commodity 
markets, share of world production and efficiency (and cost) of 
production are key variables. The net costs and benefits of the 
IPC to a particular developing country and levels of development 
are important considerations. The important attitudinal traits 
relate to (a) the perception of whether the IPC as a whole is 
beneficial to a particular country and, if not, the extent to 
which political gains outweigh economic losses (b) the perception 
of the working of specific commodity markets of particular interest 
to the country concerned and views concerning future market 
arrangments. The most salient behavioural traits are related to 
the use made of organisational membership outside the UNCTAD 
framework e.g. producer associations, commodity agreements on 
trade 'systems' and to behaviour within the bargaining process. 
Once again we recognise an element of overlap but reiterate tie 
analytical separation between material conditions (ascriptive), 
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perceptual process (attitudinal) and actions (behavioural). The 
large number of countries, multiplicity of commodities and wide 
range of market conditions (mainly free, protected or distorted, 
closed, partly open and partly closed and oligopolistic buyer) (64) 
 do not determine the degree of fractionalisation or cohesion of the 
G77 but condition the outcome. 
The potential benefit of the Integrated Programme to a 
developing country can be assessed by examining the counttyls 
overall balance of trade in the commodities covered by the scheme. 
The trial effect of the IPC was not the only important consideration 
to governments, however, since as producers of particular commodities 
they had specific interests which would dictate attitudes to the 
scheme whatever the overall calculation suggested. It is obvious 
that the IPC could not provide positive gains for all developing 
countries. A significant ascriptive trait from the outset, then 
related to the expected gains or losses from the operation of the 
scheme and the size of the gain or loss. The impact of the inte- 
grated programme was dependent on the commodity coverage, (65)  
techniques of regulation, other measures and financing. An early 
UNCTAD aulysis (before Nairobi) covering 100 developing countries 
for the 1970-72 period showed that 20 of these countries were net 
importers i.e. potential losers. Of these countries 13 had high 
incomes or enjoyed fast growth in their export earnings; the 
remaining 7 were small food-deficit countries. Of the countries 
that stood to gain 60 had a higher than 3:1 ratio of exports to 
(66) imports in the relevant commodities. 	The category of net 
importer was not a static one since the calculations are based on 
moving averages. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties surrounding 
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such an exercise i,e. the tentative nature of the statistical data, 
and the lack of comprehensive treatment, we will examine the diffe-
rential impact of the integrated programme on the G77 by looking 
at some calculations made by the UNCTAD Secretariat in 1976. See 
Table 7.3. 
This breakdown of the impact of the IPC on G77 member states 
shows that only 24 out of the 113 for which data was availble would 
suffer a negative impact hence there was a substantial majority which 
stood to benefit. Certain surprising features emerge and show again 
the danger of relying solely on trait cleavage (heterogeneity) 
to predict the behaviour of the G77. Brazil And India were among 
the main beneficiaries, indeed Brazil stood to gain the most, and 
yet both countries adopted conservative and lukewarm attitudes to 
the Integrated Programme. Although this is to some extent 
explained by the fact that Table 7.3 is very crude and unsophisti-
cated (67) and does not for instance include the effect on economies 
of a rise in food prices (a likely consequence of the Integrated 
Programme) an event of great importance to a food importing 
developing country like India id does provide preliminary 
evidence on which positions could be formulated. Secondly, it is 
interesting that Malta and Romania both net importers joined the 
Group of 77 after the beginning of the IPC dialogue. Thirdly, the 
division along regional lines expressed particularly in bargaining 
over the C.F. cannot be predicted from this table. Given the 
dmportance of regional groups within the structure and functioning 
of the G77 the regional group with the largest number of 'losers' 
would be expected to be the least receptiveia the proposals. Of 
the 24 'disadvantaged' states, 18 were in the Asian group, 4 in 
the African group and only 2 in the Latin American group. 
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Table 7.3 
Trade in 18 'Nairobi' commodities: exports, imports and net exports by country. (1970- 1973 average)  
Country 
Value of 
exports of the 
18 products 
(0 million) 
(1) 
Percentage of 
exports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total exports 
(2) 
Value of 
imports of the 
18 products 
(0 million) 
(3 ) 
Percentage of 
imports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total imports 
(4) 
Net 
exports 
(% million) 
(5)=(1)-(3) 
Brazil 2 601.3 65.72 164.4 3.59 2 436.9 
Malaysia 1 517.2 70.94 144.4 1 372.8 
Philippines 995.7 75.25 47.6 3.20 948.1 
Zambia 843.6 94.23 18.4 3.43 825.2 
Indonesia 795.7 43.4o 41.2 2.58 754.5 
Chile 843.5 78.81 121.0 . 12.24 722.5 
Cuba 760.2 82.16 70.6 5.21 689.6 
India 932.9 39.63 292.8 11.90 640.1 
Zaire 633. 4 81.62 8.9 1.40 624.5 
Columbia 580.0 67.17 24.5 2.65 555.5 
Ivory Coast 459.5 78.72 15.5 3.19 444.0 
Peru 458.4 46.7o 29.4 3.69 429.0 
Mexico 460.1 24.93 71.6 2.51 388.5 
Nigeria 399.5 19.63 32.4 2.18 367.1 
Argentina 568.5 26.08 221.1 11.48 347.4 
Egypt 418.7 47.95 110.8 12.62 307.9 
Ghana 323.2 74.90 22.0 5.56 301.2 
Thailand 308.1 29.67 41.7 2.73 266.4 
Bangladesh 341.0 92.98 76.6 11.63 264.4 
Uganda 253.1 90.72 4.6 2.47 248.5 
Table 7.3 (cont'd)  
Trade in 18 'Nairobi' commodities: exports, imports and net exports by country. (1970-1973 average)  
Value of 
exports of the 
18 products 
(% million) 
Percentage of 
exports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total exports 
Value of 
imports of the 
18 products 
(0 million) 
Percentage of 
imports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total imports 
Net 
exports 
(% million) 
Country (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5).(1)-(3) 
Angola 252.2 47.27 5.6 1.30 246.6 
Sri Lanka 280.1 81.84 42.1 11.37 238.0 
Sudan 285.3 80.48 52.2 16.25 233.1 
Liberia 231.5 92.60 2.0 1.17 229.5 
Dominican 
Republic 217.9 69.90 18.8 5.57 199.1 
Guatemala 201.2 58.70 4.5 1.34 196.7 
Ecuador 200.2 59.27 9.0 2.46 191.2 
Costa Rica 194.0 72.05 9.2 2.51 184.8 
Cameroon 177. 4 70.40 2.9 1.03 174.5 El Salvador 166.7 58.49 4.6 1.65 162.1 
Venezuela 198.7 5.81 42.5 2.09 156.2 
Honduras 156.1 78.44 2.0 0.92 154.1 
Papua New Guinea 161.2 66.20 7.2 2.46 154.0 
Nicaragua 155.2 70.63 2.2 0.92 153.0 
Bolivia 132.6 61.60 1.4 0.80 131.2 
Tanzania 143.6 46.89 13.0 3.26 130.6 
Jamaica 143.8 39.29 21.6 3.64 122.2 
Ethiopia 101.9 62.71 3.6 1.89 98.3 
Gabon 97.4 49.25 2.4 2.01 95.0 
Kenya 128.0 35.19 33.1 6.14 94.9 
Table 7.3 (cont'd)  
Trade in 18 'Nairobi' commodities: exports, imports and net exports by country. (1970-1973 average)  
Country 
Value of 
exports of the 
18 products 
(0 million) 
(1 ) 
Percentage of 
exports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total exports 
(2) 
Value of 
imports of the 
18 products 
(% million) 
(3) 
Percentage of 
imports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total imports 
(4) 
exports 
(% million) 
(5)=(1)-(3) 
Guyana 93.5 66.31 1.6 1.11 91.9 
Mauretania 97.8 88.71 7.0 8.97 91.8 
Mozambique 92.1 51.52 5.2 1.43 86.9 
Mauritius 87.7 94.05 4.4 3.92 83.3 
Senegal 95.3 55.41 20.7 7.88 74.6 
Panama 74.o 60.16 5.5 1.30 68.o 
Madagascar 69.3 42.06 2.4 1.22 66.9 
Uruguay 93.5 38.36 36.1 15.09 57.4 
Syria 100.1 38.21 48.4 9.91 51.7 
Morocco 178.4 29.19 127.4 16.09 51.0 
Togo 49.3 91.72 2.1 2.62 47.2 
Burma 48.7 40.08 2.2 1.39 46.5 
Paraguay 45.9 53.68 0.3 0.39 45.6 
Fiji 46.6 64.95 2.6 1.75 44.0 
Surinam 38.8 24.36 2.8 2.07 36.o 
Tunisia 82.8 30.32 50.3 11.75 32.5 
Benin 33.7 81.20 2.2 2.54 3 1 .5 
Haiti 34.7 76.69 3.3 5.30 31.4 
Congo 30.0 66.30 0.5 0.64 29.5 
Sierra Leone 35.0 31.11 5.8 4.57 29.2 
Zimbabwe 35.9 7.58 8.5 2.02 27.4 
Table 7.3 (cont'd)  
Trade in 18 'Nairobi' commodities: exports, imports and net exports by country. (1970-1973 average)  
Value of 	Percentage of 	Value of 	Percentage of 	Net 
exports of the exports of the 	imports of the imports of the 	exports 
18 products 	18 products in 	18 products 	18 products in 	(% million) 
(0 million) the country's (% million) 	the country's 
total exports total imports 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(3) 
Malawi 27.9 35.77 1.9 1.63 26.o 
Equatorial Guinea 25.4 88.35 0.2 0.67 25.2 
Pakistan 122.7 15.99 98.2 11.54 24.5 
Burundi 23.7 98.75 0.6 2.18 23.1 
Central African 
Republic 20.5 58.99 1.4 3.66 19.1 
Niger 21.8 47.14 3.0 4.55 18.8 
Trinidad & Tobago 31.6 5.57 13.4 1.95 18.2 
Rwanda 18.4 75.88 0.5 1.60 17.9 
Chad 22.9 67.85 5.7 8.54 17.2 Gambia 15.8 85.41 1.0 4.21 14.8 
Mali 20.1 61.37 8.0 11.51 12.1 
Botswana 10.9 26.91 2.3 2.93 8.6 
Barbados 15.0 33.71 8.4 6.10 6.6 
Sao Tome 7.0 87.50 0.4 4.57 6.6 
Swaziland 6.4 7.42 0.4 0.56 6.0 
Mongolia 1.3 - 6.7 - 5.4 
Somalia 10.8 27.69 5.9 8.22 4.9 Nepal 7.2 20.72 2.5 4.81 4.7 
Laos 5,1 97.14 0.8 1.08 4.3 
Dominica 4.2 0.6 - 3.6 
Table 7.3 (cont'd)  
Trade in 18 'Nairobi' commodities: exports, imports and net exports by country. (1970-1973 average)  
Value df 
exports of the 
18 products 
($ million) 
Percentage of 
exports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total exports 
Value of 
imports of the 
18 products 
($ million) 
Percentage of 	Net 
imports of the exports 
18 products in 	(% million) 
the country's 
total imports 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(3) 
Upper Volta 7.9 41 .04 4.5 7.79 3.4 
Samao 4.4 76.52 1.4 8.00 3.0 
Grenada 3.2 0.8 2.4 
St. Vincent 2.7 0.5 2.2 
Afghanistan 15.9 15.40 14.1 8.56 1.8 
Tonga 1.9 63.33 0.7 8.48 1.2 
Comoros o.8 14.55 0.2 1.78 0.6 
Bhutan 0.3 0.1 0.2 
Maldives 0.3 9.23 - 0.3 
Kampuchea 5.8 26.67 6.2 7.52 - 0.4 
Djibouti 0.8 1.52 - 0.8 
Cape Verde 0.3 2.55 1.8 7.66 - 1.3 
Cyprus 18.8 13.43 20.0 6.36 - 2.2 
Qatar 2.4 1.90 2.4 
Bahrain 1.5 0.51 6.5 1.80 - 5.0 
Democratic Yemen 6.2 5.24 11.4 6.72 - 5.2 
Yemen 2.8 58.95 8.7 12.79 - 5.9 Bahamas 6.5 2.12 13.6 2.6o - 7.1 Jordan 9.4 21.86 19.0 7.59 - 9.6 Malta 0.3 0.48 12.4 6.73 -12.1 
0 • • 
Table 7.3 (cont'd)  
Trade in 18 'Nairobi' commodities: exports, imports and net exports by country. (1970 -i973 average)  
Country 
Value of 
exports of the 
18 products 
(0 million) 
(1) 
Percentage of 
exports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total exports 
(2) 
Value of 
imports of the 
18 products 
($ million) 
(3) 
Percentage of 
imports of the 
18 products in 
the country's 
total imports 
(4) 
Net 
exports 
(% million) 
(5)=(1)-(3) 
Kuwait 8.2 0.38 26.2 3.37 - 18.1 
Singapore 159.0 6.99 179.1 8.26 - 20.1 
Romania 239. 4 9.34 267.5 10.54 -. 28.1 Korea, Dem. 
People's Rep. 7.5 44.1 - 36.6 
Iran 74.7 2.03 117.9 5.05 - 43.2 
Lebanon 5.0 ' 	1.44 51.3 5.99 - 46.3 
Saudi Arabia 53.9 4.69 - 53.9 Libya 0.5 0.02 74.8 7.3o - 74.3 
Iraq 0.5 0.05 100.4 14.27 - 99.9 
Algeria 26.2 2.22 141.2 9.11 
Yugoslavia 291.5 13.29 409.4 11.55 -117.9 
Korea, Republic of 16.9 1.00 362.6 13.05 -345.7 
Source: UNCTAD, Impact of Integrated Programme for Commodities (internal memorandum), October 1976, 
reproduced in Helen O'Neill - A Common Interest in a Common Fund (New York: United Nations, 1977). 
Conversely 4 of the 10 top beneficiaries were Latin American 
countries yet the Latin American Group was not very supportive of 
the idea. (68)  This perverse result shows the limitation of 
relying solely on aggregative data and the necessity to take 
perceptions, existing patterns of organisational behaviour and 
links with extra-UNCTAD groups and organisations into account. 
The Latin American group adopted a more reserved position to the 
IFC negotiations than the Asian group an outcome based on the 
strong reservations held by some leading members of the group 
e.g. Brazil and Colombia to many features of the proposal and yet 
as Table 7.3 shows the most disadvantaged members of the group were 
Romania and the Bahamas, one a tangential member of the group and 
neither capable of exercising strong influence within group decision-
making. On the other hand some leading members of the Asian group 
e.g. Yugoslavia, Iran, Singapore and Saudi Arabia were potential 
losers. Algeria and Libya, although influential members of the 
African group were not likely to affect group policy significantly 
since they represented a very small constituency. The weak con-
clusions derived from Table 7.3 points the way to a consideration 
of other significant traits. 
The contribution of the ten core commodities to total export 
earnings provides another basis on which support for the pogramme 
could be built. It has been calculated (69) that for 8 countries 
the ten core commodities accounted for more than two-thirds of 
their earnings. In declining magnitude - Zambia, Mauritius, Uganda, 
Bangladesh, Rwanda, Chile, Zaire and Sri Lanka. And for a 
further twenty-two countries, more than one-third of their export 
value - Dominican Republic, Ghana, Cameroon, Sudan, Guatemala, 
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Bolivia, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Togo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, 
Malaysia, Ethiopia, Peru, Brazil, Samoa, Guyana, Madagascar, 
Tanzania, Phillippines and Syria. Almost half of these states (14) 
are members of the African group another factor behind the group's 
support for the IPC. On the other hand some heavily populated, 
non-OPEC G77 members had an export concentration in these ten 
core commodities below one-third - India, Pakistan, Mexico, Vietnam, 
Burma, Colombia, Argentina and Afghanistan. 
The lddcs constittle a cross-regional interest group within the 
G77 and push for special measures tailored to their needs in all 
global negotiations. The different levels of development of the 
G77 is in this sense an institutionalised aspect of the intra-
group bargaining process and an explicitly recognised trait 
cleavage. The lddcs interest was twofold. First, to calculate 
their interest in the 18 commodities and therefore the overall= 
impact of the integrated programme on their economies and, 
secondly, to campaign for special measures designed to meet their 
needs. (70)  One study showed a substantial interest by the 29 
lddcs in the 18 Nairobi commodities since they accounted for 56 
per cent of their total exports (44 per cent for the 10 'core' 
commodities) and 8 per cent (6 per cent for the 'core' commodities) 
of total imports (1970-75). Nine were overall net importers of 
the ten 'core' commodities but only 4 were net importers of the 18 
commodities. Five countries had substantial trade surpluses in the 
18 commodities and also had a high dependence on 2 or 3 commodities 
for the bulk of their export earnings. These countries were 
Uganda (coffee and cotton fibre), Sudan (cotton fire and ground-
nuts ), Bangladesh (jute fibre and manufactures), Tanzania (coffee 
and cotton fibre) and Ethiopia (coffee and oilseeds). The authors 
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concluded that, "Given the trade position of the least developed 
countries in the Integrated Programme for Commodities 	 it 
would appear that these countries are likely to gain relatively 
more from the operation of the Integrated Programme than any other 
group of developing countries in that many of them rely heavily 
for their export earnings on the commodities currently envisaged 
for the Programme, while the significance of their imports of 
these commodities is very minor inaggregrate". (71)  Table 7.4 
below shows the importance of the 18 commodities in the total trade 
of developing countries, thus giving an indication of the 
importance for the lddcs in relatianio other developing countries. 
At the level of commodity by commodity negotiations it is 
possible to identify two types of conflicts, one between producers 
and consumers and the second between producers. Both consumers 
and producers have similar interests in terms of the stability of 
commodity markets but very little else in common. Producers want 
to increase revenue (prices) and in the case of non-renewable 
resources to conserve stocks. Consumers want lower prices and an 
assured supply. Developing countries as specific producers or 
consumers were inevitably going to be influenced by their market 
interests. The integrated programme was launched in the wake of 
the successful OPEC price 'hike' and although this had been given 
rhetorical support by the developing countries the serious effects 
of the quadrupling of oil prices on the economies of the dl 
importing developing countries was a factor which could not be 
ignored. Although most developing countries were not significant 
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Table 7.4  
The importance of the 18 'Nairobi' commodities in the total trade  
of the developing countries by income category. (Average 1970-75)  
(US % million) 
Imports 	Exports 
18 	C. C 9,2 
SaTT:tOdl" 
'C.el imports 
410. 
10 core common- itles 
C.1 
18 cOmm- odities 
C.2 
.1 	C 2 10 core 
RTT2' 
C.3 
ot imports 
Major 
petroleum 
exporters 	655 
Fast-growing 
exporters of 
manufactures 565 
Other countries 
with p.c. income 
in 1973 above 
$400 p.a. 	767 
Countries with 
p.c. income in 
1973 between 
$200-400 p.a. 	413 
Countries With 
p.c. income in 
1973 below 0200 
(excl. hard-core 
lddcs) 	328 
Hard-core least 
developed 
countries 	245 
Total 2973 
1022 2.8 4.3 1404 2095 2.7 4.0 
1246 2.9 6.4 424 662 3.2 5.1 
1249 2.5 4.1 9277 13231 37.0 52.8 
608 3.5 5.1 3158 4962 34.3 53.9 
514 4.1 6.5 2124 2580 34.7 42.2 
308 6.0 7.5 1134 1423 44.3 55.7 
4947 3.0 5.1 17521 24953 16.2 23.1 
Notes: Excluding centrally planned economies. p.c. - per capita; 
p.a. - per annum. 
Source: Commonwealth Secretariat - The Least Developed Countries  
and the Common Fund (August 1977). 
importers of these commodities and therefore lacked bargaining 
strength they were nevertheless likely to be affected by higher 
import prices. Poi example, countries like Yugoslavia, South 
Korea and Singapore with their developing manufacturing sea= 
needed access to cheap raw materials. Similarly, Pakistan was a 
substantial importer of jute and tea. The conflict between 
producers has a theoretical and historical al dimension. 	In 
other words, in previous international commodity arrangements there 
had been conflicts of interest between developing country producers; 
and the different cost structures, market shares, bargaining 
strengths and quality of commodity made conflict likely. Of 
course, elements of cooperation are not wholly absent, no producers 
cartel or commodity agreement could ever be negotiated unless the 
competing interests are reconciled. The effect of these cleavages 
on the individual commodity negotiations will be discussed later 
but a brief introduction to the divergent interests will be given 
here. Examples of historical conflicts in various commodities 
are (i) low cost vs. high cost producers - tin (Bolivia laysia), 
copper (Papua New Guinea and the Philippines/CIPEC members), 
(ii)market share i.e. new relatively low cost producers want 
to increase their share and are resisted by older, more established 
producers - coffee (Latin Americans/Africans), tea (Asians/Africans), 
(iii)quality of product - coffee (distinctions exist between 
unwashed arabicaffirazil and Ethiopi7, mild arabicagolombia, 
other Latin Americans and Asian, robustaZif. 'ricang ); bauxite 
(a wide variety of type of ore). In the past it had not proved 
easy to conclude commodity agreements because of producer-consumer 
conflict and producer-producer disagreement. In the face of the 
historical evidence the two year deadline for the negotiation of 
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commodity agreements set by Resolution 93 (IV) seems particularly 
absurd even as a political move designed to hasten developments. 
The inconclusive nature of the economic evidence and the wide 
diversity of objective interest meant that there would be no simple 
consensus formation. The negotiating process divided as it was 
between the C.F. and the individual commodity negotiations gave 
rise to constantly shifting perceptions and changing attitudes. 
That is to say there was an element of feedback between the two 
sets of negotiations and governments could maintain some degree of 
consistency in policy or choose not to do so depending on the state 
of the negotiations. For example, a country could be very self-
interested within an individual commodity negotiation and yet play 
a 'positive' role in the C.F. negotiations. This is not just 
hypocrisy or the failure of communications but arises from the 
attempt to reconcile two competing objectives. In this instance 
economic self-interest in the commodity negotiations and diplomatic 
solidarity with the G77 in the C.F. negotiations. I will argue 
below that the high degree of politicisation of the C.F. talks 
was not only an outgrowth of the G77 decision-making structure 
but necessary to maintain the coalition. Without the solidarist 
element provided by the C.F. the G77 would have ceased to be a 
coalition as the diverse interests took precedence in the commodity 
by commodity negotiations. This is not to deny the eistence of 
conflicting perspectives on the C.F. but to argue that removing the 
C.F. from its central position (or insisting that it should be 
negotiated after the conclusion of the commodity negotiations) would 
have meant removing the collective good or its most potent symbol. 
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The attitudes of G77 members were shaped not only by the 
specific organisational context but also by wider environmental 
considerations. Brazil and India two of the most disaffected G77 
members on the IPC issue remained with the coalition because the 
unity of the G77 was politically important within the North-South 
dialogue. The IPC negotiations and intra-77 politics cannot be 
understood unless this important fact is not forgotten. The IPC 
was the centre-piece of the attempts to establish a NIEO but its 
failure did not result in the failure of attempts to get incre- 
mental/radical change in other areas. The debate begun in UNCTAD in 
1964 was finally front page (well almost) news and extended into 
other international spheres. Defection from the G77 especially when 
interests in commodities of special concern could be safeguarded 
just did not make political sense. Most G77 governments took a 
pragmatic attitude to the IPC. Strategies varied from damage 
limitation in the case of those who felt their interests threatened 
to goal maximisation in the case of those who saw the potential 
for real benefits. 
Unlike the negotiations on the GSP there was no clear division 
between countries that would benefit immediately and countries that 
would benefit in the long-term. Similarly the intensity of feeling 
aroused by vertical preferences was absent from this debate. 
Attitudes were based on perceptions of overall benefit from the 
operation of the scheme, satisfaction with existing market arrange-
ments in commodities of particular interest and importance attached 
to the unity of the G77. A further important distinction in 
attitude was the commitment of the producers of what can be termed 
'strong' commodities i.e. those of importance in international trade 
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and on which the developed countries would be prepared (or had 
already done so) to accept agreements e.g. coffee (Brazil, 
Colombia), copper (Chile, Zaire, Zambia, Peru), tin (Bolivia, 
Melayia) to include their commodities in a scheme which aided the 
the producers of 'weak' commodities e.g. tea (India, Sri Lanka), 
sisal (Tanzania). It is also instructive to remember that govern-
ments are not monolithic institutions and that foreign policy is 
often the result of bureaucratic politics. In India there was a 
conflict between the economic ministries which argued that since 
India would not gain very much from the operation of buffer stocks 
the government should not support the integrated programme and the 
foreign ministry which aware of the political value of the unity 
of the G77 and also accepting the log-rolling thesis of the 
coalition i.e. India had benefitted from the GSP, argued for public 
support of the IPC. The victory of the foreign ministry's position 
is indicated by the fact that India was one of the first countries 
to pledge a financial commitment to the Common Fluid. It remained 
true that both within governments and between governments the 
integrated programme meant "different things to different people". (-5) 
The relevance of these different perceptions and the intensity 
with which attitudes were: held will be explored later in this 
chapter. 
The attempt to create an IPC met with difficulty because many 
producers were already members of inter-governmental agreements 
which they felt .performed an adequate job and they did not want 
these organisations to be brought under UNCTAD's umbrella. There 
were also various consultative groups and cartels the existence of 
which showed conflicting producer government aims and vales. In 
other words governments exhibited a variety of modes of behaviour 
within the international political economy of commodities and an 
integrated programme was in direct conflict with various vested 
interests. Before the Nairobi resolution ECAs existed for tin, 
coffee and cocoa. The 1968 sugar agreement had lapsed in 1973 but 
an International Sugar Organisation existed and negotiations were 
carried out in this forum. A variety of regional associations exist 
among coffee producers - the Organisation of Coffee Producers of 
Africa and Malagasy (OAMCAF) a francophonie grouping; the Inter-
African Coffee Organisation (ICAO) covering all African producers; 
the Central American, Mexican and Caribbean Coffee Federation 
(F1DECAME) which includes all Latin American producers except Brazil 
and Colombia,and the Pan-American Coffee Bureau. 
Various cartel arrangements exist. The major ones are 
detailed below. The Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting 
Countries (CIPEC) has a membership of Chile, Peru, Zambia and Zaire 
but the two lowest cost ldc producers Papua New Guinea and the 
Philippines are non-members. Similarly the banana exporters' cartel, 
the Union of Banana &porting Countries (UPEB) - Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama was not 
joined by leading exporters such as Ecuador (the largest exporter), 
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Surinam and the Philippines. The International 
Bauxite Association (IBA) links Australia, Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Sierra Leone, Surinam, Yugoslavia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Haiti 
and Indonesia. But two major producers Brazil and Cameroons are 
non-members. The World Institute of Phosphates is composed of 
Algeria, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia and Morocco. In sugar most of the 
exporting countries have special long-term contracts e.g. the Lome . 
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beneficiaries and Cuba with the socialist countries. The 
Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC) with a 
membership of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka controls 
97 per cent of world production. The Association of Iron Ore 
producers does not include the major exporters once again showing 
the conflictual nature of market organisation. Apart from these 
formal organisations governments also consult on a more informal 
basis e.g. the Asian tea producing countries (India, Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka) and the African tea-producers (Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania) engage in regional consultations. The existence of 
these organisations had two consequences for G77 unity and the IPC 
negotiations. First, producer countries had a history of dialogue 
and felt 'comfortable' in their various organisations. In so far 
as they felt in control of their market share under existing 
arrangements then the UNCTAD programme was an irrelevance. They 
therefore used their membership of these organisations to preserve 
autonomy and resist encroachment by UNCTAD. Secondly, the regional 
organisations and these cartels reflected existing disputes and the 
IPC did not provide suitable mechanisms to solve them. For example, 
the Latin Xmerican coffee producers had fundamentally opposed 
interests. International commodity agreements already in 
existence reflected different bargaining strengths under pre-
vailing rules which indicated that some countries were happy with 
the rules and the outcome. Participating in the IPC would 
jeopardise their interests, e.g. Latin American coffee producers. 
Similarly, countries outside a cartel type arrangement or ICA had 
taken that decision on perceived self-interest. Why join the 
integrated programme which might mean loss of market sham? This 
was a consideration behind Brazil's self-exclusion from the IBA. 
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On the other hand, countries seeking the conclusion of individual 
commodity agreements were those who felt that they might gain from 
new market share quotas, e.g. East African tea producers. In so 
far as existing organisational arrangements were in accord with 
the interests of some producers the IPC represented a challenge to 
their control. 
Apart from these types of intergovernmental arrangements 
another form of intergovernmental cooperation also is of interest. 
Alignments with developed countries particularly close economic 
cooperation and market arrangements produced another cleavage in 
the group. The Lome" Convention between the European Community and 
the ACP states is the most significant agreement in this context. 
Lome provided preferential access to the Community market for the 
ACP and also in the innovative Stabex provision compensatory 
financing for shortfalls in earnings from siected commodities. 
Non-members, particularly the Latin American countries complained 
about this discriminatory treatment and the Lome members had 
specific interests to'protect. Unlike the GSI‘association with 
the Community was not a crucial issue and the increase in the 
number of beneficiaries ensured greater support for discrimination. 
A key development was the geographical extension of association to 
the Pacific but most importantly the Caribbean. The existence of 
ACP members within the Latin American group was important in 
reducing that group's hostility to the European Community's 
association system. The Commonwealth Caribbean countries vigo-
rously defended the agreement and given the nature of the 
political process in the G77 were effective in moderating 
official Latin American hostility. 
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Behavioural cleavages within the negotiating process is the 
subject of the next section. The influence of differing objectives; 
conflicting perceptions; different levels of technical preparedness 
and rellance on competing economic analyses; the varying impact of 
the integrated programme both in its overall nature and in 
respect of individual commodities; and the relationship between 
IPC proposals and existing market arrangements played important 
roles in the negotiations. 
7.4 The Bargaining Process  
7.4. 1. 1974-1976 : From the Origins of the Concept to Nairobi  
Resolution 93(IV) Integrated Programme for Commodities 
adopted without dissent at UNCTAD IV in 1976 set in motion the 
series of negotiations on the CF and the individual commodities 
linked to it under the IPC rubric (see Table 7.5). This resolution 
was an important milestone in an exercise begun at the Sixth 
Special Session of the UNGA (April 9 - May 2, 1974). The 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order s (74) marked a new stage in North-
South discussions of the development problem at the level of 
global organisations by making the concept of a NIEO the most 
important political symbol of future negotiations. This is not 
to say that the developed countries accepted the demands made 
by developing countries or the need for a NIEO but rather that 
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Table 7.5  
Chronology of Common Fund and IPC Meetings 1976-1980  
1976 
November 22- 	1st. Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee 
26 	 for the Integrated Programme for Commodities (Ad Hoc Cttee) 
November 29- 	1st. Preparatory Meeting for the 
December 4 Negotiation of a Common Fund (Prep. Meet; 
doc. TD/B/IPC/CF/4) 
1977 
January 24- 	2nd. Prep. Meet (TD/B/IPC/CF/6) 
28 
February 21- 	3rd. Prep. Meet (TD/B/IPC/CF/8) 
March 1 
March 2-3 2nd. Ad Hoc Cttee (TD/B/IPC/AC/8) 
March 7- 	 1st. United Nations Negotiating 
April 2 Conference on a Common Fund under the 
Integrated Programme for Commodities 
(Neg. Conf. on CF; TD/IPC/CF/CONF/8) 
July 11-15 	3rd. Ad Hoc Cttee (TD/B/IPC/AC/11) 
November 7- 	 2nd. Neg. Conf on CF, suspended on 1st. 
December 1 December (TD/IPC/CF/CONF/14,Part 1) 
December 12- 	4th. Ad Hoc Cttee (TD/B/IPC/AC/15) 
14 
1978 
March 13-17 	5th. Ad Hoc Cttee (TD/B/IPC/AC/18) 
July 10-15 6th. Ad Hoc Cttee (TD/B/IPC/AC/21) 
November 14- 	resumed 2nd. session of Neg. Conf on CF 
30 	 (TD/IPC/CF/CONF/14,PartII) 
December 11- 	7th. Ad Hoc Cttee (TD/B/IPC/AC/24) 
12 
1979 
March 12-19 	3rd Neg. Conf on CF (TD/IPC/CF/CONF/19) 
March 22 8th. Ad Hoc Cttee (TD/B/IPC/AC/27) 
Table 7.5 (cont'd)  
Chronology of Common Fund and IPC Meetings 1976-1980  
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September 3-
14 
October 22-
November 2 
December 3-
14 
December 17-
18 
February 18-
March 5 
April 8-19 
June 5-27 
1979 
1st. Interim Committee of the United 
Nations Negotiating Conference on a 
Common Fund under the Integrated Prog-
ramme for Commodities (Interim Cttee; 
the report of all 5 sessions of the 
Interim Cttee is published as TD/IPC/CF/ 
CONF/20) 
2nd. Interim Cttee 
3rd. Interim Cttee 
9th. Ad Hoc Cttee (TD/B/IPC/AC/32) 
1980 
4th. Interim Cttee 
5th. Interim Cttee 
4th. Neg. Conf on CF 
421. 
ad hoc negotiations were now linked to a central concept. 
Subsequent discussions were conducted under the umbrella of the 
NIEO. There were many factors responsible for the demands for 
a radical restructuring of the international economic system, the 
most important being the failure of UNCTAD to make significant 
progress during its first decade, the uncertainty surrounding the 
management of the world economy following the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods framework and theespirations and perceptions 
concerning the need for change and the ability of the developing 
countries to wrest such change as a result of OPEC's success in 
quadrupling oil prices in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. 
The Programme of Action called on the UNCTAD Secretary-General to 
prepare 
"an overall integrated programme, setting out 
guidelines and taking into account the 
current work in this &id, for a comprehensive 
range of commodities of export interest to 
developing countries." 
In response to this request the UNCTAD Secretariat launched 
' the idea of an Integrated Programme for Commodities at the first 
part of the fourteenth session of the Trade and Development 
Board (20th August - 13th September, 1974). (75) The 
Secretariat played a key role in the IPC negotiations from the 
outset arguing in support of a concept developed from within its 
ranks. Although the idea of a series of individual commodity 
agreements linked by a common fund of financing was not new the 
idea having been expounded in Secretariat papers prepared for 
both UNCTAD II and UNCTAD III the higher political profile given 
by UNGA involvement ensured at the least an extended hearing this 
time wound. It is not clear why the UNCTAD Secretariat responded 
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in this particular manner to the UNGA request but a number of 
relevant factors can be suggested. Gamani Corea had become the 
new Secretary-General of the organisation in April, 1974 in the 
same month as the Sixth Special Session and the launching of the 
new initiative in North-South relations. He could immediately 
establish his particular stamp on the situation by investing it 
with new dynamism. In 1974 UNCTAD reached the end of its first 
decade with its sobriquet Under No Circumstances Take Any Decisions 
thought by many to be an apt one. (76) A new programme which would 
see it once again as the centre of United Nations development 
activities would be welcome and in its battle to become a 
legitimate negotiating bap the IPC would obviously contribute. 
GATT its major rival in the trade field had finally thrown off its 
post Kennedy Round lethargy and launched the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (MTN) the previous September. The influence of 
personalities and other idiosyncratic variables cannot be 
weighted precisely but a combination of the ambitions, and career 
aspirations of secretarial officials combined with the necessity 
for task expansion and increased ligitimisation all combined to 
provide both the initial impetus behind the proposal of an 
integrated programme and subsequent support and development of the 
concept. (77) 
The G77 endorsed the IPC with varying degrees of enthusiasm 
from the outset. (78)  They had been seeking reform in the commodity 
field since 1964 and the integrated programme was the latest in 
a long line of proposals most of which had failed to be implemented 
because of the opposition of the developed countries. Action taken 
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to date on Resolution 83(111) had been very disappointing and a 
new initiative on international commodity policy was certainly 
worth a try. It was after all these same countries that had in 
the context of the UNGA initiated demands for the NIEO. The 
current turbulence in commodity markets and the misplaced 
euphoria following the OPEC action and the commodity price boom 
of 1972-74 convinced many states that the threats of cartelisa-
tion and worries over security of supply would lead the developed 
states to re-appraise their attitudes toward the management of 
international commodity markets. Commodities were therefore an 
issue-area in which effort might be expended successfully. 
Prior to UNCTAD IV in Nairobi (5 - 31 May, 1976), the initial 
concept of the integrated programme was expanded and revised and 
the G77 began its slow process at arriving at a common group 
position. The close linking of the IPC to the NIEO ensured that 
the issue would never be treated in a low-key technical manner 
within the Committee on Commodities. The 'mandate' given by the 
more overtly political UNGA enabled the more radical members of 
the G77 to intensify the politicalisation of the integrated 
programme. Politicisation here refers to the political importance 
attached to the issue by the participants and the nature of the 
discussions which took place. 
The original note by the UNCTAD Secretary-General on the 
integrated programme was expanded at the request of the Trade and 
Development Board (79) into a series of studies which were 
published in December 1974. (80) These documents formed the basis 
on which discussion within the G77 and between the G77 and Groups 
B and D took place in the Trade and Development Board and the 
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Committee on Commodities. Before UNCTAD IV, the Trade and Develop-
ment Board met at its 14th Session (2 parts) - August-September 1974 
and April 1975; 15th Session (2parts) - August 1975 and September-
October 1975, 6th Special Session - March 1975 and Seventh Special 
Session March 1976. The Committee on Commodities held its 8th 
Session in three parts - February 1975, July 1975 and December 
1975. Attempts to coordinate the G77's position for these meetings 
were made in the regional groups in Geneva but from the outset it 
was recognised that group support would be at the level of broad 
principle and that in working out the detailed nature of the 
programme the interests of individual states would have to be 
(81) protected. 	This was a realistic assessment based not only on 
the nature of the IPC hit also reflecting a sober reappraisal of the 
centrifugal tendencies within the group exacerbated by fundamental 
changes in the global economy. 
The effects of higher oil prices were evident in the 
worsening balance of payments position of the non oil rich 
developing countries. As the economic disparities within the 
Third World widened so a plethora of categories reflecting a 
political attitude to the increasing diversity sprang up. Some 
of these categories like the Most Seriosly Affected countries (MSA) 
werelegitimised by international organisations. Others such as the 
Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs), resource-rich and resource-
poor or Fourth and Fifth Worlds were not but were nevertheless 
given a political status by governments. Within the UNCTAD context 
three special groups of developing countries had been recognised 
- the land-locked countries, the least developed developing 
countries and since Santiago 1972 the developing island countries. 
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These three groups all claimed that their special status necessitated 
positive discrimination in their favour; claims not readily 
acceptable to all members of the G77. The existence of new groups 
demanding special treatment added to the strains within the group. 
This was fuitier exacerbated when it was asserted that the newly 
prosperous group members ie. OPEC countries should contribute to 
the development of the poorer countries. This was resisted by 
the OPEC countries who refused to accept that their actions had in 
any sense contributed to the worsening plight of some developing 
countries and who, on the other hand, continuously pointed to the 
level of their economic kid commitments which in terms of GNP 
(percentage) was higher than the OECD countriesP 2) The Group B 
countries attempted to exploit these differences by adopting a 
strategy which stressed the diverse nature of the coalition. 
Apart from attacking OPEC for causing world inflation, Group B 
spokesmen attempted to initiate studies concentrating on the 
problems of the lddcs and MSAs and altered their own aid prog-
rammes so that a clear distinction was made between the poorest 
countries and other developing countries.(83)  
Countering these centrifugal forces were two centripetal 
iendencies which helped to maintain the coalition. First, the 
increased turbulence in the world economy ushered in the concept 
of Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries (ECDC). (84)  
ECDC was initially based on the belief that OPEC type producer 
associations could successfully raise prices and change the terms 
of trade and on the need to preserve developing countries from 
the adverse effects of the international economic crisis. The 
developed countries reacted to the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
regime, higher oil prices and global inflation by turning inwards 
and by increasing protectionism. ECDC was meant as an alternative 
to reliance on developed countries' markets and financial 
institutions. At the same time the more developed members of the 
G77 looked to the MTN talks to provide them with real benefits but 
felt that without the support of the developing countries as a 
whole their interests would be marginalised in the GATT in the 
same manner as in previous GATT tariff cutting rounds. (85) 
The original proposal stressed five kinds of international 
action required under an integrated programme - a) the creation of 
a series of international stocks, b) the establishment of a 
common fund to finance the stocks, c) the negotiation of multi-
lateral trade commitments, d) the creation of a compensatory 
finance facility, e) the expansion of processing in developing 
countries. Within the context of international trade rules this 
would be a cooperative venture between producers and consumers. 
Before the programme had been worked out in any detail and in 
response to the UNCTAD Secretary-General's note in August some 
developing countries made radical speeches supporting producer 
associations, indexation and the necessity to realise that a new 
age had dawned in North-South relations. The Jamaican delegate 
declared that 'conflict was inevitable' between the two camps 
and the Peruvian representative argued that the new era would, 
"owe its advent not to negotiations in an 
international forum oreren a desire for 
cooperation but to the capacity for concerted 
action shown by developing countries and to 
their having gained the necessary bargaining 
power to blot out the ineqities of the past 
changing the traditional balance of forces." (86) 
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On the other hand, some leading members of the G77 gave very luke- 
warm support to the proposal. The Argentinian delegate reminded 
the meeting that, 
"Recently consideration had been given to 
international commodity agreements covering 
a number of commodities or groups but enormous 
difficulties arose in standardising the 
clauses applicable to commodities or groups 
of commodities which did not have the same 
characteristics with respect to the production, 
marketing or distribution and also because of 
the position of each commodity in the exports 
of the developing countries and the diversity of 
the consumers' markets." (87) 
The Indian and Venezuelan delegates emphasised the compensatory 
financing provision, the multilateral commitments and improved 
access to markets aim. From its first appearance the integrated 
programme was placed in a highly political context and the developing 
countries adopted different approaches to it. 
The elaboration of the proposals in response to the TDB's 
request provided the documentation for the deliberations of the 
Committee on Commodities. The three radical elements of the 
programme i.e. the comprehensive coverage of problem commodities, 
the common fund and the multi-dimensional approach were retained 
throughout the discussions although the emphasis on certain 
elements was shifted. By the time the integrated programme 
proposals reached Nairobi two elements had come to dominate the 
discussions - international stocks and the common fund. Moreover, 
the IPC dominated the NIEO discussions. There are several reasons 
why this happened. 
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Efforts to reform the international economic order were 
carried out in a: number of fora but UNCTAD became the central organ 
of the U.N. system spearheading the thrust and within UNCTAD the 
IPC became the focus of attention. This is attributable to the 
political commitment of the UNCTAD Secretariat, the importance of 
commodities in the economies of the developing countries and trends 
in the world economy and the slow pace of reform on other issues. 
The UNCTAD Secretariat functioned as a quasi de-facto secretariat of 
the G77 and its continued influence depended on its ability to 
design programmes favoured by the majority of the Group. It was 
the G77 which with its numerical majority was capable of generating 
new programmes within the United Nations and in deciding which 
agency would be charged with the research and implementation. The 
UNCTAD Secretariat was therefore ready and willing to tailor its 
programme to suit ME constituency. But the secretariat was also 
imbued with its own organisational ideology which favoured these 
goals and therfore the intellectual justification for the integrated 
programme did not require a departure from its normal role of 
operation. The rebuttal of the secretariat's economic analysis by 
western academics was not a new phenomenon and perhaps because the 
secretariat had from its inception been subject to hostile criticism 
of its economic competence and the soundness of its ideas it self-
protectively retreated into its own cocoon and refused to recognise 
some pertinent criticisms of its approach. UNCTAD's pre-eminent 
role in the NIEO was recognised by the General Assembly and the 
satisfactory conclusion of the IPC proclaimed as an important 
( aim. 	As a group developing countries had not been performing 
well in the international economy and after the peak of the 
commodity boom in March-May 1974, the prices of their commodity 
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exports (excluding petroleum) fell while the price of manufactured 
products continued to rise. This decline in developing countries' 
purchasing power pointed to the need to restructure commodity 
markets. Furthermore, the developing countries were having no 
success in their attempts to reform the international monetary 
system, to negotiate generalised debt relief or on many of the 
various proposals under the NIEO banner. 
Within the UNCTAD the involvement of the entire membership in 
commodity policy had been in terms of getting broad agreement on 
questions of principle. Put within this institutional framework the 
IPC soon became a dispute about principles. Before the individual 
commodity negotiations could begin agreement had to be reached on 
the nature and shape of the programme. Of the five measures 
proposed by the UNCTAD Secretariat buffer stocks and the common 
fund were more amenable to this type of treatment than the other 
three. The C.F. would have a catalytic role it was argued by 
the Secretariat and therefore it became imperative to negotiate 
the C.F. before the individual commodity agreements. Without 
the Fund, less ICAs would be successfully negotiated therefore 
agreement in principle on the Fund had to take precedence. In 
making a distinction between 'core' and other commodities and 
insisting that the core commodities would be subject to buffer 
stocking the Secretariat again ensured that buffer stocking would 
become an important question of principle. Without the core 
commodities which according to UNCTAD estimates accounted for 
75 per cent of the value of the exports of developing countries 
of all 17 commodities the programme would be failing in its 
primary aim. Compensatory financing was not a contentious issue 
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the IMF and the European Community both had schemes and this 
approach was widely accepted by developed countries. The expansion 
of processing in developing countries was more a medium-term than 
a short-term goal for most states and agreement in principle 
(not difficult to get) would prove difficult to translate into 
effective policies. Finally, multilateral contracts suffered in 
comparison to buffer stocks as an approach to market management 
first because they were more complicated to negotiate and, secondly, 
because (from the politics of the programme) they were not appli-
cable to the 'core' commodities. 
These technical considerations were re-inforced by the 
bargaining process within the G77. The expected differential 
impact of the proposed scheme led to five areas of disagreement. 
First countries that felt the costs would outweigh the benefits 
argued for special consideration of their needs. Instead of 
jettisoning the programme those countries that stood to gain had 
little to lose by agreeing to the inclusion of special measures 
for the developing importing countries. Similarly, the special 
needs of the 'least developed' and 'most seriously affected' 
countries were taken into consideration. Secondly, it was obvious 
that indexation would only benefit certain exporters (metals and 
minerals) and although at this stage indexation was included in 
the package it did not have a great deal of support. Thirdly, the 
benefits to be gained depended on commodity coverage and the prog-
ramme was increased from the original 10 commodities (coffee, 
cocoa, cotton, tea, copper, tin, jute, sisal, sugar and rubber) 
to 17 with the addition of wheat, rice, bananas, meat, wool,iron 
ore and bauxite. Fourthly, some producers (particularly Colombia 
and Brazil in respect of coffee) had serious reservations about 
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including their commodities in the IPC since they were satisfied 
with existing agreements. At this stage they were willing for the 
sake of solidarity to allow its inclusion since they knew that in 
any detailed negotiations they could protect their interests. 
Finally, the emphasis given to buffer stocking in the Secretariat's 
proposal did not meet with the approval of all countries, particular- 
.(89) 	. ly those like India 	which did not expect to benefit from the 
operation of stocks. These countries therefore insisted that the 
other measures in the programme should be given the same weight as 
the buffer stock proposal. At this stage no concerted attempt had 
been made to devise a common G77 negotiating position. The task 
of doing so fell to the Third Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 
77 (26 January - 6 February 1976) which met in Manila, Philippines 
to prepare a joint position for UNCTAD IV. Prior to the Manila 
conference the three regional groups met to coordinate their 
positions. All three groups supported the aims and objectives of 
the IPC and called for the creation of new institutional structures 
within UNCTAD to negotiate the C.F. and to oversee the individual 
commodity negotiations. Nevertheless, once again there were 
subtle differences between the African, Asian and Latin American 
positions. The African Group's position was the result of the 
fourth conference of Trade Ministers of OAU member countries held 
in Algiers, 24-29 November 1975. The agreed text supported index- 
ation and called for special account to be taken of the needs of the 
least developed. Most importantly, the commodity coverage of the 
integrated programme was changed. Rice, wheat and wool products of 
limited or part interest to African countries were excluded and 
vegetable oils, timber and phosphate, added. Sisal was extended to 
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cover all hard fibres. (90)  The Asian Group also changed the 
commodity coverage of the integrated programme - extending cotton 
to cover cotton yarn, jute to cover jute goods and sisal to cover 
all hard fibres. As we have demonstrated, the Asian Group 
contained a large number of countries likely to be net importers 
of the commodities covered in the IPC and they therefore placed 
special emphasis on the needs of net importers. The Jakarta 
Declaration declared that, 
"The interests of developing importing countries 
experiencing an adverse net effect from 
commodity pricing policies within the integrated 
programme should be protected by means of 
appropriate differential and remedial 
measures." (91) 
At the insistence of India, the Asian Group placed special emphasis 
on the necessity to award equal status to all the proposed measures 
in the integrated programme. This was expressed twice in the 
Jakarta Declaration. In the Declaration of the Third Ministerial 
Meeting of the Asian Group of 77, the ministers' reaffirmed and 
stressed that, 
"Such a programme should include the establish-
ment of a common fund for the financing of a 
series of international stocks covering a 
number of commodities; improvements in the 
compensatory financing facility, as well as 
other complementary measures, each one of which  
constitutes an important and integral element  
of the Program" (emphasis mine) 
and in the section of the Programme of Action on Commodities this 
was repeated 
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January 1971 had now become institutionalised, the G24 in the context 
of the IMF had expanded its work and the G19 at the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris was supposedly 
part of the G77 although there was no clear line of authority. 
Moreover, the importance of the UNGA in launching the NIEO and the 
discussions at the Sixth and Seventh special sessions of the 
General Assembly had given an impetus to the G77 in New York which 
was once again challenging the dominance of the Geneva G77 on 
economic matters. (94)  There was thus a concerted attempt by some 
states to improve the working of the Group by establishing an 
independent secretariat. Other organisational issues also caused 
controversy notably the membership question and the possibility of 
non-regional membership. Secondly, the G77 had ceased to be the 
sole global developing country organisation attempting to harmonise 
and formulate policy on international economic relations. The 
NAM had increasingly stepped up its activities in this area and 
this was resented by some G77 members (non-members of the NAM) 
especially in Geneva where they felt that extraneous political 
considerations were being introduced into development diplomacy. (95) 
In the face of these challenges the reaffirmation of unity 
and solidarity was more than rhetorical in that the coalition 
could be thrown into crisis if there was a failure to agree a 
common position for the forthcoming UNCTAD conference. The 
salience of the commodities issue on the UNCTAD agenda helped to 
bring a spirit of compromise to the deliberations. The final agreed 
text on the IPC differed in important respects from the Report of 
the Preparatory Committee (22 December 1975). (96)  The developing 
countries' proposal was very similar to that of the UNCTAD 
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secretariat. with the suggestion of a common fund and buffer 
stocks for a range of commodities sipported by other measures. 
But in respect of commodity coverage the Manila Declaration 
expressed the wishes of the African and Asian producers and also 
included one new commodity - manganese. Indian insistence on the 
importance of measures other than buffer stocking was included 
and this was a success for Indian diplomacy since the Preparatory 
Committee's Report had made no reference to this subject. Similarly, 
those countries wishing to limit the role played by the IPC in 
respect of commodities of interest to them were successful in 
inserting the following sentence into the Declaration: 
"The application of any of the measures which 
may concern existing international arrangements 
on commodities covered by the integrated 
programme would be decided by governments within 
the commodity organizations concerned." (97) 
In these instances agreement had been reached by including 
the demands of the dissatisfied states in the final compromise. 
This of course did not resolve the conflict, but it contained the 
potential divisiveness. This form of dispute settlement did not 
prevail over the question of special measures for the lddcs. Many 
Latin American countries, traditionally fierce opponents of the 
privileges granted African countries because of their special 
relationship with the European Community, were particularly upset 
by the latest aid and trade agreement signed between Africa and 
the EEC, the Lome Convention (28 February 1975) which not only 
extended the beneficiaries to Caribbean and Pacific countries but 
also in the Stabex scheme provided a form of compensatory financing 
for 12 commodities exported by the ACP states. The Latin American 
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states therfore refused to agree special measures for the Africans 
since they argued special treatment was being provided under Lome. 
The UNCTAD secretariat had suggested that special measures for 
the lddcs might include 'exemption Am the obligation to share the 
financial costs and risks of stocks, and specially favourable 
treatment in the allocation of export quotas.' (98) The furthest 
that the Latin Americans were prepared to go was the mention of the 
special needs of the lddcs and even here they insisted on placing 
them not in a separate category but including them among the 
developing importing countries. The vague wording of the Manila 
Declaration on this subject - 'appropriate differential and remedial 
measures within the programme' meant that no specific commitments 
would be entered into at Nairobi. Here we can see two different 
methods of conflict resolution, one involves upgrading the common 
interest and the second splitting the difference. The G77 arrived 
at Nairobi with a unity which masked important disagreements but 
of crucial importance, an agreement which meant that they would 
present a united front. Unity also ensured that they would press 
for the creation of an institutional structure within UNCTAD to 
(i) negotiate a common fund (ii) set in motion negotiations on 
individual commodities and (iii) investigate measures other than 
buffer stocking. 
7.4. 1.a. Nairobi (1976) 
When UNCTAD IV opened in Nairobi in May 1976 the Integrated 
Programme had been on the international agenda for more than 18 
months and it was widely believed that the success or failure of the 
conference would be an important landmark in the NIEO discussions. 
The conference had been carefully prepared with a short agenda 
covering nine substantive areas and a timetable- of three and a 
half weeks designed to facilitate serious negotiation rather than 
mere talk. However, on the debit side the conference was being 
held just six months prior to the American presidential election 
and thus there was not likely to be any significant change by the 
American administration in its hostile attitude to the NIEO. The 
difficulties of concluding economic agreements with an American 
government in the run-up to U.S. elections had been recognised in 
the GATT where the MTN tlaks had been suspended. The three most 
important topics at Nairobi were commodities, aid and debt re-
scheduling and the transfer of technology. High oil prices, the 
collapse of the commodity boom, western worries about investment 
in commodities, concern about the relationship between commodity 
price instability and domestic inflation, the still present threat 
of producer associations and the Third Worl's insistence on 
structural tranAhrmation of the world, economy made commodities the 
single most important topic at the conference. 
The developing countries arrived with the Manila Declaration 
around which they coalesced. The major demands were the creation 
of a common fund, the setting up of international commodity 
stocking arrangements, improvement and enlargement of compensatory 
financing facilities, the promotion of processing and diversification 
activities in developing countries, improved market areas, multi-
lateral commitments and the indexation of raw material prices to 
manufactures. The ldcs argued that UNCTAD should be empowered to 
create an ad hoc intergovernmental co-ordinating committee to 
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supervise both the common fund and individual commodity negotiations 
and convene various intergovernmental preparatory meetings and 
negotiating conferences for individual commodities. These demands 
were unlikely to be met in full by Group B and this was known in 
advance by the G77. UNCTAD arrived at decisions for the most 
part by consensus and the G77 knew that although it •could use its 
numerical superiority to vote for these measures the victory would 
be meaningless. 
Group B, like the G77, had prior to the conference attempted 
to adopt a common position. But the divisions within the group 
*ere so significant that individual countries whilst agreeing to 
the group text nevertheless entered reservations on some points. 
The main division was between the 'hard liners' the United States, 
West Germany, Britain and Japan who did not accept the common fund 
or integrated approach and supported the free market against 
dirigiste attempts and the 'accomodatiorist' states led by Canada, 
the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. Group B submitted a 
Discussion Paper on Commodities (TD/215) to the conference and 
this built on the Position Paper on Commodities submitted to the 
Seventh Special Session of the Trade and Development Board. (99) 
The fragile consensus reached by Group B contained many ideas 
similar to the G77 text but there were striking differences, Group 
B supported improved market access, diversification and multilateral 
commitments. Indexation was flatly rejected and stocking was 
included as one of a possible range of appropriate measures. The 
common fund idea was entertained but not as an autonomous catalytic 
agency; it could be a residual link between individual buffer 
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stocks. Group D also submitted a position paper - ;gays and means 
of normalizing the development of world commodity markets'(TD (IV)/ 
GC/1) which gave general support to the UNCTAD secretariat plans 
and the G77's demands but which pointedly made no reference to 
the common fund thus indicating Group D's opposition to the idea. 
Discussion on commodities at Nairobi was based on UNCTAD 
secretariat reports, (100) and the papers of the groups mentioned 
above. A Third Group B paper prepared by the European Community was 
submitted which gave a more positive welcome to the common fund. 
"Given the existence of several buffer stock 
funds, held within individual agreements, there 
could probably be advantage in linking their 
financial resources by means of a central 
financing facility, in order toechieve the most 
effective pattern of financing and to mobalize 
additional funds. 
In the light, therefore, of the operation of 
existing buffer stocks and of the negotiation 
of further agreements involving such stocks, an 
early examination should be undertaken of the 
role and functioning of this possible central 
financing facility or common fund, with a view 
to starting negotiations on such a facility 
within the period of time envisaged for the 
overall commodity programme." (101) 
Negotiations took place within the formal committee structure 
and informal contact groups. The formal structure comprised the 
General Committee, Negotiating Group 1 and the President's Contact 
Group. The various differencesItthin the groups and the reservations 
by Group B hardliners about the wisdom of the UNCTAD's secretariat 
approach were responsible for the slow and arduous negotiations 
which in typical UNCTAD fashion were concluded on the penultimate 
day of the conference. The main stumbling block to agreement was 
the common fund which the G77 saw as the main element of the 
programme. Delegates repeatedly stressed the lack of success 
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enjoyed historically by ICAs and the failure of commodity by 
commodity negotiations and emphasised the importance of the common 
fund in establishing a sincere commitment to make progress in 
individual commodity negotiations. Some Group B states notably 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands and Canada 
were sympathetic to the idea of a common fund but the United Staes 
rejected it and offered the International Resources Bank (IRB) as 
an alternative proposal. A superficially attractive scheme the 
IRB sought to encourage investment in raw materials thus helping 
both producers and consumers. However, it had not been fully 
thought out and it was presented as an alternative to the common 
fund thus incurring the ire of many developing countriesvho saw 
it as a political attempt to kill the integrated programme and a 
scheme designed more to ensure supplies for the West than to assist 
the development efforts of the Third World. The IRB proposal 
severely tested the fragile unity of the G77 and was only narrowly 
defeated by 33 votes to 31 with 44 abstentions. Seven Latin 
American countries voted in favour of the proposal viz. Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Uruguay. 
Divergent interests among G77 members resurfaced during the 
conference despite the compromise reached at Manila. Within the 
G77 there was strong support for indexation from Afghanistan, the 
Central African Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Iraq, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Morocco, Niger and Uganda. On the other hand some 
countries e.g. Brazil, Papua New Guinea and India were distinctly 
cautious about the programme as a whole and therefore unwilling to 
stress one of its most contentious features. Although the Manila 
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Declaration had given a list of 18 products suitable for integra-
tion in the integrated programme those countries with interests in 
products included in the UNCTAD proposal but not the G77 one 
pressed their claims e.g. Burma (rice and wool), Lesotho (wheat, 
rice and wool) and Uruguay (wheat, rice and wool). Another division 
within the G77 concerned the responsibility of OPEC for world 
inflation and its proposed contribution to any common fund 
financing. Some developing countries e.g. Chile, India and 
Pakistan stressed the harmful effects of the oil price rise and the 
necessity for remedial action by the oil exporting developing count-
ries. Any attempt to attach special responsibility to the da 
exporters was misted by OPEC at the conference although OPEC 
ministers meeting in Bali attempted to link cooperation withtthe 
West on oil prices to the success of UNCTAD in agreeing a common 
(102) fund 	and OPEC finance ministers meeting in Paris reputedly 
established a $300 million fund to support the common fund. (103)  
Those countries satisfied with existing commodity arrangements 
continued to try to keep their commodities from being included in 
the integrated programme and Colombia entered a forceful reservation 
after the adoption of Resolution 93(IV). The Columbian delegate 
maintained that, 
H.... any integrated programme for commodities 
should specifically and unambiguously exclude 
commodities that were already governed by an 
existing agreement or one that was in the process 
of being ratified." (104) 
He reserved Colombia's right to argue the case for the exclusion 
of coffee from the Integrated Programme when the relevant inter-
governmental committee was convened. 
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Within the G77 this conflict of objectives was contained and 
group unity preserved because of the operation of amumber of 
factors. First, the Group's negotiating document was the Manila 
Declaration which had been the rusult of a long process and most 
countries insisted that the compromises agreed there were not 
subject to renegotiation within the Group e.g. commodity coverage. 
It was also unlikely that Group B would support the inclusion of 
items which would widen the category of developing importing 
countries. Secondly, despite some criticism of OPEC, the OPEC 
countries had a number of supporters mainly Arab and African states 
that had received substantial assistance from oil rich countries 
and also because one of the most effective threats that the Group 
could use was exercised on its behalf by OPEC ie. the threat to 
raise oil prices by 10 to 20 cents a barrel and to use the 
proceeds to support the C.F. (105)  Thirdly, the prospect of 
compromise with Group B needed G77 solidarity and the agreement in 
principle would be to begin negotiations giving ample opportunity 
for the re-presentation of grievances. In Group B the large number 
of states which accepted the need for an overall approach to 
commodity problems and which were prepared to reach an agreement 
in principle on the C.F. left the United States, United Kingdom, 
West Germany and Japan relatively isolated. No agreement would be 
possible without these countries especially the United States 
and therefore isolation was not particularly worrying. The 
pressure brought to bear by OPEC and the threat by the 19 
developing countries represented in Paris to boycott the CIEC 
talks upon which the West held high hopes helped to trandbrm 
outright rejection into limited agreement. Britain was subject to 
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to pressure by the developing Commonwealth countries and Japan by 
the five ASEAN countries to change their tack and support the IPC. 
The final agreement enshrined in Resolution 93(IV) was not 
much more than an agreement to go on talking and the wording left 
the objectives and follow-up action open to differing interpretations. 
The timetables set in the resolution for the convening of prep-
aratory meetings and negotiations on individual commodities was 
not a triumph for the G77 since the EEC proposal and various 
developed countries had mentioned the necessity for a strict time-
table. Resolution 93(IV) represented the maximum that the United 
States, Britain and West Germany were prepared to accept. It was 
unclear for example whether the negotiating conference on the C.F. 
to be convened by the UNCTAD Secretary-General would be concerned 
with negotiating a C.F. or discussing the possibility of negotiating 
a C.F. The controversial issue of indexation was dropped and 
although given the prime position among the various measures 
contemplated buffer stocking was definitely to be thought of as 
one among a variety of measures. 
Some countries demonstrated their support for the Integrated 
Programme prior to the final agreement on 93(IV) by making pledges 
of financial contributions to the C.F. Twenty-five countries made 
financial pledges. The Philippines was the first to do so when 
its government pledged $50 million during the Third Ministerial 
Meeting of the G77 at Manila and this offer was repeated in 
Nairobi. (106) Five countries pledged specific amounts to Nairobi 
- India $25 million, Indonesia $25 m., Norway %25m. and Yugoslavia 
%30m. Fifteen countries did not make specific commitments but 
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indicated their willingness to participate in accordance with 
the formula for contributions determined by the participating 
countries - Algeria, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, the United Arab 
Emirates, Venezuela and Zambia. Five countries indicated their 
readiness to contribute to the proposed fund during the general 
debate - Finland, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria and Sweden. 
With the adoption of 93(IV) the negotiations entered a 
different phase and we now turn to an examination of the C.F. 
negotiations and those on individual commodity agreements. 
Resolution 93(IV) a product of the organisational framework could 
only reflect the lowest common denominator of international consensus. 
But it is also clearly reflected the cleavages within the G77 in 
its various provisions. First, the commodity coverage suggested 
by the UNCTAD secretariat had been changed to reflect those 
commodities which the members of the G77 felt would benefit a 
larger group of countries and lessen the number of countries on 
which the proposed measures would have a damaging effect. As has 
already been pointed out the calculation of gain or loss in this 
instance is not non-problematical but what is important is that 
the 'Nairobi 18 commodities" reflected the widest measure of 
consensus in the G77. These commodities were bananas, bauxite, 
cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton and cotton yarns, hard fibres and 
products, iron ore, jute and products, manganese, meat, phosphates, 
rubber, sugar, tea, tropical timber, tin and vegetable oils 
including olive oil and oilseeds. Importantly, the coverage was 
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left open-ended with the provision for the inclusion of other 
products at a later stage. Measures were included in the programme 
which would benefit those countries which would not gain under the 
operation of international stocks; reference was made to the 
special needs of the lddcs, MSAs and developing importing countries. 
These wide-ranging measures arose from the necessity to protect 
the varying and diverse interests of members of the coalition. 
Furthermore, specific reference was made to the preservation of the 
status of existing international arrangements. Part IV, para 7 of 
the resolution noted, 
"It is agreed that international negotiations 
or renegotiations on individual commodities 
covered by existing agreements shall be in 
accordance with appropriate established 
procedures for the purpose of concluding 
international arrangments." (107) 
The end of UNCTAD IV produced few firm commitments and plenty 
of room for backsliding. Progress on the individual commodity 
negotiations unless ddviating remarkably from historical experience 
was bound to be slow and offered a ground for substantial intra-77 
conflict. The Common Fund negotiations presented the only hope 
for a common G77 position within the forthcoming IPC dialogue. 
7.4. 2. The Common Fund Negotiations  
As its fourth session the United Nations Negotiating Conference 
on a Common Fund convened by the UNCTAD Secretary-General in 
respect of the provision resolution 93(IV) adopted the Articles of 
Agreement of the Common Fund on 27 June 1980. (108) It had taken 
more than four years from the conclusion of the Nairobi conference 
to reach this decision and discussion within and outside the 
UNCTAD forum had been long and intense. My intention is not to 
focus in any detail on these negotiations and discussions but to 
assess the extent to which the G77's position is understandable in 
the light of the cleavages mentioned above and the effect that 
this had on the Group's strategy and tactics. Throughout this 
process the G77 retained a remarkable degree of unity and although 
there were internal disputes the public face of the Group very 
rarely reflected these tensions. On the other hand, Group B 
displayed a remarkable degree of incoherence and disunity (109) and 
the slow pace of progress was mainly attributable to the reluctance 
of major developed states especially the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany to accept first, the principle of a 
Common Fund and, secondly, the type of fund suggested by the G77. 
The UNCTAD enviromental context imposed two crucial constraints 
on the negotiating process. First, the group system of negotiation 
made intra-group compromise as important if not more important 
than inter-group agreement. Before proposals could be discussed 
they had to pass through the relevant groups because if the groups 
were by-passed there would be minimal support for the preferred 
position. Secondly, the consensual method of decision-making 
meant that an exhaustive process of deliberations had to be 
undertaken in the attempt to reach an agreement acceptable to all 
parties. The end result of this process would be a form of words 
which did not signal complete agreement but was broadly acceptable 
to all the parties. States with specific interests to protect 
could then enter reservations on relevant sections of the 
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resolution. The first constraint was clearly visible at the first 
negotiating conference where, despite the 'benefit' of three 
preparatory meetings, most of the four week meeting was spent in 
intra-group consultation. (110) The second constraint pre- 
cluded the establishment of the C.F. between the G77, the like-
minded European countries and China. Of course, any fund without 
the United States given America's power in world commodity markets 
would be at a serious disadvantage but this need not be an 
insuperable obstacle as the conclusion of the Law of the Sea 
negotiations demonstrated. (111) Apart from Group B and the G77, 
China and Group D were the parties involved in the bargaining 
process. 
China gave full support to the G77 throughout the negotiating 
process and used every opportunity to criticise the negative 
attitudes of the two super-powers. Group D led by the Soviet 
Union only gave token support to the principle of a common fund, 
arguing that problems in commodity trade in the capitalist 
economy resulted from the uncontrolled nature of that market and 
was not the concern of the socialist countries who conducted their 
trade according to different principles. Worried about the 
financial implications of the fund and an inferior position in the 
allocation of roles Group D consistently argued for a pool type of 
finance, against the financing of other measures and opposed the 
innovative voting proposals of the G77. Because of Group D's 
marginal nature in terms of financing the G77 did not put much 
pressure on these countries anticipating (correctly) that once 
the major capitalist states gave positive support to the fund the 
socialist states would be obliged to follow the consensus. 
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It is not the intention to discuss the differences within 
Group B or to account for the evolution of Group B's position from 
rejection to acceptance. (112) Continuously 'B' policy was based 
on the lowest common denominator and in this case it meant what 
the United States and West Germany were prepared to accept, with 
the United Kingdom and Japan playing a supporting role. However, 
we can note the influence of the inconclusive nature of economic 
analysis on these deliberations. The arguments hostile to or 
sceptical of the UNCTAD secretariat's analysis were used to support 
the hard line position and the tentative nature of many findings 
were used as an excuse to ask for more research to be carried out. 
I am not saying that this was a mere intellectual justification or 
that economic arguments were used to mask a political decision. 
No doubt there was an element of this involved, more fundamentally 
the disputed and uncertain nature of the economic arguments made 
such behaviour inevitable. The position of the hardline countries 
shifted for a variety of reasons chief among these were continued 
fear of the intentions of the oil producers (once again this was 
a very ambiguous threat); the political realisation that some 
concessions had to be made on the NIEO; the need for a 'success' at 
the public relations exercise called CIEC; (113) the advent of the 
Carter administration in the United States; the production of 
economic analyses which argued that stable raw material prices 
would help keep Western inflation down (the ratchet-effect); third 
world pressure; and the desire to avoid acrimonious confrontation 
at UNCTAD V. (114) 
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The negotiations for a Common Fund centred around five main 
issues - (i) objectives and purposes (ii) financing needs and 
structure (ii) source of finance (iv) modes of operations 
(v) decision-making and fund management. Three preparatory 
meetings were held prior to the first negotiating conference, the 
first from 29 November - 4 December 1976, the second from 24 - 28 
January 1977 and the third from 21 February - 1 March 1977 and yet 
when the first negotiating conference convened it proved impossible 
to reach agreement even on the principle of establishing a C.F. 
At this stage the G77 had been unable to reconcile the conflicting 
views within the group and did not present any outline text (115) 
of the proposed C.F. on which serious negotiations could take 
place. The G77 therefore sought a commitment in principle from 
the other groups before detailed negotiations could begin. (116) 
Group B countered by arguing that it was impossible to agree in 
principle to a C.F. before the precise details of its operations 
and financing were known. The ensuing stalemate cannot however be 
atributed to the G77's negotiating strategy (117) and the demand 
for a political response before technical details were worked out. 
This is because implicit in the demand for the acceptance of the 
fund in principle there was a commitment to a particular type of 
organisation i.e. financially independent and interventionist and 
the hardliners in Group B were unwilling to concede this point. 
Secondly, the studies prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat for the 
preparatory meetings (118) were sufficiently technical in nature 
for a serious debate to be started. The close cooperation between 
the G77 and the UNCTAD secretariat meant that the G77 gave strong 
support to secretariat arguments. On the other hand the G77 was 
449. 
ill-equipped to bargain as a group on the position paper submitted 
by Group B because no group consensus existed. (119) Thegroup 
system, the desire to maintain unity and the limitation of 
consensus to the priniple of the Common Fund dictated that the 
G77's tactics of the first negotiating conference would be to 
seek a commitment in principle before details could be worked out. 
When the second session of the negotiating conference 
convened on 8 November 1977 the G77 had an agreed negotiating 
(12(a) text. 	The result of months of intensive discussions in 
Geneva between the various missions and in the Working Group of 33 
on the Common Fund/IPC negotiations (with eleven members from each 
regional group) the thirteen page text contained no ideas which 
had not been previously discussed and replicated many of the ideas 
produced by the UNCTAD secretariat. The text contained the 
following proposals. The Fund apart from international commodity 
stocks was to finance other measures e.g. diversification, 
productivity improvement, market promotion, research and develop-
ment and improvements in transport, marketing and distribution. 
It was also to be empowered to intervene in markets for which 
them were no existing international arrangements. Two separate 
accounts would be opened within the FUnd, the first to finance 
buffer stocking and the second (the so-called Second Window) 
other measures. It was estimated that the Fund would need 06bn., 
03bn. at the outset consisting of subscribed capital equivalent to 
01bn. with the authority to borrow up to 02bn. with a further 
%3bn. to be raised in similar proportions hald as stand-by 
reserves. The resources of the Fund would come from four sources 
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i) direct government contributions, ii) voluntary contributions, 
iii) borrowings and iv) net earnings derived from its operations. 
The structure of the Fund would consist of a Board of Governors, an 
Executive Council (consisting of Executive Directors), a Managing 
Director and other staff. Decisions in both the Board of Governors 
and Executive Council would be by simple majority vote. Subsequently 
the G77 specified that the allocation of votes should be weighted to 
give them a built-in majority. 
Most of these proposals were unpalatable to Group B and 
(121) their counter-proposals 	suggested instad i) a pool fund 
with finance coming from the individual ICAs and not governments; 
ii) activities should be confined to the first window and buffer 
stock; iii) other measures should be undertaken by existing 
financial institutions; iv) Fund management would be undertaken 
by a small professional secretariat and an executive board; 
v) voting wocedure should rdlect the interests of producers and 
consumers and the relevant financial and economic interests i.e. 
no built-in majority. The ensuing negotiations and search for 
compromise continued until March 1979. (122) The November 
conference was suspended when the G77 walked out and resumed in 
November 1978. (123) The major issues of contention concerned 
first, the Second Window with the G77 adamant that this was non-
negotiable and Group B finally accepted in November 1978 that the 
Common Fund should have a role in this area. Secondly, the source 
of financing for both the first and second windows - i.e. direct 
government contribution, borrowing or deposits from ICAs and the 
relationship between these methods. Thirdly, the size of the 
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capital requirements for the Fund as a whole and individual 
government contributions. Fourthly, voting and decision-making 
provisions. The technical arguments mentioned above were important 
in trying to resolve the economic disputes. 
It was evident that on one hand the G77 1 8 proposals represented 
the reconciliation of competing interests and on the other that 
for agreement to be reached with the other groups some degree of 
compromise was necessary. The organisational and political 
processes of the G77 creates a, structure of influence in which the 
regional groups play the key role and theiore the support by a 
regional group for a particular issue will usually triumph over the 
opposition of a single state or groups of states. , The non-regional 
sub-groups within the coalition are an exception to this and another 
source of influence but•p have much impact the sub-groups must 
either command substantial economic resources like OPEC or be 
regionally based like the lddcs. On specific disputes it was 
the regional groups or regionally based coalitions that exercised 
effective power within the Group. The influence of sectional interest 
can be delineated as follows: 
a) The Second Window and Other Measures. A Common Fund that did 
not include provisions other than buffer stocking of the ten core 
commodities would not benefit the African countries (on the whole 
poorer than their counterparts in Latin Americ and Asia). The 
African Group as a whole had an interest in a wider Common Fund and 
it was in their interest to insist that these measures be an integral 
part of the C.F. with a guaranteed financial provisions. (124) 
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The inclusion of this demand in the G77's November negotiating text 
was not a surprise and indeed followed from the logic of resolution 
93(IV), the consensus reflected in the Manila Declaration and the 
submission of the UNCTAD secretariat to the Preparatory Meetings 
on the Common Fund. (125) The objectives enshrined in resolution 
93(IV) and its product coverage both supported the concept of 
other measures. It was agreed that i) a specific programme of 
action should be undertaken to sustain development and income in 
developing countries extensively dependent upon the production for 
export of primary commodities; and ii) the Cannon Fund would be 
established as a key element in this programme. Diversification, 
research and development, improved marketing, distribution and 
transport systems were explicitly mentioned as objectives. The 
coverage of jute, hard fibres, bananas, tropical timber, cotton 
and vegetable oils surely meant that the C.F. could not be 
restricted to stocking activities since some of these products are 
not stockable. The C.F. would therefore finance other promotional 
measures, improvement of competiveness with synthetics, supply 
management, and research and development. The Manila Declaration 
had combined similar objectives and the UNCTAD secretariat had 
noted that 
"the common fund could play an important role 
in assisting the producing countries in their 
diversification efforts. The fund would be in 
a position to facilitate the coordination of the 
diversification activities of the commodity 
organizations; it would be able to approach 
problems of commodity diversification on a 
global basis, rather than on an ad hoc  
individual country/commodity basis. 
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"The common fund could be a major source of 
finance for diversification projects within 
commodity arrangements and would help in the 
harmonization of the diversification activities 
of the several commodity organizations." (126) 
Support for the Second Window is often presented as an exclusively 
African affair but this is incorrect. Producers of the non-stockable 
commodities e.g. Central American banana exporters (127)  and 
other beneficiaries within the G77 also supported a wider C.F. 
Consideration of the distributional impact of the C.F. was always 
an important element in a strategy of mixed bargaining. As the 
Deputy Minister of Finance of the Gambia noted, 
"What good is a Fund which excludes most of 
the Third World countries? We simply can't 
compromise on that principle." (128) 
b) Disadvantaged Countries  
This category includes recognised sub-groups within the G77 
i.e. the lddcs, land-locked states and the developing island 
countries, newer categories such as the MSAs and the category 
created by the proposed measures the developing importing 
countries. As we have already shown these groups influenced the 
development of a G77 position for Nairobi and they had a fairly 
well-developed constituency. Interestingly, the divide and rule 
tactics of Group B favoured this sectional interest by stressing 
a) the diversity of the developing countries and b) the necessity 
to safeguard their interest. (129) The inconclusiveness of 
economic research aided this group in two ways. First, by 
enlarging the ranks of countries which claimed to be disadvantaged 
and, secondly, by providing (the supportive arguments) concrete 
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evidence of impairment which could be used to buttress claims 
for specific compensation. On the other hand it allowed other 
states to use different evidence to refute some of these claims.( 130)  
The crucial political wrangle developed not over whether special 
provisions should be made for these states but the extent to which 
other members of the G77 specifically OPEC would provide financial 
compensation. In an attempt to deflect criticism, the OPEC states 
agreed as early as the first negotiating conference to provide 
financial assistance to the lddcs. The important question was 
not whether rhetorical suuport would be given to the disadvantaged 
countries but the extent to which specific measures would be taken 
to protect their interests in any agreement. Not all disadvantaged 
states (i.e. states claiming to be in this category) took a 
negative attitude to the C.F. The OPEC states would have no 
difficulty in meeting the increased import costs and although 
they resisted any attempt to give them a special role did not 
actively oppose the C.F. Yugoslavia, a potential loser and in-
fluential member of the group, gave positive support to the IPC 
and was me of the first countries to pledge a specific contribution 
to the Common Fund. 
c) Relations with existing international commodity arrangements  
This concern is more closely connected with the individual 
commodity negotiations but did affect negotiations on the Common 
Fund to the extent that countries wary of the Fund interfering with 
ICAs of interest to them supported the idea of a weak fund, favoured 
B's pool proposal and generally did not give much support to the 
G77. Brazil, India, Pakistan, Mexico and Colombia were important 
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'conservative' states in this respect. Brazil's lack of enthusiasm 
for the entire IPC was well known, indeed, some members of the G77 
began to question Brazil' membership of the group and some even 
suggested that although Brazil was physically a member of the G77 
psychologically it was a member of Group B. (131)  Most of these 
dissatisfied countries tried private persuasion but Colombia 
repeatedly stated its opposition publicly to coffee being included 
in the IPC. The extent to which important members of the coalition 
were lukewarm in their support of the group position and willing to 
accept a conception of the Fund nearer that of Group B undermined 
the bargaining strength of the G77. 
In the negotiations in Geneva the ability of various delegates 
and interest groups to support a particular point of view depended 
on the technical competence of their officials and their political 
astuteness. The three leading G77 spokesmen during the negotiations 
were ambassadors Herbert Walker "(Jamaica), Ali Alatas (Indonesia) 
and Georges Alvares Maciel (Brazil). (132)  Both Jamaica and 
Indonesia were supporters of the IPC and Walker and Alatas worked 
tirelessly to reach compromises within the group and their high 
personal standings helped to keep the coalition together. The 
institutional framework of the G77 and regional groups, contact 
groups, meeting of the G77 as a _ whole and the Group of 33 
provided forums where disagreements could be thrashed out and helped 
in maintaining unity. Because the individual commodity negotiations 
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were seen as not being subject to group discipline the exhortations 
to solidarity on the Common Fund assumed a special importance in 
the IPC package. Furthermore, the rationale for the existence of 
the G77 is dependent not on one set of negotiations but on a 
vulnerability which is experienced over many issues. The over-
lapping MTN talks, also taking place in Geneva, provided another 
issue around which the G77 produced a joint strategy and some leading 
'moderates' on the IPC needed the support of other members of the 
G77 in the MTNs which were of greater significance to them e.g. 
India and Brazil. The effort put into opposing various aspects 
of the C.F. proposals was consequently relaxed not out of any 
conscious trade-off strategy but because time and expertise is 
limited and in the ordering of priorities the GATT talks took first 
place. 
It is not necessary to look in any detail at the final agree-
ment reached on the Common Fund. The compromise reached 
a) protected the autonomy of existing ICAs b) provided special 
arrangements for the lddcs, c) included a second window but one 
which would be financed almost entirely by voluntary contributions. 
Directly contributable capital would be %70m. for the second window 
and a further %280m. in voluntary contributions was earmarked for 
the second window. The G77 agreed to this truncated C.F. because 
(as in most of these compromises) they realised that it was either 
this or nothing and so they chose to have something however limited. 
Like the GSPj years had been spent negotiating for a concession of 
questionable benefit and the final result dependent as it was on 
the magnanimity of the developed world could not conceivably satisfy 
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the initial expectations. 
7.4. 3. The Individual Commodity Negotiations. 1976-1979  
It would be superfluous to detail the preparatory meetings 
and individual negotiations that took place in respect of the 
Nairobi commodities. Conflict was managed and group cohesion 
maintained through the absence of anywrious attempt apart from 
the rhetorical (133)to  impose a group consensus. This was both 
a necessary and a sensible approach because states are not going to 
give up perceived vital interests for the sake of rhetorical 
solidarity. The successful conclusion of international commodity 
negotiations is dependent on the reconciliation of diverse and often 
conflicting interests . (134) There is no magic formula and the 
invocation of political will on the part of the interested govern-
ments is as futile as it is puerile. (135) Governments are not 
autonomous actors and the influence of pressure groups representing 
traders, fabricators, producer associations and consumer interests 
is an important determinant of governmental behaviour. Moreover, 
attempts at market regulation take place in the context of develop-
ments in the market and changing market conditions and perceptions 
of short-term and long-term trends significantly affect behaviour. 
Producers are reluctant to agree on stabilisation measures when 
prices are buoyant and consumers hesitate when prices are low. 
Calculations about security of supply, market share and market 
access, changing international productivities, differential cost 
production schedules and the importance of transnational corporations 
significantly condition the politics of commodity negotiations. (136) 
Other important variables relate to the complexity of the commodity, 
the history of intergovernmental consultation on the commodity and 
the prevailing level of knowledge on the commodity and possible 
international measures. 
Before looking at the history of negotiations under the IPC 
it is necessary to discuss the effect of some environmental factors 
on the progress of the teas. The political atmosphere which 
permeated UNCTAD was not considered favourable by many producers 
and consumers. The reluctance of the developed capitalist states 
to grant UNCTAD any legitimacy as a negotiating forum has already 
been discussed. In addition, major developing country producers of 
some commodities felt that UNCTAD's usefulness was in norm creation 
e.g. consumers accepting a responsibility to contribute to buffer 
stcok financing, rather than in the technical negotiations which 
would be undertaken by the commodity orgadeations explicitly 
created for the purpose. Until the inception of the integrated 
programme cocoa was the only new commodity for which an 
international agreement had been negotiated under UNCTAD 
auspices. Some commodity organisations used UNCTAD resources but 
did not develop any ties with the organisation e.g. sugar and 
tin and others continued to conduct their negotiations away from 
Geneva e.g. the 1976 International Coffee Agreement was negotiated 
in London. The mantle of the Integrated Programme meant that 
meetings were open to all states members of UNCTAD and not con-
fined to the major importer and exporter nations as had been the 
case in the past with a resulting charged ideological and 
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political atmosphere. Secondly, the link between the individual 
commodity negotiations and the C.F. created an air of uncertainty 
which was generally felt to be inhibiting to the creation of 
agreements. In a clear sense the two sets of negotiations were 
linked politically and their respective fates intertwined. It was 
in the interest of those countries that took the minimalist approach 
(i.e. the size of the C.F. must be related to the number of 
commodity agrements created and which also favoured a small C.F.) 
to conclude as few agreements as possible at the same time as 
they were stalling in the C.F. talks. On the other hand, .countries 
in favour of both the C.F. and ICAs had to take the financial 
implications into account. The early completition of the C.F 
talks was of crucial importance in that these states needed to 
know what resources would (or would not) be available from the 
central source and the nature of any provisions made for measures 
other than buffer stocking. Another link between ICAs and the IPC 
existed at the level at which governments assessed costs and 
benefits. The UNCTAD secretariat correctly diagnosed that, 
"Attitudes of many governments are still dominated 
by the traditional case-by-case approach. There 
is thus a tendency on their part to adopt too 
narrow an approach based on an assessment of their 
interests in individual commodities, without 
taking into account the overall benefit .... 
which would accrue from the implementation of 
the Integrated Programme as a whole. The 
consequent attempt to resolve conflicting 
national interests solely within the negotiations 
on each individual commodity, rather than in 
the overall context of the Integrated Programme, 
is bound to hamper progress." (137) 
The interviews I conducted in Geneva (1976, 1978 and 1979) not 
only confirm this but suggest that for members of the G77 these 
negotiations would not be approached in the 'integrated' manner 
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suggested by the secretariat since self-interest dictated that you 
kept what you had rather than bargaining it away for some potential 
benefit that might not materialise. Thirdly, the attempt to create 
international development policy in this area could not succeed 
without the acquiescence of the major importing countries. On the 
whole, apart from France, none of the major developed states accept-
ed a dirigiste approach;.every commodity would be looked at care-
fully and if the balance of political and economic forces favoured 
the conclusion of an agreement then they would play a positive role. 
The much vaunted U.S. opposition to commodity agreements on doctrinal 
grounds did not prevent the Americans in this period from joining 
for the first time the International Sugar Agreement (1977). 
The conflict and cooperation among the developing countries over 
the IPC took place at a time when developments in the world economy 
had a dialectical impact on the underlying bases of their solidarity. 
High oil prices, global inflation and recession in the West combined 
with fluctuating commodity prices and mounting debt problems under-
lined the vulnerability of most Third World countries to the 
vagaries of the world economy. These developments helped to 
promote the concept of economic cooperation among developing 
countries. and intensified efforts to maintain unity in the G77 in 
order to effect structural change in the world economy and to increase 
the impact of the developing countries on international decision-
making. On the other hand, the economic differentiation within 
the Third World increased with the oil exporters now constituting 
a distinct grouping. The class of poor nations increased as a 
result of changes in the global economy leading to the MSA class-
ification and some countries embarked on successful policies of 
461. 
industrialisation e.g. the newly industrialised countries. These 
changes in objective conditions created competing interests and 
(138) strains within the coalition. 	In concentrating on problems 
involved in the IPC negotiations no suggestion is being made that 
trends in the world economy had removed the rationale for the coali-
tion. The evidence is contradictory and not supportive of any one 
line of argument. In respect of the individual commodity negotia-
tions the ascriptive, attitudinal and behavioural traits mentioned 
above: 	operated to hinder the development of a common position 
among producing countries. In order to retain the sharpness of the 
focus on the existence of cleavages, conflicts with developed import-
ing and developed exporting countries of the Nairobi 18 commodities 
will be omitted.(139)  
When the Integrated Programme was launched commodity agreements 
were in existence for cocoa, coffee, olive oil and tin. The analysis 
will therefore concentrate on those commodities for which such 
agreements did not exist. In the time-frame covered by this study 
negotiating conferences were only held for cocoa, natural rubber 
and sugar and only two agreements concluded the International 
Sugar Agreement (October 1977) and the International Natural Rubber 
Agreement (October 1979). A new International Cocoa Agreement was 
concluded in November 1980. The natural rubber agreement was the 
only new market arrangement to emerge under the programme. We will 
examine these three commodities first, and then examine progress in 
the remaining ones. 
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Natural Rubber  
Natural Rubber was an example of close producer cooperation combining 
with favourable market characteristics. Natural rubber is produced 
exclusively in the developing world and the four largest producers 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka accounted for 85% of 
world production. In 1971 they had established the Association of 
Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC) to attempt to coordinate 
policies in order to combat price instability. In 1976 the ANRPC 
members and Singapore signed the the Jakarta Narural Rubber Agree-
ment to stabilise prices at an equitable and remunerative level, 
achieve a balanced growth of supply and demand and to ensure 
security of supply to consumers.(140)  Large price fluctuations, 
short-term instability, declining price trends and competition from 
synthetics and a high dependence on rubber for a large share of 
export earnings (141) provided a good base for producer cooperation. 
Producer solidarity was advanced enough for the ANRPC members to 
convene a consumer/producer meeting in Kuala .Lumpur in May 1978 
(142) despite the objections of the UNCTAD secretariat. 	Agreement 
was facilitated with the importing countries because of changed 
market conditions. The increase in the price of oil led to first, 
increases in the price of synthetic rubber and secondly an increase 
in the demand for natural rubber. When asked why the rubber 
negotiations had been successfully concluded, Peter Lai the chair-
man of the negotiating confer'nce stressed the cohesion among 
(143) the producers. 
Sugar  
Althoughnmptiated under the auspices of the Integrated Programme 
sugar is really an exception because of the history of control and 
discussions were conducted between the traditional members of the 
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International Sugar Organisation. Traditional conflict between 
exporters over the size of their respective export quotas was a 
noticeable feature of the negotiations and the successful result of 
hinged on a compromise agreed by the largest exporters Australia, 
, Brazil and Cuba (the ABC states]. (144)  
Cocoa 
Producer--consumer conflicts dominate the political economy of 
international cocoa negotiations.(145)  The two international Cocoa 
Agreements of 1972 and 1975 did not affect the market because in both 
cases the market price remained above the ceiling and therefore the 
economic provisions remained inoperative. The 1975 ICCA expired in 
September 1979 but was extended for six months until March 1980. It 
was finally replaced by the Third International Cocoa Agreement in 
November 1980. Within the ICCAs producers have a long record of 
cooperation based partly on the association of the leading producers 
in the Cocoa Producers Alliance created by Ghana, Nigeria, the 
Ivory Coast, Cameroons and Brazil in 1962 and partly on high cocoa 
prices. Shifting market shares in the 1960s and 1970s which saw 
increases in Brazilian and Ivory Coast production at the expense of 
Ghana and Nigeria was accommodated by Ghanian and Nigerian policy 
which cut back production. Conflicts over price dominated the 
negotiations leading to the conclusion of the ICCAs with the Ivory 
Coast constantly demanding higher prices than other producers. 
At the time of the 1975 ICCA negotiations Ivory Coast, Togo and 
the Cameroons pressed for higher prices but Nigeria, Ghana and 
Brazil were prepared to compromise on a lower price level. By the 
time the renegotiation of the agreement had come around Brazil was 
now a militant supporter of high prices. The Ivory Coast refused to 
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ratify the 1980 agreement because the price level was too low.(146)  
The period between the breakdown of the second ICCA and the 
agreement on the third is interesting because it shows an attempt at 
producer unity and the attitude of some important producers to the 
Common Fund. When the November 1979 talks on re-negotiating the ICCA 
broke down, the leading producers attempted to control the market 
through concerted action on price. In December 1979 meeting in 
Abidjan, Ivory Coast an Abidjan Group comprising Brazil, Cameroon, 
Ghana, Ecuador, Togo, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast (i.e. the African 
Alliance plus the leading Latin American producers) agreed not to 
sell below $1.50 per head although current December prices had been 
01.44 - $1.45 147) Steadi/r -declining prices however doomed this 
attempt to failure and a new agreed support minimum of $1.20 in 
January 1980 was not respected by the Abidjan Group members and 
( after prices fell to their lowest level for four years in May 148) 
 all pretence of unity was abandoned the following month.(149)  Th  
Ivory Coast had stockpiled cocoa in an effort to keep the price up 
but Brazil continued selling and in the end no agreement was reached 
on setting up a price defenE fund which would be backed by the 
$220 million that ICCA producers could claim from the abandoned 
ICCA. 
The ICCA's buffer stock had been financed by levies on the 
export of cocoa. When the agreeemnt broke down in 1980 there was a 
surplus of approximately $220 million. The buffer stock had never 
been used because of prevailing high prices. Some observers specu-
lated that the cocoa producers allowed the agreement to lapse in 
which event the money would be redistributed among the producers 
rather than being absorbed into the C.F. when the ICCA came under 
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(150) its auspices. 	Pressure by the UNCTAD secretariat resulted in 
the producers refraining from seizing the 0220m. and it was transfer-
red to the third ICCA when it entered into force in October 1981. 
Copper 
Developing countries only accounted for 55% of world copper exports 
and therefore no agreement could be reached without cooperation of 
the major developed producing countries. Within the context of the 
Integrated Programme ldc unity was difficult to attain and historical 
strife among developing country producers spilled over into the neg-
otiating process. The history of CIPEC was one of disunity and 
dissension with political squabbles exacerbating the economic 
conflicts.(151)  The failure in 1976 of the voluntary export quota 
agreed within CIPEC the previous year did not augur well for future 
collaboration. The interest of the more established producers in 
raising prices was countered by that of some newer producers who 
wanted increased market shares. The very political nature of the 
prparatory meeting prevented any working compromise. 
Tea 
Discussions on tea failed to progress because of serious conflicts 
among the producers. The agreement reached at the first preparatory 
meeting in January 1978 to work toward an agreement as soon as 
possible did not express a realistic view of the intentions of the 
participants. A fundamental conflict existed on the one hand 
between the African ( and Latin American ) producers and the Asian 
producers on the other. The African and Latin American producers 
were interested in increasing their market share and were willing 
to contemplate a buffer stock but not an export quota or joint 
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scheme. The established Asian producers were only interested in an 
export quota scheme. An inherent difficulty in the negotiation of 
the 
an export quota scheme lay in 4iethod used for the calculation of the 
various quotas. India and Sri Lanka were prepared to accept a 
dynamic export quota ( i.e. one taking into account future increases 
in production ) thus giving the African producers a larger share of 
the market for the period of the agreement because both India and 
Sri Lanka had reached a plateau in production. But, although 
willing to let the African and Latin American acreage devoted to 
tea growing increase both main Asian producers were concerned to set 
a limit to this expansion. Within the African Group Kenya as the 
largest producer agreed with the Asians on acreage and before the 
death of President Kenyatta had withdrawn support for buffer stocks 
(152) in favour of export quotas. 	An important cleavage also developed 
along producer-consumer lines because some developing countries were 
significant importers of tea e.g. Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and the 
North African countries. The Pakistanis proposed that in any tea 
agreement the developing tea importing countries should either not 
contribute to the financing of the agreement or pay a reduced fee.(153)  
Cotton 
The United States and the Soviet Union accounting for some 45 per 
cent of the cotton trade were opposed to buffer stocking (154) and 
therefore there was no possibility of an agreement. Attention 
turned toward other measures e.g. improvements in marketing, trans-
port and distribution. Among the developing countries there was no 
unanimity concerning buffer stocking. Support for secretariat 
proposals were given by African and Arab producers including Egypt 
and the Sudan and Mexico, Peru and Bolivia. Opposition to stocking 
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came mainly from the Central American producers Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
and El Salvador. The dominance of American interests in their indust-
ries largely determined these states' policies. 
Other Commodities. 
Phosphates reoresent a classic case where developing country producers 
effectively sabotaged the Integrated Programme. No progress could 
be made because of the negative attitude toward control by the lead-
ing phosphate exporters. The first preparatory meeting (December 
1977) was boycotted by Morocco, the world's leading producer and the 
second preparatory meeting (June 1978) was not attended by Morocco, 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Mauretania. 
In hard fibres attention shifted away from stabilisation to 
research and development and market improvement. The developing 
countries had diverse interests arising from their market positions. 
Mexico with a secure market in the United States and exports con-
sisting of mainly hard fibre products e.g. twine, was not interested 
in an agreement. Brazil was interested in increasing its market 
share (in 1977 it had been accused of dumping) and rejected any 
agreement that differentiated between the price of twine and the 
price of fibre. Tanzania the largest African producer was a 
supporter of stabilisation measures but kept wavering in its 
commitment because of the financial considerations.(155) 
On the other commodities very little progress was made. There 
were no discussions on bananas or bauxite in the period covered by 
this study mainly because the producers were not interested. 
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Similarly, manganese producers showed a distinct lack of interest in 
the IPC. The GATT negotiations effectively barred any discussion 
on meats. The preliminary meetings on both jute and iron ore 
failed to lead to negotiating conferences. The complexity of the 
vegetable oils market led to investigation by experts rather than 
political discussions. In these various products specific countries 
attempted to protect their particular interests. Thus, for example 
India was interested in concluding an agreement on iron ore but 
Brazil was not. The manganese producers enjoyed favourable market 
conditions, namely, protected markets and high prices and were 
therefore averse to concluding a commodity agreement. The 
suitabilty of existing market conditions also determined the lack-
lustre response given to the integrated programme by the timber 
producers. The African timber producers were organised under the 
African Timber Association (AOB), the south-east Asian private 
producers under the South-east Asian Lumber Producers Association 
(SEALPA), the former with privileged access to the European 
Community market and the latter with secure access to the Japanese 
market. Both groups wanted to retain their priviliged market 
access and were worried that the IPC might disrupt existing 
arrangements.(156) 
This rather cursory survey of the other commodities is 
designed to show the lack of interest exhibited by developing 
countries when specific products were involved. And the gap 
existing between general support for the IPC and the negative 
attitude on individual commodities. Membership of existing commodity 
arrangements and existing market share and control were the main 
factors influencing governmental behaviour. 
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7.5 Conclusions  
The heterogenity of the G77 and specific cleavages affected the level 
and nature of Group support for the Integrated Programme and the 
Common Fund. From the first proposals in 1974 to Resolution 93(IV) 
a process of accommodation between conflicting interests in the 
coalition was entered into in order to present a unified bargaining 
front. The compromise reached in Manila at the Third Ministerial 
Meeting was maintained in the ensuing negotiations and all recognised 
interests were included in the G77's proposals. This is therefore 
not an organic solidarity but a unity based on the recognition of 
both similarity and diversity. A conjoining of similar and opposed 
interests for the purpose of multilateral diplomacy. In pursuit of 
individual gain different interests were aggregated. The existence 
of differing interests does not make the coalition irrational. In 
the IPC negotiations the G77's behaviour can be understood as 
based on a realistic assessment of possibilities. Group discipline 
was exerted on the Common Fund but not on the individual commodity 
negotiations. 
The G77 maintained unity over these negotiations through a 
rational assessment of the nature of the bargaining process. No 
attempt was made to present a united front in the individual commod-
ity negotiations. Bargaining on individual commodities not only 
presented a distributive bargaining process it also confronted G77 
members as producers and consumers. A common group position could 
be sought on the C.F. First, because a clearer line between ldcs 
and developed states could be drawn and secondly, this was a process 
of mixed bargaining. An intensive consultation process on the C.F. 
was therefore embarked upon with the object of securing concessions 
from the developed world. Collective decision was arrived at most 
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frequently through the use of persuasion and the effect of institu-
tionalisation. 
The existence of shared values and the importance of the IPC 
within the context of the NIEO resulted in the use of persuasion as 
a favoured method of reaching group decisions. But the most 
important reason for the ability of the G77 to maintain unity arose 
from the institutionalisation of group activity. The existence of 
regularised contact at regional level, the mushrooming of working 
groups and committees, the central role of the Working Group of 33 
and the importance of the ministerial meetings provided the stable 
patterns of behaviour and procedures through which interests could 
be represented. Member countries could thus safeguard their interests 
when they deviated from the majority view. Furthermore, the NAM 
provided both a spur and a challenge to the G77. UNCTAD and the 
G77 were anxious that results be produced which confirmed their 
pre-eminence in the arena of North/South negotiations. 
This case-study documents the limits to G77 cooperation. The 
G77 is an instrument for negotiating change in North/South relations. 
It is a coalition of the Third World which presents a united front 
to the industrialised states. In cases where the simple dichotomy 
between North and South is replaced by producers and consumers the 
G77 ceases to have a defined role. The G77 as an institutional 
mechanism is adept at reconciling divergent interests among its 
member states. But it cannot perform such a role if the distinctions 
between group members and non-members are eroded. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. I would say that, at a conservative estimate, ninety-per 
cent of the books and articles written on the NIEO show 
a startling myopia on the origins of these demands. Of the 
remaining ten percent at least five percent whilst aware of 
an historical dimension attach no analytical significance 
to events prior to 1973. 
2. Robert Rothstein - Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest  
for a New International Economic Order (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press 1979) persistently, and 
in my view mistakenly, criticises the UNCTAD secretariat for 
pushing the IPC to the centre of the stage. I am not 
referring to his criticisms of the IPC as a negotiating 
strategy but to the assumption that commodity trade, per se, 
was the wrong area in which to apply pressure. 
3. i.e. the sectoral allocation of the labour force and the structural composition of output. 
4. The figures are from R.M. Sundrum - DevelopmentEconomics: A  
Framework for Analysis and Policy (Chichester: John Wiley 
& Sons 1983) pp. 44 and 46. 
5. H.G. Johnson - Economic Policies Towards Less Developed  Countries, p.136; J. Pincus - Trade, Aid and Development  
p. 233. A.K. Koul - The Legal Framework of UNCTAD in World  
Trade p. 77. 
6. These issues will be discussed below. See section 7.3. 
7. C.P. Brown - The Political and Social Economy of Commodity  
Control (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan 1980) pp. 288-289 
argues that several aspects of the Havana Charter were 
altered in spirit during the 1950s within the U.N. system. 
8. The attempt within the IPC to do just this, particularly the 
demand for indexation has attracted a great deal of criticism. 
The point that I am making is that this feature of the IPC was 
neither new nor smuggled in through the back door. See 
Rothsteinju.cit. p. 75 where he says that the suspicion that 
the real objective was higher prices was probably the most 
important factor in generating hostility to the Common Fund. 
For an earlier statement of this objective see TD/B/C.1/26 
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSION 
In the preceding pages I have attempted to describe and assess the 
structure and functioning of the G77 in UNCTAD. The research 
design had three central elements. First, an historical account of 
the origins and development of group behaviour. Secondly, a study 
of the effect of organisational characteristics on group cohesion. 
Thirdly, an assessment of the development and management of 
conflict in the two most important sets of negotiations in the 
period 1964-1980. The evidence presented above suggest certain 
answers to the central questions posed at the outset of the enquiry. 
The G77 arose from the convergence of economic circumr. 
stances, international decision-making structures and ideological 
factors. The material conditions faced by the developing countries 
deteriorated during the 1950 1 s. A shared powerlessness in the face 
of adverse economic conditions provided a basis for cooperation. 
Allied to this was the absence of effective structures through which 
the developing countries could - attempt to redress their grievances. 
The institutional lacunae in world trade and payments presented the 
developing countries with a concrete issue around which they could 
coalesce. Moreover, the political process within existing institu-
tions with its emphasis on group politics contributed to the 
emergence of a grouping of developing . countries. The growth of 
the NAM introduced a political impetus into Third World politics 
and helped to pave the way for the construction of cross-regional 
alliances. 
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These developments were reinforced by the importance given to 
economic development at the beginning of the 1960s. The creation 
of the United Nations Development Decade ushered in a set of 
attitudes and expectations favourable to reform of the international 
political economy. In this climate it was hence a reasonable expecta-
tion that an alliance of developing countries would be able to exert 
sufficient pressure on the Northern states in order to secure 
meaningful changes. Furthermore, the opposition of the developed 
countries to the demands of the Third World helped to cement the 
initial shaky coalition. 
The theorisation of international resource allocation in 
terms of developed and developing countries contributed to a 
perception of the world which stressed the commonality of interests 
among the so-called Third World. The Prebisch-Singer thesis furnish-
ed statesmen with an explanation for the poverty of their countries 
and a set of remedies which placed the onus on external agencies. 
The generalised nature of the diagnosis pulled together countries at 
different stages of economic development. Theory then provided the 
rationale for action where economic and institutional factors had 
provided the necessary conditions. UNCTAD I in 1964 proved a 
catalytic event. The confrontational aspect of the conference, the 
desire to create a new institutional mechanism and the possession 
of a common ideology produced the conditions which were the immediate 
factors in the creation of the G77. 
These general features have remained relevant in the 
ensuing twenty-two years. Pressure for global economic reform 
has emanated from the G77. In the face of the negativism of the 
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industrialised countries the developing countries discovered that 
only joint action was able to exert sufficient pressure in order 
to wrest a few concessions. The essential weaknesses which forced 
these countries to unite in the first place has been a constant 
factor in the intervening period. Divisions do exist in the G77 
but certain threads of commonality have persisted over time. 
The initial causes of coalition formation and the persisten-
ce of common traits provide only partial answers to questions concern-
ing coalition maintenance. The importance of the UNCTAD framework 
for an understanding of group behaviour was thus assessed. The 
evidence suggests that UNCTAD as an organisational framework exerted 
a number of influences on the functioning of theG77. These can be 
categorised under two broad headings - institutional cooperation  
and issue saliency. 
Several distinct but interrelated patterns of institutio-
nal cooperation affected the growth and functioning of the G77. 
First, UNCTADts division along regional lines accentuated the 
differences between the G77 and Groups B and D. Moreover, it re-
inforced the regional basis of G77 politics. Secondly, the exten-
sion of UNCTADts sphere of activity created both opportunities for 
increased South/South diplomatic cooperation and North/South discord. 
Furthermore, the dispute over UNCTADts competence provided an issue 
around which the G77 could coalesce. Thirdly, the development of 
consensual patterns of decision-making in UNCTAD increased the 
importance of individual states in their respective regional groups 
with the result that it became relatively easy to mask disagreement 
in some acceptable form of words rather than accentuate confronta-
tion through the resort to voting. Fourthly, the UNCTAD 
secretariat was an important actor in the G77ts decision-making 
process. The secretariat tended to stress cooperative strategies 
for the G77. 
The saliency of issues discussed in UNCTAD had a two-fold 
effect on G77 politics. UNCTAD has been an important international 
organisation generating new ideas and concepts and providing a 
negotiating framework for international development policy. UNCTAD 
has been in the forefront of reform efforts in a variety of issue-
areas e.g. commodity trade, finance, invisibles, and Economic Co-
operation among Developing Countries. These are subjects of utmost 
concern to most ldc governments and the centrality of these issues 
tended to make governments more receptive to accepting compromise. 
Failure to reach intra-group agreement on a key issue would most 
likely weaken the G77 1 s bargaining position on other issues. On 
the other hand, compromise was inhibited when rejection or accept-
ance of a particular principle was seemingly tied to quantifiable 
costs and benefits e.g. the individual commodity negotiations 
under the IPC. 
We also assessed the impact of its own organisational 
characteristics and decision-making mechanism on the modalities 
of coalition behaviour. The G77 can be termed an informal, formal 
organisation. The evidence presented above shows that it has 
developed a high level of institutionalisation. The group has 
developed a number of procedures over time which respond creatively 
to the stresses and strains experienced by the membership. G77 
sub-groups and decision-making procedures preserves the continued 
existence of the group. Indeed, a stable pattern of behaviour has 
developed historically which deepens the commitment of member states 
to the organisation and its goals. The regional group was discovered 
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to be the basic organisational unit of the G77. And the reproduction 
of this unit at all levels of G77 structure and decision-making 
provides first an element of continuity and secondly a base upon 
which innovations can be launched. The absence of a secretariat has 
not in any significant way hindered the growth of cooperation. Its 
main effect has possibly been a lack of preparedness and lack of 
focus to G77 negotiating positions. My conclusion is that a 
secretariat would introduce an element of rigidity into G77 politics 
and would therefore be detrimental to the stability of the coalition. 
The consensus method of decision-making in preserving the autonomy of 
member states provides the sole basis upon which continued support 
to the organisation's goals can be maintained. Any form of majori-
tarianism would most likely lead disaffected minorities to withdraw 
from the coalition. 
The case-studies present important evidence and conclusions 
with respect to the nature and functioning of the G77 in UNCTAD. 
First, both the GSP and IPC emerged from the immediate context of 
North/South relations and seemed the most feasible issue on which 
to press for change. Promotion of the GSP came on the heels of a 
GATT discussion of the manufactured exports of ids and in the face 
of stern opposition by the rich countries to changes in commodity 
markets. The IPC emerged in the wake of producer power and high 
hopes for serious negotiations on international commodity policy. 
Both sets of negotiations developed so that it became impossible 
to retreat once it had become clear that the hoped for gains would 
not materialise. To a large extent this is a result of the G77's 
decision-making process. The cumbersome nature of G77 decision-
making invests the 'final' agreements with almost sacrosanct 
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status. No party is willing to unravel the agreement in the hope of 
finding a better one. And no sectional interest having fought for so 
long to reach agreement is prepared to admit that the objective is 
now of limited appeal. Both case-studies also reveal the interdepen-
dence between the UNCTAD secretariat and the G77 in the development 
and shaping of G77 demands. There is a mutuality of interest 
between some members of the G77 and the secretariat but of equal 
significance are divergencies between the secretariat and other 
members. It should also be noted that in both cases the original 
conception had originated in the UNCTAD secretariat. 
It is difficult to assess to what extent the negotiations 
constituted a learning process for theG77. Undoubtedly the early 
disagreements over the GSP led to the beginnings of the present 
organisational structure. On the other hand, it seems that develop-
ments have been unplanned and arise to meet specific needs. The CF 
negotiations were less divisive for group unity than the GSP mainly 
because the plethora of sub-groups provided avenues through which 
conflict resolution could be sought. The decision not to attempt to 
seek group unity with respect to the individual commodity negotiations 
represented not only a sensible policy in the circumstances but also 
can be seen as part of a learning process. The G77 negotiators, 
however, seemingly pay very little attention to the political 
pressures attendant on the governments of industrialised countries. 
G77 negotiators make only minimal reference to the constraints 
affecting Group B decision-makers. A more sophisticated awareness 
of the formation of foreign economic policy in the West would 
improve the G77's negotiating strategy. 
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The wider economic and political environment also affects global 
negotiations and the G77. During the period covered by this study 
a four-fold periodisation is disarnible in the international politi-
cal economy viz. 1964-1968; 1968-1974; 1 974-1976 ; 1976-1980. It was 
only during the first of these periods that the international climate 
was at all propitious for the negotiation of regime change. Although 
the long wave of capitalist expansion after World War Two did not 
end until about 1972, the series of monetary crises from 1968 
onwards made the industrialised states turn inward. The outward 
looking policy which had ushered in the first Development Decade in 
1961 was buried by 1968. During the 1974-1976 period the power of 
the oil weapon gave the Third World its best chance of increasing 
its power in global negotiations. The waning of the oil weapon led 
to a resumption of old patterns. This study concluded in 1980 for 
three main reasons. First, after the high political profile of 
1974-1980, NIEO discussions entered a lull from which they have not 
recovered. The conclusion of the C.F. negotiations seem to have 
exhausted all the participants. Secondly, with the advent of the 
Reagan administration the United States assumed a hardline approach 
which was even less conducive to the North/South dialogue than any 
of its predecessors. The importance of the U.S. in negotiating 
and implementing change creates a situation where other leading 
states are unlikely to push ahead with reform efforts when the 
U.S. is opposed. Thirdly, the onset of global recession focused 
attention onthe industrialised economies and despite attempts e.g. 
the Brandt Commission reports, to stimulate discussion North/South 
issues have been side-stepped. 
The evidence suggests that the G77 is likely to survive 
this period of prolonged neglect by the West. Attempts at interna-
tional regime change by the Third World are likely to become import-
issues again in the future. In so far as UNCTAD retains its 
centrality in the U.N. system the G77 is likely once again to play a 
vital role. In other words the coalition will be maintained as long 
as the G77 has a role to play in international regime change. The 
demise of UNCTAD (its central organisational focus) would probably 
lead to the demise of the G77. 
In many respects this is a study in international political 
cooperation. The analysis shows that the G77 represents a diplomatic 
unity of the developing countries with clearly defined limits. The 
global political process creates the conditions whereby such an 
organisation can exist. The G77 as a pressure group is an outgrowth 
of global institutional politics and fulfils a role within the pre-
vailing structural distribution of power. Access to the sources of 
power are denied to poor states and global reform initiatives can 
only be initiated by weak states in so far as they seek strength in 
numbers. The power of the coalition arises from its ability to set 
(or at least contribute to the setting of) the agenda rather than 
any ability to determine outcomes. Majoritarianism in the U.N. 
system gives the collective Third World the opportunity to present 
demands for change. Given the diversity within the coalition these 
demands are likely to be all-encompassing ones. Is it surprising 
that among the plethora of demands, few if any will benefit all 
states? The key to the coalition lies in its ability to satisfy 
the demands of a large number of its members, in stressing commona-
lity but accepting diversity. 
493. 
494. 
Our research has shown that an important reason for the continued 
existence of the coalition resides in the relative costs of remaining 
a member. First, it has yet to be demonstrated successfully that 
member states would benefit materially from leaving the G77. Rhetoric 
on this issue is not the same as convincing argument. Secondly, in 
respect of both the GSP and IPC we have shown that member governments 
have not been constrained by coalition membership from pursuing 
individualistic policies which conflict with the commonly agreed 
goals and strategy. The effective policing of members is therefore 
very low. This coupled with the low level of sanctions available 
for use against deviants means that membership of the G77 need not 
deter states from pursuing national policies in contexts where these 
conflict with agreed G77 policy objectives. The resulting lack of 
importance attached to G77 decisions in a curious way, then, contri-
butes to its continued existence. The G77 is a political coalition, 
it is the result of compromise among a variety of interests, a politi-
cal necessity in the circumstances, perhaps, but still a definite 
human creation. 
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